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2ABSTRACT
This study is concerned with the legal mechanisms and institutional arrangements 
established to control compliance with commitments undertaken in treaty form by Mediterranean 
States, with a view at protecting the marine environment from various sources o f pollution. Part 
I begins with a brief presentation o f the state o f the Mediterranean environment, both natural and 
socio-economic. There follows a consideration and assessment o f the nature and extent of, and 
the relationship between, environmental obligations arising under the relevant instruments adopted 
at the global, regional and sub-regional level, in order to identify the implications thereof for the 
design and application o f the said mechanisms and arrangements.
In Part II, the treatment o f the core issue begins with an initial review o f the evolution of 
compliance-control mechanisms under general international, and especially environmental, law, 
followed by a critical examination of the legal arrangements - actually or potentially - used in the 
Mediterranean to ensure compliance with the said body o f law. In this context, a distinction is 
made between the traditional models, namely the state responsibility and civil liability approach 
to compliance control and the comprehensive institutional model, and the emerging approaches, 
namely provision of financial and technical assistance as compliance incentives, and compliance 
control and enforcement under national law.
Finally, this thesis argues that the most constructive way to encourage observance of 
international marine pollution standards in the region in the long term is through the intervention 
o f international law towards developing appropriate procedural means for follow up and 
enforcement within domestic legal systems, while, in the short term, efforts should concentrate 
at establishing - or refining - comprehensive institutional mechanisms that would necessarily 
accommodate arrangements for financial and technical assistance dependent on effective 
compliance.
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The problem.
During the past three decades international environmental law has rapidly evolved primarily 
through international agreements and to a lesser extent by the slower, consensus-needing custom. 
Hence, today there is an ever-increasing number o f environmental treaties regulating in detail a very 
broad spectrum o f activities - often carried out exclusively within domestic jurisdictions -1 that states 
contract into, but subsequently find difficult or undesirable to implement.
It is true that no state wants to look indifferent to fashionable environmental concerns, but 
this can sometimes be far from a genuine commitment. In addition to this volatile, subjective 
attitude, which implies no actual will or intention to comply, other more concrete reasons also lead 
to international environmental law often being left unfulfilled: lack o f  financial, institutional and 
human resources; differing interpretations as to the meaning o f an obligation in view of the 
abundance o f ‘constructive ambiguities’ found in environmental instruments; different and 
contradicting interests and policy priorities; distribution of powers within the state organisation, and 
the related lack o f information and communication between different state agencies; inadequate 
analysis o f what the treaty in question requires; and the dual role o f states as lawmakers and law 
addressees.2
Moreover, one of the inherent features o f public international law in general is the lack of 
strict enforcement mechanisms like the ones available within domestic legal orders, such as courts 
and police. Then, respect for international rules becomes a critical issue, as states have, in practice 
if not in theory, ample space to choose which ones to comply with and which not. This is aggravated 
in the area of international, Community, and national environmental regulation by the distinct lack 
o f  readily identifiable vested interests willing and able to secure enforcement thereof.3 This 
phenomenon has led to the suggestion that the greatest challenge for environmental regulation today 
is the problem o f effective enforcement.4
It follows that the question o f whether international law is actually observed becomes the 
central problem in the development o f a system o f environmental protection seeking to answer the 
threats o f pollution and species’ extinction satisfactorily. If this is not addressed, there is no point
1 See infra, Chapter 2,
2 See, among others, J.Ebbesson, C om patibility o f  International and N ational Environm ental Law, 1996, pp.40-3.
3 See, among others, L.Kr&mer, EEC Treaty and Environmental Law, 1998, p. 165.
4 See M .R.Anderson, ‘Human Rights Approaches to Environmental protection: An O verview ’, in A .E .B oyle & 
M .R.Anderson (eds.), Human Rights Approaches to Environm ental Protection , 1996, p. 19.
18
in further developing substantive standards suffering from the same malfunctions as the existing 
ones. States - and other actors - will only find themselves more overwhelmed by a web of 
obligations, and possibly rights, that they will not know how to deal with. Even worse, 'dead letter’ 
rules tend to loose the authority that keeps them standing as law. Then, one can expect an increasing 
number o f disputes among states regarding the real content o f international obligations and their 
performance with obvious destabilising consequences.
In this context, the significance o f compliance with international environmental law has 
been increasingly appreciated during recent years, as the accumulated rules, conventions and 
standards have not always altered actors’ behaviour and patterns o f conducting business in more 
‘environmental’ or ‘sustainable’ ways.5 It is characteristic that the Executive Director of UNEP did 
not hesitate, in 1985, while addressing the Fourth Ordinary Meeting o f the Parties to the Barcelona 
Convention on the Protection o f the Mediterranean sea against Pollution, to say that the elaborate 
structure o f the Mediterranean Action Plan risks o f being considered a facade, “as if in a shop 
everything was in the window and there was nothing to sell on the shelves inside”.6 Growing 
attention on compliance has been also caused by recurring conflict over access to natural resources 
and the unfair economic advantage that states disregarding environmental obligations intertwined 
with economic interests are thought to gain over their competitors.7 Accordingly, in the June 1997 
revision o f the Rio Summit, it was again emphasised that “ implementation o f and compliance with 
commitments made under international treaties and other instruments in the field o f the environment 
remain a priority”.
It is, thus, not surprising that there is an ever-expanding body of legal literature and research 
on compliance with international environmental law.8 However, the only recent preoccupation of
5 For a celebrated example o f  a ‘sleeping treaty’, the 1979 Convention on the Conservation o f  Migratory Species o f  
Wild Animals (Bonn Convention), see S.Lyster, International Wildlife Law: An Analysis o f  the International Treaties 
Concerned with the Conservation o f  Wildlife, 1985, pp.278-304; and P.Birnie & A ,E,B oyle, International Law and the 
Environment, 1992, pp.470-475.
6 UNEP, Report o f  the Fourth Ordinary Meeting o f  the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection o f  
the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and its Related Protocols, UNEP/1G.56/5, 30 Sept. 1985, Annex III, p.2.
7 See P.Sands, Principles o f  International Environm ental Law, Vol. I, 1995, p,141.
8 See, among others, E.Brown Weiss & FI.K,Jacobson (eds.), Engaging Countries - Strengthening Compliance with 
International Environm ental A ccords, 1998; R.Wolfrum, ‘Means o f  Ensuring Compliance with and Enforcement o f  
International Environmental Law’, 272 Receuil des Cours, 1998, pp.9-154; D.G.Victor, K.Raustiala & E.B .Skolnikoff 
(eds.), The Implementation and Effectiveness o f  International Environmental Commitments: Theoiy and Practice, 1998; 
J.Cameron, J.Werksman & P.Roderick (eds.), Im proving Com pliance with International Environm ental Law, 1996; 
M .Bothe, ‘The Evaluation o f  Enforcement M echanisms in International Environmental Law - An Overview’, in 
R.Wolfrum (ed.), Enforcing Environmental Standards: Economic Mechanisms as Viable M eans?, 1996, p. 13; A.Chayes 
& A.FIandler Chayes, The N ew  Sovereignty - Com pliance with International R egula to iy  A greem ents, 1995; W.Lang 
(ed.), Sustainable Development and International Law, 1995, Part Three; R.B.Mitchell, Intentional Oil Pollution at Sea - 
Environmental Policy and Treaty Compliance, 1994; A.E.Boyle, ‘Saving the World? Implementation and Enforcement 
o f  International Environmental Law through International Institutions’, 3(2) J , o fE n v'l L., 1991, pp.229-45; P.Sands, 
‘Enforcing Environmental Security; The Challenge o f  Compliance with International O bligations’, 46(2) J. o f  Int 7 A ff, 
1993, pp.367-90; J.H.Ausubel, & D.G.Victor, ‘Verification o f  International Environmental Agreements’, 17 Annual 
Rev.ofEner. & the Env., 1992, pp. 1-43; T.Marauhn, ‘Towards a Procedural Law o f  Compliance Control in International
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international environmental lawyers with compliance issues has not allowed a uniform and 
consistent systematisation to emerge. Even terminology is sometimes confusing, as compliance, 
enforcement, implementation and effectiveness are notions closely related, with no clear-cut 
borderlines. For present purposes, compliance means an actor’s behaviour in conformity with a legal 
commitment it has undertaken, and more specifically a country’s adherence to the provisions o f an 
international environmental agreement by which it is bound;9 implementation refers to all the 
concrete measures that give practical effect to an undertaking and ensure its actual fulfilment; 
enforcement relates to any action undertaken in response to a violation o f a legal obligation; while 
effectiveness, depending on the context, generally means that the objective aimed at by the 
establishment o f a legal norm or procedure is achieved.
Having said that, one must always bear in mind that non-compliance has many faces. It can 
involve action or inaction depending on the content o f the substantive rule; failure to carry out 
procedural obligations, secondary in relation to the primary rule; partial performance; failure to 
enforce implementing legislation; and many more. In actual practice, it is not always straightforward 
whether one is faced with a case of non-compliance, which makes organisation o f the issue in 
abstract terms a difficult task.
The case o f the M editerranean Sea.
This study is not concerned with compliance with international environmental law as an 
abstract notion. It rather examines the established and emerging mechanisms to control compliance 
in a specific context, in the field o f conventional international law on the protection o f the 
Mediterranean Sea from pollution. This marine region is bordered by three continents and twenty- 
two states belonging to a multiplicity o f legal cultures, international organisations and groupings.10 
Hence, international law applicable here is complex and vast. Even in the more restricted field of 
international environmental law, the same pattern is prevalent: The general global rules for the 
protection o f the marine environment and its resources are applicable, sometimes imposing stricter
.continued)
Environmental R elations’, 56(3) Z.A.O.R.V., 1996, pp.696-731; K.Sachariew,, ‘Promoting Compliance with 
International Environmental Legal Standards: Reflections on Monitoring and Reporting M echanisms’, 2 YB.l.E.L., 1991, 
pp.31-52; D.G.Victor, ‘The Montreal Protocol’s Non-Compliance Procedure: Lessons for Making Other international 
Environmental Regim es More Effective’, in W.Lang (ed.), The Ozone Treaties and their Influence on the Building o f  
International Environm ental Regim es, 1996, pp.58-81.
9 See Wolfrum, op.cit. n.8, p.29; Brown W eiss &  Jacobson, op.cit, n.8, p.39-40; E.Brown W eiss, ‘Understanding 
Compliance with International Environmental Agreements: The Baker’s Dozen M yths’, 32 Univ. o f  Richmond L.Rev,, 
1999, pp. 1563-6; and Victor et al, op.cit. n.8, p.7 and fn.13. This is admittedly a simplification o f  the complex concept 
o f ‘compliance’, see B.Kingsbury, ‘The Concept o f Compliance as a Function o f  Competing Conceptions o f International 
Law’, 19 M ichigan J.I.E., 1998, pp.345-72.
10 Namely, Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, 
Libya, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Slovenia, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Yugoslavia.
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standards for sensitive seas like the Mediterranean, along with the specific, regional rules, i.e. the 
Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) system, developed within the Regional Seas Programme under 
the auspices o f  UNEP, and sub-regional or multilateral agreements providing for more localised 
circumstances. Furthermore, co-operation on the continental level has resulted in the establishment 
o f policies and law, the European Union being the principal and more sophisticated, with regard to 
the protection o f the marine environment.
One could reasonably expect an improvement in the quality o f the Mediterranean waters 
as a result o f all these efforts. However, this is not the case. As will be shown in Chapter 1, all 
scientific reports indicate an increase in many o f the pressures on the marine environment, and 
scenarios for the year 2025 indicate that the state o f the environment will deteriorate considerably.
Consequently, and although effectiveness of an international regime and compliance with the 
relevant sets o f legal standards are - as already noted - not to be confused or used interchangeably, 
deficient compliance with international environmental law in the region can reasonably be taken as 
a given in this study. This situation, as well as the participation o f both developed and developing 
states, and the EU in the international regimes involved, make a study on compliance control very 
relevant and worthwhile.11 Twenty years o f regional co-operation is a period long enough to allow 
fairly safe conclusions to be drawn in relation to the inefficiencies and malfunctions o f the legal 
regimes involved, and to assess whether these are structural so that different institutions are needed 
or simply functional and thus able to be solved by adopting different techniques within the existing 
framework.
Legal literature on the Mediterranean is fairly extensive.12 The fact that throughout history 
this sea was the theatre o f important events, as it is bordered by some o f the principal actors of 
international politics at the crossroads between Europe, Africa and Asia, explains the general 
preoccupation with international law applicable here. In the field o f environmental protection, MAP 
has been the first and widely regarded as the most successful initiative launched by UNEP’s 
ambitious Regional Seas Programme in 1975. Since then, there have been numerous analyses o f the 
evolving regime, with new impetus every time a protocol was added.13 These writings, although
11 See Brown Weiss & Jacobson, op.cit. n.8, for another multiannual research programme that made a similar choice 
o f  states to be studied.
12 See, among others, S.C.Truver, The S trait o f  G ibraltar and the M editerranean, 1980; U.Leanza (ed.), The 
International Legal Regime o f  the M editerranean Sea, 1987; U.Leanza, & L.Sico (eds.), Zona Econom ica Exclusiva e 
Mare M editerraneo, 1989; Mediterranean Institute, The Mediterranean in the N ew Law o f  the Sea, 1991; A.Ahnish, The 
International Law o f  Maritime Boundaries and the Practice o f  States in the M editerranean Sea, 1993; and W.D,Burnett, 
‘Mediterranean Mare Clausum in the year 2000?: An International Law Analysis o f  Peacetime Military Navigation in 
the Mediterranean’, 34 N aval L.Rev., 1985, pp.75-155.
13 See, e.g., Lord Ritchie-Calder, The Pollution o f  the Mediterranean Sea, 1972; P.Sand, Drafting o f  Regional Legal 
Instruments for Marine Environmental Protection: The Case o f  the Mediterranean, Doc.UNEP/TF LIRS/Inf,4, UNEP, 
N ovem ber 1976; D.de H oyos, ‘The United Nations Environment Program: The Mediterranean Conferences’, 17 
Harv.I.LJ., 1976, pp.639-46; B.de Yturriaga, ‘Convenio de Barcelona de 1976 para la Protecci6n del Mar Mediterraneo
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valuable for their insight into the real meaning and evolution o f the law, they have, however, rarely 
concentrated on its actual implementation.14
The thesis.
The present study will, therefore, focus on evaluating the operation o f legal mechanisms 
and institutional arrangements in place, the means used to facilitate and ensure compliance with 
international law on the protection o f the Mediterranean sea against pollution. The ensuing 
discussion will demonstrate the weaknesses and allow conclusions to be drawn on the corrective 
action needed to ensure better realisation o f the existing international environmental rules in the 
region.
In other words, the aim o f research conducted was not to develop a general theory on 
compliance, not even to resolve questions on the relationship between different approaches to 
compliance control, such as state responsibility, non-compliance procedures etc.15 it was rather to 
closely examine the actual practice with regard to compliance control as it has occured to date and 
consider possible developments in the future. This exercise is naturally based on the work and 
findings of other reserchers that have been preoccupied with more general issues or even formulated 
a theory on compliance control in international environmental law.16
It should also be said from the start that the present thesis does not put forward a unitary 
model o f compliance control in the Mediterranean for the future. Such a model, although desirable, 
does not find support in any o f the findings discussed throughout subsequent Chapters. More 
generally, each treaty system has in principle and in fact its own dynamic, and it is submitted that
13(...continued)
contra la Contaminacidn’, 2(1) Rev.Inst.Eur,, 1976, pp.63-96; L.Saliba, ‘Protecting the Mediterranean - Co-ordinating 
Regional Action’, 2 Mar.Pol., 1978, pp.171-80; L.Juda, ‘The Regional Effort to Control Pollution in the Mediterranean 
S ea’, 5 O cean M anagem ent, 1979, pp. 125-50; B.Boxer, ‘The Mediterranean Sea: Preparing and Implementing a 
Regional Action Plan’, in D.Kay and H.Jacobson (eds.), Environm ental Protection  - The In ternational Protection, The 
In ternational Dim ension, 1983; S.Kuwabara, The Legal Regime o f  the Protection o f  the M editerranean Sea against 
Pollution from  Land-Based Sources, 1984; E.Raftopoulos, The Mediterranean Action Plan in a Functional Perspective: 
A  Quest for Law and Policy, MAP Technical R eport Series N o.25, 1988; l.M usu, The Interdependence between  
Environment and Development: Marine Pollution in the M editerranean Sea, 1991; A.Chircop, ‘The Mediterranean Sea 
and the Quest for Sustainable D evelopm ent’, 23(1) O.D.I.L., 1992, pp. 17-30; and E.Raftopoulos, The Barcelona  
Convention and Protocols: The M editerranean Action Plan Regim e, 1993. See also som e o f  the theory-oriented 
Francophone literature, e.g., M .Dejeant-Pons, La Protection et le D eveloppem ent du Bassin M editerraneen, 1987; 
M.Dejeant-Pons, La Deuxieme Decennie du Plan d'Action po u r la M editerranee, 1987; J.-Y.Cherot & A.Roux, D roit 
Mediterraneen de T  Environment, 1988; M.Dejeant-Pons, La Mediterranee en D roit International de TEnvironnement, 
1990.
1,1 For instance, a very thorough study o f  the MAP system and its implementation by Peter Flaas, is primarily 
concerned with the evolution and systematic analysis o f  the co-operation in the region from an international political 
science standpoint, see P.Haas, Saving the Mediterranean - The Politics o f  International Environm ental Co-operation, 
1990.
15 See infra, Chapter 4, p. 148; and Chapter 5, p.222.
16 Especially those listed supra, in fn.8.
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there is no universal non-compliance model that can be applied to all international environmental 
regimes.
There are basically two broad approaches to the problem that can be used separately or in 
combination in each international environmental regime, the ‘managerial’ and the ‘enforcement’ 
approach.17 Put differently, one may choose to give incentives having the potential to change 
behaviour in the desired manner or follow a stronger, more ‘judicial’ path and attempt to enforce 
the law against the delinquent actor, what is called in international law jargon ‘carrots and sticks’ 
approach. Now, the effort both in theory and in practice o f international law has traditionally 
concentrated on how to improve quasi judicial or policing systems. In fact, the traditional school 
o f thought attributes major significance to the role o f punitive sanctions that validate international 
law as a genuine legal order.18 The ‘policeman’ approach to compliance probleniS, initially 
perceived as suitable for the enforcement of disarmament and non-use-of-force related obligations, 
went some way in creating a stronger international response mechanism. However, coercive 
enforcement mechanisms are on the decline, and “ international law displays an increasing disparity 
between its growing normative content and its lack o f enforcement mechanisms”,20 as it remains a 
system based on compliance rather than enforcement.21
What is more, if such a response could be legitimate or even effective in some vital areas 
o f international law, it hardly seems fit in the environmental context. International environmental 
law has emerged and can flourish in an atmosphere o f co-operation, not crude coercion, as it has a 
bearing on development issues and involves mainly the day-to-day conducting o f business within 
national boundaries. It follows that ‘softer’, consensus-building, non-adversarial alternatives should 
be devised, o f a sort that would encourage respect for environmental standards, prove their cost- 
effectiveness and reconcile them with development policies, especially in less affluent countries. 
The dominant underlying principle that attributes great significance to these options lies in the 
nature itself o f protected assets and o f the respective obligations. In the environmental sphere, 
regimes aim at preventing harm, i.e. pollution or overexploitation, before it occurs, as restoration 
is often impossible or uneconomical. The emphasis is then placed not on reparation but on
17 See infra, Chapter 3, pp. 124 and 132.
18 For a succinct summary o f  the traditionalist positions see, among others, A.L.Springer, The International Law o f  
Pollution: Protecting the G lobal Environment in a World o f  Sovereign Stales, 1983, pp.34-5. Som e proponents o f  this 
school focussing on dispute settlement issues have produced valuable work for international environmental law, see e.g. 
R.Bilder, ‘The Settlem ent o f  D isputes in the F ield o f  the International Law o f  the E nvironm ent’, Reccuil des Cours, 
1975(1), pp. 139-239; and A.L.Levin, Protecting the Human Environment: Procedures an d  Principles fo r  Preventing  
and Resolving International Controversies, 1977.
19 See C,Clark & L.Sohn, W orld Peace through W orld Law, 1960, for an exposition o f  this notion in respect with 
arms and violence.
20 B.Conforti, International Law and the Role o f  D om estic Legal System s, 1993, p.7.
21 See M .E.O’Connell, ‘Enforcement and the Success o f  International Environmental Law’, 3(1) Indiana J. o f  G lobal 
Leg.Stud., 1995, p.52.
23
prevention. Thus, international enforcement, at least in its traditional form, can provide only an ex 
post answer, and thus loses much o f its appeal and effectiveness. The need for enforcement o f 
international environmental rules, when it arises, can be arguably more convincingly pursued under 
the national law o f the parties to the respective regime.
In this general context, the present thesis draws a distinction between the long-established 
traditional models o f compliance control, namely the state responsibility and civil liability approach, 
and the comprehensive institutional model, which at least in the case o f the MAP system does not 
include any distinct compliance control mechanism; and the emerging approaches, namely provision 
o f financial and technical assistance as compliance incentives, and compliance control and 
enforcem ent under national law. it is submitted that the most promising ways to encourage 
observance o f international marine pollution law in the Mediterranean is, on one hand, through the 
establishment, in close co-operation with the MAP institutions, o f  arrangements for financial and 
technical assistance conditioned on the fulfilment o f international environmental requirements at 
the regional level; and, on the other, through resort to administrative and judicial proceedings in 
national legal orders with international law setting minimum procedural standards. This would, in 
fact, be a new version o f the “carrots and sticks” paradigm: Adequate incentives for compliance will 
be forthcoming, but if they make no difference, then non-state actors, i.e. concerned citizens and 
their associations speaking for the common interest, will use the national legal machinery to seek 
redress for both public and private activities that impair the environment.
Standpoints - Sources - W hat is excluded.
It is probably obvious by now that although this work is legal, it cannot help taking into 
account extra-legal considerations that help reveal and interpret tensions and underlying causes of 
different phenomena; the pronounced political character o f international law cannot be set 
aside.Actually, political scientists were concerned with non-compliance before lawyers were. The 
‘realists’ among them have claimed that law and institutions ‘don’t matter’, and some lawyers have 
even held that international law is not positive law at all, since it is not backed by a definite authority 
able to use force in case of a breach.22 While acknowledging these views, this thesis will not pursue 
them further. On the contrary, it is based on the presumption that international law, in the 
environmental field, exists by way o f positive, mainly conventional, undertakings enjoying different 
degrees o f respect and affecting more or less both state and individual behaviour. Moreover, 
although the content o f the law and the needs it addresses are essential in inducing compliance, 
institutions and procedures designed to encourage and facilitate or, as a last resort, force compliance
22 See H.Kelsen, Principles o f  International Law, 1952; and F.A .Boyle, ‘The Irrelevance o f  International Law: The 
Schism between International Law and International Politics’, 10 Cal.W .I.LJ, 1980, p. 193-219.
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with the rules and increase transparency within a regime play their role as well and can certainly be
further developed. In real life, despite academic rows and theoretical constructions,
“(g o v ern m en t diplomats and international lawyers spend considerable resources drafting 
and redrafting treaties to resolve international environmental problems. Environmental 
groups commonly support these efforts, pressing governments to negotiate more new, and 
strengthen and refine existing, environmental treaties. Business groups regularly oppose 
provisions of environmental treaties as excessively costly and burdensome. Policy analysts 
and pundits regularly highlight the problems with existing treaties and propose new treaty 
provisions to address them.”23
As much of the discussion concerns the actual practice rather than the abstract law, effort 
will be made to draw on material shedding light on the administrative and judicial practice of 
indicative Mediterranean states and concerned actors. The dynamic system approach dictates a broad 
perception o f who these are.24 In that vein, interest groups’ activities to the degree that they exercise 
influence, are not considered in advance less important than governmental action.25 Official, 
academic and informal sources have been evaluated accordingly and the records o f the regional 
international institutions have been examined thoroughly. Finally, personal ideas and evaluations 
from people involved with the application of international law in the Mediterranean context have 
been sought. Special reference should be made at this point to the use o f  Greek jurisprudence to 
illustrate certain points in Chapters 7 and 8. This was due to the author’s thorough knowledge of 
the Greek legal system and the ensuing possibility to access relevant material and understand its 
implications. Such extended reference to other national legal systems, although desirable, was not 
feasible. Moreover, it would really be beyond the scope o f this study, in view of the fact that the 
Greek case studies serve only as examples, and do not purport to be representative nor susceptible 
to generalisations.
It should also be noted that customary law or informal ‘soft law’ instruments, voluntary 
agreements etc. are excluded from the scope o f this study for several reasons, the main being the fact 
that international environmental law has evolved principally through treaty-making which serves 
to formulate more concrete and technical obligations; in addition, treaty regimes offer the possibility 
for ad hoc arrangements to control compliance. Furthermore, the conventional law examined is 
concerned with marine pollution, i.e. the detrimental alteration o f quality of the marine environment, 
and does not include conservation o f species, notwithstanding difficulties in defining pollution in 
exact terms or clearly distinguishing the latter from harm to marine ecosystems, endangered species
23 R.B.M itchell, ‘Compliance Theory: a Synthesis’, in in J,Cameron, J.Werksman & P.Roderick (eds,), Improving  
Com pliance with International Environmental Law , 1996, p.2.
24 See A.Kiss & D.Shelton, ‘Systems Analysis o f  International Law: A Methodological Inquiry’, XVII Neth. Y.B.i.L,, 
1986, p.45.
25 On the increasingly important role o fN G O s in the formation and implementation o f  international environmental 
law, see K.Raustiala, ‘The “Participatory Revolution” in International Environmental Law’, 21 H arv.Env'l L.Rev., 1997, 
pp.537-86.
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and other forms of marine life.26 In fact, the most recent trend in the Mediterranean area in particular 
is to encompass marine pollution under the heading o f sustainable development o f the seas and 
coastal a reas;27 hence the only justification for the limited scope o f this study is the need to make 
its subject more manageable.
Outline.
Finally, a b rief description o f the thesis’ structure is as follows:
Part I will set the stage with an initial presentation in Chapter 1 o f the Mediterranean 
realities, both in terms o f physical environment, pollution loads and special problems, but also of 
the socio-political and economic conditions prevalent. Chapter 2 classifies the main conventional 
obligations aiming at protecting the Mediterranean marine environment from various sources of 
pollution into broad categories, explores their nature and extent, and briefly examines the hierarchy 
between them. This is necessary in view of the focus o f the present work which lies, as already 
explained, not in compliance control as an abstract notion, but in a study o f a specific area of 
international environmental regulation, marine pollution in the Mediterranean region, and the related 
procedures to control compliance. Thus, information on the Mediterranean Sea, the states involved 
and their political and economic relations, as well as the substance o f the standards to be observed, 
becomes relevant and indispensable.
In Part II, the discussion turns to the pith o f compliance issues: Chapter 3 provides a general 
account o f the evolution o f compliance control mechanisms in international environmental law and 
identifies the different - established and emerging - approaches, building on existing literature 
concerning compliance control.
The following Chapters expand on this initial categorisation. Chapter 4 briefly examines 
the traditional notions o f state responsibility and o f civil liability as means to redress non- 
compliance, and concludes that the former’s relevance in the specific context is very limited, while 
the latter can only be a useful tool if further developed as one set o f minimum procedural standards 
such as those discussed in Chapter 8. Moreover, it is submitted that some o f the basic concepts 
articulated in the state responsibility context have been transformed and adapted to the particular 
needs o f international environmental law, and have been accommodated in the most widely-used 
arrangements for compliance control, i.e. the institutional follow-up carried out within each 
environmental regime. Chapter 5, hence, discusses the so-called ‘comprehensive institutional 
approach’, and the related ‘non-compliance procedures’ and the EU model o f compliance control. 
It concludes that this model, although more relevant than the previous one, is again underutilised
26 See generally, Springer, op.cit. n.18, Chapter 3.
27 See infra, Chapter 2, p.58.
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in the environmental regimes examined, with the notable exception of Community law that controls 
compliance o f its Member States in a much more effective way. Another significant finding is the 
importance o f economic and financial incentives and sanctions when linked with environmental 
compliance in the Community system and the ‘non-compliance procedures’. Therefore, Chapter 6 
looks into the financial and technical incentives and assistance as tools for compliance control with 
regard to environmental norms in the framework of MAP, the EU, the World Bank, EIB, and GEF, 
and puts forward the first part o f the thesis, namely that there is much scope for developing effective 
compliance control tools by linking economic assistance, or reversely penalties, to compliance with 
international environmental standards, in the Community, as well as in the MAP system.
In Chapter 7, the focus shifts from purely international compliance control mechanisms to 
national legal systems. It addresses national implementation o f environmental obligations and 
compliance control and enforcement under national law, and puts forward the thesis that national 
legal machinery is most appropriate level to accommodate concerned citizens and NGOs seeking 
to control compliance with and enforce international environmental standards in the Mediterranean. 
Finally, Chapter 8 considers the existing and potential contribution o f international law to the 
effectiveness o f the above model, by examining a series of procedural rights set by international law 
and operating within national legal orders, which are crucial in that they empower individuals and 
NGOs to pursue compliance control and enforcement more successfully.
PART I
THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT
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CHAPTER 1.
Th e  M e d it e r r a n e a n  S ea  a n d  it s  P e o p l e .
“Thus you make a model of the Mediterranean Sea... In 
this model let the rivers be commensurate with the size 
and outlines of the sea. Then by experimental 
observations of the streams of water, you will learn what 
they carry away of things covered and not covered by 
water. And you will let the waters of the Nile, Don and Po 
and other rivers of that size flow into the sea, which will 
have its outlet through the straits of Gibraltar... In this 
way you will soon see whence the water currents take 
objects and where they deposit them.” (Leonardo da 
Vinci, circa 1500 AD)1
The first Chapter o f  this study provides the background information that will enable the 
reader to better follow the ensuing discussion on the mechanisms of control over compliance with 
international norms for the protection o f the Mediterranean Sea against pollution. In particular, it 
summarises the physical characteristics and the socio- and geo-political parameters that shape the
particular character o f the region, i.e. the overall context in which Mediterranean states co-exist and
co-operate to conclude and implement binding international agreements that address common 
environmental problems. In the last section, the patterns o f economic activity in the basin that result 
in certain significant environmental pressures, as well as the relevant trends for the twenty-first 
century, are also reviewed, in order to assess the major pollution problems; this will make possible 
the identification, in the next Chapter, o f the international legal standards that are more urgently 
in need o f proper follow-up.
1.1. Physical Aspects.
The Mediterranean has probably been the first sea to be explored,2 and is one o f the most 
studied ocean regions, especially during the second half o f the twentieth century when technical 
progress facilitated a great accumulation o f  knowledge. That is not to say that data is uniform and 
unequivocal, however. Indeed, large areas, such as open waters or the deep seabed, are under­
explored with very little information available on them. The following presentation will, 
consequently, be based on these scientific findings most widely accepted in the Mediterranean
1 Cited in S.C.Truver, The S trait o f  G ibraltar and the M editerranean, 1980, p. 13.
2 Since it was in Egypt that history records the beginning o f  sailing around the year 2650BC , see L.Casson, The 
A ncient Mariners: Seafarers and Seaflghters o f  the M editerranean in Ancient Tim es, 1959, p.4,
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community as authoritative, either because they have been repeatedly documented and tested or due 
to the respect enjoyed by the author or body responsible for them.
The M editerranean is a semi-enclosed sea lying between Europe, Asia and Africa and 
covering an area o f 2.5 million km2. Although considered small compared to other ocean basins, 
the Mediterranean is quite long (3,800km from Gibraltar to Syria) and narrow (maximum distance 
in the North-South direction, from France to Algeria, about 900km).3 The average depth is about 
1.5km, and the total water volume 3.7 million km3. The many islands and complex seaboard create 
a total length o f 20,000km o f coastline. It consists o f a series o f interacting parts and adjacent seas: 
There are two major basins, the Western and the Eastern separated by the shallow submarine ridges 
o f Sicily - Tunisia and of Messina. The Western basin is divided into the Alboran Sea, the Algero- 
Provencal basin, the Ligurian (the last two often divided differently, i.e. in Northwestern and 
Southwestern basins) and the Tyrrhenian Seas, whereas the Eastern basin comprises the Adriatic, 
Ionian, Central, Aegean and Levantine Seas.
The Mediterranean is connected to the Red Sea by the Suez Canal; to the Sea of Mannara, 
Bosporus and the Black Sea by the Dardanelles; and to the Atlantic by the only natural oceanic 
connection, the Strait o f Gibraltar.4 It is, thus, a virtually enclosed sea with small drainage basins, 
marine basins o f considerable maximum depth, a great number o f large and small islands, intense 
seismic and volcanic activity, a much damped tidal regime, and a specific wind regime.5 Moreover, 
the young relief and the contact between the sea and the mountains signifies few large plains, little 
good agricultural land, few broad fluvial basins (the Ebro, Rhone and Po in the North and the Nile 
in the South) and ports and harbours closely hemmed in between sea and rock.6
On the whole, the region is situated in the semi-arid zone, characterised by hot, dry 
summers and mild, damp winters.7 It follows that the M editerranean Sea has a deficient 
hydrological balance,8 being what is called a “concentration basin”, constantly lower than the 
Atlantic,9 which results in a continuous flow o f Atlantic surface waters through the Strait o f
3 L. Jeftic et al, State o f  the Marine Environment in the Mediterranean Region, UNEP R egional Seas Reports and  
Studies, N o. 132, UNEP, 1990; MAP Technical Report Series, N o.28, UNEP, Athens, 1989, p .l
4 See id,\ and Truver, op.cit. n .l ,  pp. 14-15,
5 Winds generally blow from the North and East through gaps in the mountain ranges, see UNEP, The State o f  the 
Marine and Coastal Environment in the Mediterranean Region, MAP Technical Reports Series, N o. 100, UNEP, Athens, 
1996, p.4; and M.Grenon & M .Balisse (eds.), Futures fo r  the M editerranean Basin: the Blue P lan, 1989, p .l.
6 See Jeftic et al, op.cit. n.3; and Grenon & Batisse (eds.), op.cit.n.5, pp. 1-2.
7 However, there are considerable variations in rainfall in the region decreasing from Northwest to Southeast (from 
450cm/annum near the Dalmatian coast to 2cm in the Sahara), while torrential rain is responsible for considerable soil 
erosion in the South, see Jeftic et al, op.cit. n.3, p.2; Truver, op.cit. n .l ,  p.27; and Grenon & Batisse (eds.), op.cit.n.5.
x The Adriatic is a notable exception due to the Po and other rivers’ inflow, see S.Kuwabara, The Legal Regime o f  
the Protection o f  the M editerranean Sea against Pollution from  Land-Based Sources, 1984, p. 169.
9 Sea level decreases progressively from Gibraltar towards the North Aegean, with maximum differences o f  about 
80cm, see Jeftic et at, op.cit. n.3, p.3.
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G ibraltar.10 The main volume o f these easterly currents travels along the coast o f North Africa - 
mainly due to thermocline forces, wind stress and atmospheric pressure distribution - finally 
reaching the Levantine basin, and constitutes the most constant component o f the Mediterranean 
circulation pattern." This process creates significant risks of transboundary pollution as the surface 
water carries along and spreads throughout the basins suspended industrial and urban pollutants, 
especially in the Balearic Deep Water formed near the mouth o f the Rhone river, and the Adriatic 
waters loaded with effluents from Po. Yet, the exact movements o f these bodies o f water are not 
well known, which means that the size and impact o f the pollution transportation is still very 
unclear.12
The estimated renewal time for Mediterranean waters is generally considered to be 80 
years.13 This is a relatively short period compared with other semi-enclosed seas, such as the Baltic 
(2500 years) or the Black Sea. However, new data show that different types o f water - surface, 
intermediate or bottom - require different periods for their renewal; hence, some o f the water that 
finds its way into the basin’s depths may take 100 to 300 years to return to the Atlantic, while some 
o f it may exit in only a few decades.14 It is equally possible that some water never quite exits the 
Mediterranean as the intricate coastline and the abundance o f islands create many more complex 
local currents forming small and big gyres where waters - and pollutants - get trapped in an ever- 
going circular movement.15 On the other hand, coastal waters do not appear to be greatly influenced 
by these general flow patterns, as movement here is mainly caused by wind stress and the 
corresponding waves and eddies with great seasonal or local variations; hence, pollutants disposed 
o f near the coast cannot be sufficiently diluted and dispersed.16
M editerranean ecosystems are highly compartmentalised and the biodiversity is 
exceptional. The ecosystems o f the region are particularly threatened due to drainage or 
introduction o f fish in wetlands; destruction o f the maquis\ fires or over-exploitation o f the 
M editerranean forest - arguably the most degraded by human action in the world causing 
disturbances in the water-cycle and soil erosion -; effects o f pesticides and fertilizers etc. In fact, 
a number o f  animal species have suffered or are close to extinction.17 Although solar energy is
10 As exchange with the Red Sea through the Suez canal or with the Black Sea is minimal.
u See Jeftic et al, op.cit. n.3, p.3; and Truver, op.cit. n. 1, p.27-8.
12 See Truver, op.cit. n. 1, pp.35-6.
13 See ibid, p.28.
1,1 See UNEP, op.cit. n.5, p.6.
15 See A.E.Chircop, ‘The Mediterranean Sea and the Quest for Sustainable Development’, 23(1) O.DJ.L., 1992, p.27.
16 See Kuwabara, op.cit. n.8, p.3.
17 Including large forest animals such as the bear, wolf, lynx, and antelope; large birds o f  prey, such as eagles and 
vultures; but also other birds, because o f  unrestricted hunting, despite the fact that the whole area, and especially the 
narrow straits between the northern and southern shores, is a major migration route between Europe and Africa, see 
Grenon & Batisse (eds.), op.cit. n.5, pp.7-9
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abundant, the Mediterranean Sea as such is relatively poor in terms o f quantity.18 The reasons for 
that are mainly the diversity o f the basins; the low productivity o f the waters due to the low level 
o f organic matter - mainly phytoplankton -; the great average depth; and the limited surface area 
o f continental shelves.19 The Mediterranean marine mammals, which principally comprise 
cetaceans, such as dolphins and whales, and pinnipeds (seals) are particularly vulnerable,20 as it is 
estimated that they are all currently threatened,21 and some, like the monk seal (.Monachus 
Monachus) are considered directly or indirectly endangered by accidental and commercial catches, 
systematic extermination, decreasing food supplies, fatal indigestion o f non-degradable products 
(plastic, aluminium etc), and, finally, pollution. In fact, small M editerranean cetaceans are among 
the species showing the highest concentration o f pollutants affecting their reproductive capacity, 
in view o f the fact that because of their low reproduction rate, they cannot respond rapidly to 
environmental changes. During the 90s there have been notable efforts to preserve and protect them 
and an increased awareness that their extinction would surely bring about serious imbalances in the 
marine ecosystem o f the region as a whole.
1.2. Socio- and Geo-Political Aspects.
Turning now to the people living around this complex water body, one cannot help noticing 
the weight o f past and more recent history on their present life and activities. It is well-known that 
the distant past has witnessed the establishment, nourishment and decline o f many o f the world’s 
major civilisations in the Mediterranean region, including the Egyptian, M inoan, Phoenician, 
Greek, Roman, Arab, and Ottoman, some o f them notably based on empire. Christianity, Judaism 
and Islam have also emerged from here. Studying this extraordinary sequence, Fernand Braudel has 
drawn attention to the paradox o f Mediterranean peoples: Recorded history reveals an astonishing
ls In terms o f  diversity, on the other hand, it is very rich, with some 900 species o f  fish, a lot o f  which are endemic,
19 See Grenon & Batisse (eds.), op.cit. n.5, pp.9-10.
20 Twenty two cetacean species have been recorded (77 species worldwide) in the region, the Black Sea included, nine 
o f  which are rare. A s a matter o f  fact, information on their populations and biology has started being gathered 
comparatively recently - in the early 70s. Hence, a lot o f  crucial data is still lacking; for instance, mass mortality o f  
dolphins observed during the 80s and early 90s - reaching a peak o f  many thousands in 1990 - has been attributed to 
viruses, but, as yet, there are only speculations about the connection o f decreased resistance to infections with pollution, 
although high concentrations o f  pollutants, like PCBs, heavy metals etc. were traced on dead animals, see ‘Mass 
M ortalities o f  Mediterranean Dolphins’, M edW aves, N o .24, Winter 1991/92, p.7; P.-C. Beaubrun, ‘What we Know  
about Mediterranean Cetaceans’, M edW aves, N o .26, Summer/Fall 1992, p.21; and UNEP, op.cit. n.5, p.68,
21 See UNEP/1UCN, Technical Report on the State o f  Cetaceans in the Mediterranean, M AP Technical Reports Series, 
N o .82, Athens, 1994.
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stability, yet also extraordinary mobility, shifts and movement.22 This contradiction explains why 
so much ink has been shed on whether a “Mediterranean identity” exists or not.23
One can, indeed, point to certain socio-cultural features that are common to or largely 
shared by the coastal populations, despite important disparities in history, language and religion. 
Thus, for thousands o f years, Mediterranean civilizations have grown in a number o f urban sites. 
A network o f towns and villages emerged very early on, and the M editerranean landscape 
developed around it, and received its animation and life from it. The current network, apart from 
a few exceptions, is the direct inheritance o f two to three thousand years ago, and particularly of 
the Roman Empire. Residential densities are quite high, especially in the Islamic towns South and 
East o f the basin, and in the centres inherited directly from the Middle Ages. Problems, such as 
water supply, are also common and predominant.24
Moreover, Mediterranean civilizations have elaborated the philosophical concepts which 
have made possible the apparent mastery o f man over nature. In the Blue Plan studies,25 such a 
“common stock” o f behaviour, with deep cultural and religious roots in the Mediterranean, was 
identified and taken into account together with the modern tensions that come with 
industrialisation:
“Thus, agriculture and farming practices have over the centuries made sparing use of land, 
soil, water, and the countryside. Land-tenure patterns differ from one country to another, 
but have common features... Attitudes concerning nature reflect the very old 
“anthropization” of nature, which Mediterranean people over the centuries have been more 
inclined or more prompted to tame rather than to protect.
The contemporary cultural environment is destabilized by the massive intrusion 
o f a rootless urban life-style and the arrival o f the communication and consumer society, 
either through the influence o f tourists or the o f foreign audio-visual productions. The 
media cany issues which have virtually no base in the local environment. They bombard 
local populations with references more related to the industrialized West than to the 
M editerranean reality. A huge task o f active instruction is required so that in the future 
adults and young people will understand the issues, risks, and also the renewal patterns 
which still provide the Mediterranean world with its values and individuality, even if new 
kinds o f collective behaviour are added to the changing ones o f the past.”25
22 F.Braudel, The M editerranean and the M editerranean W orld in the Age o f  Philip II, 1992.
23 On the unity o f  the Mediterranean culture, see, inter alia, J.G.Peristiany (ed.), H onor and Shame: The Values o f  
M editerranean Society, 1965; J. Davis, People o f  the M editerranean, 1977; J.Goody, The D evelopm ent o f  the Family 
and M arriage in Europe, 1983; and D.D.Gilmore (ed.), H onor and Shame and the Unity o f  the M editerranean, 1987. 
For the contrary view, M.Herzfeld, ‘Honor and Shame: Problems in the Comparative Analysis o f  Moral System s’, 15 
Man, 1980, pp.339-351.
24 See Grenon & Batisse (eds.), op.cit. n.5, p. 12.
25 The study-oriented ‘Blue Plan’programme, initiated in 1979 as one o f  the first activities o f  the Mediterranean 
Action Plan (MAP), calls for systematic surveys o f  major development and environmental protection activities and for 
the development o f  alternative development policies based on the findings o f  the surveys; for the results o f  Phase 1 o f  
this project, see ibid.
26 Ibid, pp. 12-13.
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Having said that, the collapse o f the Roman Empire in the western part o f the Sea laid the 
ground for the basic, continuing division into an Eastern Mediterranean essentially Slav, Greek and 
Turkish, the Arabic Southeastern and Southern shores, and the Latin West. Consequently, the 
Mediterranean should be better described as a “bridge” or “cross roads” for the interchange of 
materials and ideas than a uniform space; at the same time, “ [i]t is... a dense network o f a diversity 
of dividing lines - dividing lines between different economic and security systems, different 
political systems and political cultures, different languages, forms o f expression and religious 
denominations”.27
The deepest division that have evolved with time is arguably the difference in the 
development o f democratic political structures between the developed, affluent, and largely 
democratic, Christian European states o f the Northern coast and the developing, largely 
authoritarian and oligarchic Muslim countries o f North Africa and Middle East - Q addafi’s Libya 
being an infamous example -, despite increasingly “modernised” - or better “westernised” - 
structures and government attitudes in the latter. Having said that, the gap shows signs of 
diminishing in the future, as there is a noted increase in the number and influence o f a variety o f 
social movements and organisations striving for social, political and civil rights, and pressing 
towards democratisation throughout the region.28 It has, in fact, been argued that security and 
stability in the Arab world are essentially linked to the governments’ response to public demands 
for accountability, greater representation, and respect for the rule o f law and human rights, all 
essential components o f  the W est’s understanding o f democracy.29
From a geopolitical standpoint, for many centuries the Mediterranean coasts were hardly 
secure, because o f the semi-permanent warfare between Muslims and Christians. It is only for 150 
years that peace has - to all intents and purposes - prevailed between North and South, East and 
West. Still, it has been repeatedly asserted that “the Mediterranean is a barometer o f the world’s 
political climate”, since inter-state relations in the region have always reflected the polarisation of 
international allegiances - as some European countries are members o f NATO, others are strongly 
dependent on major countries, and others are non-allied or neutral - and the relations between the
27 W .W eidenfeld, Challenges in the M editerranean - The European R esponse, 1991, p,7. See also S.C.Calleya, 
Navigating Regional Dynamics in the Post- C old War W orld - Patterns o f  Relations in the M editerranean Area, 1997, 
Chapter 3.
28 See E.Goldberg, R.Kasaba & J.S.Migdal, Rules and Rights in the M iddle E ast - D em ocracy, Law, and Society, 
1993.
29 See M.Azzam, ‘Islam: Political Implications for Europe and the Middle East’, in P.Ludlow (ed.), Europe and the 
M editerranean, 1990, pp.91-2.
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two former superpowers, both having an “overwhelming strategic stake” in this Sea.30 The sea has, 
indeed, during the “cold war” era, been the primary area o f superpower presence in the region.31
Apart from the USA and Russia, the other important power in the region is France. In fact, 
this is probably the only country in the basin possessing the political and economic motivation and 
military power - with its large nuclear arsenal - to play such a role. Significantly, France was the 
architect o f the EEC ’s “Mediterranean Policy”, whereby a series o f co-operation and association 
agreements between the Community and third Mediterranean countries were concluded.32
More generally, the present high volume and complex pattern o f traffic in this Sea,33 
situated at the crossroads o f three continents, is a feature that helps measure its importance both to 
its coastal states and to other parts o f the world. The surrounding lands are rather rugged - mountain 
or desert - and often the neighbouring countries5 policies are inhospitable as well. The case of 
Israel, having no other passageway to the world markets than the Mediterranean waters and a small 
outlet to the Red Sea, illustrates how important access to the sea is for a country’s economic 
survival.
Now, together with the notorious Middle East web o f problems, there is a considerable 
number o f major and minor outstanding matters in the region, such as the dispute over the Spanish 
Sahara; the status o f Gibraltar; and of the two Spanish enclaves in Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla; the 
Libya-Tunisia territorial sea boundary; the Syro-Turkish dispute over Alexandretta; the Greco- 
Turkish problems over the Aegean and Cyprus; and last but not least, the revived tensions and wars 
in the Balkans, after the splitting-up o f former Yugoslavia.
Be that as it may, in the past decades, considerable efforts have been made to achieve the 
freezing and reduction of all non-Mediterranean powers’ naval forces, the neutralisation and 
denuclearisation o f the region, and the security that a Mediterranean - zone o f  peace would 
guarantee.34 Some have even suggested that there is a trend towards a new “ Mediterranean 
identity” based precisely on the community o f interests that economic and strategic interdependence 
creates;35 while others came to fear that this “identity” will eventually displace non-regional powers,
30 J.W.Lewis, The Strategic Balance in the M editerranean, 1976, p. 1. See also S.D.Snyder, D efending the Fringe - 
NATO, the M editerranean, and the Persian Gulf, 1987, pp.3-27.
31 In 1975, the US had approximately 60,000 men, 275 combat aircraft, and 45 ships in the Mediterranean, stationed 
in their extensive base network, see Lewis, op.cit, n.30, pp. 17-33; the Soviets had normally around 55 ships, o f  which 
25 warships, ibid, p .59.
32 See Lewis, op.cit. n.30, p .l 11; and infra, Chapter 6, pp.302-3.
33 See infra, pp.47-8.
34 See Truver, op.cit. n .l , p.92; A.K.Abbadi, ‘Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean Basin’, 14 O.D.I.L., 
1984, p.65; V.Y.Lyubomudrova, ‘Turning the Mediterranean into a Zone o f  Peace and Security and the Law o f the Sea’, 
XVII Thesaurus Acroasium , 1991, pp.501-41; and Calleya, op.cit. n.27, Chapter 5.
35 See Truver, op.cit. n .l, p .92.
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through, for example extensive EEZ claims that “would blanket the entire sea”.36 It does not seem 
that theses fears are justified, however. As it has been rightly pointed out, due to economic, 
political, and practical reasons, “the only concerted movement that has taken place in the 
Mediterranean is that o f non-establishment o f EFZ or EEZs”.37 In fact, considerable pressures to 
maintain both freedom o f fishing and freedom o f navigation in the region, combined with long­
standing maritime boundary delimitation frictions, make future proclamation o f EEZs in the 
Mediterranean basin highly unlikely.38
Although safe conclusions on the future shape of the geopolitical setting in the region are 
impossible, since, after the termination o f the “cold war” era, new strategic aspirations in the region 
are far from clear, some discern fresh forms o f fragmentation coming about in the area, in 
developments such as the process of EU enlargement combined with trends towards re­
nationalisation in European foreign policies; the crisis in the former Yugoslavia; the Arab-Israeii 
negotiations; and the Islamist movement.39 It is also suggested that the end o f the “cold war” meant 
that the East-West dimension within the Mediterranean region has largely disappeared; that North 
Africa has emerged as a “grey area” trying to find its position between its Islamic background and 
the “westernisation” process; and that the US interest is shifting to the Near East.40 At the same 
time, Eastern Europe became a serious rival for the capital and investment that the South and East 
Mediterranean neighbours o f Europe need.41
Time will test the validity o f these hypotheses. In any case, it seems that, today, sub­
regional relations are a priority for most countries as the “grip” of the superpowers has weakened 
and has not yet been replaced by another defined pattern o f international politics.42 Two recent 
developments are thought to be particularly crucial for the future balance in the region,43 namely 
the Peace Treaties signed between Israel and PLO, and the EU initiative towards what it calls a 
“Mediterranean Partnership” that will work towards establishing a free trade zone in the whole of 
the Mediterranean basin.44 In this context, the EU is seen by some as the next dominating power
36 W.D.Burnett, ‘Mediterranean Mare Clausum in the Year 2000?’, 34 N aval Law R eview , 1985, p .134.
37 T, Ijistra, ‘Development ofR esource Jurisdiction in the EC’s Regional Seas: National EEZ Policies o f  EC Member 
States in the Northeast Atlantic, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Baltic Sea’, 23 O.D.I.L., 1992, p. 176.
38 See B.Conforti, ‘The Mediterranean and The Exclusive Econom ic Zone’, in U.Leanza (ed.), The International 
Legal Regime o f  the Mediterranean Sea, 1987, pp. 173-80; and U.Leanza & L.Sico (eds,), Zona Econom ica Esclusiva  
e M are M editerraneo, 1989.
39 See R.Aliboni, ‘Collective Political Co-operation in the Mediterranean’, in R.Aliboni, G.Joffd & T.Niblock (eds.), 
Security Challenges in the M editerranean Region, 1996, pp.52-3.
40 See Calleya, op.cit. n.27, p.232.
41 See A.Biad, ‘Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean: A Southern V iew point’, in Aliboni et al (eds,), 
op.cit. n.39, pp.41-9.
42 See Calleya, op.cit. n.27, Chapter 4.
43 See ibid, pp.224-5.
44 See infra, Chapter 6, pp.274-5.
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in the area, based on the trade and broader economic dependency of the Southern countries on the 
former.45
Let us, then, examine the patterns o f economic development in the Mediterranean and their 
implications for the coastal and marine environment.
1.3. Economic Activities and Human Pressures on the Environm ent
To remark that there is a very close relationship between economic activity and costal 
development is admittedly commonplace. In fact, the coastal zone is subject to multiple uses, the 
main ones being construction o f human habitation and related infrastructure; domestic waste 
disposal; industrial waste discharge and plant cooling; marine mining; tourism and recreation; 
fishing; aquaculture; and shipping. The sea has - until recently - been viewed as large enough to 
carry away all sewage and effluents, as a convenient “sink” for all unwanted by-products o f these 
activities. Thus, the Mediterranean faced “pollution” problems already from ancient times.46 The 
vast difference between the past and the present, however, is that during modern times man has 
been responsible for the discharge of pollutants into the marine environment in such quantities and 
concentrations that cannot be handled naturally, that exceed the natural self-cleansing capacity of 
a given environment, and consequently cannot be assimilated or rendered harmless; moreover, man 
has come up with an immense array o f artificial substances that are toxic, unknown to nature and 
cannot be dealt with either.
Enclosed and semi-enclosed seas are especially susceptible to human activities, depending 
in each case on the scale o f riverine, atmospheric, and coastal inputs relative to the rate o f flushing 
into the ocean, the latitude, depth, and general configuration o f the sea, and, o f course, the size of 
human populations residing around it, the level o f their activities and land use practices. All these 
factors, as specified in relation to the Mediterranean Sea, burden the marine environment with a 
variety o f pollutants, originating both from land and from ships.
The principal land-based sources o f pollution in the region are domestic and industrial 
waste - both liquid and solid -, agricultural runoff, river discharges, and the atmosphere. All these 
are, in fact, thought to account for almost 80% o f the pollution load ending up in the sea,47 with the 
Northwestern basin receiving one-third o f the total, the Adriatic Sea about one-quarter, the 
Tyrrhenian and Aegean Seas each about 10%, whereas the other six sub-regions each account for
45 See Calleya, op.cit. n.27, pp.233 and 237-8.
46 Most likely sillation fi'om tree-cutting and overgrasing and some local sewage disposal problems, while excessive 
plankton bloom s were repeatedly recorded. The first mineral pollutants o f  the Mediterranean date back to the copper- 
workings o f  Cyprus, the iron-workings o f  Asia Minor and the tin-workings o f  the Phoenicians, see C.Osterberg and 
S.Keckes, ‘The State o f  Pollution in the Mediterranean Sea’, 6 Ambio> 1977, p.322.
47 See UNEP, op.cit. n.5, p.28.
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no more than 5% o f the total load.48 There follows a consideration o f the pressures exercised on the 
Mediterranean coastal and marine environment, stemming from patterns o f social and economic 
development o f the past decades, and the main trends identified for the future.
1.3.1. Urbanisation.
The M editerranean countries sustained a population o f 450 million in 1999, while in 
coastal regions lived about 40% o f  that.49 The densest areas were found around the Northwestern 
basin and the Tyrrhenian Sea, accounting for almost 40% o f the total. Since the 1960s, a 
considerable proportion o f the poorly skilled manual workers in the countries o f Northwestern 
Europe consisted o f immigrants from the Mediterranean, in view o f the fact that, in the latter, 
agriculture was the main source of income and employment, while most industrial activities were 
still incipient. Changes in economic structures have brought about a reversal o f the situation in 
some o f  the Southern European countries, especially Spain, Italy and Greece, which are now 
receiving immigrants, mainly nationals from the countries on the opposite side of the basin and the 
Balkans. This influx has led to some six million people o f North African origin residing in EU 
countries today, most o f  them Muslim and not well-integrated into European society.50
At the same time, the South and East o f the basin have, since the mid-twentieth century, 
been characterised by an “urban explosion”,51 not only with regard to the number o f city-dwellers, 
but also to the density o f urban housing; peri-urban sprawl; the transformation o f ways o f life and 
consumer patterns; the daily scale o f the necessary commuting; and the nuisances o f  traffic jams 
and pollution.52 It is significant, in this context, that in the M editerranean, urbanisation may be 
taken to encompass not only the growth o f towns, but also the occupation o f  the coastal strip 
between towns, mainly as tourist accommodation, and in some countries, as secondary residences 
and recreation facilities.53
Thus, in 1985, in all Mediterranean countries, the urban population was about 207million 
or 58% o f the total. The proportion o f urban population, as well as coastal development - which is 
sometimes uncontrolled, poorly managed, or even illegal, especially in the form of tourist 
accommodation and facilities -, will probably continue to increase in all countries, until the
48 UNEP/ECE et al, Pollutants from Land-Based Sources in the Mediterranean, UNEP R egional Seas Reports and  
Studies, N o .32, UNEP, 1984, p.22.
49 See EEA, State and Pressures o f  the Marine and Coastal Mediterranean Environment, Environmental Issues Series 
N o .5, 1999; and Grenon & Batisse (eds.), op.cit. n.5, pp.46-7.
50 See E.Mortimer, ‘Europe and the Mediterranean: The Security Dimension’, in Ludlow (ed.), op.cit n.29, pp.l 11-8.
51 Because o f  total population growth and by augmented rural llow  to cities, whose contribution sometimes increased 
certain cities to an annual rate o f  more than 3%, e.g. Algiers and Cairo. Still, the Mediterranean has always been a region 
o f large, even monstrous cities, such as Rome and Constantinople (Istanbul), so that major urban centres have historically 
been concentrated around costal settlements and ports, primary examples being Barcelona, M arseilles, Genoa, Naples, 
Piraeus, Limmasol, Alexandria, Tunis, and Algiers.
52 See L.Leontidou, The M editerranean C ity in Transition: Social Change an d  Urban D evelopm ent, 1990,
53 See UNEP, op.cit. n.5, p. 10.
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attainment o f a saturation level for each society. In this connection, it should be noted that “post- 
industrialisation” - the shift to a service and communication economy mostly taking place in 
countries o f the North and requiring a highly-educated and skilled workforce not being so limited 
to a particular place, together with improved transport, is likely to lead to a spread in urbanisation 
away from traditional industrial centres, and preferably in the coastal zone which offers pleasant 
working and living conditions.54 The resulting environmental pressures, mainly land consumption, 
water supply and evacuation, waste, air and noise, urban planning and green spaces, are 
considerable, but different in each case as the size o f settlements is crucial for their sustainability.55
The production o f waste is the main marine pollution problem caused by this phenomenon. 
Domestic effluents burden the marine environment with organic matter, microbial pollution,56 and 
nutrients, as well as detergents from household uses, and lubricating oils.57 A substantial part of 
these effluents are carried by rivers, which are the single largest source o f land-based pollution in 
the Mediterranean; northern rivers contribute the large majority of pollution, as only about 20% of 
the total flow is discharged along the Southern and Eastern shores.58
In the Mediterranean, as in the rest o f the world, water resources were, traditionally, 
regarded as free to the consumer, and this notion persists in the public mind, tempting or obliging 
governments or local authorities to subsidise their supply, thus leading to reduced incentives to 
conserve water, treat and re-use wastewater and prevent contamination o f water bodies. Hence, 
there is a continuing increase both in volume and composition o f liquid wastes, as more household 
chemicals are used, especially in countries with intermediate average incomes.59
In the 70s, the most common system o f waste disposal has been by marine outfalls without 
any prior treatment, relying on the self-purification capacity of seawater.60 Since then, there has 
been an increasing awareness o f the need to install waste water treatment plants along the coastal 
zone, but it was not until 1985 that the Mediterranean countries in the framework o f MAP decided 
to adopt as a priority the establishment o f sewage treatment plants in all cities with more than
54 See ibid, p. 11.
55 See Grenon & Batisse (eds.), op.cit. n.5, pp. 182-200.
56 There is no data on domestic sources o f  microbial pollution to permit a direct assessment, but it is estimated that 
very large quantities are discharged with sewage, causing contamination o f  shellfish, and rendering waters unsuitable 
for recreational uses, notwithstanding considerable improvement in recent years, see UNEP, op.cit n.5, pp.50-1, and 
pp.59-60. It is noteworthy that, as recently as 1973, an epidemic o f  cholera, centred around Naples, spread by the 
consumption o f  infected shellfish, see R.B.Clark, M arine Pollution, 1986, p. 166.
57 See UNEP, op.cit n.5, pp.29-31. The direct discharges, as estimated in 1996, are in the order o f  2x10 9m 3.
58 See Jeftic et al, op.cit. n.3, p.22.
5S Ibid, pp.8-9 and 20.
60 Hence, in 1972, in the Northwestern basin at least 80-90%  o f  sewage was discharged com pletely untreated either 
directly into the sea or into river estuaries, or by pipelines which did not normally extend to distances o f  more than 100 
to 300m o ff the coast. In the Adriatic, for instance, only forty communities out o f  556 along the Italian coast had some 
degree o f  treatment facilities, see FAO/GFCM, The State o f Marine Pollution in the Mediterranean and Legislative
Controls, Studies and Reviews, N o .51, FAO, Rome, 1972, pp.6-8. In the same vein, 1978 information showed that only
50% o f  the population in the region as a whole was connected to a sewerage system, and a much smaller fraction to a 
marine outfall or a treatment facility.
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100.000 inhabitants and appropriate outfalls and/or treatment plants in all towns with more than
10.000 inhabitants. Accordingly, any new installations were expected to involve biological 
treatment. Be that as it may, a 1996 survey showed that 90% o f the population served by a 
wastewater collection system, is so served by municipal sewers.61
As far urban solid waste is concerned, such as organic matter, paper, glass, wood, textiles, 
plastics, and metals, there are considerable differences in the amounts produced in Mediterranean 
countries. At the same time, different treatment and disposal methods are used, while sometimes 
they are just dumped into the sea. According to the afore-mentioned 1996 study, 70% o f solid 
wastes are disposed by “unspecified” means in the Mediterranean region, with the rest disposed 
either by composting (~21%), or incineration (~7%), while in the five OECD countries, i.e. EU 
countries and Turkey, there is an increasing trend in the generation o f solid municipal and 
household waste.62
Landfill disposal o f solid waste and sludge are frequently practised, and leaching often 
presents a problem. Usually, the leachate is composed o f the liquid produced from the 
decomposition of the wastes and liquids entering the landfill from external sources, and depending 
on circumstances, it may contain many contaminants, in high concentrations. Leachate formation 
and movement is often a threat for groundwater quality and may sometimes reach surface waters 
causing extensive local pollution problems.
Sea disposal o f  solid wastes has always been controversial. In the past few years, the 
aesthetic nuisance and the hindrance to beneficial uses that floating paper, wood, plastic, and 
fishing gear creates has increasingly become unacceptable - although still a problem - in the region.
Turning to economic development in a strict sense, the major characteristic o f the region 
is the discrepancy among different countries, since in the Mediterranean one can come across some 
of the core countries o f the developed world, integrated in the EU, e.g. France and Italy; some semi­
peripheral - despite their EU membership - economies, e.g. Spain and Greece; and many more 
peripheral/developing countries at various levels o f industrialisation and development. All o f them, 
however, are influenced by recession periods and the global fluctuations in economic growth, trade 
and monetary equilibria. The general trends in the region are favouring the continuing 
industrialisation o f the Southern and Eastern coast, while developed economies are expected to shift 
towards lighter industries and services.
61 See UNEP, op.cit. n.5, p.31; and UNEP/W HO, Survey o f  Pollutants from  L and-B ased Sources in the 
Mediterranean, U N E P(O C A )/M £D  WG. 104/Inf. 10, UNEP, Athens, 1996. Some 33% o f  the population have no
municipal sewage treatment system, and about 41% have the benefit o f  secondary treatment, with the rest having only 
preliminary and primary treatment. About 5% o f  the wastewater is re-used, o f which 95% in irrigation; when discharged, 
about 85% o f  it goes directly or indirectly into the sea.
62 See UNEP, op.cit. n.5, p.33.
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Now, at the regional level, so far, there has been very little in the way o f economic policy. 
The EU Common Agricultural Policy and other Community policies only apply to the 
M editerranean Member States, i.e. four out o f the twenty-two countries bordering the Sea. 
Therefore, the relevant economic policies in the region remain national. Bearing that in mind, the 
main sectors of economic activity in the Mediterranean, their future development, and the pollution 
problems they create, will be examined next.
1.3.2. Agriculture.
There is a trend o f continuing industrialisation o f the agricultural sector.63 The largest 
technological progress is likely to occur in Southern and Eastern countries, where in the next twenty 
to thirty years industrial consumption by the agricultural sector will equal that o f the North. All this 
activity will affect the environment because o f the energy, water and other types o f consumption 
required. Agriculture in the hinterland, if not a “use” o f the coastal zone, has a significant 
environmental impact on the latter by way of release o f pesticides and fertilizers, which are often 
over-applied, and washed by rain directly or indirectly into the sea. Hence, land-based pollution 
from the massive use o f fertilizers would be the most obvious outcome of increased 
industrialisation, even if technological innovations lead to some economy in this area. At present, 
the fertilizers industry is responsible for the largest discharges o f mercury, and causes pollution 
from ammonia and sulphuric and phosphoric acids. Pesticide consumption data is not available 
from all countries. They can be transported by the wind and contaminate the open sea, and cause 
fish mortality and destruction o f  fauna. Organochlorine pesticides, e.g. DDT, are persistent and 
highly toxic; they have been restricted or banned, but past accumulation is reported even in remote 
areas and organisms.
1.3.3. Fishing - Aquaculture.
As far as fisheries are concerned, these are more abundant in the southern area of the 
W estern basin. The Eastern basin is distinctively poorer,64 a fact attributed to the Sicily channel 
having acted as a barrier for the diffusion o f species in past geological periods. The first signs o f 
fisheries overexploitation came with the increase in catches during the last decades. In the second 
part o f the 80s, there was a marked decline in Mediterranean fisheries, mainly attributed to 
overfishing and marine pollution, accompanied by an increase in aquaculture.65 Today demersal 
stocks o f the northern seas are considerably depleted, and many fisheries depend on the zero-class
63 See Grenon & Batisse, op.cit. n.5, pp.81-100; and UNEP, op.cit. n.5, pp,16-8.
M The mean gross yearly production o f  the coastal waters o f  Israel is around 60% less than that o f  the Western 
Mediterranean, see M.Moraitou-Apostolopoulou & V.ICiortsis (eds.), M editerranean M arine Ecosystem , 1985, p.8. But
see ibid , p.320 for doubts resulting from new data.
fi5 See Grenon & Batisse (eds.), op.cit. n.5, pp.100-2; and UNEP, op.cit. n.5, pp.18-22.
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of fish and often on juveniles that are just being recruited. This is particularly acute in the Adriatic 
and Central Mediterranean: It has been estimated that in the sea around Italy the standing biomass 
is about 20%  o f that o f comparable waters as a result o f heavy overfishing.66 On the other hand, 
coastal pelagic fisheries can still be developed, although there is not much demand due to consumer 
preferences.
Apart from the negative impact on stocks themselves, fishing activities in the 
Mediterranean have other harmful consequences: Driftnet fishing - although not widely used in the 
region - and floating long lines lead to massive, unintended destruction o f non commercial fish, 
birds and often endangered species, like the Leatherback, Green and Loggerhead turtles and 
mammals, and pollute the marine environment with lost or discarded nets and other gear. Finally, 
direct pollution from fishing fleets, although small compared with pollution caused by merchant 
and pleasure fleets, consists mainly o f bilge waters, solid waste (mainly garbage), synthetic netting, 
twines and ropes and lost “make do” buoys (often empty containers and polystyrene blocks), which 
are often washed up on beaches.
M editerranean fish-farm production was estimated at around 26,500t in 1978, basically 
consisting o f species with high market value; by 1996 this figure had increased to almost 250,000t 
and is expected to continue increasing, as aquaculture becomes more and more attractive and 
intensive, albeit not free from environmental problems. In fact, intensive aquaculture (in cages or 
tanks) uses substantial amounts o f chemicals to control parasitic and fungal infections in the 
cultured species; supplementary fish feeds may also contribute to local eutrophication. More 
important, however, will be the added competition for space along the already burdened 
Mediterranean coastline, especially in case o f extensive cultures encroaching on coastal lagoons, 
salt marshes and coastal w etlands,per se endangered habitats.67
1.3.4. Industry.
The period 1945 to 1985 was characterised by a spectacular industrialisation process in the 
Mediterranean countries, in the latter year providing approximately 16%  o f the world industrial 
production, with France alone accounting for 6 % 68 However, there is again a persistent imbalance 
between the two sides o f the basin: The Northern countries still account for approximately 93% of 
total manufacturing value added, and three countries alone account for 87% , i.e. France, Italy and
66 See FAO, Marine Resources Service, Fishery Resources and Environment D ivision, R eview  o f  the State o f  World 
F isheiy Resources, FAO Fish.Circ.(710) R ev.5, 1985, p.64.
67 Jeftic et al, op.cit. n.3, pp.44-5.
f,!i See Grenon & Batisse (eds.), op.cit, n.5, pp. 103-119; and UNEP, op.cit n.5, pp.11-2 and 25-7..
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Spain. And that is despite economic growth in the Middle East and North Africa, which, during 
the 60s and 70s, was the highest in the world, mainly due to oil exports.69
Since the 1980s, however, especially the North is suffering from a decline in traditional 
industries, such as steelmaking, the cement industry, oil refining and the related petrochemicals 
industry, as well as the mining industry, because o f fierce competition from other industrialised 
countries and market saturation for mass-consumption end-products. At the same time, in Southern 
and Eastern countries (including Turkey), industrial development slackened less, but nevertheless 
became irregular and variable from country to country, largely depending on indigenous 
adaptability to the industrial evolution o f  this period and on considerable loss o f revenue from 
declining oil exports, which often led to slow or even negative p er capita growth rates. By the 
1990s, the “ lost decade” o f the 80s prompted many o f these governments to begin economic reform 
programs to improve resource efficiency and spur private sector growth. In the process, however, 
they came face to face with the environmental legacy o f their earlier development strategy, with 
their unsustainable use of natural resources and widespread environmental degradation.
As far as the North is concerned, future trends indicate that, in the best o f cases, a growth 
in production and employment will follow GDP growth for food and agriculture, primary 
processing, and light industry, whereas only “high technology” sectors in capital goods and 
consumer durables industries, such as electronics, telematics, and biotechnologies, have most 
potential for real expansion. In the South, on the other hand, the so-called light industries are likely, 
at least initially, to have the highest relative growth, because of the fast expansion o f domestic 
markets and comparative advantages for exports, while agro-food primary processing industries will 
also enjoy steady expansion.
The main environmental impacts o f industrial activities affecting the coast and the sea are 
the so-called “ littoralisation” o f the coast - i.e. human implantation in the coastal zone -; and land- 
based pollution, including hazardous wastes. More specifically, the industry releases organic matter, 
suspended solids, phenols, PCBs (halogenated hydrocarbons), other oils, detergents, solvents, 
organic chemicals, heated cooling water, and metals.
As far as industrial effluents are concerned, the most heavily polluting industries in the 
Mediterranean region are leather tanning and finishing, mainly encountered along the Spanish and 
Italian coastline and in the area o f Athens and Alexandria; iron and steel basic industries, chiefly 
situated around Marseilles, Genova and Athens; petroleum refineries and oil terminals; and 
chemical production. Other industries o f relevant significance include textile manufacturing, food 
processing and canning, and pulp and paper factories.
6i> It is notable that, during these years, in a drive for self-sufficiency, these countries embarked on a strategy o f
industrial and agricultural protectionism supported by trade barriers, a strategy encouraged by publicly subsidised energy, 
water and agrochemicals, see B.Larsen, ‘Middle East and North Africa R egion’, in http://www- 
esd.worldbank.org/envmat/ vol2196/ mena.htm.
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The discharge o f sewage occurs in the vicinity o f all major cities o f the basin, and has 
drastically modified the ecosystem therein.70 The “dumping” o f heat (cooling water) from industrial 
and power-generating plants may also have contributed to such modification. In this context, 
pollution combatting techniques are not being developed as fast as industry is expanding. Direct 
industrial discharges to the sea are generally dispersed relatively quickly, usually within only a few 
ten kilometres o f the point o f discharge; nonetheless, flora and fauna are usually severely affected 
within this area. Dispersion and dilution are much slower if discharge is direct into rivers, and 
estuaries and deltas serving as spawning grounds for many species can be severely prejudiced.
Moreover, sometimes, nutrients are discharged in such immense quantities from sewage 
and agricultural and industrial activities that eutrophication occurs; having abundant nourishment, 
the phytoplankton population increases so much that the dissolved oxygen in the surface waters 
becomes depleted due to the increased respiratory demand o f micro-organisms digesting the excess 
organic matter.71 There are often outbursts o f heavy, often almost monospecific, blooms or “ red 
tides” in the Mediterranean, and in some instances there will be very few beneficial living 
organisms left due to the development of azoic conditions. Eutrophication, as reported in the 
Mediterranean, is mostly associated with the release o f untreated domestic-industrial waste water.72 
It is a local rather than a regional problem, frequent in the North Adriatic, and the Tyrrhenian Seas, 
the Izmir Bay (Turkey), Kastela Bay (Yugoslavia), Elefsis Bay (Greece), the lagoon o f Tunis and 
in all such areas where the rate of input o f waste exceeds that o f the exchange with the open sea.73
The industry’s solid by-products include slag, sludge, dust, combustion ashes, and mine 
tailings.74 Most o f the solid residues are inorganic and their impact on the environment still remains 
a controversial issue.75 However, there are certain types o f wastes containing specific pollutants of 
known toxic effects to the environment, which, in the Mediterranean region, principally come from 
the chemical industry, including heavy chemicals, fertilizers, primary plastics, rubber etc.; other 
bulk materials such as non-ferrous metals and pulp; speciality chemicals, such as pharmaceuticals, 
fine chemicals, dyes, paints and glues; and chemical preparations.
It should be remarked in this context that the concept o f hazardous waste is not yet entirely 
recognised and implemented in the Mediterranean, in the sense that in some areas, most hazardous 
residues such as solvents, organic chemicals, acids, alkalies, spent catalysts and inflammable solids
70 The annual direct discharges, as estimated in 1996, amounted to 6x10 9m 3.
71 See UNEP, op.cit. n.5, pp.60-1; and UNEP/FAO/W HO, Assessment o f  the State o f  Eutrophication in the 
Mediterranean Sea, MAP Technical R eports Series N o. 106, Athens, 1996.
72 Industrial waste sources account for about half o f  the organic load from the coastal area, while domestic sewage 
and agricultural organics contribute roughly a quarter each. In practice, a large percentage o f  the industrial wastes is 
discharged together with domestic sewage to form a single municipal effluent discharge; having said that, domestic 
organics are highly degradable, whereas agricultural ones are relatively stable.
73 See Jeftic et al, op.cit. n.3, pp.46-8.
7A See ibid, pp.39-40; and UNEP, op.cit. n.5, pp.31-2.
75 See Jeftic et al, op.cit. n.3, p.38, for information on the “Cassidaigne” affair.
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are currently discharged directly to the sewage system or disposed of through open dumping. In 
most countries, however, effort is being made to incorporate the notion in the existing waste 
management policy, although there is a lack o f data to quantify the magnitude o f the problem. In 
this context, it has been persistently recommended that the measures and programmes to be 
developed in the region to control liquid wastewater discharges should be accompanied by 
complementary measures dealing with the treatment and disposal o f solid and especially hazardous 
waste.76
Finally, another important carrier of, mainly industrial but also agricultural and urban, 
pollution is the atmosphere, through which wastes, especially particulates, are deposited dry on the 
sea surface or washed by rain.77 In fact, a considerable proportion o f land-based pollution is now 
thought to be airborne, e.g. 50% o f some heavy metals and nitrogen,78 but the mechanisms by 
which it spreads (“aerial catchment areas”) are rather poorly known, as it is very difficult to make 
direct measurements o f gas fluxes across the air-sea interface. Indirect methods developed have not 
yet produced results for the whole of the region.79
1.3.5. Production and Consumption o f Energy.
Both consumption and production o f commercial energy throughout the Mediterranean 
basin have changed radically in the past decades, and have been greatly influenced by the oil 
crises.80 Energy consumption has developed over sixfold between 1950 and 1985,81 whereas total 
commercial energy production has increased nearly ninefold. Nevertheless, there is - yet again - 
a very big gap between the countries o f the North and the rest, as roughly 70% o f coal production 
and 95% of primary electricity generation is concentrated in the former. This difference is gradually 
being reduced, as growth o f consumption in the North has tended to peak, whereas in the South and 
East, it is still on the increase. In fact, future scenarios foresee the continued expansion o f electricity 
in many countries, based partly on coal. Be that as it may, in both coasts, oil remains the primary 
energy source, although some importing countries have made considerable efforts to reduce their
76 WHO, Environm ental Health No.8: Industrial W astewater in the M editerranean A rea , Copenhagen, 1986.
77 See UNEP, op.cit. n.5, pp.36-8.
78 See UNEP/W HO, Assessm ent o f  Airborne Pollution o f  the Mediterranean Sea by Sulphur and Nitrogen 
Compounds and Heavy Metals in 1991, MAP Technical Report Series, N o .85, Athens, 1994; and GESAMP, The State 
o f  the Marine Environment, UNEP R egional Seas Reports and Studies, N o .l 15, UNEP, 1990, pp.34-7.
79 Take note o f  several relevant projects under way, the principal being DYFAM ED (Dynamique et Flux 
Atmosphdriques en Mdditerrande Occidentale - France); a sub-project o f  the Community ERO S-2000 (European River- 
Ocean System) project, attempting to compare riverine and atmospheric fluxes to the North-Western Mediterranean; and 
the MED POL component o f  the WMO Global Atmospheric Watch (GAW), see UNEP, op .cit n.5, p.36.
80 See G.Luciani, ‘The Mediterranean and the Energy Picture’, in G.Luciani (ed.) The M editerranean Region: 
Economic Interdependence and the Future o f  the Society, 1984, pp. 1-40; Grenon & Batisse (eds.), op.cit. n.5, pp. 120- 
MO; and UNEP, op.cit. n.5, pp.25-7.
81 It is characteristic that, in 1950, total consumption in the Mediterranean was virtually equivalent to that o f  Spain 
alone in 1985.
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consumption. Except from France, where uranium has largely replaced heavy fuels for the thermal 
generation o f electricity, the shift from oil has been generally towards natural gas. Unlike coal and 
electricity, oil is produced in the South and East - more than 90% in 1986 mainly in Libya, 
Algeria, and Egypt, followed by Syria and Tunisia.
On the other hand, offshore oil operations in the Mediterranean are not very extensive; 
depending on the year, a score o f mobile drilling rigs are in operation, accounting in 1985 for 3% 
o f the world total, as compared with 13-14% in the North Sea. The main active areas are the 
Adriatic, the Ebro shelf, the plateau between Sicily and Tunisia, the G ulf o f Gabes, the Nile Delta, 
and the Aegean Sea. For the moment, there is no question of a major oil field in the Mediterranean 
continental shelf, although there may be a deep-sea potential. The greatest environmental impact 
comes from exploration, production, and removal o f extracted oil, along with associated 
installations and activities on land, and the processing in refineries.
Refining capacities in the North should continue to contract, since there is already surplus 
capacity, and a peak in oil consumption is expected; at the same time, refining structure changes 
with an increase in expensive conversion o f heavy products into light ones, fuels and fillers for 
petrochemicals. In the South and East, refining capacities are likely to increase considerably and 
could more than double by the start o f the next century. Their environmental impact is considerable 
both to the air and the sea: In 1975, UNEP estimated that Mediterranean refineries discharged about 
20,000t/annum  o f oil into the sea; however, since then, advances in methods used must have 
reduced this figure.
As far as nuclear energy is concerned, there are sixty plants in the Mediterranean countries, 
about half o f them on the coast, with an installed capacity o f about 50,000 MWe. The nuclear cycle, 
from uranium in the ground to the end consumer o f electricity, is rather complex, involving risks 
o f pollution and/or “conventional” and radioactive accidents. The most serious fall under the 
category o f  accidents with very low probability and large-scale potential consequences, comparable 
to some extent to natural disasters. With regard to long-term storage o f radioactive waste produced, 
technical solutions have been proposed but have not yet been adopted on an industrial or market 
scale, or as a definitive answer to the problem. However, it does not seem that the pollution load 
from radioactive substances in the Mediterranean presents a major problem.82
It should finally be stressed that coal-fired power stations are, at present, the major source 
o f atmospheric pollution and global climate change, emitting C 0 3, SOx, NOx, CO, hydrocarbons, 
dust, trace heavy metals, radon, etc., and they also produce large amounts o f polluted liquid effluent
82 Radioactive discharges from nuclear plants are almost exclusively concentrated in the Northwestern basin and the 
Adriatic Sea, i.e. France, Italy and Spain. In general, levels are and will continue being low, especially if  compared to 
the radioactive contaminants in other discharged materials, e.g. phosphates, and as a result o f  fall-out from weapon test; 
and that is despite the considerable impact o f  the Chernobyl accident still being felt in Mediterranean waters, see 
UNEP/IAEA, Assessment o f  the State o f  Pollution o f  the Mediterranean Sea by Radioactive Substances, MAP Technical 
Reports Series, N o .62, Athens, 1992.
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and solid waste, ash, and recovered flying ash. More generally, the main toxic substances emitted 
during the generation, transformation and consumption o f energy are benzene and other aromatic 
hydrocarbons, from crude oil processing; heavy metals, notably lead from consumption o f leaded 
petrol; and even radioactive substances from the burning o f coal and heavy fuels. Having said that, 
there is considerable effort to develop “clean” methods o f production and expand the use of 
renewable energy sources, which, in the Mediterranean, basically involve water, sun, wind, and 
biomass, but also hot subterranean water producing geothermal energy, a rather poorly known and 
under-exploited source o f energy at present.
1.3,6. Tourism.
Many features have contributed to the tourist attraction o f the Mediterranean, including 
geographical proximity for Northern European tourists; climate; beauty o f landscapes and natural 
sites; exceptionally rich cultural heritage and more recent historical ties, which have fostered the 
habit, even created a tradition, o f inter-regional and international exchange and travel.83 Hence, in 
1999, Mediterranean countries as a whole accounted for nearly 30% o f the world tourist market; 
that made the Mediterranean the leading “tourist basin” in the world. In numbers, the 
M editerranean market rose from 58million in 1970 to 135million tourists in 1990, with the three 
Northwestern countries, Spain, France, and Italy, receiving between 70 and 80% o f international 
tourism, followed by Yugoslavia and Greece; the remaining 10% was shared among all the other 
countries, some o f which experiencing spectacular growth.
The seasonal nature of tourist arrivals is a veiy accentuated feature causing great problems 
o f employment, accommodation, resources management - notably water and pollution. Apart 
from Algeria, Israel, Egypt and to a lesser extent Syria, most other countries are affected by a high 
concentration o f tourists during the summer quarter, when the population o f some resorts is 
multiplied two to five times, while there is a considerable additional number o f domestic tourists 
(estimated 105million in 1984), excessively burdening coastal regions devoted largely or almost 
solely to this industry and receiving the major bulk.84
Be that as it may, tourism plays a sometimes important role in both the balance o f payments 
and employment; in 1984, for example, the contribution of international tourism to GDP averaged 
6.5% in the Mediterranean countries as a whole, and in 1999 exceeded 20% in Cyprus and Malta. 
Thus, in view o f its importance for national economies in the region, tourism is bound to expand 
considerably in the future. According to moderate estimations for the year 2000, 350million visitors 
are likely to arrive in the Mediterranean, with the market share o f the Northwestern countries
83 See Grenon & Batisse (eds.), op.cit. n.5, pp. 141-61; and UNEP, op.cit. n.5, pp. 15-6.
84 In fact, in Tunisia, 80% o f  foreign and domestic visitors go to the Mediterranean coast, whereas in Yugoslavia the 
figure reaches 90%.
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expected to fall slightly, while the shares o f the other regions, mostly Southern Europe followed 
by the Eastern basin and the Greater Maghreb, are likely to increase. This will lead to greater 
pressures on the environment, including consumption o f resources , both land - as vast stretches 
o f the coast, wetlands included, are turned into a continuous resort through a process of ribbon 
development - and water; pollution, especially noise, atmospheric and coastal waters pollution; and 
waste; as well as physical and socio-cultural pressures that are likely to increase, unless co­
ordination and planning, and notably promotion o f sustainable types o f  tourism, such as “eco- 
tourism”, are developed.
1.3.7. M aritime Transport.
Finally, maritime transport plays - and is likely to continue playing - an irreplaceable role 
in the trade o f  Mediterranean countries, particularly if it involves the routing o f weight cargo, large 
volumes o f liquid, and dry merchandise, or even massive passenger traffic during seasonal 
migrations.85 It is estimated that more than 200,000 commercial vessels over 100 gross registered 
tonnes (GRT) cross the Mediterranean each year, o f which the large majority are simply in transit; 
in other words, at any moment there are about 2,000 ships at sea, 250 to 300 of which are oil 
tankers. Traffic is already heavy in some areas near major ports or near compulsory crossing-points, 
such as straits or the Suez Canal. Navigation conditions are usually better in the Mediterranean than 
in other parts o f the world because o f the reliability o f maps and marine signalling, weak tides and 
currents and generally good visibility. However, all commercial vessels, as well as pleasure craft, 
contribute to the deterioration o f the marine environment, shorelines and ports, on an everyday 
basis, by the discharge o f garbage, litter, and even hazardous substances, albeit illegally.
A special characteristic o f the region is the imbalance in maritime traffic between the 
Western and Eastern parts o f the basin: The economic activity o f Northwestern countries produces 
the largest volume o f traffic in the region as regards tonnages of merchandise loaded and unloaded. 
In contrast, the activity in the South and East is more limited, with traffic being more a matter o f 
necessary routing, than o f requirements and resources o f coastal states, since, for example, the oil 
loaded on their shores comes mostly by pipeline from non-Mediterranean countries.
The actual calculation o f the “Mediterranean fleet” is a difficult task due to the special 
characteristics o f the “flag” concept - some fleets, most notably the Greek one, have a considerable 
proportion o f ships under “flags o f convenience”, in particular Panama and Liberia -, and to the fact 
that vessels registered in a country might be engaged elsewhere in the world never entering the 
Mediterranean, or possibly at another seaboard o f countries like France, Spain, Turkey, Morocco
“5 See Grenon & Batisse (eds.), op.cit. n.5, pp.171-81; and UNEP, op.cit. n.5, pp.12-5.
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etc.86 The distribution o f capacity is also quite imbalanced, in view o f the fact that Greece, together 
with two largely “open” flags, Malta and Cyprus, account for over 70% o f the GRT. It follows that 
transport capacity o f Mediterranean flags hardly corresponds to the different countries’ share in the 
region’s maritime trade, and this trend is on the rise, leading to difficulties in ensuring compliance 
with anti-pollution regulations.87
Mediterranean maritime traffic, by category o f merchandise, comprises a very large 
hydrocarbon tonnage, which includes crude oil, refined products, and liquefied natural gas. The 
main flow o f loaded tankers crosses the Mediterranean from East to West, primarily from the Suez 
and Near East, but also from Black Sea ports. Although crude-oil traffic is declining considerably, 
compared with the years before the second “oil shock”, the tonnage o f oil cargo travelling through 
the Sea is estimated at about 20% (approximately 350million tonnes) o f the world total, which is 
exceptionally high. Notwithstanding the fact that a significant increase in oil requirements in coastal 
states is not envisaged, transit traffic could increase as North Sea and US deposits become depleted. 
M oreover, the shift o f refining processes closer to production sites would signify a rise in the 
proportion o f  refined products in traffic. Overall, a decline is probable in the average tonnage o f 
tankers operating in the Mediterranean, which will lead to more units using the sea for the same 
tonnage transported.
As far as chronic oil pollution is concerned,88 the two main M editerranean basins have 
different loads; the Eastern basin has some well-defined centres o f oil pollution, i.e. a few areas in 
the Aegean and around the pipeline terminals o f the Middle and Near East, whereas in the Western 
basin oil terminals and refineries are much more numerous and the problem is wide-spread. Having 
said that, the principal source o f chronic oil pollution is the day-to-day activity o f ships, and in this 
connection the Mediterranean Sea has always been without adequate reception facilities for ballast 
waters.89 In 1983, thirty-six out o f fifty-two ports reviewed did not have the necessary facilities,
86 That said, as at 1 July 1987, according to Lloyd’s Register o f Shipping, all the 10,369 ships navigating under flags 
o f  Mediterranean states were equivalent to a fleet o f  58.3m.GRT (14% o f  the world total), with a lading capacity o f  a 
little over 98m.t (or 15% o f  the world total). The distribution o f  tanker tonnage by Mediterranean flag and the relative 
importance o f  each country involved in oil import or export is even greater than that for the total fleet.
87 See infra, Chapter 2, pp.80-2.
88 The main sources o f  oil pollution in the Mediterranean are ballasting/deballasting operations o f  tankers; discharge 
o f oily bilge-water; tank washing; accidental spills; terminal and bunkering operations; dry docking; refinery effluents 
and oil storage wastes; and discarded lubricants and other o ils in municipal and industrial waste waters and rivers. 
Lubricating oil is indeed one o f  the most important pollutants, widely used in machinery, electrical and transportation 
equipment, chemical, rubber and plastic production, but there is little data indicating the amounts discharged in the 
Mediterranean region, although attention has repeatedly been drawn to their management, see UNEP/UNIDO, 
Assessment o f  Used Lubricating Oils in the M editerranean Sea and P roposed  M easures f o r  their Elim ination, UNEP, 
1987.
89 According to a 1972 survey by the GFCM, many o f  the oil ports possessed only one reception facility and often 
those that were available were not fully utilised, FAO/GFCM, op.cit, n.60.The “ load-on-top” system was inconvenient 
to use in the Mediterranean, as distances involved are too short and there was usually not enough time to transfer the 
ballast water back and forth, to clean the tanks and to allow the water to settle out from the oily washings and dirty 
ballast, Truver, op.cit. n .l, pp. 104-5.Therefore, most tankers continued to discharge their ballast, washings and oily 
bilges, in the two areas o f  the Mediterranean Sea where such discharges were permitted under the 1954 OILPOL, i.e.
(continued...)
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although MARPOL having entered into force the same year banned all discharges in the area,90 and 
the situation has since improved at a very slow pace.
As far as accidental oil pollution is concerned, the situation in the Mediterranean as 
compared with the rest o f the world oceans has been unusually good.91 In fact, in the period 
between January 1990 and December 1995, the Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response 
Centre (REMPEC) reported twenty-nine major accidents (out o f 145 maritime accidents reported 
in all), o f which nine were due to sinking, nine were due to collision, eight were due to operational 
failures, two were due to fire or explosion, and one due to grounding,92 The cargo involved was 
predominantly oil, but also other hazardous substances such as ammonia, barite, potash, propylene, 
sulphuric acid etc. However, risk o f accidents should increase in the future in proportion with the 
increase in traffic, but spillages would involve smaller amounts o f material. "Notably, refined 
products are more volatile and soluble than crude oil, but also more explosive and/or toxic. On the 
other hand, it should also be noted that increase in transport implies the construction of new ships 
complying with international standards, and, hopefully, utilising advanced technology to avoid 
human errors.
It should be noted in this context that the toxicity o f petroleum hydrocarbons depends on 
the composition o f the petroleum, the concentration and the type o f organisms exposed. Generally, 
oil is biologically toxic and depletes oxygen in the water. The impact o f oil on fish and mammals 
includes tainting, contamination by carcinogenic compounds, diminution o f populations, death; 
consumption of such food may lead to poisoning.93 In addition, cyclonic circulation in the 
Mediterranean tends to deposit the oil on the shores or to accumulate it at certain exposed points, 
no matter whether it comes from offshore or from land, which means that fishing gear is coated and 
beaches - and their recreational utility - damaged. Having said that, oil is not as dangerous as other 
chemicals. The wide-spread concern about it stems from its visibility as it forms slicks and tar 
lumps, and from celebrated accidents attracting public attention. Some o f the chemical dispersants 
used in large quantities to control spills can be more toxic to marine life than oil itself or cause it 
to sink and cover extended areas o f seabed.
*w(... continued)
between Italy and Libya, and South-W est o f  Cyprus. However, these two areas are situated within two surface gyres 
causing the residues to be trapped indefinitely and becom e highly concentrated.
y<) See Grenon & Batisse (eds.), op.cit. n.5, p .173.
y| On the effective response to the explosion o f  Haven, carrying 144,000t o f  crude oil, near the port o f  Genova in 
1991, see A.Alati, ‘Emergency Response at the Port o f  Genoa’, UNEP Indusrty an d  Environment, Vol. 15(1/2), 1992, 
pp.69-72.
M See UNEP, op.cit. n.5, p. 14.
”  GESAMP, Impact o f  Oil on the Marine Environment, Reports and Studies, N o.6 , FAO, Rome, 1977.
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Information available on inputs o f oils, and of the relative importance o f different sources, 
in the Mediterranean is limited.94 Le Lourd’s 1975 estimate o f 0.5 to 1 million tons/year,95 however, 
remains a reasonable figure,95 in view o f the fact that although the amount o f oil transported over 
the world’s oceans has increased considerably, there has been a significant reduction in the quantity 
o f oil discharged into the sea due to the entering into force o f the M ARPOL Convention.
As far as natural gas is concerned, increased use should lead to new trans-Mediterranean 
pipelines (apart from the already existing Algeria-Italy pipeline, there are projects to link Algeria 
to Spain), presenting the most economical means o f transport for distances not exceeding 3,000km. 
Risk of explosion aside, transport o f gas by sea seems fairly safe, as there is only one serious 
accident reported so far involving grounding on a rock in the Straits o f Gibraltar.
It should also be noted that although the main products transported “ in bulk” on the 
Mediterranean Sea are ores, coal, and grain, hazardous chemicals, such as propane, ammonia, 
benzene, sulphuric and phosphoric acids, caustic soda etc., are also transported in significant 
quantities. There are no global statistics on maritime transport o f chemicals in the Mediterranean; 
only some national figures exist, but the section on unidentified products covers usually more than 
20% o f the data reported.97 However, chemical products, most frequently transported “ in bulk” in 
considerable quantities, can be a source o f accidental pollution causing grave ecological damage.
1.4. Concluding Remarks.
As has become evident by the preceding discussion, it is quite difficult to come up with 
a general pronouncement on the state o f the Mediterranean environment; the sheer size, complexity, 
and diversity o f the sea, and the human pressures exerted thereon, as well as the usually fragmented 
data, account for this difficulty, In 1977, in a much cited paper, Osterberg and Keckes presented 
an overview o f the major pollutants in the Mediterranean and evaluated their relative importance.98 
They concluded that although the Mediterranean is polluted by pesticides, heavy metals and sewage 
in the coastal waters where population and industry are greatest, “the large open masses of... water 
do not seem to be much different from other oceans, except perhaps for oil tar-balls floating in the
‘M See Truver, op.cit. n .l , p. 14; and UNEP, op.cit. n.5, p.49.
95 See Ph.Le Lourd, ‘Oil Pollution in the Mediterranean Sea’, 6 Am bio, 1977, pp.318-9. But see Truver, op.cit, n .l, 
p. 105, for a different estimation, i.e. that operational spills were in the range o f  2 00 -300 ,OOOm.t annually in the mid- 
1970s, but all other sources accounted for an additional one million m.t per year.
96 See UNEP/IM O/IOC, A ssessm ent o f  the Present State o f  Pollution by Petroleum  Plydrocarbons in the 
Mediterranean Sea, UNEP/W G.160/11, Athens, 1987, for an estimation o f  an annual petroleum load o f  635,000 tons, 
out o f which, 330,000 are spilled from ballasting and loading operations, bilge and tank washings (even a figure o f  500 
x 103t has been considered reasonable by 1MO), 270,000 from land sources (160,000 from municipal and 110,000 from 
industrial sources) and 35,000 are airborne.
97 See Jeftic et al, op.cit. n.3, pp.37-9.
98 Osterberg & Keckes, op.cit. n.46, pp.321 e tse q .
51
water and for the elevated levels o f mercury found in migratory fish, such as tuna and swordfish”.99 
In the same vein, the 1990 UNEP Report on the State o f the Mediterranean Environment concludes 
that “ in the light o f load assessment results...and data related to pollution monitoring in the 
receiving waters,...the main water body o f the Mediterranean Sea is relatively clean and pollution 
is o f concern locally in highly populated coastal areas”.100 The 1996 Report, on the other hand, 
concluded that “ [t]he Mediterranean continues to be a polluted semi-enclosed sea, quite badly so 
in certain places at certain times, but perhaps quite moderately so in general.”101
This general conclusion seems, in fact, to reflect more accurately the current state o f the 
M editerranean marine environment than the earlier ones.102 In fact, all confined Mediterranean 
localities adjacent to large urban centres appear to face progressive built-up o f pollution, as a result 
o f continued uncontrolled anthropogenic release,103 and the region as a whole is subject to intense 
maritime traffic. And that is despite international efforts at controlling marine pollution from these 
two main sources, under way in the region for more than two decades, which will be reviewed in 
the next Chapter.
The envisaged continuation o f the pattern o f coastal urban expansion will only make the 
problem o f land-based pollution more intense, not only in the North where it is already acute, but 
also in the developing Southern and Eastern coast o f the basin. That brings us to the North-South 
dimension o f the Mediterranean region. Despite a long common tradition o f nature exploitation and 
co-existence, the Mediterranean states have throughout the past also developed political and social 
divisions, and have often resorted to war. Today there appears to begin a new era o f Euro- 
Mediterranean co-operation that can be used to promote observance o f environmental protection 
standards as will be shown in Chapter 6.
™ Ibid, p.326.
100 See Jeftic et al, op.cit. n.3, p.22.
101 See UNEP, op.cit. n.5, p. 117.
102 This is confirmed in EEA, op.cit. n.49.
103 A  reality observed especially in the Bay o f  Algiers, the “ lac de Tunis”, the Bay o f  Abu-Kir near Alexandria, the 
Bay o f  Izmir in Turkey, the North Adriatic and the entire coastal belt along the North coast o f  Western Mediterranean 
already since the late 70s, see L.J.Saliba ‘Protecting the Mediterranean - Co-ordinating regional A ction’, 2 M ar.Pol., 
1978, pp.51-2.
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Chapter 2.
Th e  In te r n a  tional  L a  w  o n  th e  P r o t e c t io n  o f  th e  
M e d it e r r a n e a n  Sea  a  g a in s t  P oll  u tio n .
This Chapter provides an overview o f international environmental law related to marine 
pollution and applicable in the Mediterranean region to serve as a necessary background for the 
discussion that is to follow in the next Chapters. This is necessary not only because it provides the 
indispensable setting for examining the central issue o f the present study, i.e. established and 
emerging mechanisms to ensure compliance with that body o f law, but, most importantly, because 
the extent and content o f applicable rules have a direct bearing on whether and how they are 
complied with, as will be argued in the next Chapter. Moreover, the type o f compliance control that 
international law should put in place also depends on the nature o f the set rules as will become 
apparent in subsequent Chapters.
The second Section o f this Chapter goes on to examine the hierarchy between the various 
norms o f international law that are applicable in the present context. This is because rules adopted 
at different fo ra  have to be complementary and consistent in order to allow for all states bound by 
them to effectively implement them without risking being accused o f  an international violation. 
Moreover, regional treaties cross-referring to global rules are particularly important, since they thus 
create binding obligations for countries which have not chosen to abstain from an environmental 
regime established in their region, but fail - for whatever reason - to participate in wider 
international legal arrangements.
2.1. Obligations to Protect and Enhance the M editerranean M arine Environment.
As was observed in the previous Chapter, the M editerranean Sea is bordered by three 
continents and twenty-two states belonging to a multiplicity o f legal cultures, international 
organisations and groupings; hence, international law applicable here is complex and vast. Even in 
the more restricted field o f  international environmental law, the same pattern is prevalent. More 
specifically, global rules - comprehensive and sectoral - referring to the protection o f the marine 
environment from pollution are applicable, sometimes imposing stricter standards for sensitive seas, 
like the Mediterranean, along with the specific, regional rules, i.e. those o f the Mediterranean Action 
Plan (MAP) system, developed within the Mediterranean Regional Seas Programme under the 
auspices o f the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and consisting o f a framework 
Convention and an ever-increasing series o f sectoral Protocols.
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Furthermore, co-operation on a continental level has resulted in the establishment of 
policies and law, those o f the European Union (EU) being the principal and more sophisticated, 
relating to the protection o f the marine environment. European Union law (henceforth Community 
law) encompasses a great range o f diverse, environmental instruments, from Action Programmes 
designating mid-term policy - not endowed with strict, legally binding force - to specific legislation 
o f a procedural or substantive nature and o f more or less immediate application in M ember States’ 
legal orders. Jt also contains an abundance o f economic rules that indirectly come to have a great 
bearing on the sea, by regulating economic activities with polluting effects. Other economic co­
operation arrangements in Africa and the Middle East have a similar, although much more restricted 
im pact.1 The European contribution is not limited to Community law, however. There is an 
additional series o f treaties, adopted under the auspices o f the UN Economic Commission for 
Europe (ECE), or the Council o f Europe, which regulate a diversity o f issues o f great importance 
to the present study.
If  it is to be properly understood and implemented, this intricate web o f international 
regulation on the protection o f the Mediterranean Sea from pollution has to be viewed as an 
interdependent whole, a dynamic system, and not a haphazard sum o f autonomous elements.2 In 
this context, it must be clarified from the start that the traditional distinction between different 
international legal rules according to the level at which they have been adopted, i.e. global, regional 
etc., is not observed in the following Sections. This is because the origin o f a rule is not as 
significant for inducing compliance as the nature and formulation o f the obligations contained 
therein. Hence, international law examined here is divided on the basis o f  other criteria, such as 
what kind of substantive or procedural obligation it introduces.
Having said that, the origin o f the norms is, by no means, always inconsequential to 
compliance. Indeed, it will be shown below that Community environmental law tends to present 
certain characteristics that make its implementation and enforcement more likely. Moreover, as will 
be argued in subsequent Chapters, the advanced stage o f development o f the European legal order 
as such, irrespectively o f any specific standard, even allows for a distinct model o f  compliance 
control.
Throughout the subsequent discussion, secondary categorisations are also suggested 
corresponding to some questions critical for present purposes, namely whether an obligation 
operates at the international/domestic level or at both, on which depends whether an international/ 
national/transnational compliance control system is more suitable; and whether the obligations at 
hand are incurred by developed states only or by both developed and developing countries - either
1 See UNEP, R eport o f  the African M inisterial Conference on the Environm ent, Cairo, 16-18 Dec. 1985, 
UNEP/AEC.1/2.
2 See A.Kiss & D.Shelton, ‘Systems Analysis o f  International Law: A  M ethodological Inquiry’, XVII Neth.Y.B.J.L., 
1986, p.45.
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due to the geographical coverage o f the instrument in which they are contained or to the substance 
o f the rule - on which the nature o f problems those called upon to implement them are likely to face 
and the type o f international response they necessitate largely depend.
The following account does not purport to be exhaustive in the sense that every detail o f 
a particular legal regime is presented; it is rather intended to give a broad picture o f the core 
elements in various areas o f international regulation that will enable some general conclusions to 
be drawn. Moreover, large parts o f international environmental law applicable in the Mediterranean 
area are not touched upon, either because regulated activities are not known to pose a problem for 
the region, as is the case with production and transport o f nuclear energy and matter,3 or because 
the subject-matter o f regulation does not traditionally fall under the marine pollution heading.4 
Hence, the following discussion is confined to the main bulk o f international law traditionally 
perceived as related to marine pollution, and, especially, to pollution from land-based and maritime 
activities that have already been identified as the many problems in the region, so as to be 
manageable.5
Accordingly, the principal sets o f applicable international standards that will be examined 
are those contained in global conventions, both general, such as the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law o f the Sea (LOSC), and sectoral, i.e. addressing specific sources o f marine 
pollution, such as the 1972 Convention on the Prevention o f Marine Pollution from Dumping o f 
Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention) with regard to dumping; the 1973 Convention for 
the Prevention o f Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) in relation to vessel-generated pollution; and 
the 1989 Convention on the Control o f Transboundary Movements o f Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal (Basel Convention) which regulates seaborne movement o f hazardous waste.
There are also global agreements addressing the issue o f effective response in case of 
accidental pollution, including the 1969 International Convention relating to Intervention on the 
High Seas in Cases o f Oil Pollution Casualties (1969 Intervention Convention); the 1973 Protocol 
relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases o f Marine Pollution by Substances Other than Oil 
(1973 Intervention Protocol); and the 1990 Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response 
and Co-operation (OPRC Convention).
Regional legal regimes are equally, if not more, important. The ones especially pertinent 
to the Mediterranean region are that under the 1976/1995 ‘framework’ Convention on the Protection 
o f the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region o f the Mediterranean (Barcelona
3 See supra  Chapter 1, p,45 and fn.82.
4 In that vein, the European regulation o f  atmospheric pollution in the 1979 ECE Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution (Geneva Convention), and the related Protocols, and any relevant Community law and 
MAP standards (Land-Based Protocol, Annex 111) are excluded.
5 While acknowledging the current trend to encompass marine pollution under the much wider heading o f  sustainable 
development o f  seas and coastal areas, see supra, Introduction, pp.24-5.
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Convention/BC); the 1976/1995 Protocol for the Prevention and Elimination o f Pollution o f the 
Mediterranean Sea by Dumping fi'om Ships and Aircraft or Incineration at Sea (Dumping Protocol); 
the 1976 Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Combatting Pollution o f the Mediterranean Sea by 
Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases o f Emergency (Emergency Protocol); the 1980/1996 
Protocol for the Protection o f the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-Based Sources 
and Activities (Athens Protocol; in its revised form Land-Based Protocol); the 1994 Protocol for the 
Protection o f the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation 
o f the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil (Offshore Protocol); and the 1996 Protocol 
on the Prevention o f Pollution o f the Mediterranean Sea by Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Hazardous Wastes Protocol).6
Continental sectoral regimes will also be reviewed, such as those o f the 1991 Convention 
on the Ban o f the Import into Africa and the Control o f Transboundary M ovement o f Hazardous 
Wastes within Africa (Bamako Convention); the 1992 ECE Convention on the Protection and Use 
o f Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (ECE Transboundary Watercourses 
Convention); and the 1997 Convention on the Law o f Non-Navigational Uses o f International 
Watercourses (International Watercourses Convention).
At Community level, pollution control is regulated in a comprehensive manner in Council 
Directive 96/61 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control. The principal instruments 
addressing pollution o f Community waters are Council Directive 73/404 relating to detergents; 
Council Directive 76/160 on the quality o f bathing water; Council Directive 79/923 on the quality 
required o f shellfish waters; Council Directive 76/464 on pollution caused by certain dangerous 
substances discharged into the aquatic environment o f the Community, and ‘daughter’ Directives; 
Council Directive 80/68 on the protection of groundwater. Discharge o f urban and industrial waste 
into the sea is regulated by Council Directive 91/271 on the collection, treatment and discharge of 
urban and industrial waste, as amended by Directive 98/15. Industrial processes generating waste 
that might eventually end up in the sea are regulated by Council Directive 78/76 on the disposal o f 
titanium dioxide waste; and Council Directive 75/439 on the disposal o f waste oils. Transfrontier 
movement o f hazardous waste is regulated by Council Directive 84/631 on transfrontier shipments 
o f hazardous waste; and Council Regulation 259/93 on the supervision and control o f shipments of 
waste within, into and out o f the European Union. Finally, procedural rules for the eventuality of 
an emergency are found in Council Decision 86/85 on the establishment o f a Community 
information system for the control and reduction o f pollution caused by oil spillages of 
hydrocarbons and other harmful substances discharged at sea or in inland waterways, and Council 
Directive 93/75 concerning minimum requirements for vessels bound for or leaving Community
6 For the sake o f  completeness, it should be noted that the MAP system is complemented by the 1982/1995 Protocol 
concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean, which, however, is beyond the 
scope o f  the present study, see supra , Introduction, pp.24-5.
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ports and carrying dangerous or polluting goods.
Discussion o f the positive law upheld by these instruments begins with substantive 
obligations, ranging from the very general to the more particular, namely from the duty to formulate 
policies and programmes and adopt measures to protect and enhance the marine environment to the 
duty to control/eliminate specific polluting substances and control/ban certain activities. The only 
procedural obligation operating at the international level examined in this Chapter is the duty to co­
operate with a view to protecting the marine environment in cases o f emergency. It should be said 
that these are actually the least significant standards o f this nature that will concern this study. A 
series o f other procedural rules closely linked to compliance control at the national or international 
level are discussed throughout subsequent Chapters. Suffice it here to say that they include co­
operation to build capacity in developing states and provide funding for environmental infrastructure 
(Chapter 6); the duty to submit periodic reports, monitor the marine environment, and co-operate 
within international organs to follow up implementation o f international rules (Chapter 5); the 
requirement o f prior environmental impact assessment; public access to environmental information; 
and standing in judicial and administrative proceedings (Chapter 8); as well as civil liability 
standards (Chapter 4).
2.1.1. Duty to Formulate Policies, Programmes and Strategies, and Adopt Measures
with a view to Protecting the Marine Environment from Pollution and Enhancing it.
2.1.1.1. LOSC, Arts.192-194.
The cardinal rule found in the main body o f environmental provisions o f the LOSC (Part 
XII, Arts. 192-237) is the one declaring that “states have the obligation to protect and preserve the 
marine environment” (Art. 192), irrespective o f  whether it is under their sovereignty and/or 
jurisdiction or not, and to take all measures necessary “to prevent, reduce and control pollution of 
the marine environment from any source” (Art. 194(1)). These stipulations, but also the whole web 
o f provisions that follow, mirror what has been succinctly described as “a fundamental shift from 
power to duty as the central controlling principle o f the legal regime for the protection of the marine 
environment” .7
Consequently, the traditional ‘freedom of the high seas’, which comprised the freedom to 
pollute,8 no longer exists in this respect5? At the same time, maritime zones under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of coastal states also fall under the above mandate irrespective o f whether pollution 
thereof has any impact on other states and their environment or on areas beyond national
7 A.E. Boyle, ‘Marine Pollution under the Law o f  the Sea Convention’, 79 A .J.l.L ., 1985, p.350.
8 The 1958 Convention on the High Seas merely required states to take measures to prevent pollution from oil and 
dumping o f  radioactive waste, and to co-operate with a view to prevent pollution from radioactive substances (Arls.24- 
25). It also reaffirmed the principle o f ‘reasonable regard to the interests o f  other states’ prohibiting in this way abuse 
o f  rights; hence, ‘unreasonable’ pollution interfering with other states freedoms might be illegal; see also Nuclear Tests 
Case, 1974 l.C.J. Reports, per Judge de Castro, p.390.
9 See P.W .Birnie & A.E.Boyle, International Law an d  the Environment, 1992, p.253.
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jurisdiction; thus, the absolute sovereignty o f states is limited to the extent that they have an 
independent duty to protect and preserve their own marine environment (Art. 193). This ground­
breaking duty goes beyond the traditional ‘no harm’ rule as codified in relation to the environment 
in Principle 21 o f the Stockholm Declaration - which is nevertheless upheld in Article 194(2). The 
proliferation o f general and sectoral treaties on the protection of the marine environment, especially 
the comprehensive regional ones - whether under the auspices o f U N EP’s Regional Seas 
Programme or not -10, reiterate these precepts. Almost twenty years after their identification and 
formulation, the LOSC principles still provide the global framework for environmental protection; 
however, although by now widely acceded to as customary law," much remains to be done in terms 
o f further specification and implementation thereof.12
Having said that, the LOSC does not have anything substantially new to say in relation to 
actual implementation of these duties.13 It rather entrusts states, individually or collectively, with the 
task o f adopting appropriate measures, using “the best practicable means at their disposal and in 
accordance with their capabilities” and thus having broad discretion, albeit urging them to consider 
jo in t adoption o f such measures and harmonisation o f their policies (Art. 194(1)).
In this context, an important stipulation which usually passes unnoticed is that o f Article 
195 whereby action to prevent marine pollution must not lead to direct or indirect transfer o f 
damage or hazards from one area to another or transformation o f one type o f pollution into another. 
By virtue o f it, and although the notion is not expressly incorporated in the Barcelona framework,14 
Mediterranean states are not free to adopt ‘anti-pollution’ measures that are not genuine, e.g. 
measures that would reduce discharge o f urban or industrial pollutants into the sea by dumping them 
in sites inadequate to ensure that the soil or groundwater are not contaminated.15
2.1.1.2. Barcelona Convention, Art.4.
The objective o f the revised Barcelona Convention - which constitutes the cornerstone of 
the legal component o f the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) - as stated in its preamble is to protect 
and enhance the marine environment in the region, taking into account its special characteristics and 
particular vulnerability, and appreciating its value and the Parties’ own “responsibility to preserve
10 Covering almost all marine regions, i.e. the Mediterranean, the North-East Atlantic, the Baltic, the Arabian Gulf, 
West and Central Africa, the South-East Pacific, the Red Sea and the G ulf o f  Aden, the Caribbean, Eastern Africa, the 
South Pacific, the Black Sea, and the East Asian region.
" See among others, Boyle, op.cit. n .l, pp, 347-72; B.Kwiatkowska, The 200-M ile EEZ in the New law o f  the Sea, 
1989, Chapter 5; J.Norlon Moore, ‘Customary International Law after the Convention’, in R.B.Kruger & S.A.Riesenfeld 
(eds.), The D eveloping O rder o f  the Oceans (Law o f  the Sea Institute Eighteenth Annual Conference Proceedings), 
1985, p.43; W.L.Schachle Jr., ‘The Value o f  the 1982 UN Convention on the Law o f the Sea: Preserving Our Freedoms 
and Protecting the Environment’, 23 O.D.I.L., 1992, p.59; and Birnie & Boyle, op.cit. n.9, pp.254-5.
12 See, e.g. Boyle, op.cit. n .l ,  p .357.
13 For a more detailed discussion, see infra Chapter 7, pp.296-7.
14 C f  Art.5(2) o f  the 1986 Convention for the Protection o f  the Natural Resources and Environment o f  the South 
Pacific Region; and Art.2(4) o f  the 1992 Paris Convention.
15 On the relevant EC Directive on integrated pollution control, see infra, pp.67-9.
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and sustainably develop this common heritage for the benefit and enjoyment o f present and future 
generations” . The basic undertaking to that effect is to take individual or collective appropriate 
measures “to prevent, abate, combat and to the fullest possible extent eliminate pollution... and to 
protect and enhance the marine environment...”,16 so as to contribute towards sustainable 
development o f the region (A rt.4(l)). Furthermore, in the 1995 revision, the Parties laid down 
certain principles to guide adoption o f  such measures: They agreed to apply the ‘precautionary 
principle’, in accordance with their capabilities; as well as the ‘polluter pays’ principle; to 
undertake environmental impact assessments for proposed activities, and co-operate in relevant 
procedures when appropriate; and to promote integrated management o f the coastal zones (Art.4(3)).
It is also specified that relevant programmes and measures must “contain, where 
appropriate, time limits for their completion”, that “best available techniques and best environmental 
practices” must be utilised, and environmentally sound technology, including clean production 
methods must be promoted (Art.4(4)).17 The Parties have, moreover, agreed to “co-operate in the 
formulation and adoption o f  protocols...prescribing agreed measures, procedures and standards for 
the implementation o f [the] Convention” (Art.4(5) and 21).
One must, at this point, put the above undertakings in context: Already from its inception 
in 1976, the overall legal approach o f the Barcelona Convention is described as a ‘framework’ 
system, lying somewhere between the comprehensive (Baltic Sea) and the piecemeal (North-East 
Atlantic) ones.18 Like the 1974/1992 Helsinki Convention, it comprises a general, all-encompassing, 
‘umbrella’ agreement; but unlike it, implementation and elaboration o f specific provisions are not 
left to technical annexes forming an integral part o f the instrument. Under the Barcelona Convention 
detailed regulations are to be adopted through sectoral Protocols and their Annexes, independent 
from each other, similar to the instruments o f the early North-East Atlantic system,19 in the sense 
that each Protocol is only binding on its parties (BC, Art.29(2)), which are additionally empowered 
to take any relevant decisions (Art.29(3)). On the other hand, the framework Convention is related 
to the Protocols, since no-one may become party to the Convention without becoming party to at 
least one o f the Protocols, and vice versa (A rt.29(l)).
A lthough all possibilities were considered in the preliminary inter-governmental
16 Italics denote formulations inserted at the 1995 revision o f  the Barcelona Convention and Protocols.These 
instruments are not yet in force.
17 It must, however, be noted that an Italian proposal to attach an Annex to the BC that would lay down criteria for 
the definition o f  Best Available Techniques and Best Environmental Practice was rejected, see UNEP, Report o f  the 
Meeting o f Legal and Technical Experts to examine amendments to the Barcelona Convention, the Dumping Protocol 
and the Specially Protected Areas Protocol, UNEP(OCA)/M ED W G.91/7, 1 March 1995, p.4.
18 J.A de Yturriaga, ‘Regional Conventions on the Protection o f  the Marine Environment’, 162/1 Receuil des Cours, 
1979, p.336-40.
19 See, e.g., 1974 Paris Convention; 1972 Oslo Dumping Convention; and 1969 Agreement for Co-operation in 
dealing with Pollution o f  the North Sea by Oil and Other Harmful Substances.
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consultations,20 and the need for comprehensive regulation o f all forms o f pollution was 
acknowledged, in 1976 it was too early for everybody - in view o f the great diversity o f countries - 
to assume detailed obligations on all polluting sources. According to Bliss-Guest, a system less 
onerous than one in which all obligations are contained in a single agreement, with a take-it-or- 
leave-it implication, might be the only way to give adequate recognition to the diverse national 
political constraints upon the adoption o f new international obligations, and is particularly important 
in regions containing both developed and developing states, as it allows negotiation and 
implementation o f technical regulations by those best suited to the task - presumably scientists. This 
approach also helps build consensus, since Parties’ self-assurance increases with each successive 
agreement, and allows for partial revocation if circumstances so require.21 Thus, the legal content 
o f the system is not static but - potentially - ever evolving, a possibility acknowledged and 
sanctioned from the very beginning.
In view o f the broad wording - as will be shown more clearly below - o f the Convention's 
substantive provisions, most notably “to take all appropriate measures”, the not rare qualifications 
inserted, e.g “as far as possible”, and the weakness o f some operative phrases, e.g. “shall endeavour 
to”, it w ouldprima facie  seem that “the Barcelona Convention is a skeletal document which places 
no specific duties on the contracting parties” .22 However, the Convention is neither a legal text 
devoid o f meaning nor a political statement o f will. To be properly understood, it must be seen in 
context, i.e as the constituent instrument - in many aspects a ‘non self-executing’ one -23 o f a single 
normative system,24 containing protocols and other legal norms with increasing prescriptive 
concreteness.25 In this connection, along with the general principles of that system and the general 
duty o f article 4(1), as was already noted, the Convention imposes on its Parties a duty de 
contrahendo in Article 4(5) - irrespectively o f whether this is in theory a duty to actually conclude 
agreements or a duty to negotiate them in good faith -, which Parties began fulfilling simultaneously 
with the adoption o f  the Convention through conclusion o f the first two Protocols.
An interesting analytical approach is that o f Professor Raftopoulos who argues that the 
Barcelona Convention system is
20 See de Yturriaga, op.cit. n . l8, p.338-9, where it is reminded that the piecemeal approach had been attempted twice 
without success, namely at the 1972 N euilly Conference, where Western Mediterranean states failed to approve an 
Agreement concerning Co-operation in Dealing with Oil Pollution o f  the Waters o f  the Mediterranean, and the 1972 
Rome Conference, where a preliminary draft Convention for the Prevention o f  Pollution in the Mediterranean by 
Dumping from Ships and Aircraft was never finalised.
21 P.A .Bliss-G uest, ‘The Protocol against Pollution from Land-Based Sources: A  Turning Point in the Rising Tide 
o f  Pollution’, 17 Stanford J  o f  Int 7 L. , 1981, pp.267 and 279.
22 D.de Hoyos, ‘The United Nations Environment Program: The Mediterranean Conferences’, 17 H a rv .l.L J ., 1976, 
p.643.
23 On the issue o f ‘self-executing’ provisions o f  international law, see infra, Chapter 7, pp.309-10.
24 U.Leanza, ‘The Regional System o f  Protection o f  the Mediterranean against Pollution’, in U.Leanza (ed.), The 
International Legal Regime o f  the M editerranean Sea, 1987, p.397.
25 Ibid, p.398,
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“a complex legal and institutional phenomenon,... constitutive o f an international 
environmental order developing diacronically rather than syncronically and contextually 
rather than in isolation from its relational foundation.”26
He submits that such systems generate an ‘international trust’ on their subject-matter - with coastal
states acting as ‘regional environmental trustees’ and the international community through UNEP
and other organizations involved as assisting ‘relational trustees’ - through gwasMegislative
instruments, such as the Barcelona Convention and Protocols.27
Thus,
“each Contracting Party retains a degree o f discretion regarding its conduct vis-a-vis the 
adoption o f an additional Protocol. Yet its discretion is as to ‘w hen’ rather than as to 
‘whether’ it will adopt...[it]... As a... Party, a [s]tate is, therefore, attributed a relational 
status and its membership is, as a result, based on a relational consensus... [which] refers 
to all aspects o f the relation... and it covers, in effect, all the implementing Protocols which 
are to be gradually established....”28
That said, the stipulations of both the LOSC and the Barcelona Convention discussed so 
far, however categorical, are still very general. They may acquire concrete meaning susceptible to 
legal control only if read together with the following.
2.1.2. Duty to Control/Eliminate Specific Polluting Substances and Control/Ban 
Specific Polluting Activities - Land-Based Pollution.
2.1.2.1. LOSC (Arts.207, 212) and Other International Instruments.
The LOSC imposes on states a general obligation to control all sources o f marine pollution 
(Art. 194(3)). in particular, they have to adopt legislation and take other appropriate measures “to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution... from land-based sources, including rivers, estuaries, 
pipelines and outfall structures, taking into account internationally agreed rules, standards and 
recommended practices and procedures” (A rt.207(l) and (2)).
Notwithstanding reference to international standards on land-based pollution, it is widely 
conceded that this field o f positive international environmental law is still rather under-developed.29 
As there is no binding global instrument dealing with the substance o f  land-based control 
regulations, the Athens Protocol examined below, together with the 1974 Paris and Helsinki 
Conventions, have served as models for the formulation o f the Montreal Guidelines for the 
Protection o f the Marine Environment against Pollution from Land-based Sources that were 
designed to serve as a ‘checklist’ o f basic provisions for national measures, for future agreements
26 E.Raflopoulos, The Barcelona Convention and P rotocols: The M editerranean Action P lan Regim e, 1993, p.42.
27 See E.Raftopoulos, ‘The Barcelona Convention System - An International Trust at Work’, 7(1) I.J.E.C.L., 1992,
pp.27-41.
2B Raltopoulos, op.cit. n.26, p.48.
29 See P.Sands, Principles o f  International Environmental Law, Vol.I, 1995, pp.318-25 and 339.
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and for “the preparation in the long term, should the need arise, o f a global convention”,30 
comprising in some respects more specific and comprehensive obligations than those in the then- 
existing international instruments.31 Increasing realisation of the seminal role that reduction o f land- 
based discharges plays if an effective regime o f marine environmental protection is to be brought 
about,32 provoked extensive discussion on the desirability o f a global instrument - o f ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ 
nature - that would authoritatively assert the relevant international law and would encourage states 
not committed to any regional rules to engage in regulating these sources o f marine degradation.33
All this activity culminated in the Washington Conference, held in late 1995, where the 
choice o f a ‘soft’ instrument, the Global Programme o f Action for the Protection o f the Marine 
Environment from Land-Based Activities, was confirmed in view of the great divergence o f land- 
based pollution problems and relevant management and regulation exigencies in different parts o f 
the world. In fact, the Global Programme o f Action is designed to be a source o f conceptual and 
practical guidance to be drawn upon by principally national, as well as regional, authorities in 
devising and implementing sustained action to prevent, reduce, control, and/or eliminate marine 
degradation from land-based activities. In this vein, it adopts a comprehensive approach inspired 
by Agenda 21 and the notion o f sustainable development; it pays particular attention to integrated 
management; as well as to the particular significance o f capacity-building and funding, especially 
as far as developing states are concerned, in the effective attainment o f the stated objectives; and 
it, additionally, recommends a series o f detailed targets for most categories o f land-based pollution 
sources.
Turning now to the most important carriers o f land-based pollution, namely rivers, it must 
be noted that, in the past, there has been no strict duty under customary or conventional international 
law to prevent pollution o f the sea originating from international watercourses, nor a stringent duty 
to protect the environment o f the watercourse itself, for that matter.34 The 1992 ECE Transboundary
30 See UN, Preparatory Committee for the UN Conference on Environment and Developm ent, Land-based Sources 
o f Marine Pollution, Report ofth e Secretary-General o f  the Conference, UN Doc. A /C O N F/.151/PC /71, 17 July 1991, 
pp.37 et seq., for a review o f  measures taken by individual countries in implementation o f  the Montreal Guidelines.
31 See, for example, Guideline 12 on prior environmental impact assessment; Guideline 9 on assistance to developing 
countries; and Guideline on equal access to national remedies, including compensation for damage. See also 
R.M .M ’Gonigle, ‘“Developing Sustainability” and the Emerging Norms o f  International Environmental Law: The Case 
o f  Land-Based Marine Pollution Control’, 1990 C a n .Y B .ll ., pp.202-3; and A .E .B oyle, ‘The Law o f  the Sea and 
International Watercourses - An Emerging C ycle’, 14(2) M a r.P o l, 1990, p.154.
32 See, for example, GESAMP, The State o f  the M arine Environment, R egional Seas R eports and Studies, No. 115, 
UNEP, 1990, for an authoritative statement o f  the major sources o f  marine pollution; and M ’Gonigle, op.cit. n.31, 
pp.170 and 172.
33 See Birnie & Boyle, op.cit. n.9, pp.317-20; and especially Preparatory Com mission for the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development, op.cit. n.30, pp. 19-36, where all options for such an instrument are considered, pursuant 
to Resolution 40(13) ofth e Consultative meeting ofthe London Convention calling for a global instrument and improved 
regional agreements on land-based pollution.
3,1 For example, the 1976 Convention for the Protection o f  the Rhine against Chemical Pollution provides that 
measures adopted shall take, inter alia, into account ‘the need to preserve an acceptable quality o f  sea water’, 
A rt.l(2 )(g ). On this problem, see S.Burchi, ‘International Legal Aspects o f  pollution o f  the Sea from Rivers’, 3
(continued,..)
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Watercourses Convention introduced, for the first time, a specific obligation o f  environmental 
protection independent from equitable utilisation considerations (Art.2(1)). However, and despite 
explicit reference in the Preamble o fthe need to prevent pollution o f the marine environment from 
land-based sources, there is no further elaboration o f relevant rules. Still, this instrument is 
important for present purposes, to the extent it dictates specific obligations to prevent, control and 
reduce pollution in international rivers that ultimately reaches the sea, and in explicitly turning 
access to relevant information into a public right (Art. 16), which might be o f  significance in order 
to trace damage to the marine environment back to a particular source.
The recent 1997 International Watercourses Convention goes even further; it reaffirms the 
duty to “take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing o f significant harm” to other states 
(A rt.7(l)),35 and, furthermore, creates an obligation for its parties to individually or jointly, “take 
all measures... that are necessary to protect and preserve the marine environment, including 
estuaries, taking into account generally accepted international rules and standards” (Art.23).36 
Although it is too soon to assess whether this explicit obligation would eventually pass into custom 
and apply to all riparians wherever they might be, already today the independent obligation to 
protect the seas and prevent pollution as expressed in the LOSC is globally binding, which arguably 
implies that all states are obliged - when acting as riparians - to respect this duty, even when the 
river in question is running entirely within national boundaries.
2.I.2.2. Barcelona Convention (Art.8) and Athens Protocol.
The Parties o f the Barcelona Convention are required to “take all appropriate measures to 
prevent, abate, combat and to the fu llest possible extent elim inate” land-based pollution, and to 
“draw up and implement plans for the reduction and phasing out o f substances that are toxic, 
persistent and liable to bioaccumulate”, covering effluents from rivers, coastal establishments or 
outfalls, or emanating from any other land-based sources within their territories, including those 
transported by the atmosphere (Art.8). In discharge o f this obligation and after many years of 
negotiations,37 the Parties concluded the Athens Protocol.38
M(...continued)
Jtal.YB .lL ,, 1977, pp. 115-142; Boyle, op.cit. n.29, p. 151-7.
35 For a discussion o f  the main provisions o f  the Convention, see S.C.McCaffrey & M .Sinjela, ‘The 1997 United 
Nations Convention on International Watercourses’, 92 A.J.I.L , 1998, pp.97-107.Especially on the controversial Article 
7, see pp. 100-2..
36 For a critique o f the substance and value o f  the Convention from a ‘sustainable development’ viewpoint, see E.Hey, 
‘The Watercourses Convention: To what Extent does it Provide a Basis for Regulating Uses o f  International 
Watercourses’, 7(3) R.E.C.I.E.L . , 1998, pp.291-300.
37 One year previous to its conclusion, a document produced by the Meeting o f  Legal and Technical Experts on the 
Draft Protocol for the Protection o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-Based Sources, entitled 
Preliminary draft Protocol for the Protection o fth e  Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-Based Sources - 
Comments on the inventory o f  areas o f  disagreement, UNEP/W G.17/5, 9 April 1979, was covering 40 pages o f  
comments on various formulations, ranging from whether the protocol would include internal waters in its geographical
(continued...)
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The Athens Protocol divides polluting substances into two groups. Annex J substances are 
to be eliminated (A rt.5(l)).39 To this end, the Parties have to elaborate necessary programmes and 
measures (Art.5(2)), in particular common emission standards and standards for use (Art.5(3)). 
These standards as well as time-tables for their implementation are to be fixed and periodically 
reviewed (Art.5(4)).40 Annex II substances, on the other hand, are only to be ‘strictly’ limited and 
subject to an authorisation issued by the competent national authorities, that takes due account of 
the provisions o f Annex III, i.e. the characteristics and composition o f the waste; its harmfulness 
(persistency, toxicity, accumulation etc); the characteristics o f the discharge site and o f the receiving 
marine environment; the availability o f waste technologies; and the potential impairment o f marine 
ecosystems and sea-water uses (Art.6).41
Thus, two different approaches are used, depending on the nature o f the substance: uniform 
emission standards for the more noxious ones and environmental quality objectives for the rest.42 
Although more difficult to apply at the national level, where much specific scientific information 
and skilled planners would be indispensable, the latter allows for flexibility, as it gives less 
industrialised states the possibility to adopt less stringent regulations, exactly because their waters 
carry less pollution loads than those o f the industrialised North. If  taken to its extreme implication, 
this could mean that, should a particular water body satisfy the quality objectives, the state 
concerned would be under no obligation to regulate polluting activities at all.
Now, measures and programmes referred to in Articles 5 and 6 are to be decided in the
37(...continued)
coverage to what is actually meant by ‘land-based pollution’ and to whether special assistance should be granted to 
developing countries. See also UNEP, Report ofth e Meeting o f  Legal Experts on the preliminary draft Protocol for the 
Protection ofth e  Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-Based Sources, UNEP/ W G.17/6, 9 July 1979, pp.2-5, 
for relevant reservations o f  various countries; and J.-P.Dobbert, ‘Protocol to Control Pollution in the Mediterranean’, 
6 Env'l Pol. & L., 1980, p, 110, for some comments on the preparatory work.
38 See, among others, S.Kuwabara, The Legal Regime fo r  the Protection o f  the M editerranean Sea against Pollution  
from  Land-Based Sources, 1984; P.A Bliss-Guest, op.cit, n.21, p.261; G.J.Timagenis, ‘Protocol for the Protection o f  
the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-Based Sources’, 1(1) H ellenic Rev. o f ln t'l Relations, 1980, p. 123; 
K.W .Goering, ‘Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources: Regional Response to a Pressing Transnational 
Problem’, 13 C ornell J.L.J., 1980, p.329.
y) Substances contained here are: organohalogen, organotin and organophosphorus compounds; mercury, cadmium 
and their compounds; used lubricating oils, persistent synthetic material; substances having proven carcinogenic, 
teratogenic or mutagenic properties; and radioactive substances and wastes, when their discharges do not comply with 
the principles o f  radiation protection as defined by the competent international organizations. Despite absolute 
proscription o f  these materials, the parties may define limits below which discharges are permitted (Annex I (B)).
40 The Protocol was to be fully implemented by 1995, see UNEP, Report o f  the Fifth M eeting o f  the Contracting 
Parties to the Barcelona Convention and its Related Protocols, UNEP/1G.74/5, 28 September 1987, p.32.
41 Substances included here are: zinc, copper, nickel, chromium, lead, selenium, arsenic, antimony, molybdenum, 
titanium, tin, barium, beryllium, boron, uranium, vanadium, cobalt, thallium, tellurium, silver and their compounds; 
biocides; crude oils and hydrocarbons o f  any origin; cyanides and fluorides; non-biodegradable detergents; compounds 
o f  phosphorus; pathogenic micro-organisms; thermal discharges; substances that have a deleterious effect on the taste 
and/or smell o f  aquatic products and the oxygen content o f  the water etc.(Annex 11(A)).
42 See A. Wolf, Quotas in International Environmental Agreements, 1997, pp. 111-5; P.Sands, op.cit. n.29, pp. 127-8; 
and Bliss-Guest, op.cit. n.21, pp.273-4.
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Meeting o fthe Parties.43 However, if a Party is “not able to accept” a programme or measure - which 
implies that decisions are not binding on the minority -44 it has to inform the Meeting o f the action 
it intends to take on the matter, and may at any time give its consent to the adopted programme or 
measure (Art. 15(2)). Moreover, the Parties are under an obligation to progressively formulate and 
adopt, in co-operation with the competent international organisations, common guidelines and 
standards or criteria dealing with the length, depth and position o f pipelines for coastal outfalls; 
special requirements for effluents necessitating separate treatment; the quality o f sea-water used for 
specific purposes that is necessary for the protection o f human health, living resources and 
ecosystems; the control and progressive replacement o f products, installations and industrial and 
other processes causing significant pollution of the marine environment; and specific requirements 
concerning quantities o f substances listed in the Annexes, their concentration in effluents and 
methods o f discharging them (Art.7(l)).
So far, this obligation has been executed through the adoption o f interim  environmental 
quality criteria for bathing waters (1985); interim environmental quality criteria for mercury (1985); 
measures to prevent mercury pollution (1987); environmental quality criteria for shellfish waters 
(1987); measures for control o f pollution by used lubricating oils (1989); measures for control o f 
pollution by cadmium and cadmium compounds (1989); measures for control o f pollution by 
organotin compounds (1989); measures for control o f pollution by organohalogen compounds 
(1989);45 measures for control of pollution by organophosphorus compounds (1991); measures for 
control o f pollution by persistent synthetic materials (1991); measures for control o f radioactive 
pollution (1991); measures for control o f pollution by pathogenic micro-organisms (1991 );46 and 
lastly, measures for control o f pollution by carcinogenic, teratogenic and mutagenic substances 
(1993);47 while common measures for zinc, copper, and anionic detergents are currently being 
elaborated. More significantly, in 1993, the Parties adopted a Recommendation whereby inputs of 
toxic, persistent and bioaccumulative substances into the marine environment, in particular 
organohalogen compounds must be reduced and phased out by the year 2005.48
All these different decisions vary considerably and range from banning, e.g, the use of 
organotin compounds on hulls o f boats less than 25m long and on all structures, equipment or
43 C f. 1992 Helsinki Convention, Annex 111 setting out specific criteria and measures from the outset, and especially  
R eg .2 (l) requiring at least biological (secondary) treatment o f  municipal waste.
44 On this point see also infra, Chapter 5, p p l87-8.
45 UNEP, Common Measures adopted by the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection o fth e  
Mediterranean Sea against Pollution, MAP Technical Reports Series, N o .38, 1990.
46 See UNEP, Report o fth e  Seventh Ordinary Meeting o fth e  Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection 
o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and its Related Protocols, UNEP(OCA)/MED 1G.2/4, 1991, Annex IV, pp. 18- 
24.
47 Ibid, p .7.
48 UNEP, Report o fth e  Eighth Ordinary M eeting o f  the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection o f
the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and its Related Protocols, UNEP(OCA)/M ED IG.3/5, 15 October 1993, p.5.
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apparatus used in marieulturc, to concrete measures to prevent mercury pollution. More specifically, 
there is a precise obligation to ensure a maximum concentration (to be calculated as a monthly 
average) o f 50mg mercury per litre for all effluent discharges before dilution into the Mediterranean 
Sea, to pursue enforcement through compulsory monitoring requirements and procedures, and to 
ensure that outfalls for new discharges o f mercury into the sea would be designed and constructed 
in such a way as to achieve a suitable effluent dilution in the mixing zone so that the increase from 
the outfall structures will not be more than 50% above background levels.49 In the latter case, 
existing discharges are to be adjusted as to progressively achieve these objectives within a period 
o f 10 years.
On the other hand, quality criteria for shellfish waters lay down the minimum common 
requirements in relation to concentrations, sampling frequency, and analytical and interpretation 
methods, while, at the same time, they allow for other complementary measures as may be 
demanded by national or local circumstances, and urge Parties to include, to the extent possible, all 
shellfish waters in their national monitoring programmes. As far as used lubricating oils are 
concerned, the standards are mere guidelines, e.g. that wastes containing such oils should not be 
discharged directly or indirectly into the sea, and that the Parties undertake to progressively 
implement programmes and measures to realise that principle, through appropriate national 
procedures, taking into account the various techniques available, i.e. recovery, regeneration for re­
use or burning as fuel, or treatment and disposal in specially designed units. Nevertheless, in this 
instance, these general requirements are coupled with a specific time limit for the definite 
elimination o f such direct or indirect discharges into the marine environment, namely the 1st o f 
January 1994, which, although leaving much room to decide on individual domestic policies, is 
binding as to the time the objective has to be achieved, and thus resembles Community Directives.50
Finally, noteworthy are the measures for control o f pollution by persistent synthetic 
materials to the extent they directly import MARPOL into the Barcelona system;51 in fact, there are 
no specific substantive standards established, merely an instruction that all countries ratify Annex 
V o f MARPOL and install the necessary facilities for reception o f garbage from vessels at all ports, 
anchorages and marinas so that the provisions of Annex V for special areas apply to the 
M editerranean as soon as possible.
It seems that Mediterranean states, recognising the major contribution o f  land-based sources 
to overall pollution o f the sea, have an ambitious scheme which, if applied, would bring about, 
along with significant reduction of pollution, substantial changes to economic and social patterns 
o f production and consumption, what would in effect be a substantial move towards sustainable
4lJ Similar are the measures for cadmium and its components. 
5U See infra, pp.69-71.
51 On MARPOL, see infra , pp.80-2.
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development in the region. This is the reason why this Protocol is the only one in the Barcelona
system implicitly accepting that Northern states contribute far greater quantities o f hazardous
material from their economic and other activities, recognising “the difference in levels of
development between the coastal states, and [taking] into account the economic and social
imperatives o fthe  developing countries” (Preamble). Consequently:
Article 7(2). “ ...such common guidelines, standards or criteria shall take into account local, 
ecological, geographical and physical characteristics, the economic capacity o f the Parties 
and their need for development, the level o f existing pollution and the real absorptive 
capacity o f the marine environment.”
Article 7(3). “The programmes and measures referred to in articles 5 and 6 shall be adopted 
by taking into account, for their progressive implementation, the capacity to adapt and 
reconvert existing installations, the economic capacity o f the Parties and their need for 
development.”
Although these qualifications might seem to undermine the substantive, categorical undertakings, 
as these are in practice postponed until they become less disruptive economically,52 they should be 
read in context. Firstly, it is important to have a regional instrument purporting to control land-based 
sources of pollution. Such instruments, as already mentioned, are rare exactly because o f their far- 
reaching implications - among other reasons, exactly because they restrict activities on land where 
perceptions o f national sovereignty are still predominant - and great costs involved.53 Secondly, 
northern littorals are, indeed, the ones that have to act without delay with a view to minimising their 
effluents. And lastly, as developing states are still committed by the Protocol and may not ignore 
their duty to control land-based sources, the crucial stake is to give them appropriate incentives to 
conform with early time-tables and high standards. It is submitted that the cautious formulation of 
binding rules is preferable to early hard-and-fast, all-encompassing ones, exactly because the latter 
run too much the risk o f remaining dormant until they become cost-effective or feasible for each 
country. In this context, the statement o f the Turkish delegation in relation to common measures to 
be adopted concerning organotin compounds, whereby the proposed date o f implementation would 
be too early since Contracting Parties were still lacking information on commercially available 
alternative compounds, is characteristic.54
This discussion cannot be complete without reference to the fact that the Athens Protocol 
has recently undergone a substantial revision. Negotiations were, not surprisingly, again complicated 
and lengthy. The central issues debated were the introduction o f the concept o f ‘hydrological basin’, 
which would permit extended inland catchment areas to be covered by the Protocol; the introduction 
o f specific target dates for the elimination o f certain substances; the inclusion o f a long series of 
polluting activities as priority areas for regulation, alongside substances; and the innovatory
52 For relevant critical views, see M'Gonigle, op.cit. n.31, pp. 190-1,
53 See infra, Chapter 6, p .24 l-2 .
3,1 UNEP, Report o f th e  Sixth Ordinary Meeting o f  the Contracting Parties to the Barcelona Convention and its 
Related Protocols, UNEP(OCA)/M ED 1G. 1/5, 1 November 1989, p.9.
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introduction o f a requirement to put in place regional programmes with specific measures and 
timetables for the reduction of certain priority substances, obligatory for Parties that do not opt out 
within sixty days from adoption.55
The revised Land-Based Protocol - which nevertheless is not yet in force - has in fact 
extended the scope o f application to cover the whole hydrological basin o f the Mediterranean 
(Art.3(b); it abolishes division o f substances in separate lists, and introduces the obligation to 
eventually phase out the most dangerous among them instead (A rt.5(l) and Annex IC);56 it provides 
for regional programmes o f action for its implementation, with priority to be given to substances that 
are toxic, persistent and liable to bioaccumulate, as well as to water treatment and management 
(Art.5(2)); and introduces the precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle, the principle of 
prior environmental impact assessment (Preamble), and o f ‘best available techniques’ and ‘best 
environmental practices’ (Annex IV). But the most significant change appears to be an explicit 
requirement for the establishment o f authorisation or regulation systems in each country to which 
point source discharges and releases into water or air that reach and may affect the Mediterranean 
Sea are to be “strictly subject”, and which are to include inspection procedures to assess compliance 
as well as appropriate sanctions (Art.6),57 It is this aspect o f the new Protocol that has the most 
potential o f making some real difference in the future and that bears some similarities to the Council 
Directive on integrated pollution control that we will now turn to.
2,1.2.3. Council Directive 96/61 on Integrated Pollution Prevention and 
Control.58
A fter three years o f gestation, and building on the experience o f national integrated 
pollution control systems in several countries o f Europe and North America and on a relevant 
OECD Recommendation,59 the Council adopted Directive 96/61 in October 1996. This instrument 
is very significant - arguably the most important piece o f Community legislation in the area of 
pollution control - since it establishes an overall framework which will have a bearing on most 
sectors o f industrial activity in Member States, in which environmental considerations will in the
55 See UNEP, Report o fth e  Meeting o f  Legal and Technical Experts to Examine Amendments to the Protocol for the 
Protection ofth e  Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-Based Sources, UNEP(OCA)/M ED W G.92/4, 11 May 
1995.
56 Note also the Strategic Action Programme to address pollution from land-based activities adopted at the 1997 
Meeting o f  the Parties which, albeit in a soft form, establishes target years for full elimination o f  input o f  a wide array 
o f  substances, see UNEP, Report o fth e  Tenth Ordinary M eeting o f  the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the 
Protection o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and its Protocols, Tunis, 18-21 November 1997, 
UNEP(OCA)/M ED 1G.11/10, 3 December 1997, Annex IV, Appendix II.
57 In the above Strategic Action Programme it is specified that, by the year 2000, such an authorisation system for 
new installations as w ell as a comprehensive inspection regime should be in place in each country, see ibid, pp.42-4.
58 See L.Krtimer, Focus on European Environm ental L aw , 1997, Chapter 11; and C.Backes & G.Bellem (eds.), 
Integrated Pollu tion Prevention and Control, 1999.
5y See N.H aigh & F.lrwin (eds.), Integrated Pollution Control in Europe an d  N orth A m erica , 1990; and OECD, 
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control, Environment M onograph, N o .37, Paris, 1991. On the Recommendation 
see also N.Emmott & N.Haigh, ‘Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control: UK and EC Approaches and Possible Next 
Steps’, 8(2) J .o f  Env 7 L ., 1996, pp.301-2.
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future have to be tightly integrated. The rationale underlying this development rests in the realisation 
that sectoral regulation o f pollution controlling emissions into the air, water or soil has in the past 
rather encouraged the shifting o f pollution between the various media rather than achieving a high 
level o f protection for the environment as a whole (Recitals 7 and 8).60
Accordingly, the Directive aspires to prevent, or at least reduce emissions in all media from 
an array o f highly polluting activities, including energy industries, metal installations and the 
mineral industry, waste management plants etc. (Art.l and Annex I). To this effect, Member States 
will have to ensure that these installations operate in such a way that all the appropriate preventative 
measures are taken; that no significant pollution is actually caused; that waste production is avoided, 
and energy is used efficiently; that accidents are prevented and their effects mitigated; and, finally, 
that after cessation o f the activity any pollution risk is prevented (Art.3).
More specifically, the competent authorities have to see that “no new installation is operated 
without a permit” (Art.4), issued after application by the interested party, and upon a co-ordinated 
consideration by all authorities concerned o f the necessary environmental conditions (Arts.6-8), 
such as emission limit values, generally based on ‘best available techniques1 (Arts.9(3) and (4) and 
10, and Annex IV), and any other condition the authorities deem fit (Art.9(7)). In this connection, 
Member States may prescribe specific requirements for certain categories o f installations in “general 
binding rules”, instead o f including them in individual permits (Art.9(8)), as they are likely to have 
done for all the industrial sectors already regulated under the earlier Directives examined below. 
However, this does not mean that Member States are relieved from the duty to take into account the 
technical characteristics o f a particular installation or local environmental conditions when setting 
permit conditions.61 To this effect, it is envisaged that the Council will eventually set Community- 
wide emission limit values for the categories o f installations covered by the Directive, and the 
principal polluting substances involved ((Art.l 8(1)). In the absence o f such Community standards, 
limit values contained in a series o f relevant Community instruments are to be applied as minimum 
standards for the said installations (Art.l 8(2)). Furthermore, permit conditions are to be periodically 
reconsidered and updated, in particular when changes in the operation o f the installations concerned 
are planned, or when new and relevant Community or national legislation is introduced (Arts. 12- 
13). Existing installations are also required to eventually adapt to the same standards by 2008 
(Art. 5).
The Directive had specified a three year time-limit in which M ember States will have to 
adapt their legal and administrative systems in order to comply with the form er's stipulations
60 See also supra, p.57,
61 See ‘IPPC Directive Adopted, 1PCC on Small Firms on the W ay’, 261 ENDS R eport, October 1996, p,38.
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(A rt.21 (1 )),e2 which expired at the end o f 1999, and the first comprehensive report on its 
implementation is expected only in 2002.
2.1.2.4. W ater Directives.
Until then, however, Directives already regulating water pollution remain the primary 
instruments that address degradation ofthe marine environment in Mediterranean Member States.63 
The first such instrument aiming at protecting fresh and salt water was:
Council Directive 73/404 prohibiting the placing on the market and use o f detergents where 
the average level of biodegradability o f certain surfactants contained therein is less than 90% tested 
by prescribed methods. Amending instruments introduced a number o f exceptions for certain 
categories o f products due to technical problems and undesirable effects on health and the 
environment o f detergents with the fixed biodegradability limits.
A substantial number o f other pieces o f Community legislation followed. The most 
significant are:
• Council Directive 76/160 laying down several physical, chemical and microbiological 
parameters for the quality o f bathing water and establishing a system o f monitoring bathing water 
quality in Member States. The relevant parameters are set out in an Annex and include mandatory 
and guiding ones. An indication o f the difficulties in achieving waters as clean as the Directive 
requires is the ten year period in which compliance with the set standards should have been reached, 
and the allowance for further derogations beyond that limit.
• Council Directive 79/923 on the quality o f coastal and brackish waters designated by 
Member States for the support o f shellfish life and growth. Pursuant to it, M ember States must set 
up pollution reduction programmes to bring waters into conformity with imperative values o f quality 
within six years o f  their designation and endeavour to observe guide values o f quality.
• Council Directive 76/464 on pollution caused by certain dangerous substances discharged 
into the aquatic environment o f the Community. This is a ‘framework’ Directive aiming at the 
elimination or reduction o f the pollution o f inland, coastal, and territorial waters by particularly 
dangerous substances, comprised in Lists I and II o f the Annex.
List I substances, which are the most hazardous, are subject to a prior authorisation limited 
in time and containing emission limit values restricting the maximum concentration and quantity 
o f the matter allowed to be discharged, that have to be at least as restrictive as the emission limit 
values to be adopted at Community level. Alternatively, a Member State may establish water quality 
objectives, if it can prove that these are being met and continuously maintained. List II substances 
are to be controlled by pollution reduction programmes drawn up by Member States, and including
62 Whereas existing installations should be brought into conformity with the requirements o f  the Directive by 30 
October 2007,
63 See generally, L.KrHmer, E.C. Environmental Law, 4th ed., 2000, Chapter 7.
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prior authorisation and compliance with emission standards based on quality objectives to be issued 
by the Community.
Implementing or ‘daughter’ Directives adopted so far are Council Directives 82/176 and 
84/156, laying down emission limit values and water quality objectives for mercury; Council 
Directive 83/513, for cadmium; Council Directive 84/491, for hexachlorocyclohexane (HCH); 
Council Directive 86/280, for carbon tetrachloride, DDT and pentachlorophenol which provides for 
acceleration o f the process initiated by Directive 76/464. It is sufficient to amend this latter 
instrument’s Annexes in order to regulate other substances. That is what Council Directive 88/347, 
for aldrin, dieldrin, endrin, isodrin, hexachlorobenzene, hexachlorobutadiene and chloroform, and 
Council Directive 90/415, for dichloroethane, trichloroethylene, perchloroethylene and 
trichlorobenzene, do. On the other hand, instruments on List II substances have not yet been 
adopted. In fact the process o f adopting standards for other harmful substances as well as the follow- 
up work for the implementation o f the ‘daughter’ Directives has come to a standstill since the early 
90s for reasons that are far from clear.64
• The newest instrument that regulates the input o f harmful substances into the sea is Council 
Directive 91/676 concerning the protection o f waters against pollution caused by agricultural 
sources. Pursuant to it Member States had to designate vulnerable areas in their territories, mainly 
those with eutrophic waters, and to subsequently establish action programmes to improve their 
quality. The Directive specifies some o f the measures that have to be taken in this context, e.g. the 
prohibition o f use of certain fertilizers for certain periods and the establishment o f a code of “good 
agricultural practice” to be implemented by farmers on a voluntary basis. Again, by the end of the 
transposition period (1993) very few countries had done anything to implement these norms and by 
1997 many cases had been brought before the ECJ, including against Greece and Italy.65
By regulating discharges into fresh water and ensuring its quality,66 one ultimately protects 
the marine environment where fresh water ends up via rivers and groundwater paths. In this context,
• Council Directive 80/68 introduces a comprehensive scheme for the protection of 
groundwater and substitutes the relevant article o f Directive 76/464. It instructs Member States to 
prohibit all direct discharges o f substances on List I o f the Annex, and to subject any disposal or 
tipping that might lead to indirect discharge to prior investigation followed by prohibition or 
authorisation, which is granted for a limited period and is subject to review at least eveiy four years. 
Discharges, disposal or tipping o f List II substances are subject to an investigation and authorisation
M See ibid, pp. 194-6.
65 See infra, Chapter 5, p.235.
66 Fresh water instruments also include Council Directive 75/440 concerning the quality requirements o f  surface 
waters intended for the abstraction o f  drinking water; Council Directive 78/659 on the quality o f  fresh waters supporting 
fish life; Council Directive 80/778 relating to the quality o f  water intended for human consumption; and Council 
Directive 91/676 concerning the protection o f  waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources.
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procedure according to criteria laid down in the Directive. There have notably been several ECJ 
holdings whereby Member states have been found in violation o f these provisions.67
This piece-meal approach to water pollution - which has not actually succeeded in 
substantially improving the quality o f Community waters despite extensive and long-standing 
regulation - has provoked a serious debate within the Community on whether there should be a 
framework instrument that would lay down general criteria for what is called ‘the ecological quality’ 
o f all kinds o f water leaving it to Member States to translate the overall objectives into quantified 
‘operational targets’ for specific locations and circumstances in their territory, according to the 
principle o f subsidiarity. The Commission has even produced a relevant proposal, which is aiming 
at incorporating all requirements for management o f water into a single system premised on a “river 
basin” approach, co-ordinating all the different objectives for which water is protected and filling 
any gaps, co-ordinating all relevant measures, and increasing public participation that will hopefully 
lead to great enforceability o f the new instrument.68 However, this has not yet met with adequate 
support, as there are fears that the existing regime, although not entirely effective, could be further 
weakened in the event such an instrument is adopted.69
Now, comparing Community rules on land-based pollution to those under the Barcelona 
Convention and Protocols is by no means a straightforward task. At first glance, some basic 
differences are obvious; for instance, the fact that Community rules are much more elaborate and 
detailed which arguably improves the chances o f the rule being implemented in actual practice, 
although it deprives states o f  a degree o f flexibility in designing their laws and policy. Moreover, 
EU rules cover a much wider range o f activities.
But at that point the obvious differences end. If ones tries to extrapolate the core rules that 
are set out in various instruments, i.e. what level o f protection against specific substances they 
introduce, there can be 110 uniform inference. For example, rules relating to the quality o f shellfish 
and o f bathing waters deal with different parameters, the Community ones with far more than those 
dealt with in the MAP system; consequently, Community law is arguably more stringent. On the 
contrary, pollution o f the sea from organophosphorus compounds is only dealt with indirectly at 
Community level through the groundwater Directive, and there is no elimination date as in the 
M editerranean measures; one could argue, then, that the latter are more rigid. In the case of 
measures for cadmium, it is again difficult for a non-scientist to assess the level o f protection 
granted by the two instruments: the MAP one sets an overall limit value, which seems to be often 
lower than the Community limit values that refer to different sectors of the cadmium industry, while
67 See, e.g. Case C -360/87, Commission v. Italy. 1991 E.C.R., p .1-791.
68 See EC Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive establishing a framework for Community action in the field 
o f  water policy, COM (97) 49  final - 97/0067 (SY N ), 1997 O.J. (C 184) 2; as amended in COM (1999) 271 final.
69 See M.Pallemaerts, ‘The Draft Ecological Water Quality D irective’, 5(1) R.E.C.I.E.L., 1996, pp.61-2; and 
S.Leubuscher, ‘The Water Framework D irective’, ibid, pp.62-4.
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the opposite seems to be true in relation to mercury limit values.
Having said that, as most Directives allow Member States to apply more stringent measures, 
an agreement to that effect in the context o f MAP does not present significant problems. 
Nonetheless, EU Member States tend to submit declarations at Meetings o f  the Parties o f the 
Barcelona Convention, pursuant to which recommendations on different substances do not prejudice 
their obligation to respect relevant Directives.70 Essential background work is carried out in this 
context by comparing EU standards with proposed criteria in the MAP framework and rules before 
the latter are formally adopted.71
Lastly, a striking feature o f Community legislation worth noticing is its frequent allowance 
for exceptions. Much discussion is devoted within MAP on the particularities o f different countries 
or groups of countries with different developmental needs and resources, and on whether to impose 
limit values or quality objectives,72 but when it comes to adopting common measures differentiations 
are not so apparent. On the contrary, in the European context states are permitted to deviate from 
uniform practices; under the cornerstone Directive 76/464, they are even permitted to impose quality 
objectives instead o f limit values, which indicates that EU countries should not be treated as an 
absolutely uniform group with regard to pollution levels and relevant protection rules either.
2.1.2.5. Directive 91/271 on the Collection, Treatment and Discharge o f urban 
and industrial waste into the sea.
Directive 91/271 addresses a major source o f land-based pollution in the Mediterranean - 
and the whole o f Europe for that matter - and is consequently o f primary importance, especially in 
view o f the fact that there is no comparable set o f legal rules in the Barcelona framework.73
This Directive instructs Member States to provide towns o f more than 15,000 inhabitants 
with waste water collecting or equivalent systems according to standards set out in Annexes by 31 
December 2000, and towns o f between 2,000 and 15,000 by 31 December 2005. Waste water has 
to be subject to ‘secondary treatment’, i.e. to be biologically treated before discharge, while more 
stringent requirements are laid down for sensitive areas that are identified on the basis o f prescribed 
criteria and reviewed at least every four years.
Extension o f deadlines, due to strictly technical problems, as implementation o f the 
Directive requires significant and expensive alterations in the existing installations, is permitted in 
exceptional cases. Allowance is also made for laxer standards in less sensitive areas, but discharges
70 See e.g. UNEP, op.cit. n,40, p. 17, par. 105, for such a declaration in relation to mercury standards and to the quality 
o f  shellfish waters. In the same vein, when organosilicon compounds were removed from Annex II o fth e  Dumping 
Protocol, the EU submitted a reservation, ibid, p.78.
71 Ibid, par. 106.
72 See supra , p.63.
73 D espite frequent reference to waste treatment in ‘soft’ instruments, such as the Genoa Declaration, see UNEP, 
Report o f  the Fourth Ordinary Meeting o f the Contracting Parties to the Barcelona Convention and its Related Protocols, 
UNEP/1G.56/5, 30 September 1985, p.23, and, more recently, the 1997 Strategic Action Programme, see UNEP, op.cit. 
n.58, pp.7-9.
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must still be subject to ‘primary treatment’ and comprehensive studies must indicate that they will 
not have any substantial adverse impact on the environment. Areas no longer identified as less 
sensitive must comply with the stricter standards within seven years.
Discharges resulting after the prescribed treatment have to satisfy certain standards with 
regard to biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and chemical oxygen demand (COD), suspended 
solids, phosphorous and nitrogen. Discharge o f industrial waste water must be subject to prior 
regulations and/or authorisations to satisfy specific requirements, while some biodegradable 
industrial discharges are regulated separately. At the same time, re-use o f treated waste water and 
sludge is encouraged. The disposal o f sludge to surface waters by dumping or other means was to 
be terminated by 31 December 1998. The Directive sets out additional requirements concerning the 
adverse effects o f discharges from one state to the other, and standards for the design, construction 
and operation of treatment plants.
States were to have enacted the necessary legislation by June 1993, but the actual 
implementation o f the standards set showed differing interpretations in various Member States. That 
led to an additional Community instrument being adopted, Directive 98/15, which clarifies certain 
prescriptions relating to permitted discharges from urban waste water treatment plants. Still, Greece 
and Italy have been condemned by the ECJ for not having transposed the Directive on time, while 
at the end o f 1998, cases o f incorrect application against the two countries together with Spain were 
pending before the Court.74
2.1.2.6. Directives on Industrial Processes Generating waste.
Industrial processes generating waste are more extensively treated in a series o f instruments, 
the most significant o f which, for present purposes, are:75
• Council Directive 78/76 on the disposal o f titanium dioxide waste -76 responsible for the so- 
called ‘red sludge’ in the Mediterranean. Initially, discharge or dumping o f such waste was subject 
to prior authorisation if  no alternative means o f disposal were available and after scientific 
evaluation showed that there were no harmful effects to the marine environment and other legitimate 
uses o fthe sea. When the Directive was reviewed States undertook to draw up programmes for the 
eventual elimination o f such waste. Time limits were repeatedly extended, though, due to ‘serious 
techno-economic difficulties’, and were last set at the end of 1994, when a definitive ban must have 
been effected.
74 See infra, Chapter 5, p.235.
75 See also the general Council Directive 75/442 on waste, as amended by Directive 91/156; and the Council Directive 
78/319 on toxic and dangerous waste, repealed by Council Directive 91/689 on hazardous waste.
76 As supplemented by Council Directive 82/883 on procedures for the surveillance and monitoring o f  environments 
affected by waste from the titanium dioxide industry; and amended by Council Directive 83/29; and Council Directives 
89/428, and 92/112 on procedures for harmonising the programmes for the reduction and eventual elimination o f  
pollution caused by waste from the titanium dioxide industry.
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Council Directive 75/439 on disposal o f waste oils.77 There is a prohibition o f any discharge 
into surface, ground and coastal waters and drainage systems. Undertakings disposing o f waste oil 
are to obtain permits and to be supervised by national authorities; re-use is especially encouraged. 
Again, application of this Directive has been fraught with problems.78
Hence, a discernable pattern appears, namely that States find compliance with 
environmental regulation o f vital industrial or other economic activities both difficult and 
undesirable, a point even better illustrated in the application of environmental impact assessment.79
2.1,3. Duty to Control/Ban Dumping at Sea,
2.1.3.1. LOSC (Art.210) and London Convention.
As far as dumping is concerned, the LOSC imposes much more concrete obligations 
compared with land-based pollution, namely that states shall adopt legislation and other measures 
to prevent, reduce and control pollution from dumping at sea, that will be “no less effective” than 
relevant global rules and standards (Art.210(l), (2), and (6)); that any dumping activities under the 
jurisdiction o f Parties shall not be carried out without permission from their competent authorities 
(Art.210(3)); and shall be subject to express prior approval o f the relevant coastal state, if they are 
to be carried out within maritime areas under its jurisdiction, and after other states likely to be 
adversely affected thereby have been consulted (Art.210(5)). It follows that in areas under coastal 
jurisdiction dumping can be completely banned.
The relevant international rules and standards are found in the 1972 London Convention.80 
The substantive norms in the initial text o f the Convention are almost identical with the 
Mediterranean Dumping Protocol - before revision - discussed below. Furthermore, the Consultative 
Meeting o f the Parties assigned with the task o f continuous review o f its implementation has 
substantially developed the law on dumping, by terminating incineration at sea,81 and, most 
importantly, by adopting a moratorium on dumping o f radioactive waste in 1983 which was turned 
into a definitive ban ten years later,82 and by unanimously agreeing that the dumping o f all industrial 
waste should be terminated by the end o f 1995.83
77 A s amended by Council Directive 87/101.
78 See P.W. Birnie, ‘The European Community’s Environmental Policy’, in E.D.Brown & R.R.Churchill (eds.), The 
UN Convention on the Law o f  the Sea: Impact and Im plem entation , 1987, pp.544-5.
7y See infra, Chapter 8, pp.335-42.
80 It should also be noted that African states have undertaken to prohibit dumping and incineration o f  hazardous waste 
in all sea areas and penalise relevant activities in a separate regional instrument, i.e. the 1991 Bamako Convention 
(Art,4(2)(a)), see infra, p.82.
81 Resolution L D C .35(11).
82 At the Sixteenth Consultative Meeting o f  Novem ber 1993.
83 Resolution LDC.43(13).
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Then, in late 1996, the Convention was extensively reviewed by means o f a Protocol,84 
whereby the precautionary, and the polluter pays principles are reaffirmed; the scope of application 
is extended to cover decommissioning o f offshore installations; and more importantly, dumping is 
generally prohibited, except for substances included in a ‘reverse’ or ‘positive’ list. The difficulty 
many states faced with regard to the implementation o f the London Convention before revision has 
led to the inclusion o f the possibility o f invoking a ‘grace’ period o f Five years after entry into force 
for full application o f the Protocol; hence, it should not be expected that the new international 
standards will become operational soon.
2.1.3.2, Barcelona Convention (Art.5) and Dumping Protocol.
Under Article 5 o f the Barcelona Convention, the Parties have to “take all appropriate 
measures to prevent, abate and to the fu llest possible extent eliminate pollution by dumping, or 
incineration at sea .” The Dumping Protocol further stipulated that the dumping o f ‘black list’ 
substances is prohibited (Art.4); that o f ‘grey list’ substances requires a prior special permit (Art.5); 
whereas that o f all other matter requires a prior general permit (Art. 6). When the revised Protocol 
enters into force, however, the general rule will become one o f general prohibition o f dumping of 
wastes, except o f those enumerated in an exhaustive ‘reverse’ list, the dumping of which will 
require a prior special permit (Arts.4 and 5). This list comprises dredged material;85 fish waste or 
organic material resulting from fish processing; vessels, until 31 December 2000; platforms and 
other structures provided that polluting material has been removed to the maximum extent; and inert 
uncontaminated and non-polluting geological material. Incineration at sea is also totally banned 
(Art. 7).
However, the above prohibitions and restrictions will not apply when, because offorce  
majeure, human life or the safety o f a ship or aircraft is endangered. Such instances have to be 
immediately reported to the Secretariat and any Party likely to be affected, together with relevant 
information (Art.8). Moreover, Article 9 seems to provide a loophole for states considering that an 
exceptional and critical situation makes dumping of matter at sea, that is otherwise impermissible, 
necessary. In such an instance, the party involved has to inform the Secretariat - apparently before 
the activity is carried out -, which will in turn consult the other Parties, and recommend the best 
methods o f storage or destruction (Art.9). The Party concerned is not bound by any relevant 
recommendation; it has, however, to communicate the “steps adopted in pursuance” thereof, and
84 See R.Coenen, ‘Dumping o f  Wastes at Sea: Adoption o f  the 1996 Protocol to the London Convention ] 972', 6( 1) 
R.E.C.I.E.L., 1997, pp.54-61.
85 Recommendations for the management o f  dredged material have been prepared by the Secretariat in close 
cooperation with government-designated experts, see UNEP, Report o f the Eleventh Ordinary Meeting o f  the Contracting 
Parties to the Convention for the Protection o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and its Protocols, 
UNEP(OCA)/M ED 1G.12/9, 6 December 1999, Annex IV, Appendix VI.
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the other Parties undertake to assist it to that effect.86
That said, under both versions, the Parties have to designate national authorities competent 
to issue special permits (Art. 10(1)), “after careful consideration” o f certain factors, related to the 
characteristics and composition o f the matter to be dumped, those o f the dumping site and method 
o f disposal, and other circumstances, laid down in the Annex (A rt.6(l)). These authorities are 
responsible in respect o f waste loaded in their territory, or loaded by a ship or aircraft registered in 
their territory or flying their flag when the loading occurs in the territory o f a state not party to the 
Protocol (Art. 10(2)).
Moreover, each state has to apply the measures required to implement the Protocol to all 
ships and aircraft registered in its territory or flying its flag - government ships are no longer 
exempted ships and aircraft loading in its territory matter to be dumped, and ships and aircraft 
believed to be engaged in dumping in areas under its jurisdiction (Art.l l) .87 This is not the same as 
the obligation o f article 10(2); it is more general as it does not involve only permit issue, but also 
other control duties, such as those stipulated in Article 12, i.e. the undertaking to issue instructions 
to the national maritime-inspection ships and aircraft and to other appropriate services to report to 
the national authorities any incidents or conditions wherever in the M editerranean which give rise 
to suspicions that illegal dumping has occurred or is about to occur.
Despite detailed regulation, it seems that dumping is not a major pollution source in the 
M editerranean; in 1985, for instance, only two Parties reported that they had granted permits for 
dumping during the previous years.88 Still, in the same year, not all o f the Parties had designated 
‘competent authorities’ under Art.10.89
2.1.4. Duty to Control Pollution from Offshore Activities - LOSC (Arts.208-209),
Barcelona Convention (Art.7) and Offshore Protocol..
As was the case in relation to dumping, the LOSC instructs states to abide by internationally 
agreed rules to mitigate pollution from seabed activities and artificial islands, installations and 
structures subject to national jurisdiction (Art.208);90 and from activities in the Area (Art.209), for 
which prescription o f environmental rules falls under the mandate o f the International Sea-Bed
“  See also infra, Chapter 5, pp. 188-9.
87 Since Article 11 does not apply to non-parties, the 1976 Conference o f  Plenipotentiaries felt obliged to adopt 
Resolution 3, which stresses the importance o f  universal implementation and observation o f  Article 11 by all ships and 
aircraft and invites the Parties and 1MO to persuade the other states to act in conformity with the Dumping Protocol. The 
fact remains, though, that third party ships would not be bound by regional law if  they carried out dumping activities 
in the Mediterranean, but are arguably bound by customary law as reflected in the London Convention.
88 see UNEP, op.cit. n.73, p. 14.
m Ibid, p .35.
yo The only set o f  rules developed in this context and in a non-binding form is found in U N E P’s Guidelines 
concerning the Environment related to Offshore Mining and Drilling within the Limits o f  National Jurisdiction o f  1982. 
It must be noted, though, that MARPOL also applies to drilling rigs and other platforms (Art.2(4); Annex 1, Reg.21).
77
Authority (Alt. 145). Accordingly, rules, regulations, procedures and other measures to control these 
sources must be “no less effective” than international ones (Arts.208(3), 209(2)).
In the Mediterranean region, the Barcelona Convention requires states to “take all 
appropriate measures” to prevent, abate and to the fu llest possible extent eliminate pollution 
resulting from the exploration and exploitation o f the continental shelf and the sea-bed and its 
subsoil (Art.7). The Offshore Protocol, which is the instrument laying down the respective regime 
in detail, underwent a drafting procedure o f several years and was adopted in October 1994.
This Protocol aims at ensuring that offshore activities do not cause pollution, and that “the 
best available techniques, environmentally effective and economically appropriate”, are used 
(Art.3), and creates a system o f prior written authorisation by competent national authorities for any 
exploration or exploitation activity to be undertaken (Arts.4(1) and 28). In particular, authorisation 
o f installations and activities is subject to submission, among others, o f an environmental impact 
assessment, which should include elements specified in Annex IV (A rt.5(l)(a)), provided that the 
national authority is satisfied that the installation is to be constructed according to international 
standards and practice; that the operator has the technical competence and financial capacity 
(Art.4(l)); and that there are no indications that the activities are likely to cause significant adverse 
effect on the environment (Art.4(2), 6(1)). Each authorisation may impose special conditions for the 
protection o f the marine environment (Art,6(3)), to which sanctions are attached (Art.7).
A general obligation is imposed upon operators to use the best available, environmentally 
effective, and economically appropriate technology and to observe internationally accepted 
standards, with a view to avoid pollution caused by wastes and harmful or noxious substances 
(A rt.8). Disposal o f such substances is subject to the issuance o f a prior permit by the national 
authority, according to a ‘black’ and ‘grey’ list classification (Annexes I and 11), and after 
consideration o f  all factors set out in Annex 111 (Art.9). Disposal o f oil and oily mixtures and drilling 
fluids is subject to the formulation o f common standards to be adopted in accordance with Annex 
V, or stricter national ones (Art. 10). Discharge of sewage is prohibited, except in certain cases, such 
as after treatment, but the Parties may impose stricter conditions (A rt.l 1). Disposal o f  plastic and 
non-biodegradable garbage is also proscribed (Art. 12).
In addition, operators have to make effective use o f onshore reception facilities, or 
otherwise face sanctions (Art. 13); take safety measures; have contingency plans; notify of any event 
causing or likely to cause pollution; and measure and report the effects o f offshore activities on the 
marine environment (Arts. 15, 16, 17, and 19). Finally, they are required to remove abandoned or 
disused installations taking into account international standards, and to remove or abandon or bury 
disused pipelines after cleaning them inside (Art.20(l), (2)); should an operator fail to comply with 
these requirements, the competent authority is empowered to undertake appropriate action at his 
expense (Art.20(6)).
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2.1.5. Duty to Control Pollution from M aritime Activities.
2.1.5.1. LOSC (Art.211) and Barcelona Convention (Art.6).
Admittedly, the more far-reaching and detailed rules to be found in Part X ll o f the LOSC 
relate to pollution caused by operational discharges o f vessels.91 This is arguably because there had 
already existed a well developed body of law on the jurisdiction o f states to legislate and enforce 
for matters relating to ships and more generally to navigation,92 while at the same time the traditional 
supremacy - or even near exclusivity beyond territorial seas - o f flag state jurisdiction was not 
sufficient to ensure protection o f the marine environment.93
Confining discussion for the moment to legislative jurisdiction,94 one notices that the LOSC 
reduced coastal states’ legislative competence as far as pollution regulations are concerned, but it 
increased the geographical area to which such regulations may be applied by instituting a new large 
area o f jurisdiction for, among others environmental protection purposes, the EEZ 
(Art.56(l)(b)(iii)).95 More specifically, ships in innocent passage have to comply with coastal laws 
and regulations with regard to marine pollution, even when they impose stricter standards than 
generally accepted international law, as long as innocent passage is not hampered (Arts.21(l)(f) and 
(4), 211(4)). Nevertheless, coastal laws cannot be stricter, if  they refer to construction, design, 
manning and equipment o f the ship (Art.21(2)).96 Furthermore, coastal states are explicitly 
authorised to designate sea lanes and/or prescribe traffic separation schemes in the territorial sea 
taking into account recommendations o f competent international organisations and local 
characteristics, and to require foreign ships to use them (Arts.22 and 211(1)). However, these are 
not mandatory nor are ships not complying with them sanctioned; only tankers, nuclear ships or 
ships carrying “ inherently dangerous or noxious substances or materials” may be required to confine 
their passage to such sea lanes (Art.22(2)).97
Vessels in transit passage are subject to coastal laws giving effect to applicable international 
regulations, i.e. regulations binding on the coastal state (A it.42(l)(b) and (4)), and have to respect 
sea lanes and traffic separation schemes conforming with generally accepted international 
regulations (Art.41); in addition, they are under an independent duty to comply with generally
91 It should nevertheless be noted that the whole o f  Part XII does not apply to warships and other governmental ships, 
see Art.236.
92 See, e.g., R.R. Churchill & A.V.Lowe, The Law o f  the Sea, (2nd ed.) 1988, Chapters 3, 4, 5, 11, and 13.
93 See generally R.M ’Gonigle & M.W.Zacher, Pollution, Politics and International Law  - Tankers at Sea, 1979, Ch.4.
94 On enforcement jurisdiction under the LOSC, see infra, Chapter 7, pp.296-7.
95 It should be reminded here that Mediterranean states have not proclaimed EEZ, nor are they likely to undertake 
such action in the near future, see supra, Chapter 1, p.35.
96 C f  Art. 17 o f  the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea.
97 See G.Plant, ‘Legal Environmental Restraints upon Navigation Post Braer’, 10(9/10) Oil & Gas L. &Taxation Rev., 
1992, pp.247-50. There are also significant pressures from several countries for mandatory traffic measures and even 
mandatory ship reporting being considered by 1MO, ibid, pp.250-58.
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accepted international anti-pollution rules (Art.39(2)(b)).98
Similarly, coastal laws applying to the EEZ may only give effect to generally accepted 
international rules and standards for enforcement purposes (A rt.211(5))," i.e. the state imports 
international law so that it can enforce it. That is unless a special area, such as those established 
under MARPOL, is designated with IMO approval as requiring enhanced protection, due to its 
oceanographical and ecological conditions, as well as its utilisation or the protection o f its resources 
and the particular character o f its traffic (A rt.211(6)), in which case coastal laws can be more 
stringent so far as they are confined to discharge or navigation practices and not design, 
construction, manning and equipment standards. A similar but distinct concept that is gathering 
impetus at IMO is that o f ‘Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas’ (PSSAs),100 where it is envisaged that 
measures otherwise prohibited by international law, e.g. excessively restrictive to navigation, would 
be allowed.
The legislative competence of port states remained as it was under customary international 
law, in other words port states can adopt anti-pollution legislation as a condition o f entry o f foreign 
vessels in their ports.101 The new element introduced by LOSC is the encouragement it gives to co­
operative arrangements between more than one port states establishing identical requirements, and 
the obligation imposed upon flag states to ensure that masters o f ships flying their flag will, when 
navigating within the territorial sea of a state participating in such an arrangement and upon request 
o f that state, furnish information as to whether they are proceeding to a state o f the same region 
participating in such co-operative arrangements and, if so, to indicate whether they comply with the 
harmonised port entry requirements. As will be shown in Chapter 5, this notion o f port state co­
operation and reporting is particularly useful for more effective enforcement o f international 
standards.102
On the other hand, flag states have an obligation to adopt pollution regulations applicable 
to their vessels at least as strict as the generally accepted international rules and standards adopted 
through the competent international organisation or diplomatic conference (A rt.211(2)). It is 
important that, in this way, LOSC makes these global standards obligatory for all flag states 
irrespective o f  their status with regard to a particular instrument, thus addressing the problem of sub­
98 Churchill & Lowe, op.cit. n.92, p .92 are commenting that the advantage o f  implementing safety and pollution 
standards in coastal state’s legislation is that they then become directly enforceable by the coastal state authorities, 
whereas the duty o f  compliance would allow only an international claim through diplomatic channels for breach o f treaty 
obligations and the international conventions leave enforcement in the hands o f  the flag slate; Plant, op.cit n.97, p.250 
says that article 39 is broadly drafted but precisely what are the consequences when ships fail to comply is unclear as 
LOSC remains silent on this point.
99 Apart from the obvious prohibition o f  setting stricter standards, this proviso has been argued to imply that the 
coastal state is equally not able to apply lower standards in its EEZ, see Boyle, op.cit. n.7. p .36L
100 Introduced under Resolution A .720(17). For a discussion o f  relevant Guidelines produced by IM O’s Maritime 
Environment Protection Committee see Plant, op.cit. n.97, pp.252-5.
101 See Churcill & Lowe, op.cit. n.92, p.95.
102 See infra, Chapter 5, pp.212-7.
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standard vessels widely considered as environmental hazards and usually - but not exclusively - 
flocked under ‘flags o f convenience’ which are generally lax in relevant requirements.
‘Generally accepted international rules and standards’ include at least those among the IMO 
conventions and regulations that are widely ratified and generally observed even by non-parties,103 
The LOSC places special emphasis on their development and regular review, within the framework 
o f IMO or at ad hoc conferences, as well as on the adoption and review o f routing systems to 
minimise the threat o f accidents and ensuing damage.
In this context, Article 6 o f the Barcelona Convention reiterates the duty o f the Parties to 
take measures “ in conformity with international law to prevent, abate, combat and lo the fullest 
possible extent elim inate” pollution caused by discharges o f ships, as well as for the effective 
implementation o f relevant internationally recognised rules and standards. Repeated reference to 
international law and standards in this Article points to the fact that, as far as operational pollution 
from ships is concerned, the Parties did not intend to adopt a special protocol. The main 
consideration rendering a regional - presumably stricter than the global - regime undesirable is the 
nature itself of international shipping, which makes the imposition o f multiple standards along the 
route o f a vessel burdensome and ultimately unworkable. More importantly, the nature o f the 
maritime activity in the Mediterranean, i.e its use by vessels of many flags in transit,104 would render 
a regional regime applicable only to ships flying the flags of parties largely ineffective.105 It follows 
that all global rules regarding marine pollution from maritime activity reviewed above applies in this 
area. Nevertheless, the special sensitivity o f the Mediterranean, as a semi-enclosed sea, was put 
forward in IMO deliberations, resulting in its inclusion in the areas where discharges are totally 
prohibited under Annex I (Regulation 1.10) o f MARPOL which is examined in the following 
Section.
2.I.5.2. M ARPOL.
The frequently invoked ‘generally agreed international rules and standards’ are laid down 
in the 1973/1978 MARPOL which superseded the 1954 OILPOL.106 OILPO L’s approach was
103 For a discussion o f  what is meant by these terms, see Boyle, op.cit. n.7, pp.355-7; Kwiatkowska, op.cit. n .l I, 
pp. 172-3; and G.Kasoulides, P ort State Control and Jurisdiction: Evolution o f  P ort S tate Regim e, 1993, pp.3 5-41.
104 Approximately 1/6 o f  the world maritime traffic transits the Mediterranean, UNEP, op.cit. n.54, Annex IV, p.3.
105 Cf. L.M, Alexander, ‘Regionalism and the Law ofth e  Sea: The Case o f  Semi-Enclosed Seas’, 2(2) O.D.I.L.J., 1974, 
p. 159, where the author anticipated even two sets o f  standards, one for vessels o f  third countries and a less rigid one for 
coastal slates o fth e  region. Cf. 1992 Helsinki Convention, Annex IV, which designates specific discharge and inspection 
rules and standards for ships navigating in the Baltic Sea,
106 It must also be noted that a series o f  other international conventions adopted under the auspices o f  IMO and ILO 
and not addressing pollution issues are viewed as complementary to MARPOL, because they aim at ensuring safety o f  
navigation through high construction, equipment, manning and operation standards, and thus reduce the risks o f incidents 
with possible adverse environmental impact. The main among them are: the 1972 COLREG, the 1974 SOLAS, the 1966 
International Convention on Load Lines, the 1978 International Convention on Standards o f  Training, Certification and 
W atchkeeping for Seafarers and the 1976 Convention Concerning Minimum Standards for Merchant Ships. These, 
together with MARPOL, are usually treated as a package o f  applicable standards, especially when it comes to 
enforcement.
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primarily one o f discharge regulation, and required states to ensure that reception facilities for 
vessels other than tankers are available at ports. MARPOL, on the other hand, imposed a general 
obligation to prevent vessel pollution from various harmful substances - i.e. noxious liquid 
substances in bulk (Annex II), harmful substances in packaged form (Annex III), sewage (Annex 
IV), and garbage (Annex V) - and not just oil, the discharge o f which in small quantities - with the 
same limits as OILPOL - is permitted if it takes place en route and more than fifty miles from land 
(Annex I, Reg.9), but not within special areas where it is totally prohibited (Annex I, Reg.l 0); the 
Mediterranean is such an area since 1978. Reception facilities are also to be put in place by port 
states, with priority to be given to the special areas.
MARPOL sets out standards o f vessel design and construction, notably oily water separators 
and monitoring devices for ships other than tankers, and segregated ballast tanks and crude oil 
washing systems for tankers.107 In this connection, flag states have to provide their ships with an 
International Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate, pursuant periodic surveys with a view to ensure 
that the structure, equipment, fittings, arrangements and material o f the ship fully comply with the 
Convention (A rt.5(l), Annex 1, Regs.5-8); equally important in this context is the compulsory oil 
discharge monitoring and control system for the purpose o f continuously recording oil discharges 
(Annex 1, Reg. 16).
The most significant construction standards are to be found in the 1992 amendments which 
introduce further restrictions on the permissible amounts of oil discharges: new tankers (of 5,000dwt 
and above) must be fitted with double hulls or an equivalent alternative affording the same level of 
protection in the event o f collision or stranding (Annex 1, Reg.l3F), while existing tankers must be 
converted accordingly, when they reach the age o f 25 or 30 depending on whether they comply with 
the 1978 Protocol or not (Annex I, R eg .l3G ).108
Moreover, under Annex II residues containing noxious liquid substances must be disposed 
at reception facilities; they may be discharged at sea according with specific rules, only if 
adequately diluted. Requirements for minimising accidental pollution are also laid down. Annex III 
prescribes standards on the packaging, marking, labelling, documentation, stowage and quantity 
limitations for harmful substances in packaged form. Annex IV bans the discharge o f sewage in an 
area less than four miles offshore, unless it is treated in an approved plant on board, while in an area 
between four and twelve miles, sewage has to be comminuted and disinfected before discharge. 
Lastly, Annex V prohibits the disposal o f all plastic at sea and defines minimum distances from land 
for the disposal o f other kinds o f garbage.
107 For an extensive discussion o f  how the shill from discharge regulation to construction and equipment standards 
positively affected compliance with the conventions by all actors concerned, see R.B.M itchell, Intentional O il Pollution  
at Sea: Environm ental P o licy and Treaty Com pliance, 1994.
1011 Because o fth e  high cost o f  conversion, it is expected that many old ships will be scrapped and replaced by new, 
presumably safer ones, see ‘How MARPOL has Changed’, 2 IMO News, 1992, p.9,
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Finally, it should be stressed that, according to Article 5(4), ships o f non-parties don't 
escape conventional obligations, since the Parties have to ensure that no more favourable treatment 
is given to such ships. Thus, although the flag state is under no direct commitment, all ships can 
expect some kind o f enforcement action if they don’t meet MARPOL standards, at least when they 
enter a Party’s port, where they are subject, under general international law, to any rule that the port 
state sees fit to prescribe.
The impact o f MARPOL is considerable but by no means straightforward. By shifting the 
focus from regulating the amount of permissible discharges to technical construction and equipment 
standards, it became more ‘enforceable’. In this regard it improved OILPOL, but it still relies 
heavily on flag states for effective implementation.109
2.1.6. Duty to Control/Ban M aritime Transport o f Hazardous Wastes.
2.1.6.1. LOSC (Art.23), Basel Convention and Bamako Convention.
Seaborne movement of hazardous matter presents a twofold threat o f damage to the marine 
environment: In case o f a casualty involving the carrier vessel and spilling or otherwise dispersing 
the cargo in the sea, and in case hazardous substances are transported to a state that cannot or may 
not dispose o f them in a sound manner, with resulting contamination o f the marine environment 
either directly or indirectly through aquifers. This kind o f activity was very little regulated, even 
when it occurred in the vicinity o f a coast, until the adoption, following U N EP’s Cairo Guidelines 
and Principles for the Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Waste, o f the 1989 Basel 
and the 1991 Bamako Conventions. Accordingly, the LOSC merely required ships in innocent 
passage carrying such matter to ‘carry documents and observe special precautionary measures 
established for such ships by international agreements’ (Art.23), and confine their passage to 
designated sea lanes as explained above.110
Having said that, innocent passage for ships carrying hazardous cargoes in its traditional 
sense has been repeatedy challenged. Egypt, for instance, upon ratification o f the LOSC, declared 
that it would require foreign nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently 
dangerous and noxious substances to obtain authorisation before entering its territorial sea, until the 
international agreements mentioned in Article 23, e.g. the Basel Convention, are concluded and 
Egypt becomes a party to them ;111 the same stance was taken by other states as well, but met with
lu‘; See W .Cheng-Pang, ‘A Review o f  the Enforcement Regime for V essel-Source Oil Pollution Control’, 16(4) 
O.D.I.L, 1986, p .3 18-20.
110 However, there is some state practice that deflects from that position, notably the 1985 Italian ban on the passage 
o f tankers and ships carrying hazardous and noxious substances (over 50,000 tons) through the Strait o f  Messina, and 
more recent bans on innocent passage in areas adjacent to Italian islands, see Plant, op.cit. n.92, p.248.
111 See LoS Bulletin, Special Issue, 1987, p.3.
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firm resistance by major powers, such as the US and Russia.112
Now, the Basel Convention applies to ‘hazardous’ cargos, defined by the substances they 
contain, and other characteristics (Art. 1(1), Annexes 1-1V). At the same time a Party can impose 
stricter national criteria for the designation o f such cargos (Alt. 1 (l)(b)). A hazardous cargo may be 
transported by sea, unless it is exported to or from a non-party country; or to a country that has not 
consented to that effect; or pass in transit through a state that has not consented to the movement; 
or it is to be disposed in the area south o f 60° South. In such cases movement is prohibited.
African states, particularly concerned with illegal trade o f hazardous waste ending up in 
Africa and dissatisfied with the Basel Convention’s failure to introduce a total ban on trade o f such 
w aste,113 concluded the 1991 Bamako Convention which completely prohibits the import o f 
hazardous wastes, including radioactive material, in the continent, even for recycling purposes; 
while intra-African movement o f waste, i.e. from one Party to another, is still allowed (A rts.4(l) and 
(3), 11(2)). Moreover, the definition o f hazardous waste and in general the categories o f wastes to 
be regulated are broader than in the Basel Convention (Art.2). In this context, although the 
Convention is not yet in force, all North African states, except Morocco, have banned waste 
imports.114
importantly, the Basel Convention allows for more stringent arrangements to be adopted 
in bilateral, regional, and economic-political integration unit agreements (A rt.l 1), such as the one 
now existing in Africa. In the same vein, waste may not be exported to Parties that have prohibited 
such imports or where the waste cannot be managed in an environmentally sound manner (Art.4(e)). 
Consequently, the Bamako Convention is complementary to and explicitly authorised by the global 
instrument.115 A significant development, namely Decision IV/9 o fth e  1998 Basel Conference o f 
the Parties to prohibit immediately all transboundary movement o f the most hazardous categories 
o f wastes (List A), for whatever purpose, from OECD (Northern M editerranean) to non-OECD 
countries,116 may even be said to have made the African instrument reluctant at least to the extent 
its provisions are now covered by the Basel regime.
W hen transport is still allowed, however, certain conditions must be met, including
112 See L.Pineschi, ‘The Transit o f  Ships Carrying Hazardous Wastes through Foreign Coastal Z ones’, in F.Francioni 
&  T.Scovazzi (eds.), International R esponsibility fo r  Environmental Harm, 1991, pp.312-3.
113 See K.Kummcr, T h e  International Regulation o f  Transboundary Traffic in Hazardous Wastes: The 1989 Basel 
Convention’, 41 I.C .L.Q ., 1992, pp,535-8; and C.R.H,Shearer, ‘Comparative Analysis o f  the Basel and Bamako 
Conventions on Hazardous W aste’, 23 Env'l L , 1993, pp, 144-53.
114 See B.Kwiatkowska, ‘Ocean Affairs and the Law ofthe Sea in Africa - Towards the 21st Century’, 17(1) M ar.Pol,, 
1993, p.19.
155 See Shearer, op.cit. n. 113, pp .174-83.
116 See ‘N ew  System for Waste Exports’, 28(2) E nv'l Pol.&  L., 1998, pp.68-9. In fact, it was Decision 11/12 that 
initially laid down such standards, see 24(5) Env'l Pol.&  L., 1994, p.290. This was in 1995 turned into a formal 
amendment (Decision 111/1), in view o f  extensive controversy on the binding effect o f  Conference o f  Parties’ Decisions, 
see J.Werksman, ‘The Basel Convention’s Amendment to Ban the Shipping o f  Hazardous W astes’, 5(1) R.E.C.I.E.L., 
1996, pp.69-70.
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notification to the competent authorities o f the states concerned containing detailed information 
(Basel, Art.6(l), Annex V A; Bamako, Art.6(l), Annex IV A)); affirmative response in writing from 
the states o f import and transit (Basel, Art.6(2),(3),(4); Bamako, Art.6(2),(3),(4), (5));117 appropriate 
packaging, labelling, and transportation according to international standards (Basel, Art.4(7)(b); 
Bamako, Art.4(3)(m)(ii)); provision o f a movement document that will be carried on board 
(Art.4(7)(c), Annex V B; Bamako, Art.4(3)(m)(iii), Annex IV B); and any other condition that the 
states concerned have laid down when giving their consent (Arts.4(9)(c),(l 1), and 6(7),(11)).
The waste is to be tracked until safely disposed of; hence, the exporter must be notified that 
the waste has reached its destination and that it has it has been disposed of. Otherwise the import 
state has to be notified and ensure that the party in charge of the waste provides the information 
required (Basel, Art,6(9); Bamako, Art.6(8)). In addition, exporters o f hazardous waste, which 
though legally transported cannot be disposed o f as provided in the contract, must re-import it unless 
other environmentally sound arrangements can be made (Basel, Art.8; Bamako, A rt.8)).
More generally, both instruments demand enactment o f national laws in implementation of 
the Conventions which may impose additional requirements in so far as they are consistent with the 
Conventions and international law (Basel, Art.4(4) and (11); Bamako, Arts.4(4)(a) and 3(1)); and 
designation o f national focal points charged with compiling and disseminating all types of 
information to other parties and the Secretariat (Basel, Arts.2(7) and 5(1); Bamako, Arts. 1(9) and 
5(1))-
Finally, it should be noted that the approach adopted in both instruments is that of 
minimisation o f generation and transboundary movement o f hazardous waste, i.e. that low-waste 
or ‘clean production’ technologies should be jointly developed with a view to eliminating the 
generation o f  such waste and achieving more efficient and environmentally sound management 
methods (Basel, Arts.4(2)(a), 10(2)(c); Bamako, Art.4(3)(c), (f) and (g)), and that waste should be 
disposed o f at source (Basel, Art.4(2)(b) and (d); Bamako, Art.4(3)(d)).
2.I.6.2. Barcelona Convention (A rt.ll)  and Hazardous W astes Protocol.
In the Mediterranean, the Hazardous Wastes Protocol incorporating the main provisions of 
the Basel and Bamaco Conventions was the most recent instrument to be added to the MAP arsenal 
in 1996.118 The Protocol is guided by the principle that transfrontier movement o f hazardous waste 
is the exception rather than the rule, so that the obligation to take all appropriate measures to 
“reduce to a minimum, and where possible eliminate, the generation o f hazardous wastes” 
(Art.5(l)), immediately follows the primary undertaking to “prevent, abate and eliminate pollution”
117 The Basel Convention, unlike the Bamako, allows a general notification covering multiple shipments o f  the same 
kind o f  waste to the same destination and via the same ports o f  exit and entry and the same transit states (Art.6(6)); it 
also allows for a general or specific waiver o f  transit states’ consent (Art.6(4)).
llK For a comparative analysis ofthe three instruments, see P.Cubel, ‘Transboundary Movements o f  Hazardous Wastes 
in International Law: The Special Case ofth e Mediterranean Area’, 12(4) In t’lJ , o f  M ar A  Coastal l „  1997, pp.447-74.
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caused by transboundary movements and disposal o f such waste (Art.5(l)). Movement o f hazardous 
substances in the Mediterranean is to be reduced, and if possible eliminated, and to this end the 
Parties may individually or collectively ban the import o f hazardous waste (Art.5(3)).
Furthermore, the Protocol itself bans the export and transit o f hazardous wastes to all 
countries in the region, except Members o f the EU (Art.5(4)). When such wastes cannot be safely 
disposed o f in a developing Mediterranean country, transboundary movement is allowed only when 
the state of import ensures that it has the necessary facilities and technical capacity for safe disposal, 
and gives its written consent, along with any possible transit states after proper notification from the 
country of origin has been received (Art.6); however, if only passage through the territorial sea of 
the state o f  transit is involved, then there is only a duty o f notification and not o f waiting for the 
express consent o f that state (Art.6(4)).119 Moreover, there is an additional duty to re-import waste 
that cannot be moved or disposed o f safely (Art.7); unlike the Basel Convention, no alternative 
arrangements are allowed.
Finally, the Parties are to co-operate in technological fields, especially with regard to 
implementation and development o f methods for reducing and eliminating hazardous waste, through 
clean production methods (Art.8(l)). To this end, they have to submit annual reports on the 
hazardous waste they generate and transfer in order to enable the Secretariat to produce a hazardous 
waste audit (Art. 8(2)). What is more, in implementation o f  the precautionary principle, the Parties 
have an independent obligation to “ensure that clean production methods are applied to production 
processes” (Art. 8(3)).120
2.I.6.3. Council Regulations and Directives.
Transfrontier shipment o f hazardous waste in the Community is supervised and controlled 
pursuant to Council Directive 84/631. The holder o f the waste has to notify the competent 
authorities o f dispatch or transit states, providing information on the nature o f the waste and 
precautions taken. Notification may be acknowledged plainly or with conditions that have to be met 
before the shipment may proceed. The Directive applies to movement o f hazardous waste to a non- 
Community destination as well, it has been updated and adapted to the requirements o f international 
instruments, and in particular the Basel Convention,’21 by Council Regulation 259/93 on the 
supervision and control o f shipments o f waste within, into and out o f the EU ,122 while a Council 
Decision incorporating the above-mentioned Decision 1V/9 of the Conference o f the Parties o f the
119 See T.Scovazzi, ‘N ew  Ideas as regards the Passage o f Ships Carrying Hazardous Wastes: The 1996 Mediterranean 
Protocol’, 7(3) R.E.C.I.E.L., 1998, p.264-7.
120 In this vein, in their 1997 Strategic Action Programme they agreed on a target o f  20%  reduction o f  hazardous 
wastes generated from industrial installations, over a period o f  10 years, see UNEP, op.cit. n .56 ,p.29.
121 Another instrument which is applicable as it bans the direct or indirect export o f  hazardous waste from the EU to 
ACP countries is the 1990 Lomd IV, A rt.39(l).
122 A s amended by Council Regulation 120/97.
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Basel Convention has been recently issued.123
2.1.7. Emergency Co-operation.
2.1.7.1. LOSC (Arts.198-199), OPRC Convention and M ARPOL.
As far as emergency situations are concerned, the LOSC restates the customary duties of 
notification and co-operation in case o f imminent danger o f pollution o f the marine environment,124 
and even requires jo in t development o f contingency plans for responding to pollution incidents 
(Arts.198-199); while the 1990 OPRC Convention provides the global framework for co-operation 
and assistance in oil pollution emergencies irrespective of the source, and should be viewed as 
complementary to the Mediterranean Emergency Protocol reviewed below.
Under the OPRC Convention, the Parties are committed to collaborate in mitigating oil 
spills and to provide assistance upon request. To this effect, they have to make sure that ships, 
offshore installations, aircraft, ports, and oil-handling facilities report without delay any incident 
involving a discharge actual or threatened to the nearest coastal state or responsible national 
authority. These reports are to be made following standards developed at IMO and especially those 
o f MARPOL. In this respect, MARPOL and the OPRC Convention lay down international rules on 
prompt notification that under LOSC Article 211(7) should be adopted by flag, coastal and port 
states alike. When a state receives such a report, it has to assess the nature, extent and possible 
consequences o f the incident and inform all states likely to be affected. Each Party must establish 
a national response system (OPRC, Art.6) and ensure that ships, offshore installations, aircraft, 
ports, and oil-handling facilities under its jurisdiction have an appropriate contingency plan (OPRC, 
Art.3). It should be noted in this connection that the OPRC Convention has inspired positive action 
long before its entry into force, as IMO relied on its substantive provisions in organising assistance 
to states in need.125
More detailed rules are found at the 1991 amendments of MARPOL requiring vessels over 
a certain tonnage to carry an oil pollution emergency plan approved by the flag Administration, 
setting out the procedure to be followed in reporting an oil pollution incident; the authorities to be 
informed; the action to be taken; and the procedure and point o f contact on the ship for coordinating 
action with national and local authorities. The national response system must contain at least such 
a plan and designated national authorities and operational focal points. Moreover, each Party must 
maintain, individually or in co-operation with other Parties and international organisations, and the 
oil and shipping industry, a minimum level o f oil spill response equipment; programmes for its use;
123 Nam ely Council Decision 99/816.
12,1 See Birnie & Boyle, op.cit. n.9, pp. 102-9.
125 For example, in the Persian G ulf oil spill disaster and the Katina P incident o ff  the coast o f  Mozambique, see 
W.A.O'Neil, ‘The International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 1990 (OPRC)’, 
in C.M .de la Rue (ed.), L iability f o r  Dam age to the M arine Environment, 1993, pp. 24 and 27.
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a programme o f exercises and training of personnel; detailed plans and communication capabilities; 
and a coordinating mechanism. Finally technical and educational assistance and co-operation in 
technology transfer is provided for the Parties with lesser means.
2.1.7.2. Barcelona Convention (Art.9), Emergency Protocol and Offshore 
Protocol.
When it comes to pollution emergencies - the most obvious and frequent o f which are 
accidents involving ships carrying dangerous substances, particularly oil, the Barcelona Convention 
Parties undertake - or rather reaffirm their customary duty - to co-operate in taking all necessary 
measures, whatever the causes o f such emergencies and with a view to reduce or eliminate resulting 
damage (A rt.9(l)), and notify the Secretariat or directly any Party likely to be affected, as soon as 
they become aware o f any emergency (Art.9(2)).
These duties are restated in the Emergency Protocol - currently under revision -126, where 
the ‘necessary measures’ are laid down in detail: They involve the maintenance and promotion of 
contingency plans,527 and means for combatting pollution, such as equipment, ships, aircraft and 
manpower (Art.3), and the development and application of monitoring activities that would furnish 
precise information on emergency situations (Art.4). All Parties had to have national Contingency 
Plans established by 1989,128 but by 1993 seven countries had failed to do sBf The first sub­
regional contingency scheme is the Plan on response to accidental marine pollution in the 
RAM OGE region (RAMOGEPOL) drawn up in October 1993;130 while in 1995 and 1996 
respectively, relevant schemes were introduced for the maritime areas o f  Cyprus, Egypt and Israel, 
and for the Southwestern Mediterranean (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia).131
Moreover, pursuant to the Emergency Protocol, states have to instruct the masters o f ships 
flying their flag and pilots o f aircraft registered in their territory to report all accidents causing or 
likely to cause pollution and the presence, characteristics and extent o f spillages o f oil and other 
harmful substances observed at sea likely to present a serious and imminent threat (Art.8(l), “by the 
most rapid and adequate channels in the circumstances”, either to a Party or to the Regional 
Emergency Response Centre for the Mediterranean Sea (REM PEC),132 and which in turn informs
136 See UNEP, op .cit.n.56, Annex IV, Appendix II.
127 Cf. 1983 Quito Supplementary Emergency Protocol, Art. 11, where, unlike the Mediterranean Protocol, it sets out 
minimum requirements that national contingency plans have to meet.
128 See UNEP, op.cit. n,40, p.32.
129 See UNEP, op.cit. n.48, p.7.
130 Ibid, p .28,
131 On international funding provided for the latter see infra, Chapter 6, pp.284-7.
132 REMPEC has several responsibilities, mainly collection and dissemination o f  information on competent national 
authorities responsible for receiving reports o f  marine pollution and for dealing with matters concerning measures o f  
assistance between Parties; establishment o f  a data base on chemicals, their properties and risks, response techniques 
and combatting methods progressive development and operation o f  a marine pollution emergency decision support 
system, with a view to rapidly providing coastal states with information concerning behaviour, risks and different
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other Parties likely to be affected (Art.8(2)). According to Annex I o f the Protocol, these reports 
have to contain, the identification o f the source o f pollution, the geographical position, time and date 
o f the occurrence, the wind and sea conditions prevailing, information on the responsible ship and 
if possible a description and estimation o f the harmful substance (Annex 1, Arts. 1-2).133
States must, furthermore, co-ordinate the utilisation o f the means of communication at their 
disposal in order to ensure, with the necessary speed and reliability, the reception, transmission and 
dissemination o f all reports and urgent information relative to emergencies (Art.7).
Any Party faced with an emergency situation must make the necessary assessments of its 
nature and extent, o f the quantity, direction and speed of the spillage; take every practicable measure 
to avoid or reduce the effects o f pollution; immediately inform all other Parties, either directly or 
through the REMPEC, o f the assessments and of any action taken or intended; and continue to 
observe the situation for as long as possible and report thereon (A rt.9(l)). It may also call for 
assistance from other Parties, either directly or through REMPEC, starting with those likely to be 
affected by the pollution. This assistance may comprise expert advice and the supply to or placing 
at the disposal o f the Party concerned of products, equipment and nautical facilities. O f course, this 
assistance is not guaranteed; Parties “shall use their best endeavours” to render it (Art. 10(1)).
Lastly, the Emergency Protocol requires states to co-operate, as far as practicable, in the 
salvage and recovery o f polluting substances in containers, packages etc so as to reduce the danger 
o f pollution (Art.5); it is reasonable to assume that in discharge o f this obligation they at least have 
to adapt their national salvage laws so as to include the marine environment among protected 
interests.134
Further elaboration by the Meeting o f the Parties resulted in various Recommendations on 
principles and guidelines concerning co-operation and mutual assistance, the role and 
responsibilities o f experts sent on site, equipment sent in case o f international assistance operation, 
procedures that could be applied in case o f a joint operation, procedures to be followed and persons 
to be conducted in case o f  emergency etc.135
The recent Offshore Protocol also contains special provisions, under the heading
132(.,.continued)
possibilities for action in case o f  accident; development and maintenance o f  a regional Communications/Information 
system; developm ent o f  technological co-operation and training programmes; assistance to requesting states in the 
preparation and development o f bilateral or multilateral operational agreements; assistance to requesting states in cases 
o f emergency, by using its own capacities or through the secondment o f  experts, or by obtaining assistance from other 
Parties or from outside the region. On the work o f  the Centre during recent years, see, e.g., REMPEC, Review ofth e  
Implementation o f  the Regional System Regarding International Assistance in Cases o f  Emergency, 
REM PEC/W G.5/lnf.22, Malta, 1992; and under the same title, REMPEC/WG. 10/Inf. 10, Malta, 1994.
133 As was the case with dumping, Resolution 5 o fth e  1976 Conference o f  Plenipotentiaries urges third states to see 
that ships flying their flag observe the Protocol's reporting requirements and Parties to encourage charterers o f  their 
nationality to insert in charter parties a clause to the effect that the ships in question navigating in the Mediterranean shall 
observe the same provision as ships flying the flag o f  a Party.
134 See also 1989 International Convention on Salvage, Articles 8 and 14.
135 See UNEP, op.cit. n.46, Annex IV, pp.3-13.
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“Safeguards”, with a view to preventing and dealing with harmful accidents. States under whose 
jurisdiction an offshore activity is carried out have to ensure - and to that effect cany out inspections 
- that safety measures are taken with regard to the design, construction, operation etc. o f 
installations; that at all times the operator has in situ adequate equipment to prevent accidental 
pollution and promptly respond to an emergency (Art. 15), in accordance with the latter’s 
contingency plan which is laid down under the procedures defined in the Emergency Protocol 
(Art. 16).
The operator is additionally under the obligation to report to the competent authority any 
event on his installation causing or likely to cause pollution, and any such event observed at sea 
(Art. 17). i f  a Party becomes aware of imminent danger or actual transfrontier pollution, it shall 
immediately notify the parties likely to be affected and provide them with timely information that 
would enable them to take appropriate measures (Art.26(3)). When an emergency arises, any Party 
in need of assistance may request help either directly from another state or through REMPEC, under 
the pertinent provisions o f the Emergency Protocol (Art.l 8).
2.1.7.3. Com m unity Instruments.
Council Decision 86/85 on the establishment o f a Community information system for the 
control and reduction o f pollution caused by oil spillages o f hydrocarbons and other harmful 
substances discharged at sea or in inland waterways136 establishes an information system that 
comprises a list o f national and jo in t contingency plans; an inventory o f  resources for combatting 
marine pollution, i.e. equipment and personnel, existing in Member States; a catalogue of the means 
listed in the inventory, describing all the different types o f clean-up facilities; an inventory of 
resources for intervention for combating other harmful substances spilled at sea; and of the resources 
for intervention against a spillage o f hydrocarbons or other substances in major inland waters, 
especially certain international waterways; a compendium o f hydrocarbon properties and their 
behaviour and of methods o f treatment; a compilation study on the different impacts of 
hydrocarbons on fauna and flora, depending on the characteristics o f the area concerned; and 
information on the properties and behaviour o f other harmful substances. Member States have to 
provide, update and make use o f that information. A Task Force o f experts that can be called upon 
to provide advice and assistance in case o f emergency complements the information system. This 
instrument is not confined to spillages caused by vessels, but o f course such incidents are the most 
frequent ones.
More generally Directive 93/75 concerning minimum requirements for vessels bound for 
or leaving Community ports and carrying dangerous or polluting goods137 provides for compulsory 
notification to the competent authorities o fthe port state of specific information concerning any ship
136 Amended by D ecision 88/346.
137 A s amended by Directive 98/55,
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and its cargo, if the latter falls under the definition of ‘dangerous or polluting’ according to 
M ARPOL or the pertinent IMO Codes, whenever that vessel enters or leaves a Community port. 
It also institutes an obligation under Community law to promptly report any incident involving such 
ships without prejudice to the afore-mentioned international arrangements.
2.2. The Hierarchy o f International Marine Pollution Rules Applicable in the Mediterranean.
It is now useful to clarify the relationship between the great variety o f international 
environmental norms that are applicable in the Mediterranean area.There follows a discussion, 
initially, o f  the relationship between the Barcelona Convention and other international 
environmental agreements, and, then, o fth e  position o f international treaties in Community law.
2.2.1. The Relationship o f the Barcelona Convention and Related Protocols with
Other International Environmental Agreements.
The Barcelona Convention itself sets out the basic hierarchical order to be followed in case 
o f friction between different rules o f international law: The general (customary) international law 
takes precedence (Art.3(l)); the 1982 LOSC follows, or even coincides with customary law to the 
extent that it codifies and/or progressively develops it (Art.3(3)); the Barcelona Convention comes 
next; and last come all other bilateral or multilateral agreements, regional or sub-regional inclusive, 
for the protection o fthe Mediterranean environment (Art. 3 (2)).138 This subordination clause helps 
clarify difficult legal questions, often arising when several rules apply to the same issue, and had 
particular significance with regard to the LOSC, since, on one hand, the Barcelona Convention was 
lex specialis, while, on the other, the LOSC was lex posterior. The situation has, o f course, now 
changed in view o f  the fact that the Barcelona Convention text has been formally amended in 1995; 
hence, when the latter effectively comes into force, it will be both the special and the most recent 
legal text addressing protection o f the marine environment in the Mediterranean. Consequently, it 
may only be superseded by a rule o f customary law whether included in the LOSC or not.
It should also be reminded in this connection that the LOSC, for its part, explicitly 
authorises regional elaboration o f marine protection norms, and, more generally, regional 
institutional co-operation.139 In Article 197, states express their commitment to:
138 See B.Vucas, ‘The Protection ofth e  Mediterranean against Pollution’, in U.Leanza (ed.), The Internationa! Legal 
Regime o f  the M editerranean Sea , 1987, pp .419-20.
139 In fact one o fth e  major innovations in the modern law ofth e  sea, namely the institution o f  the Exclusive Economic 
Zone, stemmed from a regional (African) claim widely endorsed during the LOSC negotiations, see Conclusions o f  the 
African States Regional Seminar on the Law ofthe Sea, Yaounde, 20-30 June 1972, reprinted in 12 I.L.M ., 1973, p.210.
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“ ...co-operate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis,140 directly or 
through competent international organisations, in formulating and elaborating international 
rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with [the] 
Convention, for the protection and preservation o f the marine environment, taking into 
account characteristic regional features.”
They, moreover, have to endeavour to harmonise their policies by establishing, especially 
through competent international organisations and conferences at the global or regional level, such 
rules, standards and procedures, “taking into account characteristic regional features, the economic 
capacity o f developing states and their need for economic development” (Art.207(3) and (4)). A 
prime example o f such a ‘harmonisation’ respecting the relevant parameters is taking place in the 
context o f the Athens Protocol discussed above.
In this vein, specific obligations assumed under agreements predating or implementing the 
LOSC are to be respected - in deviation from the general supremacy rule o f Article 311, but should 
be carried out consistently with the general principles and objectives o f the Convention (Art.237). 
The rationale behind this approach is the assumption that “marine pollution could be effectively 
dealt with by a combination o f global, regional and national rules and standards with the global ones 
fixing the minimum provisions... and the regional ones laying down particular and stricter 
provisions”;141 this is why Part XII has been described as “an ‘um brella’ for regional activity”, 
especially in view o f the main trend in international regulation towards “ increasing emphasis on 
regionalism as a functional compromise between a necessarily generalised global response and 
unpredictable and uncertain unilateral responses”.142
Semi-enclosed seas, such as the Mediterranean, are - due to their particularities - inherently 
susceptible to regional regulation.143 The LOSC recognises this reality and calls upon states 
bordering semi-enclosed seas to a closer co-operation with a view to co-ordinating their policies in 
relation to marine living resources, protection o f the marine environment, and scientific research 
(Arts. 122-123), although admittedly it does not go so far as to satisfy the initial aspiration of the 
countries that put forward the relevant proposals - developing Mediterranean states being prominent
140 On the tensions between ‘regionalists’ and ‘internationalists’ during LOSC negotiations, see J.W.Kindt, ‘The 
Effect o f  Claims by D eveloping Countries on LOS International Marine Pollution N egotiations’, 20(2) Virginia J. o f  
Int 7 L. , 1980, pp .313-40.
141 UN, Official Records o f  the General Assembly; Twenty-Seventh Session, Suppl.21 (A /8721), p .53, cited in 
C.O.Okidi, ‘Toward Regional Arrangements for Regulation o f  Marine Pollution: An Appraisal o f  O ptions’, 4(1) 
O.D.I.L.J., 1977, p. 13. For a comparison o f  the unilateral, regional and global approach to marine pollution regulation 
and the substantive merits o fth e  regional one, see ibid; and C.O.Okidi, Regional Control o f  Ocean Pollution, Legal and  
Institutional Problem s and P rospects, 1978, Chapter III.
142 See M.L.McConnell & E.Gold, ‘The Modern Law o f  the Sea: Framework for the Protection and Preservation o f  
the Marine Environment?’, 23 Case W est.Res.JJ.L ., 1991, p .85.
143 See L.M .Alexander, ‘Regionalism and the Law o fth e  Sea: The Case o f  Sem i-Enclosed Seas’, 2(2) O.D.I.L.J., 
1974, pp .151-186; and by the same author, ‘Regional Arrangements in the O ceans’, 71 A .J J .L , 1977, pp.84-109.
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among them - by establishing a distinct legal category.144
The clear implication o f the above is that the Mediterranean legal system must follow 
general international law on the protection o f the marine environment as it evolves; regional rules 
may only be more protective, never more permissive than the global ones.145 The Preamble itself of 
the Barcelona Convention reinforces this inference; the Parties, explaining the need for a regional 
legal system, noted “ ... that existing international conventions on the subject do not cover, in spite 
o f the progress achieved, all aspects and sources o f marine pollution and do not entirely meet the 
special requirements o f the Mediterranean Sea Area” . It follows that, for matters not specially 
regulated in the Barcelona regime, most notably operational pollution from ships, the applicable law 
is found in other international regimes. Article 6, indeed, reiterates the customary duty o f the Parties 
to take measures “ in conformity with international law to prevent, abate, combat and to the fullest 
possible extent eliminate” pollution caused by discharges o f ships, as well as to effectively 
implement relevant internationally recognised rules and standards, i.e. principally MARPOL and 
other IMO standards discussed above; in this way these standards become indirectly binding on the 
Barcelona Parties, even if the latter have not formally committed themselves in this respect.
As far as the Dumping Protocol is concerned, Article 13 states that this instrument should 
not be construed so as to prejudice the right o f Parties to take other measures, in accordance with 
international law, to prevent pollution from dumping. Hence, complementary or stricter measures, 
established in other fora, are entirely legitimate. Having said that, over the years, it had been 
suggested that, because o f a statement in the Preamble o f the Protocol to the effect that 
Mediterranean states were concluding the agreement “bearing in mind” the 1972 London 
Convention, the latter should prevail, in case o f incompatibility, for parties to both Conventions.146 
What seemed more significant, in view o f the widely held opinion that the London Dumping 
Convention represents customary law in the field, was to establish that the global instrument did in 
fact set the minimum standards, obligatory for all, and only higher ones could be imposed through 
other non-global instruments. This is how revision o f the Dumping Protocol came about, so that the 
regional law on dumping now incorporates, or even moves beyond,147 global rules, and especially 
the decisions o f the London Convention Parties to prohibit industrial dumping and incineration at 
sea.
In the same vein, the recent Hazardous Waste Protocol acknowledges in its Preamble both
144 On the proposals at the LOSC negotiations, the underlying rationale o fth e  proponents o fth e  notion, and the fears 
and position o f  developed Mediterranean states and major naval powers, see M.Benchikh, ‘La Mcr Mediterrande, Mer 
Scmi-Fermde’, 84 R .G .D .I.P ., 1980, pp.284-297,
145 See J.J.Ruiz, ‘The Evolution ofthe Barcelona Convention and its Protocols for the Protection ofth e  Mediterranean 
Sea against Pollution’, in E.L.Miles & T.Trcves (eds.), The Law o f  the Sea: New Worlds, N ew D iscoveries (Law ofth e  
Sea Institute Twenty-Sixth Annual Conference Proceedings), 1993, p.210.
146 See Vucas, op.cit. n. 138, pp.422-3,
147 Scvsu p a , pp. 112-3
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the Basel Convention, and Decisions adopted by the latter’s three first Conferences of the Parties, 
as well as the Lome IV and Bamako Conventions. On the other hand, the Emergency Protocol has 
not yet undergone any revision, and, although acknowledging the older MARPOL, 1969 
Intervention Convention, and 1973 Intervention Protocol, fails to take into account the more recent 
OPRC Convention.
Lastly, as far as the Athens and the Offshore Protocols are concerned, the issue examined 
here does not present many difficulties, since global rules are almost non-existent. Hence, the 
revised Land-Based Protocol merely acknowledges in its Preamble the 1995 Global Programme of 
Action for the Protection o f the Marine Environment from Land-Based Sources, while the Offshore 
Protocol does the same with regard to relevant provisions laid down in the LO SC.148
2.2.2. The Relationship o f Community Law with International Environmental
Agreements.
2.2.2.I. Community Participation in International Environmental 
Agreements.
The Community has an international legal personality both under general international law 
which attributes such personality to international organisations,149 and, albeit implicitly,550 under the 
EC Treaty, which regulates the modalities for the conclusion o f international agreements between 
the Community and third states or international organisations (Arts. 133(3), 300, 310), and other 
aspects o f Community relations with international organisations (Arts.302-304). Where the EC 
Treaty accords a certain power to the Community, Member States may not exercise the same power 
concurrently,151 and this equally holds for agreements to which the Community is not formally a 
party, while the M ember States are, and which cover a subject-matter o f exclusive Community 
competence. In those instances, the Community replaces Member States in the fulfilment of 
obligations under the relevant treaty.152
In fact, the actual competence of the Community to enter into treaties is not confined to the 
instances explicitly provided for in the EC Treaty, but rather extends to the whole range o f targets
,‘IX See supra, pp.61 and 76-7, respectively,
HV Codification ofth e  ensuing competence to enter into international agreements has been attempted through the 1986 
Convention on the Law o f  Treaties between States and International Organizations.
150 The EC Treaty does not explicitly provide for the international legal personality o f  the Community, 
notwithstanding Articles 281 etseq . confirming its legal personality in the domestic order o f  Member States; c f  Article 
6 ofth e  ECSC Treaty, which expressly vests the ECSC “ in international relations...[with] the legal capacity it requires 
to perform its functions and attain its objectives” . However, this is deemed to be an assertion o f  personality in 
international law as well, see D.McGoldrick, International Relations Law o f  the European Union, 1997, p.29. See also, 
ibid, pp.36-9, for a discussion o f  the issue o f  why the EU has no legal personality as yet.
151 See Opinion 1/75, 1975 E.C.R., p.1355.
152 Cases 21 to 24-72, International Fruit Company, 1972 E.C.R., p. 1219.
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laid down therein. In the ERTA case,153 the European Court o f Justice (ECJ) found that what is now 
Article 281 (“The Community has legal personality”) confers on the Community treaty-making 
power in its international relations, on any o f  the objectives set out by the EC Treaty, especially in 
Part One. If some form o f common rule in pursuance o f the objective has been issued, any 
concurrent exercise o f such a power by Member States that might affect this rule or alter its scope 
is excluded. According to this theory of ‘parallelism’, competence in fo ro  externo follows - and is 
analogous to -154 that in foro  interno. In the same vein, when Community law gives an organ 
competence to achieve a certain goal, the Community has the power to undertake international 
commitments necessary for that achievement, even in the absence of an explicit provision to that 
effect ( ‘implied powers’).155
Having said that, international environmental agreements with Community participation are 
explicitly allowed under the EC Treaty (Art. 174(4)),156 but Article 176 implies that in the 
environmental plane there can only be minimum standards and not exclusive competence.157 
Consequently, Member States retain their own competence at the international level, but only 
consistently with the ERTA principles.158 However, the terms of a particular convention and those 
o f  internal Community rules rarely coincide and it is difficult to establish where the exclusive 
competence of the Community ends regarding a specific subject-matter regulated by a convention, 
and where concurrent competence begins. The most commonly used method in such instances, 
especially in the environmental sphere, is that o f ‘mixed agreements’, to which both the EU and 
some or all Member States are parties.159 Hence, the Community is bound by an increasing number 
o f multilateral conventions covering a broad spectrum o f environmental issues, the most significant 
o f which for present purposes are the Basel Convention; and most importantly, the Barcelona 
Convention and Protocols,160 and it is also a signatory to the 1982 Convention on the Law o f the 
Sea.161
153 Case 22-70, Commission v. Council (ERTA). 1971 E.C.IL, p.263.
154 See Cases 3, 4 and 6/76, Kramer. 1976 E.C.R., p. 1279; and Opinions 1-75, loc.cit. n .151; 1-76, 1977 E.C.R., 
p .741; 1-78, 1979 E.C.R., p .2871; and 2/91, 1993 E.C .R., p.1-1061. For an elucidating discussion o f  these cases, see 
T.C.Hartley, The Foundations o f  European Community Law, 4th ed.1998, pp. 159-70.
155 Cf. Reparation for Injuries Case, 1949 l.C.J. Reports, p. 179.
150 See generally J.H.Jans, European Environm ental Law, 1995, Chapter II.
157 See M.Mession & R.Macrory, ‘Maastricht and the Environmental Policy o fth e  Community: Legal Issues o f  a New  
Environment P olicy’, in D.O'Keefe & P.M .Twomey (eds.), Legal Issues o f  the M aastricht Treaty, 1994, pp. 159-160.
158 C.Zacker, ‘Environmental Law o fth e  European Economic Community. N ew  Powers under the Single European 
A ct’, 14(2) Boston Coll.Int’l & Com p.L.Rev., 1991, pp.270-1.
I5‘J See generally D.O'Keefe & G.Schermers (eds.), M ixed Agreem ents, 1983; McGoldrick, op.cit. n. 150, Chapter 5; 
and M.Mession, ‘The R ole o fth e  EC in Implementing International Environmental Law’, in J.Cameron, J.Werksman 
& P.Roderick (eds.), Im proving Com pliance with International Environmental Law, 3996, pp. 180-4.
160 Council Decisions 77/585, 1977 O.J. (L 240  1; 81/420, 1981 O.J. (L 162)4; 83/101, 1983 O.J. (L 67) 1; 84/132, 
1984 O J . (L 68) 36.
161 Other environmental Conventions to which the Community is a Party are the 1973 Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species o f  Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES), Council Regulation 3626/82, 1982 O.J. (L 384) 1, as
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The participation clause o f the Barcelona Convention, whereby the EU - and other regional 
economic groupings exercise their right to vote with a number of votes equal to the number o f their 
member states which are Parties to the Convention, while they may not exercise this right in case 
where the M ember States exercise theirs, and conversely (Art.25), has served as a precedent for 
other multilateral instruments, although it took some time to find its place in subsequent treaties.162
However, Community participation in the LOSC presented rather more complexities. The 
LOSC includes a clause (Art.305 (1)0)) according to which “an international organisation may sign 
this Convention if a majority of its Member States are signatories o f this Convention”;163 the EU did 
in fact meet the requirement and signed the Convention. In addition, it was required to make a 
declaration o f competence stating the matters governed by LOSC in respect o f which competence 
had been transferred by those Members that were also signatories, as well as the nature and extent 
o f that competence (Annex IX, Art.2). That was provoked by many participants at the Law of the 
Sea Conference being reluctant to accept that an international organisation could substitute its 
members in carrying the obligations and rights deriving from the Convention in a general and all- 
encompassing way. In response, the Community bluntly declared that it had competence with regard 
to the conservation and management o f sea fishing resources; in relation to other marine 
environmental matters, however, it declared its competence “as formulated in provisions adopted 
by the Community and as reflected by its participation in certain international agreements”, 
selectively listed in an Annex.
This incident illustrates the fact that the ‘mixed agreement’ device does not solve all 
problems arising from the extent o f Community competence at each instance; there have indeed 
been times when the EU has refrained from participating in decisions at Meetings of Contracting 
Parties,164 or - even worse - has entered into disputes with Member States on their rights to adopt
l6i(.. .continued)
amended; the 1979 Convention on Conservation o f  European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, 1982 O.J. (L 38) 3; the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1994 O.J. (L 33) 13; and the Convention on Biological Diversity, 1993 O.J. 
(L 309) 3.
162 See, e.g. the 1976 Bonn Agreement relating to the EU accession to the 1963 Berne Convention for the Protection 
o f  Rhine against Pollution, cited in M .Brusasco-M acKenzie & A.Kiss, ‘Les Relations Exlerieures des Communaut£s 
Europdennes en Matidre de Protection de l’Environnement’, 35 A .F .D .l., 1989, at fn.9; Article 15 o fth e  1985 Vienna 
Convention for the Protection o f  the Ozone Layer; and Art.20(2) o f the 1992 Paris Convention for the Protection o f  the 
Marine Environment o f  the North East Atlantic.
163 See, among others, P.W .Birnie, ‘The European Community’s Environmental P o licy’, in E.D,Brown & 
R.R.Churchill (eds.), The UN Convention on the Law o f  the Sea: Impact and Implementation, (Law o f  the Sea institute 
Nineteenth Annual Conference Proceedings), 1987, pp.532-3; and G.Conetti, ‘UNCLOS and EEC External Competence 
on Marine Environment Protection’, in B.Vucas (ed.), Essays on the New Law o f  the Sea, 1985, pp.399-406.
164 For example, in the 1990 Meeting o f  the Montreal Protocol Parties, it did not take part in the decision to establish 
a Fund to assist developing countries, see NTlaigh, ‘The European Community and International Environmental Policy’, 
in A.Hurrell & B.Kingsbury (eds.) International Politics o f  the Environment, 1992, p p .240-1. On the problems that EU 
participation in the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol created, see J.Temple Lang, ‘The Ozone Layer 
Convention: A  N ew  Solution to the Question o f  Community Participation in ‘M ixed’ International Agreements’, 23 
C.M .L.Rev., 1986, pp. 157-176.
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more stringent standards than those under EU law.165
As far as conclusion o f international agreements by the Community is concerned, the 
Maastricht Treaty introduced substantial changes in the procedure laid down in what is now Article 
300 .166 More specifically, the Commission is the negotiator, while in principle the Council 
‘concludes’ the final agreement, i.e. expresses consent to be bound (A rt.300(l)), When expressing 
its consent to be bound, the Council may delegate - with or without attaching conditions - some of 
its powers to the Commission, so that the latter may itself approve on behalf o f the Community 
modifications o f the agreement adopted by a simplified procedure or by a body such as the Meeting 
o fthe Contracting Parties (Art.300(4)).167 Hence, the effective party to the day-to-day operation of 
international agreements is usually the Commission and not the Council.
Whereas previously the Council could proceed to concluding an agreement only by 
unanimity, now it acts by a ‘qualified majority’ upon a Commission proposal; unanimity is still the 
rule, however, when the agreement covers a field for which unanimity is required for the adoption 
o f internal rules, and for association agreements (Art.300(2)). Moreover, while the Parliament was 
previously consulted only to the extent the Treaty explicitly provided so, after the Maastricht Treaty 
came into effect it is always consulted, except in relation to agreements in the field o fth e  common 
commercial policy (Art.300(3)).168 More importantly, association agreements, other agreements 
establishing a specific institutional framework by organising co-operation procedures - as several 
conventions organising environmental regimes do -, agreements having important budgetary 
implications, and agreements entailing amendment o f an act adopted under the ‘co-decision 
procedure’, are concluded only after the assent o f the Parliament has been given, while in urgent 
situations the Council and the Parliament may agree on a time limit for the assent.
2.2.2.2. The Position of International Environmental Agreements in the 
Community Legal Order.
Once the Community has been duly bound by an international convention, a question arises 
as to the placing o f the rules contained therein in the legal hierarchy of the Community legal order 
as such. In practice, when doubts on the compatibility o f an envisaged agreement with the Treaty 
arise,169 the Council, the Commission, or a Member State may ask the ECJ to deliver an Opinion
if’5 In the context o fth e  1974 Paris Convention, see Haigh, op.cit. n.165, pp.241-2.
166 See McGoldrick, op.cit. n.150, Chapter 6.
167 See, for instance, EC Commission, Recommendation for a Council D ecision authorizing the Commission to 
negotiate on behalf o fth e  Community measures concerning bathing water, shellfish water [etc.]...under the Convention 
for the Protection o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution, COM (85) 362 final, 8,07.1985.
168 Actually, a time limit in which the Parliament must deliver its opinion is set by the Council depending on the 
urgency o f  the matter; if  that period elapses without an opinion, the Council may proceed alone.
169 When agreements concluded by Member States before the EC Treaty entered into force are incompatible with 
Community law, all appropriate steps must be taken to eliminate the incompatibilities (Art.307). In any case, the rights 
o f  third states against Member States created in this way are not affected by Community law, whereas Community rights 
and obligations are still valid as between Member States.
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(Art.300(6)); should the Opinion be adverse, the agreement may enter into force only in accordance 
with the Treaty amendment procedure, as laid down in Article 48 o f the Treaty on European 
Union.170
Agreements properly concluded in the above sense effectively bind the Community and its 
Member States (Art.3 00(7)), form an integral part of Community law and fall within the competence 
o fE C J .171 The implication o f  Article 300 with regard to secondary Community law, although not 
explicitly articulated, seems to be that the Community must observe its international undertakings - 
according to the pacta  sunt servanda  rule - and ensure that its Members do the same, by issuing a 
harmonisation instrument where necessary replacing possible pre-existing and conflicting rules.172 
Hence, the Community is ultimately responsible for Member State compliance with environmental 
obligations undertaken at the international level.173 Even if it does not act at all, it may not issue 
secondary legislation contrary to the international obligations; moreover, already existing rules with 
such dispositions will be subject to judicial review, on the grounds o f breach o f Article 300(7).
Now, all national law - including constitutional rules - is inapplicable if in conflict with the 
EC Treaty or directly applicable secondary law - uniquely in the international plane, since all 
international acts require ratification before they can be translated into domestic law.174 If, in turn, 
international agreements binding on the Community are integrated in its legal order, that would 
signify that they would bind all Member States exactly as the rest o f Community rules, i.e. without 
waiting for ratification by each national Parliament.
To support this conclusion, the ECJ has ruled that international agreements to which the 
Community is a party may have ‘direct effect’, if they impose clear and precise obligations that are 
not subject to the adoption o f any subsequent measure;175 such provisions, should they confer rights 
on citizens, can be invoked before national courts.176 This dictate has particular practical importance 
when not every Member State is party to an international convention, or when there is no detailed 
Community legislation on a subject-matter, as all assume the relevant obligations indirectly - by 
means o f Community and not general international law.
The significance o f Community joining environmental regimes does not end here, however; 
even when all Member States are parties to a convention and implement it at the national level, the
170 See J.Groux & Ph.Manin, The European Communities in the Internationa! O rder, 1984, pp.l 17-8.
171 See Cases 21 to 24-72, International Fruit Company. 1972 E .C .R , p. 1219; Case 181-73, Haegeman. 1974 E.C.R., 
p.449; Case 10-/81, Kunferberg. 1982 E.C.R., p.3641, at para.17; Hession, op.cit. n.159, p .184; McGoldrick, op.cit. 
n.150, Chapter 7; and Hartley, op.cit. n.154, pp. 176-81 and 216-7.
172 See International Fruit and Haegeman Cases.
173 But the Community strangely does not in itself monitor the implementation o f  the conventions to which it has 
acceded, see Krttmer, op.cit. n.58, pp. 18 and 283-4; and infra, Chapter 5, p.232, and Chapter 7, pp.322-3.
174 On the notion o f ‘direct effect’ see infra, Chapter 7, pp.322-5.
175 See Case 12/86, Demirel. 1987 E.C.R., at para.14; and McGoldrick, op.cit. n.150, pp .126-33.
176 Case 87-75, Bresciani. 1976 E.C.R., p.129; Case 104-81. Kupferberg. op.cit. n .172, p .3 6 4 l.
98
EU, as such, becomes bound and has to proceed with relevant action in implementation o f the 
agreement, for example, monetary or other contributions etc., only after it has become a distinct 
party. That is particularly important in environmental treaties establishing continuous regimes of 
co-operation, such as those encountered in the Mediterranean.
Another significant extract from ECJ jurisprudence declares acts o f organs established 
under international agreements, such as those o f the Meeting of the Contracting Parties o f MAP, if 
legally binding at the international plane, “an integral part o f the Community legal system”,177 and 
thus also binding on the EU and its Members with ‘direct effect’. In the context o f MAP, the EU 
delegation accept the various recommendations mainly those implementing the Athens Protocol ad  
referendum , subject to the appropriate administrative procedures o f the Community.178
Finally, it should be noted at this point that there is a very significant reverse aspect o f the 
issues discussed in the preceding pages, namely the export o f Community environmental legislation 
to the international plane through co-operation agreements with third countries. This issue, however, 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
2.3. Concluding Remarks.
After having examined all the major sets o f international rules that relate to the protection 
o fthe Mediterranean Sea against pollution, let us make, by way of conclusion, two closely related 
points that seem particularly relevant to the central thesis argued in Part II o f this study. Firstly, it 
is evident that activities involving ships, be it dumping, or transport o f goods or waste, have a 
transnational character since ships move between different jurisdictions, and hence the potential o f 
directly involving other states in any relevant follow-up and enforcement procedures. On the 
contrary, control o f pollution caused mainly by land-based sources, but also offshore exploitation, 
is not linked to any other state’s interest and/or jurisdiction, but is entirely left to the domestic legal 
system. It follows that only indirectly can international actors interfere and challenge the way a state 
has carried out the tasks it has been assigned by international law.
Secondly and more importantly, in this Chapter we saw how the international rules for the 
protection o fthe Mediterranean Sea against pollution evolved from an aspirational ‘framework5 to 
more or less specific commitments in the context o f MAP, and from a rather piece-meal approach 
to integrated pollution control in the context o f the EU. The ever-expanding scope and character o f 
this legal framework, now arguably covering to a lesser or greater extent any possible polluting 
source and often being fairly detailed and technical, is a clear indication that states have accepted 
that the world community has an interest in controlling activities carried out within their exclusive
177 See Case 30/88. Greece v. Commission. 1989 E.C.R,. p .3711;and Case C -192/89, Sevince, 1990 E.C.R., p.1-3461.
I7S See, e.g. UNEP, op.cit. n.54, pp.6, 10 and 13.
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jurisdiction and in preserving and improving the quality of their own marine environment, 
irrespective o f any possible transboundary effect. This ‘internationalisation’ o f the domestic 
environment,179 has thus curtailed their absolute sovereignty and discretion as to what conduct is 
allowed and indeed required within national borders. If  that is to become anything more than a 
theoretical notion with little real impact, however, it should have as a corollary a comparable 
intrusion of international law in the follow-up process within national jurisdictions so as to ensure 
compliance with the standards laid down at the international level. The implications of the above 
will be further pursued in subsequent Chapters.
17'J On this notion, see also infra, Chapter 8.
PART II
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C h ap ter  3.
In te r n a  tio n a l  E n v ir o n m e n t a l  L a  w a n d  th e  E v o lu tio n  
o f  C o m p l ia n c e  C o n tr o l  M e c h a n is m s .
After Part I provided necessary contextual information on points o f law and o f fact, Part II 
will now focus on the core issues that inform the present thesis, namely existing and emerging 
mechanisms to control compliance with international environmental law on the protection of the 
Mediterranean Sea against pollution. This Chapter introduces the topic:
The first Section reviews the evolution o f  mechanisms used to secure compliance during 
the course o f development o f international environmental regulation, i.e. from the late 19th century 
to the present days. Four phases are distinguished in this context: The first starts in the late 1800s 
and ends with the creation o f the United Nations system in 1945; although this is an era in which 
the pace o f formation o f international environmental law - and international law in general, for that 
matter - is slow, state responsibility and sanctions are already in place in order to respond to any 
breach o f obligation. The second phase lasts from 1945 to the Stockholm Conference in 1972, and 
is marked by more intense environmental law-making, the proliferation o f international institutions, 
and the emergence o f innovatory compliance-control procedures, especially in the context of 
international labour law and human rights protection. The third period covers twenty years of rapid 
growth o f international environmental regulation, from 1972 to 1992, during which one can observe 
the actual formation o f a substantial body o f primary rules, distinct legal principles, as well as 
follow-up techniques that are still valid. Finally, the fourth phase begins at the Rio Conference on 
Environment and Development and is still evolving. In view o f the substantive legal coverage of 
a wide variety o f regional and global, sectoral and trans-sectoral issues and also of the increasing 
awareness surrounding proper fulfilment of relevant obligations that has been achieved up to now, 
this is probably the stage where the maturity of international environmental law as a system of 
relatively well-respected - and thus potentially effective - standards will be tested.
Finally, the second Section o f this Chapter reviews the various compliance-control 
mechanisms as they have evolved with a view at identifying the needs they address and the legal 
notions they accommodate, as well as the flaws and inadequacies inherent in each one o f them, in 
order to make an initial assessment o f their utility in the context o f international law for the 
protection o f the Mediterranean Sea against pollution.
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3.1. A Historical Account o f the Evolution o f Compliance Control M echanisms with Emphasis 
on the M arine Environm ent.1
3.1.1. Late 19th Century to the Establishment of the United Nations System.
The early years o f international environmental law-making are characterised by sparse 
attempts at preserving certain wild species, perceived as threatened at the time, especially fish, birds, 
and marine mammals, as well as protecting particular shared watercourses from detrimental human 
impact, including pollution.2 The resulting instruments are mostly bilateral and follow the wider 
patterns o f international law-making o f  the period; as such, they are usually not concerned with 
questions of implementation, or control over compliance with their terms, nor they create any 
institutional structures to follow-up their application.3 However, there has always been an implicit 
presumption that the parties will adopt any necessary national legislation and in general conform 
to the rules laid down in the treaties acting in good faith, according to the fundamental requirement 
o f international law that pacta sunt servanda .4
During this period, the general course o f action available to challenge any type o f behaviour 
in contravention with specific treaty commitments - or customary international rules, for that matter 
- was that o f an interstate claim of responsibility for breach o f obligation,5 notwithstanding the fact 
that the law on state responsibility was controversial at the time and certainly far from clear.6 Such 
a claim was - and still is - commonly followed by diplomatic means o f dispute settlement, i.e. 
negotiations or consultations between the parties involved, and mediation or conciliation carried out 
by a third party, and less frequently by judicial means, i.e. arbitration or adjudication with binding 
force.7 As early as the beginning of the 20th century there were already in place two judicial organs 
to deal with international disputes, the Permanent Court o f Arbitration and the Permanent Court 
o f International Justice; nonetheless, ad hoc arbitral tribunals have always been a favoured
1 On the history o f  international environmental law-making, see generally A .K iss & D.Shelton, International 
Environmental Law , 1991, at Ch.ll; and P.Sands, Principles o f  International Environmental Law, Vol.I, 1995, pp.25-62.
2 See Sands, op.cit. n .l ,  pp.26-9; and V.P.Nanda, International Environm ental Law and P olicy , 1995, pp.73-5.
3 See Sands, op.cit. n .l, p.28. A notable exception is the International Joint Com mission, established by the 1909 US- 
Canada Boundary Waters Treaty, and whose functions included approval o f  projects that would alter the flow o f  the 
waters, surveillance and monitoring, as well as dispute settlement.
4 See also Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties, Art.26; and Exchange o f  Greek and Turkish Populations Case, 
1925, P.C.I.J., Ser.B, No. 10, p.20. According to the Court, it is a “self-evident” principle that “a stale which has 
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislation such m odifications as may be necessary to 
ensure the fulfilment o f  the obligations undertaken”.
5 See generally, C.Eagleton, The R esponsibility o f  States in International Law, 1928; and J.C.Witenberg, ‘La 
Recevabilitd des Reclamations devant les Jurisdictions Internationales’, 41 Receuil des Conrs, 1932/111, pp.5-132. On 
the historical roots o f  state responsibility and the relevant literature up to 1930, see I.Brownlie, System o f  the Law o f  
N ations - State R esponsibility, Part I, 1983, Chapter I.
6 Hence, e.g., the 1930 Hague Conference for the Codification o f  International Law was unable to reach agreement on 
the issue o f  state responsibility for damage caused in the territory o f  a state to the person or properly o f  foreigners 
included in its agenda, see S.Rosenne (ed.), League o f  N ations Conference fo r  the C odification o f  International Law  
(1930), 4 V ols, 1975, esp. at V ol.4, Annex II, p. 169.
7 See, among others, J.G.Merrills, International D ispute Settlement, 3rd ed., 1998; and J.Collier & V.Lowe, The 
Settlem ent o f  D isputes in International Law - Institutions and Procedures, 1999.
103
procedure for the resolution o f legal conflicts because o f the considerable flexibility they allow in 
the choice o f their members and of the applicable law.
In fact, arbitration was the means chosen to resolve the two well-known environmental 
disputes o f the period, namely the controversy between the United States and Great Britain 
regarding overexploitation o f fur seals in the Behring Sea,8 and the United States claim for 
reparation o f damage caused by a Canadian smelter at Trail.9 Both cases have been extensively 
analysed and used by international lawyers,10 and their important contribution in the development 
o f international environmental law has been repeatedly stressed.11 However, none o f them was 
premised on a conventional violation, nor do they contribute substantially to the clarification o f the 
rules on responsibility for non-compliance with environmental obligations,12 understandably so, in 
view of the very thin body o f relevant obligations at that time. What can, nevertheless, be learned 
from the Trail Smelter case is how slow and cumbersome the process o f interstate claims can be, 
considering that the first relevant claims were raised in 1926 and the final award given only 15 years 
later.13 This arbitration is also important in that it acknowledges for the first time that - apart from 
the area o f treatment o f aliens and their property, where it has been traditionally used - state 
responsibility is in principle capable o f application in cases o f transfrontier pollution.14
When a party was actually found responsible for breach o f international law, the principle 
remedy it was liable to provide was reparation,15 either in the form o f restitutio in integrum  or 
damages; the relevant dicta from the 1927 and 1928 Chorzow Factory cases are even today 
frequently quoted as a major authority on this point.16 The Trail Smelter award also indicates that 
the responsible state may incur the burden o f taking measures to prevent repetition o f the harm 
caused. However, as breach o f treaty stipulations is only one o f many legal bases on which state
8 See the Behring Sea Fur Seals Fisheries Arbitration, 1 M oore Ini'I Arb. A w ards , 1898, p.755.
i} See the Trail Smelter Arbitration, 33 A .J .I .L , 1939, p. 182; 35 A.J.I.L., 1941, p.684.
10 On Fur Seals, see, among others, D.M. Johnston, International Law  o f  Fisheries: A F ram ew ork fo r  P olicy O riented  
Enquiries, 1965, pp.205-12; and M .S.M e Dougal & W.T.Burke, The Public O rder o f  the O ceans, 1987, pp.942-50. On 
Trail Smelter, see, among others, A.P.Rubin, ‘Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration’, 50 Oregon L.Rev.,
1971, pp,259-82; F.L.Kirgis, ‘Technological Challenges to the Shared Environment: United States Practice’, 66 A.J.I.L.,
1972, pp.295-300; and B.D.Sm ith, Stale R esponsibility and the Marine Environment ~ The Rules o f  D ecision, 1988, 
pp.72 el seq. and 113 et seq.
11 See, e.g., Sands, op.cit. n .l, p.28; and P.W .Birnie and A .E.Boyle, International Law a n d  the Environment, 1992, 
p.494.
12 It should be reminded here that Canada had already accepted responsibility in the relevant com prom is that was 
signed before the arbitration, and thus the tribunal did not deal with the issue.
13 As has been pointed out by Kiss & Shelton, op.cit. n .l ,  p .347. The same delay has been experienced in the context 
o fth em u ch  more recent Gut Dam Arbitration, sec 8 I.L.M., 1969, p .118.
14 Kiss & Shelton, op.cit. n .l ,  p.348.
15 See generally, C.Gray, Judicial Remedies in International Law, 1990; and infra, Chapter 4, pp. 146-8.
16 Chorz6w Factory Case (Jurisdiction), 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, N o .9, p.21; and Chorzdw Factory Case (Indemnity), 
1928, P.C.J.J., Series A, N o. 17, esp. at pp.29 and 47.
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responsibility can be invoked,17 a look at specific cases where breach o f treaty was alleged, not 
necessarily entailing tangible damage to the claimant, reveals that, although reparation was 
sometimes requested, more often the remedy sought was simply a declaratory judgement 
authoritatively attesting that the defendant has acted in contravention of certain conventional rules.18 
Then, the actual remedy would be the satisfaction o f the claimant and the international obligation 
o f the defendant to discontinue the breach.
In the specific area o f the law o f treaties, a state was also entitled,19 under customary law 
as it has been later partially codified in Article 60 o f  the Vienna Convention, to seek to redress the 
balance o f interests upset because o f a violation by partially or totally suspending the operation of 
the relevant agreement.20 A related response was that o f reciprocal non-performance without formal 
suspension o f the treaty, which was the most common type o f reprisal, or some other act o f 
proportional retortion.21 These theoretical possibilities o f applying sanctions, however, have not 
been tried in practice in environmental disputes, not only during the years examined, but also, as 
Schachter points out,22 in the following decades o f more intense environmental law-making.
That said, there are exceptional instances o f treaty provisions which, although they do not 
alter the overall state o f international law, explicitly address issues o f compliance, enforcement and 
dispute settlement; this is especially the case in fisheries agreements laying down norms which go 
beyond the established division of jurisdictional competences under the law o f the sea.23 The 1921 
Agreement between the Kingdom o f Italy and that o f Serbs, Croats and Slovenes regarding the 
Regulation o f Fishing in the Adriatic is remarkable in this connection, as it lays down compliance 
control and enforcement principles and procedures that will become common in international 
environmental regimes, especially those regulating shipping activities, only several decades later.
M ore specifically, the Agreement devotes a separate Chapter to the rules concerning 
supervision o f joint fishing grounds (Chapter V), whereby the enforcement authorities o f the Parties 
are under an explicit duty to co-operate in order “to prevent any infringement o f the regulations laid
17 See Brownlie, op.cit. n.5, Chapter V, where the author lists no less than twenty six different causes o f  action, 
although most o f  them would fall under a general heading o f  international customary law violations,
18 Ibid , pp.61-2.
19 In fact, it seems that any  party to a multilateral treaty was entitled to invoke a breach by another state in order for 
the former to be relieved from further performance o f  its own obligations, see Harvard Drall Convention on the Law o f  
Treaties, 29 A.J.I.L. Suppl., 1935, pp .1077 and 1092.
20 See Namimbia Advisory Opinion, 1971 LC.J. Reports, p.47; B.Simma, ‘Reflections on Article 60 o f  the Vienna 
Convention on the Law o f  Treaties and its Background in General International Law’, 20  O .Z.O.R., 1970, pp.5-83; and 
R.Jennings & A. Watts (eds.), Oppenheim's International Law , Vol. I, (9th ed.) 1992, pp. 1300-3.
21 See Air Services Agreement Arbitration. 54 I.L.R., 1978, pp.304 and 335-41. On the various counter-measures 
available to respond to a violation o f  international law, see O.Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 
1991, at Chapter IX.
22 Schachter, op.cit. n.21, p.381; and infra, Chapter 4, pp.150-3.
23 Thus, for example, the 1923 US-Canada Convention for the Preservation o f  Halibut Fisheries in the Northern Pacific 
Ocean gives reciprocal arrest rights in the high seas and in areas under the jurisdiction o f  the arresting slate, with regard 
to fishing vessels registered in the Parties which are caught violating agreed regulations (Art.2).
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down in the... Convention” (Art.37) - a concept reminiscent o f the port authorities co-operative 
regimes for ship-pollution control introduced in the 1980s -2'1 and are entitled to inspect each other’s 
vessels (Art.38). The Parties must ensure that their officials are given detailed instructions on how 
to establish violations o f the said regulations (Art.39); that every possible assistance is given to the 
foreign authorities during the judicial process following a violation (Art.41); that the masters of 
delinquent vessels are held personally responsible for any fines incurred (Art.40); that penalties 
inflicted for various offences are, to the extent possible, identical in both countries (Art.42), and 
fines levied are duly paid (Art.41); and that fishermen repeatedly found in violation o f certain 
prohibited rules are deprived o f their fishing permits (Art.44).
A Permanent Adriatic Fisheries Commission is additionally established (Chapter VII), in 
which, besides state officials, representatives o f the fishing interests participate (Art.50). This organ 
has the mandate to co-operate with the Parties’ authorities in order, among others, to prevent any 
disputes likely to arise from the application o f the Convention (Art. 51). It is equally noteworthy that, 
under this instrument, the Parties undertake to submit to the Commission quarterly reports on their 
enforcement activity, as well as “all the observations which have been made and the difficulties 
noted in connection with... the application o f  the... Convention” (Art.43), i.e. they have a self- 
reporting obligation coupled with an implicit assignment to the standing body o f the task of 
deliberating on any obstacles to effective implementation, and possibly recommending corrective 
measures. Moreover, any modifications to national regulations concerning conservation measures 
may be put in force by the two states “acting in agreement” and after consultation with the 
Commission (Art.53), which points to a considerable external constraint placed on the domain of 
national legislation.
3.1.2. 1945 to the Stockholm Conference.
The end o f the Second World War is marked with the creation o f  the United Nations system 
o f international law-making and dispute settlement. The former is primarily effected under the 
auspices o f  a great number o f specialised agencies that are being set up, while the latter is 
streamlined by the UN Charter which outlaws the use o f war as a method for settling international 
disputes and commits all states to the use of one o f the above-mentioned peaceful means o f conflict 
resolution, listed in Article 33.
The organisations o f the UN system henceforth become the fo ra  where the most important 
multilateral treaties are negotiated, but also the permanent institutional structures entrusted with 
follow-up and dispute settlement functions in relation to these instruments. This leads to the 
development o f innovative and sophisticated follow-up procedures, which will be duplicated in the 
environmental sphere, much later, if at all. The most characteristic example is that o f the intricate,
24 See infra, Chapter 5, pp.212-7.
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but largely effective compliance-control system o f the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
which comprises t^asz-judicial phases entrusted to independent bodies that examine complaints 
filed by any interested party, including NGOs, and political phases o f consideration by the 
legislative and administrative bodies o f the Organisation, combined with technical assistance and 
capacity-building.25
A similar in many aspects development took place during this period in the field o f human 
rights. Here, a series o f global and regional regimes o f protection were put in place,26 marked by the 
establishment o f supervisory commissions,27 such as the Commission on Human Rights o f the UN 
Economic and Social Council and the European Commission o f Human Rights. These organs 
receive national reports on implementation and decide on complaints regarding non-compliance 
when the state concerned has consented to such a competence. In their latter function, therefore, the 
Commissions are formal judicial fo ra  with jurisdiction to declare breaches o f human rights norms. 
A very notable feature o f these regimes has also been the attribution o f standing to press relevant 
complaints to any state, as well as individuals and NGOs.28
The factor that conditions these developments is the nature itself o f  these new areas of 
international regulation: The international community establishes an interest in the protection of 
certain goods and groups o f people situated exclusively within national borders and thus intrudes 
on the previously reserved internal domain o f each state by means o f principally multilateral 
conventions. As no direct ‘injury’ to other states is involved, there is a need to move forward from 
the traditional notions o f state responsibility and devise ad hoc procedures to ensure respect for the 
law, administered collectively by the competent international structure,29 and to give standing to 
those that are in effect harmed by any violation thereof, i.e. not just states, but also individuals and 
their associations. In parallel, some traditional concepts are also altered to accommodate the new 
realities: the notion o f the ‘injured’ state that is entitled to invoke state responsibility is broadened 
to cover all countries in relation to obligations erga omnes,30 while reciprocal non­
25 See, among others, N .Valticos, ‘The Internationa! Labour Organization’, in S.M .Schw ebel (ed.), The Effectiveness 
o f  International D ecisions, 1971, pp. 134-55, esp. at 144-53; and E.Landy, The Effectiveness o f  International 
Supervision: Thirty Years o f  ILO Experience, 1966.
26 See, among others, A.l-1.Robertson and J.G.Merrills, Human Rights in the World, (3rd ed,), 1992; T.Meron (ed.), 
Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues, 3 Vols., 1984; and H.Laulerpacht, International Law and  
Human Rights, 1973.
27 As well as fact-finding bodies, see UN, United Nations Action in the Field o f  Human Rights, ST/HR/2/Rev.2, 1983.
28 See, among others, L.B.Sohn and T.Burgenthal (eds.), International Protection o f  Human Rights, 1973, esp. at 
pp.739-71, and Chapter V, for the origins o f  individual standing in the League o f  Nations Trusteeship Mandates; P.- 
M .Dupuy, D roit International Public, 1993, Premiere Parlic, Chapitre 3; and E.W .Vierdag, ‘Som e Remarks about 
Special Features o f  Human Rights Treaties’, X X V , Neth.YB.l.L., 1994, pp. 134-42.
29 On the emergence o f ‘co-operative international law ’, mainly effected through the functioning o f  international 
organisations, and the importance o f  the ‘sanction’ o f  non-participation therein, see W.Friedman, The Changing  
Structure o f  International Law, 1964, pp.88-95.
30 See the Barcelona Traction Case, 1970 I .C J . Reports, p.3; and K.Sachariew, ‘Stale R esponsibility for Multilateral 
Treaty Violations: Identifying the “Injured Stale” and its Legal Status’, 35 N eth.I.L.Rev., 1988, pp.273-289, for a
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compliance with, and suspension or termination of treaty rules is explicitly barred under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law o f Treaties (Art.60(5)) in the human rights area.
B rief reference must be made to the emergence, during this period, o f  a distinct regional 
legal order, that o f the European Economic Communities, established in 1957 under the Treaties 
o f Rome. Although environmental considerations became central in the Community agenda only 
after the Stockholm Conference, the main features o f that legal order that have a significant bearing 
on subsequent developments with regard to compliance control are already apparent in the period 
under discussion. These include the supremacy of Community law over domestic legislation of 
Member States,31 and its ‘direct effect’ in national legal orders, and the incremental strengthening 
o f institutions with extensive compliance-control powers, such as the European Parliament, and 
most importantly the Commission and the European Court o f Justice.
Although conservation and pollution concerns become more prominent during this period, 
and were included in the agenda o f several specialised agencies, such as FAO, the ECE, and 
UNESCO,32 as well as regional organisations outside the UN system, e.g., the Council o f Europe 
or the Organisation o f African Unity,33 in the field o f environmental protection there was no 
international organisation with any well-defined or comprehensive mandate to address relevant 
concerns.34 Most o f the activity undertaken was oriented towards studies of environmental problems, 
as well as drafting of ‘soft’ instruments, such as recommendations, as opposed to binding 
international conventions. Consequently, the question o f compliance does not really arise as yet.
Even in the context o f regional fisheries commissions, or the International Whaling 
Commission, that were being set up at the time, conservation was only a secondary consideration 
needed to guarantee better conditions o f exploitation o f the marine living resources, whereas 
bilateral river commissions that proliferated considerably during this period were only marginally 
concerned with pollution issues in the broad context o f utilisation o f international fresh waters.35 
Hence, international environmental regulation continued to be piece-meal and ad hoc, lacking a 
broad framework of principles, although it was at that stage proceeding at a faster pace.
30(...continued)
discussion o f  the evolution o f ‘multilateralized’ responsibility in treaty regimes. It should be reminded that rights to apply 
for judicial determination o f  breach without having to prove injury to the applicant’s individual rights first appear in the 
Mandate Agreements, sec the Mavrommalis Palestine Concessions Case (Jurisdiction), 1924, P.C.I.J., Ser.A, N o .2.
31 See Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration. 1963 E.C.R., p. 1.
32 See Sands, op.cit. n .l, pp.29-34; Kiss & Shelton, op.cit. n .l, at Chapter III; and Birnic & Boyle, op.cit. n .l 1, pp.53- 
63.
33 Sec Kiss & Shelton, op.cit. n .l ,  pp.37-8.
34 It is characteristic that the first convention regulating oil pollution from ships, the 1954 OILPOL, was not concluded 
under the auspices o f  IMO, although its administration was transferred to that organisation when it entered into force 
in January 1959.
35 In the Mediterranean, after the Second World war, Yugoslavia, for instance, entered into several such agreements 
with its neighbouring countries.
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Polluting sources that attracted international attention during this period were oil discharges 
from ships and nuclear testing and production;36 in the early 70s there were also efforts at regulating 
the dumping o f waste at sea.37 The respective instruments were basically confined to prohibiting 
certain practices,38 or attributing exceptional powers to states whose interests were threatened by a 
situation o f ecological emergency.39 In some instances, they even went as far as establishing certain 
substantive standards,40 and/or conditions,41 that should be observed when undertaking a polluting 
activity.
Prescriptions on what a state must specifically do in order to implement and enforce 
international rules are beginning to be laid down in explicit terms in these conventions, while actual 
enforcement jurisdiction remains with individual countries.42 This progress is mainly due to 
increasing appreciation o f the fact that conformity with substantial requirements imposed on ships 
and aircraft registered in any particular party should be easily verified wherever the vessel may be, 
a possibility encouraged by the transnational nature o f relevant activities.43 There are, indeed, 
already instances o f co-operative action to enforce international environmental standards, especially 
among Northern and Western European states, where environmental concerns and close political 
ties create the necessary conditions.44
Another significant type o f arrangement that is increasingly used is the procedural 
requirem ent to report on national measures to implement and enforce a particular agreement to a 
permanent body entrusted with follow-up functions, either exclusive to the specific regime,45 or to
36 See the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, Arts.24 and 25; the 1954 OILPOL; and the 1969 Intervention 
Convention. At the regional level, see the 1969 Agreement Concerning Co-operation in D ealing with Pollution o f the 
North Sea by Oil; and the 1971 Nordic Agreement Concerning Co-operation in Taking Measures against Pollution o f  
the Sea by Oil, See also the 1963 Test Ban Treaty; and the 1959 Antarctic Treaty which prohibits all nuclear activity on 
Antarctica.
37 See the 1972 London and Oslo Dumping Conventions.
3B See, e.g. the 1963 Test Ban Treaty.
3U See, e.g., the 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation o f  the Living Resources o f  the High Seas, Art.7; and 
the 1969 Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases o f  Oil Pollution Damage,
40 See, e.g., the OILPOL.
41 See, e.g., the 1972 London Dumping Convention.
42 See the OILPOL, whereby the flag slate must ensure that its ships comply with the Convention (Art.II), that offenders 
are punished (Art.ill(3)) with penalties not less strict than those imposed for the same infringements in the territorial sea 
(Art.VI), and investigate allegations submitted by other Parties and institute proceedings (Art,X(2)); and the London 
Convention, whereby the Parties have to ensure that all vessels and aircraft registered in their territory, or loading therein 
matter to be dumped, or engaged in dumping in areas under their jurisdiction comply with the conventional stipulations, 
and prevent and punish infringements (Art.VII).
43 See, e.g, OILPOL, ArtJX, whereby the ship must carry an oil record book that can be inspected by the port 
authorities o f  any Party.
44 See, e.g., the 1967 Agreement between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden concerning Co-operation to Ensure 
C om pliance with the Regulations for Preventing Pollution o f  the Sea by Oil; the 1969 North-East Atlantic Fisheries 
Com m ission’s Scheme o f  Joint Enforcement, N.D., V ol.l, p.484; and the 1952 International Convention for the High 
Seas Fisheries o f  the North Pacific Ocean.
45 See, e.g., the London Convention, Art.VI, whereby state authorities have to report on the permits issued by them 
to the Consultative Meeting o f  the Parties; and Art.XIV, whereby the Meeting is assigned with the task o f  keeping under 
review the implementation o f  the Convention; and the 1972 Oslo Dumping Convention, Art. 17,
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the international institution administering the relevant instrument.46 On the other hand, dispute 
settlem ent is still viewed as a bilateral issue, placed in the traditional framework o f state 
responsibility and accomplished by one or more o f the means listed in Article 33 o f the UN Charter. 
Relevant clauses contained in environmental agreements o f the period vary considerably, but do 
not break any new ground.47
Lastly it should be noted that, despite lack o f notable international disputes arising out o f 
environmental issues during this period, there is an increasing concern among governments and the 
public, at both the international and domestic level, with the occurrence o f  accidents involving 
tankers and resulting in considerable damage to private and public interests in coastal states. This 
leads to the adoption o f international conventions which - building on long accepted principles and 
agreements relating to liability for maritime claims -48 establish uniform rules to be applied by 
national courts for the imposition o f civil liability to tanker owners, irrespective o f any fault on their 
part, including non-observance o f international standards, i.e. strict liability, and the assessment of 
damages up to a limited amount o f compensation, with additional resort to funds provided by the 
oil industry.49 Similar developments, albeit prompted from different reasons, occur in the area of 
production and maritime transport o f nuclear matter and of the operation o f nuclear ships.50 Unlike 
state responsibility, claims o f  liability o f private persons for damage arising out o f oil pollution 
incidents, submitted and resolved according to procedures specified under these international 
instruments, henceforth become commonplace.51
3.1.3. 1972 to the Rio Conference.
The UN Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972, marked the 
beginning of an era o f rapid development o f international environmental law, through adoption of 
an ever-increasing number o f bilateral and, mainly, multilateral conventions covering practically 
every aspect o f pollution and conservation, and the establishment o f many organisations with an 
environmental mandate, ranging from the global United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
46 See, e.g., the OILPOL, Art.XIl, whereby an obligation to report to 1MO on the national legislative and enforcement 
activity is instituted, but note that information deemed ‘confidential’ may be withheld,
47 See, e.g., the OILPOL, Art.XlII, which provides for negotiation, arbitration, and ultimately unilateral submission 
o f  the dispute to the ICJ; the 1969 Intervention Convention, Art.VlII, providing for negotiation, and unilateral resort 
to conciliation or an a d  hoc arbitration procedure; the 1958 High Seas Convention, Arts.9-12, allowing for unilateral 
submission o f  a dispute to a special commission, bearing the characteristics o f  binding arbitration; and c f  Art. 18 o f  the 
1968 African Convention on the Conservation o f  Nature and Natural Resources, which provides for unilateral resort to 
the Com m ission o f  M ediation, Conciliation and Arbitration o f  the Organisation o f  African Unity; and the London 
Convention, Arts.X and XI, whereby the Consultative Meeting o f  the Parlies undertakes to develop procedures for the 
assessm ent o f  liability and the settlement o f  disputes, in accordance with the principles o f  international law on state 
responsibility.
4K See the 1957 International Convention relating to the Limitation o f  Liability o f  Owners o f  Sea-Going Ships.
49 1969 CLC; 1969 TOVALOP Agreement; and 1971 Fund Convention.
50 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field o f  Nuclear Energy; 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil 
Liability for Nuclear Damage; and 1971 Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field o f  Maritime Carriage o f  
Nuclear Material.
51 See the IOPC Fund Annual Reports.
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to the permanent bodies administering specific treaty regimes. In fact, immediately after the 
Stockholm Conference, the UN General Assembly decided to set up an environmental organisation, 
UNEP, which, although not enjoying the status o f a specialised agency, has been playing a very 
significant role in the development o f international environmental law, both as a catalyst for action 
and as the administrator o f  many agreements,52 and notably those o f the MAP system.
The Stockholm Conference also gave new impetus to the international effort at mitigating 
marine pollution (Principle 7, Recommendations 86-94). Recommendation 86, in particular, called 
for adherence and implementation of existing marine pollution instruments and development of new 
rules, both at the national and international levels. Shortly after the Conference, UNEP, frequently 
in co-operation with other agencies such as FAO, began its ambitious Regional Seas Programme 
which today covers practically every region of the world oceans. This important initiative evolved 
simultaneously with the negotiations for the 1982 Law o f the Sea Convention (LOSC), which in 
Part XII lays down the global principles and rules for the protection o f the marine environment.
On the other hand, the Stockholm Conference itself did not address questions of 
implementation o f and compliance with that body o f international law to any considerable extent, 
nor did it introduce any significant innovations. The most relevant Principles enunciated at 
Stockholm are 21, 22, and 23. The well-known and repeatedly analysed Principle 21 restates the 
Trail Smelter rule,53 but also extends it to areas beyond national jurisdiction.54 Principle 22 requires 
states to develop international law on state responsibility for environmental damage, and is the 
modest result o f the reluctance o f participating states to accept any formulation that would imply 
a strict standard o f liability for environmental harm.55 Lastly, Principle 23 acknowledges the 
importance o f domestic determination o f certain environmental standards to accommodate different 
circumstances and social costs and values.
It has already been suggested in the previous Chapter that the degree to which 
environmental treaties restrain states as to the steps they have to take at the domestic level to 
implement their international undertakings varies greatly and depends on the nature o f the problem 
addressed and o f the law laid down in relevant international instruments. Thus, ‘framework’ treaties 
adopted during this period, establish principles and general rules o f protection but leave 
considerable discretion to the parties,56 as do agreements purporting to regulate activities within
52 See, among others, Kiss & Shelton, op.cit. n .l , pp.59-63; and I.Rummel-Bulska, ‘United Nations Environment 
Programme’, 1 YB.I.E.L., 1990, pp.369-86.
53 See also the Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. Reports, p .l.
54 See, e.g., E.J.de Arechaga, ‘International Law in the Past Third o f  a Century’, 159 Receuil des Conrs, 1978/1, pp.272 
et seq.; P.-M .Dupuy, ‘Due Diligence in the International Law o f  Liability’, in OECD, L egal A spects o f  Transfrontier 
Pollution, 1979, pp,345 et seq.; Birnie & Boyle, op.cit n .l 1, pp.91-2; Sands, op.cit. n .l, pp .186-94.
55 See UN D oc.A/CO NF.48/PC.12, 1971, Annex 1 at 15.
50 See, e.g., the 1976 Barcelona Convention and the other Regional Seas framework treaties; the 1979 Convention on 
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution; the 1982 LOSC, Part XII; and the 1985 Vienna Convention on the Protection 
o f  the Ozone Layer.
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exclusive state jurisdiction, such as land-based marine pollution. On the contrary, when an activity 
with international elements is regulated, for example international trade o f fauna and flora and 
hazardous matter,57 or shipping,58 internal actions that are required to bring about the desired control 
are designated with more precision.
Moreover, a number o f treaties, especially those containing detailed prescriptions on 
national measures to be undertaken, expressly commit their parties to ensure compliance or 
enforcement o f international norms with regard to persons or activities within their jurisdiction or 
control,59 and even to impose sanctions or criminal penalties for relevant violations60 Then, this 
enforcement activity is typically covered by a reporting obligation, which makes it - at least in theory 
- collectively controllable at the international level.
A major relative development, that took place in the context o f  the LOSC, is the attribution 
of innovative enforcement powers for marine pollution purposes to costal states over extensive sea 
areas, through the introduction o f EEZs (Art.56), and to port states for pollution offences committed 
by ships literally anywhere in the world (Art.218). In parallel, port authorities have been involved 
in co-operative networks, the first being the 1982 Paris Memorandum on Port State Control, with 
a view to detecting violations o f vessel anti-pollution standards. Although failing short o f actual 
enforcement action, this is a type o f arrangement for controlling compliance with treaty stipulations 
that is deemed considerably effective in the specific area o f pollution from shipping activities.61
A technique related to implementation o f international - as well as national - environmental 
norms is that o f a prior assessment o f the environmental impact o f any privately planned activity. 
Although endorsement o f this procedure was slow and fraught with difficulties, it progressed 
throughout this period,62 and, by the end o f it, appeared established, at least in the context o f marine 
environmental protection.63
During that period, the EC put in place an extended and distinct body o f environmental 
legislation, and participated in negotiations and activities for global agreements under the auspices 
o f other organisations. As the volume of Community legislation relating to environmental protection 
grew, it presented significant characteristics facilitating its implementation and enforcement. 
Environmental Directives seem to be more detailed and technical than most international
57 See, eg., the CITES, and the Basel Convention.
58 See, e.g., MARPOL.
59 See, e.g., CITES, A rt.V ill(l) .
60 See, e.g., Basel Convention, Art.9(5).
61 See also infra, Chapter 5, pp.212-7.
62 See Sands, op.cit. n. 1, Chapter 15; and infra, Chapter 8, pp.333 et seq..
63 Sec the 1991 Espoo Convention; EC Directive 85/337; 1989 World Bank Operative D irective 4.00. In the specific 
context o f  marine pollution, see the LOSC, Art.206; the 1986 Noum ea Convention, Art. 16; the 1978 Kuwait Regional 
C onvention, Art.XI; the 1982 Jeddah Regional Convention, Art.Xl; the 1981 West and Central Africa Regional 
Convention, Art. 13; the 1983 Wider Caribbean Regional Convention, Art. 12; the 1985 East Africa Regional Convention, 
Art. 13; the 1989 South-East Pacific Protected Areas Protocol, Art.VIII; and the 1990 Wider Caribbean Specially  
Protected Areas Protocol, Art. 13.
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regulations, and, more importantly, if certain conditions are met, they have a ‘direct effect5 in 
national legal orders, thus bypassing - at least in theory - the obstacle o f positive government action 
(or inaction) required to give substance to international law in the internal domain.64
Even within other international regimes, the widespread adherence to a pattern o f 
institutional structure, which usually consists o f a permanent organ, either in the form o f the 
M eeting of the Parties, or o f a commission o f independent members, commonly backed by a 
Secretariat, provided the necessary basis for a continuous elaboration o f the respective international 
standards,65 and also for constant review and consideration o f implementation problems as they 
arise.66 Apart from their regulatory role, environmental institutions contribute in research and 
information exchange with regard to concrete environmental problems, and they have in some 
instances - albeit rarely - been given overall responsibility for the management o f particular natural 
resources.67 On the other hand, it is quite common to entrust them with supervisory functions, 
ranging from extended powers o f direct observation and inspection under the 1980 Convention on 
the Conservation o f Antarctic Marine Living Resources and the 1991 Protocol on Environmental 
Protection o f the Antarctica, and the competence o f  the Sea-bed Authority to undertake enforcement 
action for, among others, environmental protection purposes, to the standard task of receiving 
national implementation reports and assessing relevant progress, the latter encountered in practically 
every environmental regime established during this period.
Although in some instruments, such as the 1989 Basel Convention and the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol, there is an explicit attribution of a right o f supervision to each one o f the Parties - as 
anyone can inform the Secretariat, and through it all other Parties, o f any breach that has come to 
its attention -,68 the most common follow-up technique is, in fact, that o f self-reporting, a procedure 
under the tight control o f  each state concerned. Now, the content o f the reporting obligation is 
dependent on the substantive duties imposed on the parties of each particular treaty, and ranges from 
a general requirement to provide information on any measures adopted in implementation o f the 
convention,69 and on relevant violations by persons under the jurisdiction or control o f  the reporting 
party,70 to the specific duty to communicate decisions, such as those granting permits, taken by
64 See infra, Chapter 7, pp.322-5.
65 Primary exam ples being the law-making activity o f  the Consultative M eeting o f  the Parties to the London 
Convention, and o f  the M eeting o f  the Parties to the Montreal Protocol.
66 See in this connection the work o f  the 1MO Marine Environment Protection Committee in order to further 
implementation o f  MARPOL, infra, Chapter 5, pp. 184-5.
67 Under the 1988 CRAM RA, which nevertheless is unlikely to come into force, and the LOSC which entrusts the 
management o f  the deep sea-bed to the Authority. On the functions o f  environmental institutions in general, see Kiss 
& Shelton, op.cit. n .l, pp.56-7.
68 Basel Convention, Art.19; and UNEP, Report o f  the Fourth Meeting o f  the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, UNEP/OzL.Pro4/15, 25 November 1992, Annexes IV and V..
69 See, e.g., Basel Convention, A rt.l3(3)(c).
70 See, e.g., MARPOL, Art. 11(1).
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com petent national authorities,71 statistical information on production, imports and exports1,2 
detailed monitoring data,73 etc.
Thus, there is a blanket cover for implementation and follow-up matters by the institutional 
structures put in place in various environmental regimes. But only by the end of the period 
examined, financial assistance is starting to be incorporated in these mechanisms, as the principle 
o f ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ gains acceptance; the primary example is found in the 
ozone regime. In this connection, there are two parallel - and lately converging - levels at which 
significant developments took place during these two decades: The first is the level o f bilateral or 
multilateral funding not related to any international regime o f substantive environmental regulation; 
and the second is that o f assistance provided under a treaty framework.
Traditionally, bilateral and multilateral international funding rarely entailed environmental 
considerations. Consequently, evaluations after project implementation suggested a fairly high 
incidence o f environmental damage. Moreover, inadequate attention was paid to institutional 
weaknesses, and to the broader measures needed to integrate natural resource concerns into 
investments. The inclusion o f environmental assessments in project evaluation, whenever required, 
also made little difference to the procedures for selecting and designing projects.74
In the 1980s, however, the World Bank made some considerable progress - albeit slow and 
controversial -73 towards ensuring the ecological soundness o f the projects it finances and devoting 
more o f its resources to environmental actions.76 This trend was consolidated at Rio, where the Bank 
was identified as the principal manager o f new financial mechanisms that were set up to address 
major global concerns regulated by treaty, such as climate change, protection o f biodiversity and 
ozone depletion.77
71 See, e.g., London Convention, A rt.V I(l)(c).
72 See, e.g., Montreal Protocol, Arl.7.
73 See, e.g., 1985 Sulphur Protocol, Art.5.
74 See, among others, R.K.Tumer, ‘Environmentally Sensitive A id ’, in D.Pearce (cd.), Blueprint 2 - Greening the 
W orld Economy, 1991, pp. 169-70; and G.Handl, ‘Controlling Implementation and Com pliance with International 
Environmental Commitments: The Rocky Road from Rio”, 5 C o lo J J n t'l E n v’l L .& P o l’y , 1994, p.319 at in .81.
75 See K.Horla, ‘The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund’, in J.Werksman (ed.), G reening International 
Institutions, 1996, pp. 131-47. Despite positive steps towards more stringent prior assessment o f  environmental impacts 
o f  the projects funded, as well as increased accountability and transparency, the author concludes that “...the World 
Bank focuses on approving loans. The environmental and social sustainability o f  what these loans are financing remains 
a largely rhetorical preoccupation”, p. 132.
76 See, among others, I.F.I.Shihata, The W orld Bank in a Changing World, 1991, Chapter 4; P.M.Sand, Trusts fo r  the 
Earth: New Financial Mechanisms fo r  International Environmental Protection  (The Josephine Onoh Memorial Lecture), 
1994, p. 15 at fn.47 and 48; and Handl, op.cit. n.74 ,pp ,319-21. For relevant information, see World Bank/IBRD, 
M ainstream ing the Environment - The W orld Bank an d  the Environment: F iscal 1996, 1996.
77 See Sand, op.cit. n.76; and World Bank, op.cit. n.76. Note that in 1993 an independent non-governmental forum  
which examines com pliance o f  the Bank with its own policies and procedures, the World Bank Inspection Panel, was 
established by Resolution No.93-10.Its task consists in receiving complaints by “any group o f  two or more people” who 
believe their rights or interests have been adversely affected in a direct and material way by a Bank’s violation. The 
importance o f  this institution lies in the implicit recognition o f  the primary interest o f  affected non-governmental actors, 
as opposed to member states, in seeing that the Bank’s policies are respected, and in the attribution o f  formal powers 
o f  recourse to the former, see J.Cameron & R.Mackenzie, ‘A ccess to Environmental Justice and Procedural Rights in
(continued...)
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The second level at which important developments took place is that o f environmental treaty 
regimes. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed the emergence and evolution o f trust funds.78 Peter Sand 
has identified four main categories o f international funds devoted to environmental protection, two 
o f  which are directly linked with treaty regimes.79
The first one is the “standard type” o f trust fund for earmarked contributions to support the 
administration o f various treaty regimes, such as the Mediterranean Trust Fund in the framework 
o f  MAP. Although their budgets are almost always small, these funds have resulted in 
environmental regimes becoming self-supporting, as well as in an increasing recognition o f the 
special funding needs o f developing states in order “to enable them to join on a more equitable 
footing” in the regime’s governance.80 The second type involves funds that are designed to 
compensate states for certain environmental activities o f global interest, or to subsidise national 
compliance with environmental treaties, such as the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund.81
It is, indeed in the context of the ozone regime that the most significant development in the 
area o f international trust funds took place. More specifically, the 1990 Amendments to the 
Montreal Protocol established an ‘'interim financial mechanism in order to meet the incremental 
costs incurred by developing countries for their compliance with the Protocol, principally the phase­
out o f ozone-depleting substances (Art. 10),82 and became the first international environmental 
instrument that made implementation o f international obligations dependent upon receipt o f 
financial resources and the transfer o f technology (Art.5(5)). 83 Despite its modest size, this 
arrangement is justly considered a “turning point” in international environmental law;84 from then 
on finance and technology transfer have become central issues in international environmental law­
making and their importance for achieving the objectives o f international regulation is consolidated.
But when it comes to international enforcement, developments were hardly dramatic during 
this period. In fact, the paradigm o f human rights regimes discussed above, which gives standing 
to any state without having to prove a special ‘injury’, and to affected individuals or concerned
77(...continued)
International Institutions’, in A .E .B oyle & M.R.Anderson (eds.), Human Rights A pproaches to Environmental 
P rotection , 1996, pp. 147-9.
78 See Sand, op.cit. n.76, pp.4-15.
79 See ibid, esp, at pp,28-32, The other two categories o f  international trust funds relate to the protection o f resources 
that remain strictly under national sovereignty, such as the Rain Forest Trust Fund, and to international financing o f  
national environmental funds.
80 See ibid, p. 13.
81 In this context the issue o f  old treaties based on the principle o f  egalitarian reciprocity among parties, as opposed 
to new concepts o f ‘differentiated responsibility’ and the resultant ‘asymmetrical’ obligations becom es central, see ibid, 
p.30. The follow -up question, that was actually raised during UNCED preparatory work, is wether old treaties not 
providing for such entitlement to incremental subsidies should be revised, or otherwise considered ‘unequal’.
82 Adopted at the Second M eeting o f  the Parties, see UNEP, Report o f  the Second M eeting o f  the Parties to the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete the Ozone Layer, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, 29  June 1990.
83 See, among others, J.M.Patlis, ‘The Multilateral Fund o f  the Montreal Protocol: A  Prototype for Financial 
M echanisms in Protecting the Global Environment’, 25 Cornell I.L.J., 1992, pp. 181-230.
84 Sands, op.cit. n .l , p.727; and infra, Chapter 5, pp.219-20.
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NGOs, to challenge a breach o f treaty rule in front o f a competent body, has not generally been 
reproduced in the field o f international environmental law,85 nor has there been any state practice 
that would alter this picture. Consequently, the existence o f obligations erga omnes in the 
environmental sphere has not had a chance to be tested.86 Only in the context o f the Community 
legal order has every M ember State and the Commission an unlimited right - and as far as the 
Commission is concerned, actually a duty - to seek enforcement of environmental legislation against 
states that violate it.87
That said, the typical provision found in environmental treaties requires that the Meeting 
o f the Parties reviews implementation of the convention on the basis o f national reports and 
recommends any action it deems appropriate to improve its effectiveness.88 That falls well short o f 
attributing any meaningful enforcement powers to the international organisation, or o f designating 
an enforcement and/or dispute settlement procedure against violators.
A breakthrough in this connection occurred only in 1990, when a formal ‘non-compliance 
procedure’ was put in place for the first time within the ozone regime. The Second Meeting o f the 
Parties to the 1987 Montreal Protocol resolved to establish a subsidiary body, the Implementation 
Committee,89 assigned with the task o f receiving and considering allegations o f breaches o f the 
Protocol made by any Party, and any information or observations submitted by the Secretariat in 
relation to the preparation o f reports based on information furnished by the Parties in pursuance of 
their reporting obligations. The Committee operates as a dispute settlement forum  - but without 
prejudicing the possibility o f resorting to traditional means o f dispute settlement, with a view to 
reaching “an amicable resolution o f  the matter on the basis o f respect for the provisions o f the 
Protocol”. It eventually reports any findings to the Meeting o f the Parties, which has the ultimate 
authority to decide any measures it deems appropriate to bring about full compliance with the 
Protocol, including appropriate assistance; issuing cautions; and even suspension o f specific rights 
and privileges under the Protocol, in accordance with relevant international law.90
This procedure is illustrative o f the emphasis placed on dispute avoidance in international 
environmental regimes, a task generally, explicitly or implicitly,91 entrusted to the institutions
85 It should, however, be noted that NGOs have throughout this period repeatedly played a significant, albeit informal, 
role in the actual enforcement o f  international environmental rules, see Sands, op.cit. n .l ,  pp .158 and 160-3.
86 See ibid, pp. 150-4.
87 See infra, Chapter 5, pp.231 e tse q .
88 See, e.g., CITES, Art.XI(3); Geneva Convention, Art. 10; Barcelona Convention, Art. 14; and Basel Convention, 
Art. 15.
8!> See Decision 11/5, in UNEP, op.cit. n.83; and Decision IV/5 and Annexes IV and V, in UNEP, Report o f  the Fourth 
Meeting o f  the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, 25 
Novem ber 1992.
90 See infra, Chapter 5, p.217-23
91 An exam ple o f  explicit attribution o f  dispute settlement powers is provided in A rt.X X lV (2) o f  the 1982 Jeddah 
Convention, while a case o f  de fac to  exercise o f  dispute settlement functions is the 1985 decision o f  the Conference o f  
the Parties to CITES on the application o f  the Convention to species acquired before its entry into force, see Sands,
(continued...)
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handling - in a co-operative, as opposed to confrontational, spirit - all issues, including conflicts, 
arising during the operation o f the agreements.92 Consequently, the attention devoted to dispute 
settlement clauses in environmental treaties is not great. They typically provide for the use by parties 
o f diplomatic means, mainly negotiations and consultations, to resolve their differences.93 Should 
the latter reach the level o f dispute, and where the foregoing procedures prove abortive, there is also 
provision for the use o f third party diplomatic efforts, i.e. mediation and conciliation.94 Judicial 
settlement, usually in the form o f arbitration,95 or o f  resort to the ICJ,96 is the last resort for conflict 
resolution. The Barcelona Convention is one of the instruments providing for arbitration to resolve 
possible differences which cannot be settled through consultations (Art.28(2) and (3) and Annex 
A), but this procedure has never been resorted to.
It is not, therefore, surprising that despite the impressive growth of international 
environmental law, only two disputes with a clear environmental dimension came in front o f the ICJ 
from 1972 to 1992,97 both o f them, significantly, very early on in this period: The 1973/74 Nuclear 
Tests Cases,98 where the question whether radioactive fallout on the high seas constituted a violation 
o f other states’ high seas freedoms was left unresolved, and the acceptance o f the concept o f an 
actio popularis to protect the commons was resisted, albeit with a strong dissenting minority; and 
the 1974 Icelandic Fisheries Case, which resulted in an authoritative affirmation o f the duty of states 
to co-operate with a view to conserving fish stocks found in areas beyond national jurisdiction. Still 
in these instances, no allegation of environmental treaty violation was raised. However, another 
claim, involving damage to the Canadian territory caused by the crashing o f the Soviet satellite 
Cosmos 954, was fairly expediently and satisfactory settled by means of negotiations, on the basis 
o f the 1972 Space Objects Liability Convention. That incident highlighted once again the suitability 
o f establishing uniform rules on civil liability for environmental damage through international 
agreements.
9I(... continued) 
op.cit. n .l, pp. 166-7.
92 Although there are instances where a distinct organ or procedure can be summoned to resolve a controversy. For 
example, under the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Art.8 and Annex 4), it is possible to submit complaints 
with regard to treaty violations to a Consultative Committee, whereas under the Espoo Convention (Art.3(7), 
disagreement on whether a planned activity will have significant transboundary impact may becom e the subject o f  an 
Inquiry Commission.
93 See, e.g., Barcelona Convention, A rl.28(l); MARPOL, Art.10; London Convention, Art.V(2); CITES, Art.XVllI;
1974 Nordic Convention, Art. 11; Vienna Convention, Art. 11(1).
94 See, e.g., LOSC, Arl.284 and Annex V, Section 1; 1974 Paris Convention, A rt.21; Vienna Convention, Art. 11(2), 
(4), and (5),
95 See, e.g., MARPOL, Art.10 and Protocol 11; CITES, Art.XVIIl; Vienna Convention, Art.l 1; Basel Convention, 
Art.20 and Annex VI; 1992 Paris Convention, Arl,32(2).
95 See, e.g., Basel Convention, Arl.20(3); 1992 Helsinki Convention, Art.26(2).
97 The Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru Case, which came before the ICJ in 1992, and where the issue was one o f  
responsibility for rehabilitation o f  mined lands, was settled out o f  court in 1993, and consequently the proceedings were 
discontinued, see Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia) Case, 1993 J.C.J. R eports , p.322.
98 Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France, and N ew  Zealand v. France), (Interim Measures), 1973 I.C.J, R eports, 
p.99; and (Jurisdiction), 1974 l.C.J. R eports , p.253.
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A discussion of the settlement o f environmental disputes cannot be complete without 
reference to two international courts that have either been playing or have the potential to play an 
important role in the interpretation and enforcement o f international environmental law. These are 
the European Court o f Justice, whose role will be later discussed in more detail, and the 
International Tribunal for the Law o f the Sea and the ordinary and special arbitral tribunals 
established under the LOSC (Annexes VI, VII and VIII).99 Although it is too early in its effective 
operation to draw any definite conclusions, the latter is likely to become in the future the principal 
forum  for the resolution o f conflicts related to rights and obligations under the modem law o f the 
sea.
More specifically, pursuant to the LOSC dispute settlement provisions, the primary rule is 
that o f the ‘free choice o f m eans’ (Art.280). Then, dispute resolution procedures that can be 
unilaterally initiated and entail binding decisions under other general, regional or bilateral 
agreements are to be pursued (Art.282). If  a dispute is not thus resolved, the Parties are under an 
obligation to consult (Art.283) and, if they both agree, to submit their case to a fixed conciliation 
procedure (Art.284). Then comes the possibility of judicial resolution should the above stages prove 
abortive (Art.286). Parties may - when expressing their consent to be bound - declare that they 
submit their disputes to one o f the listed fo ra  (A rt.287(l)); a Party which has not made such a 
declaration is deemed to have accepted Annex VII arbitration (Art.287(3)), whereas the same 
procedure is applicable if the Parties to a dispute have opted for different procedures (Art.287(5)). 
The special arbitral procedure according to Annex VIII can deal with disputes concerning 
environmental protection, and in particular those regarding the exercise by a coastal state o f its 
sovereign rights or jurisdiction allegedly in contravention of international rules and standards on 
protection and preservation of the marine environment established by the Convention or through 
a competent international organisation or diplomatic conference (A rt.297(l)(c)); the resulting 
decisions are final and binding (Art.296).
Interestingly, disputes concerning the interpretation and application o f other international 
agreements “related to the purposes o f this Convention”, thus largely covering all aspects of 
protection and enhancement o f the marine environment, may be submitted to the special arbitral 
tribunal (Art.288(2)). The 1996 Protocol amending the London Convention in fact acknowledges 
the relevance o f the LOSC dispute settlement arrangements and allows its Parties to choose between 
an ad hoc arbitration and the LOSC system (Art. 16). Similarly, the Annex VIII Tribunal has the 
potential o f turning into the competent dispute resolution forum  for all issues arising in the context 
o f the Barcelona Convention and Protocols, although this possibility has not been explored in the 
recent revision. That would be an interesting development, but only in abstract terms in view o f the
;i> Sec A.O.Adede, The System fo r  Settlement o f  Disputes under the United Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea, 
1987.
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fact that the conflict resolution provisions o f the Barcelona regime have never been used in more 
than twenty years o f operation and there is no indication that the situation will change in the future.
All said, it is not until the later years o f this phase that compliance control become 
established as a major concern in the minds and practice o f international environmental lawyers and 
treaty-makers. It is characteristic, in this connection, that the 1981 M ontevideo A d  Hoc Meeting of 
Senior Government Officials Expert in Environmental Law, which adopted the Programme for the 
Development and Periodic Review o f Environmental Law,100 addressed issues o f implementation, 
review and follow-up only in a very general manner, calling for the
“establishment, designation and strengthening o f appropriate international machinery to 
ensure the harmonization and implementation o f global and regional rules, standards, 
recommended practices and procedures and to review the effectiveness o f measures taken.”
It also stressed the need for assistance in the development and application o f such laws, and
encouraged widespread endorsement o f environmental assessment mechanisms as means o f
implementing existing and promoting new environmental legislation.
On the other hand, by 1991, when the Caring for the Earth Strategy was formulated,101 the
importance o f national and international law implementation and enforcement was fairly
appreciated. Thus, the Strategy includes recommendations with a view to establishing
comprehensive systems o f  environmental protection at the national level and providing for their
implementation and enforcement; reviewing the adequacy o f existing national implementation and
enforcement mechanisms; increasing the accountability o f the authorities entrusted with
implementation and enforcement tasks; granting public rights o f access to environmental
information, and to environmental impact assessment procedures; and granting NGOs standing in
judicial and administrative proceedings to enforce the law.
3.1.4. 1992 and Beyond.
The debate that culminated in the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) brought to the forefront o f international attention the concept o f sustainable development 
and the consequent increasing awareness o f the need to integrate economic activities with 
environmental protection. Furthermore, the imperative to develop financial mechanisms of 
assistance to implement sustainable development strategies was central in the reasoning o f the 
Brutland Report,102 which provided the essential background for the Rio Conference.
At the 1992 Rio Conference, the centrality o f financial resources devoted to the 
environment was reiterated; in fact, that was the single most controversial issue in the Conference’s
100 See UNEP/GC. 10/5/Add.2, 1981, Annex, Chapter II.
101 IUCN/UNEP/W W F, C aring fo r  the Earth: S trategy fo r  Sustainable Living, 1991.
102 WCED, Our Common Future, 1987.
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agenda.103 Principle 7 o f the Rio Declaration establishes, albeit in a ‘soft’ form, the primary 
responsibility o f developed states in providing the resources to pursue global sustainable 
development. It is illustrative o f the absolute importance o f financing in the context o f 
implementation o f environmental obligations that Section IV o f Agenda 21, which lays down the 
‘means o f  implementation’ o f the sustainable development strategies, devotes its major part to the 
‘new and additional’ financial resources and mechanisms (Chapter 33) that need to be devised and 
developed, and to other closely related issues, such as transfer o f technology, co-operation and 
capacity building, scientific research and data gathering, and environmental education and training. 
This logically includes a respective increased burden with regard to implementation o f international 
standards o f environmental protection and conservation, a conclusion actually well-reflected in 
Chapter 39, as well as in the two global instruments adopted at Rio, the Climate Change and 
Biodiversity Conventions.
Both these instruments build on the precedent o f the ozone regime and require developed 
states to transfer technology and provide ‘new and additional’ financial resources, so that 
developing states can meet the ‘agreed full incremental costs’ o f complying witli their conventional 
obligations;104 they even go further by explicitly conditioning implementation o f developing 
countries’ obligations - including that o f reporting - on fulfilment o f developed countries’ financial 
commitments.105 However, they do not follow the ozone pattern o f establishing a separate financial 
mechanism and opt to rely instead on the effective operation o f the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF).
GEF, a notable product o f the reorientation o f World Bank activities,106 was indeed defined 
as the interim  financial mechanism for Agenda 21, as well as for the Climate Change and the 
Biodiversity Conventions, Established in 1990 as a pilot programme,107 and restructured - through 
a cumbersome and highly controversial process -108 in 1994 with a view at universal membership 
and greater transparency and participation, it consists o f the ‘core’ Global Environment Trust Fund 
(GET), related co-financing arrangements, and the Ozone Projects Trust Fund (OTF). GEF aims 
at assisting in the protection o f the global environment and the promotion o f environmentally sound 
and sustainable economic development in developing countries in need o f additional and 
concessional international financing to achieve these objectives. It is designed to provide grants, or
103 See M.SjOberg, ‘The Global Environment Facility’, in J.Werksman (ed.), op.cit. n.75, pp. 153-5.
104 See, among others, A.Jordan & J.Werksman, ‘Additional Funds, Incremental Costs and the Global Environment’, 
3(2/3 )R .E .C .I.E .L ., 1994, pp .81-7.
1U3 Climate Change Convention, A rl.4(3),(5), and especially (7), 11 and 12(5); Biodiversity Convention, Art.20, 
especially at (4), and 21.
11)6 See, among others, SjOberg, op.cit. n.103, pp.148-62; Shihala, op.cit. n,76, p p .168-73; Sand, op.cit. n.76, pp .17-9; 
and Sands, op.cit. n .l, pp.736-41. The Bank serves as trustee for the fund, as well as implementing agency together with 
UNDP and UNEP.
11,7 See SjOberg, op.cit. n. 103, pp .150-3. In its pilot phase, the GEF committed 115 grants totalling $735 million, see 
World Bank, op.cit. n.76, p.66, The restructured GEF is capitalised at $2 billion.
u»t por a detailed account, see SjOberg, op.cit. n.103, pp .153-8.
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arrange concessional loans to developing countries, to be used in four areas o f priority, namely 
protection o f the ozone layer; limiting emissions o f greenhouse gases; protection o f  ecosystems and 
biodiversity; and protection o f international waters from industrial, wastewater and hazardous waste 
pollution (10-20% o f the total allocations). GEF also provides funding to NGOs through a small- 
grants programme.109
Financial mechanisms o f assistance aside, implementation, enforcement and dispute 
settlement issues also occupy a prominent position in Agenda 21, Chapter 39, where the desired 
future course o f action in relation to international legal instruments and mechanisms is outlined. It 
is specifically stated that some o f the primary objectives of the review and development of 
international environmental law should be:
• To identify and address difficulties which prevent some States, in particular developing 
countries, from duly implementing international agreements or instruments and, where appropriate, 
to review or revise them with the purpose o f laying down a sound basis for the implementation o f 
these agreements or instruments;
• To promote and support the effective participation o f all countries concerned, and in
particular developing ones, in the negotiation, implementation, review and governance of 
international agreements, including appropriate provision o f financial assistance and other available 
mechanisms for that purpose, as well as the use o f differential obligations where appropriate. To this 
effect, developing countries should be given ‘headstarf support, such as assistance in building up 
expertise in international environmental law, and in assuring access to the necessary information 
and scientific/technical expertise;
• To ensure the effective, full and prompt implementation o f legally binding instruments, and
to facilitate their timely review and adjustment. To this effect, the parties to international 
agreements, with the contribution o f international bodies such as UNEP, should consider 
establishment and development o f appropriate procedures and mechanisms, for example efficient 
and practical reporting systems;
• To improve the effectiveness o f institutions, mechanisms and procedures for the
administration o f agreements; and
• To study and consider the broadening and strengthening o f the capacity and range of
mechanisms, inter alia o f the UN system, to facilitate the identification, avoidance and settlement 
o f international disputes in the field o f sustainable development, taking into account existing 
bilateral and multilateral agreements for the settlement o f such disputes. This may include 
mechanisms and procedures for the exchange o f data and information, notification and consultation 
regarding situations that might lead to disputes, and for effective peaceful means o f dispute
109 See D.Reed, ‘The Global Environment Facility and Non-Governmental Organizations’, 9 Am erican U niv.J.ln t’l 
L .& P o l’y ,  1993, pp.191-213.
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settlement in accordance with the UN Charter, including recourse to the ICJ, and their inclusion in
sustainable development treaties.
In relation specifically to ‘implementation mechanisms’ o f international conventions
(Chapter 39.7), Agenda 21 goes on to stress that:
" The parties to international agreements should consider procedures and 
mechanisms to promote and review effective, full and prompt implementation. To that 
effect, States could, inter alia:
(a) Establish efficient and practical reporting systems on the effective, full and prompt 
implementation o f international legal instruments;
(b) Consider appropriate ways in which relevant international bodies, such as UNEP, might 
contribute towards the further development o f such mechanisms.”
The Rio Declaration is also significant in its approach to the process o f  implementation o f 
international norms. In Principle 10, it calls for individual access to publicly held environmental 
information, as well as for public participation in decision-making processes. It also promotes 
effective access o f  individuals to judicial and administrative proceedings at the national level as a 
means to enforce environmental law. Hence, domestic enforcement procedures become a central 
concern of the international community; while, at the same time, international law on liability is 
once again pinpointed as an area where development is desirable (Principle 13).
Relevant references are also made in Chapter 17 which lays down the strategy for, among 
others, marine environmental protection. Here, emphasis is put on ensuring prior assessment o f any 
activity that may have adverse impacts upon the marine environment, and on taking action to ensure 
compliance with generally accepted regulation regarding pollution caused by ships.
The revised Montevideo Programme, finalised in 1992 and endorsed by UNEP in 1993,'10 
reflects this shift o f emphasis to procedural and institutional matters for the future development o f 
international environmental law: Programmes A to G aim at enhancing the capacity o f  states to 
participate in the development and implementation o f  environmental law; promoting the effective 
implementation o f international legal instruments; and assessing the adequacy o f  existing ones; 
developing further mechanisms to facilitate the avoidance and settlement o f disputes; developing 
and implementing legal and administrative mechanisms for the prevention and redress o f pollution 
and other environmental damage; promoting widespread use o f environmental impact assessment; 
and promoting public awareness and education, provision o f information, and public participation.
This trend is slowly consolidated in later years, especially in the Western world, through 
adoption o f a series o f instruments, such as the Community Directive 90/313 on public access to 
environmental information, the 1993 NAFTA side-Agreement on Environmental Co-operation, and 
the 1998 ECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention). As will be argued in Chapter 9,
liu See UNEP/GC.17/5, 1993.
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this is one o f  the most promising areas of development o f international regulation that could have 
some tangible impact in more vigorous compliance control in the future.
M ore generally, in the first years o f the new phase o f international environmental law­
making that begins at Rio, especially in the newly established climate change and biodiversity 
regimes, the main modern compliance-inducing elements are present. Besides financial mechanisms 
discussed above, the respective Conventions also include extensive reporting requirements,111 and 
the usual provision o f power to the Conference o f the Parties to assess implementation o f the 
Convention and adopt regular relevant reports.112 Dispute settlement clauses make provision for 
possible compulsory resort to arbitration or the ICJ, and compulsory establishment o f a conciliation 
commission.113
These provisions aside, however, there is a conspicuous absence o f any reference to 
compliance, or rather non-compliance, issues, or to national or international enforcement 
obligations. In fact, under the Climate Change Convention (Art.10), a Subsidiary Body for 
Implementation is to consider national reports and assist the Conference in its task of 
implementation review, and there is the additional possibility o f establishing a ‘multilateral 
consultative process’, available to the Parties on request, to resolve implementation questions 
(Art. 13). But it is indicative o f the suspicion with which the states involved view compliance control 
that this euphemism is used to describe what is actually turning out to be a ‘non-compliance 
procedure’.114
On the other hand, there is at least one instance o f duplicating the ozone non-compliance
procedure, in the transboundary air pollution regime. In 1994, an Implementation Committee with
functions similar to these o f the Montreal Protocol Implementation Committee was set up under the
Protocol to the 1979 Geneva Convention on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions (1994 Sulphur
Protocol, Art.7).115 The 1992 Paris Convention on the Protection o f  the Marine Environment o f the
N orth-East Atlantic is also significant in that it attempts to lay down in terms more explicit than
usual - and using a language that greatly contrasts with that o f the new global conventions - the
compliance-related powers o f the Commission. Under Article 23, the Commission has to assess the
compliance records o f  the Parties on the basis o f  their periodic reports, and
“when appropriate, decide upon and call for steps to bring about full compliance with the 
Convention, and decisions adopted thereunder, and promote the implementation off 
recommendations, including measures to assist a Contracting Party to carry out its 
obligations.”
111 Climate Change Convention, Art.12; Biodiversity Convention, Art.26.
112 Climate Change Convention, Art.7; Biodiversity Convention, Art.23(4).
113 Climate Change Convention, Art. 14; Biodiversity Convention, Art.27 and Annex II.
114 On the efforts to establish such a mechanism, see infra, Chapter 5, at fn.190.
115 See ibid, at fn.184,
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As will be later discussed, this formulation is closely followed in the new Article 27 o f the revised 
Barcelona Convention.116
One could, hence, tentatively assume at that stage that the new regimes o f environmental 
protection will gradually come to fully conform with that prominent trend, especially as the 
substantive obligations undertaken will become more specific and thus susceptible to concrete legal 
control and enforcement. This assumption is supported by some recent statements, namely the 
Observations and Recommendations regarding the Programme for the development and periodic 
review o f environmental law in the 1990s, which assert the “overriding importance” o f further 
improving reporting and data-collection systems, and developing compliance regimes and 
procedures to “help and encourage states to fulfil their obligations under multilateral environmental 
agreements by simple, co-operative, non-judicial and transparent means”;117 and the Programme for 
the further implementation o f Agenda 21, adopted by the UN General Assembly at a Special Session 
in June 1997, which follows an almost identical wording.118
Finally, it should be noted, that in 1992, another significant development took place, i.e. 
the inclusion of ecological concerns in the security agenda o f the UN Security Council,119 followed 
by the establishment o f  a Chamber for Environmental Matters by the ICJ, in July 1993.120 These 
events point to the possibility that in the future major environmental conflicts might be resolved 
through the UN enforcement and dispute settlement machinery used to tackle issues threatening 
global peace and security. For the time being, however, the protracted - since 1977 - history o f the 
controversy between Hungary and Slovakia regarding the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam suggests that 
the settlement o f a complicated dispute with environmental aspects might entail the use o f a great 
variety of enforcement and dispute settlement techniques, including unilateral reference to the ICJ, 
negotiation, arbitration, conciliation by the EC Commission, resort to the emergency procedures 
o f the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), and finally submission o f the 
difference to the ICJ agreed by the two parties.121 Hence, formal dispute settlement mechanisms are 
today more flexible,122 in the sense that there are several options available, but still cumbersome and 
uncertain.
116 See ibid, p.216.
117 See UNEP, Meeting o f  Senior Government Officials Expert in Environmental Law for the Mid-term review o f  the 
Programme for the developm ent and periodic review o f  environmental law in the 1990s, Observations and 
Recommendations regarding the Programme for the development and periodic review o f  environmental law in the 1990s, 
UNEP/ENV .LAW /3/3, 1996, at B.7 and 8.
118 See UN D o c .A /S -19/29, 27 June 1997, Annex, at para, 110.
119 See Note by the President o f  the Security Council on the responsibility o f  the Security Council in the maintenance 
o f  international peace and security, UN Doc. S23500, 31 January 1992, p.2, cited in Sands, op.cit. n .l , p. 141.
120 Which, however, has never had a dispute brought before it as yet, and, some argue, may never do, see P.Sands, 
‘International Environmental Litigation and its Future’, 32 Univ. o f  Richm ond L.Rev., 1999, p. 1638.
121 Sec Sands, op.cit. n .l ,  pp. 142 and 351-4.
122 See also B.Conforli, International Law and the Role o f  Domestic Legal Systems, 1993, pp.5-7, arguing that judicial 
decision-making, including all forms o f  dispute settlement is on the decline giving way to alternative dispute resolution 
techniques.
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3.2. A Review o f Different Approaches to Compliance Control.
in the previous Section we outlined the evolution o f international compliance-control 
mechanisms from the early bilateral state responsibility/sanctions model, which was eventually 
broadened to accommodate community interests entailed in multilateral treaty regimes, where 
violation of international standards often does not involve direct injury to other states, to ad hoc 
follow-up procedures collectively administered by international organs coupled with attribution of 
standing to those actually affected by any given violation. In the specific field o f international 
environmental law, we traced the progress from piece-meai rules, mainly dealing with shipping 
activities combined with some minimum civil liability standards, to a wholesome system of 
principles and comprehensive regulation o f a wide range of polluting activities, irrespective o f their 
transboundary effects. This in turn led to increased attention to issues o f implementation at the 
national level, and to the proliferation of institutional arrangements setting up permanent bodies to 
review implementation o f international law by means o f regular reports submitted by the parties. We 
also noted the focus lately placed on more streamlined compliance-control mechanisms; on financial 
and technical assistance to induce application o f international standards in individual states; and, 
lastly, on procedural requirements, especially in relation to prior environmental impact assessments, 
access to environmental information, and to judicial and administrative proceedings, that are to 
operate at the domestic level and have become an essential international concern in the post-Rio era.
Before we attempt to systematise the different approaches to compliance control as they 
have developed and make some initial points on their relevance for enhanced implementation of 
international environmental standards for the protection o f the Mediterranean Sea, let us review the 
basic characteristics that a compliance-control system must have in order to meet today’s needs, 
according to existing literature.
3.2.1. General Considerations.
In the Introduction reference was made to the merits o f the ‘managerial approach’ to control 
compliance with international environmental undertakings.123 The tasks o f managing compliance 
are threefold: reviewing and assessing the performance o f  parties to a treaty in order to identify 
problems with the regime itself and cases o f non-compliance; ensuring that appropriate responses
123 See A.Chayes & A.Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignly - Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements, 
1995, especially at Pari II: Toward a Strategy for Managing Compliance; D.G. Victor, K.Raustiala. & E.B .Skolnikoff 
(eds.), The Implementation and Effectiveness o f  International Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice, 1998, 
pp.681-4; and A.Chayes, A.Handler Chayes & R.B.M itchell, ‘Managing Compliance: A  Comparative Perspective’ in
E.Brown W eiss & H.K.Jacobson (eds.), Engaging Countries - Strengthening C om pliance with International 
E nvironm ental A ccords, 1998, pp.41 et seq.\ and supra, Introduction, pp.22-3. For a review o f  current literature, see 
J.Werksman, ‘Compliance and the Kyoto Protocol: Building a Backbone into a “Flexible” R egim e’, 9 YBJ.E.L., 1998, 
pp.56-8.
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to non-compliance are put in operation; and adjusting the rules to improve performance.124 Thus, 
treaty compliance systems can be systematically divided into three parts: the primary rules system, 
the compliance-information system, and the non-compliance response system.125 With regard to the 
primary rules system, it has been noted that “some rules work better than others” and that the choice 
o f who is regulated and how “sets the bounds on how many actors will comply voluntarily and the 
efforts needed to get others to comply”.126 It follows that “the selection o f primary rules may prove 
the most powerful lever international policy-makers have over the level o f compliance”.127
According to this line o f reasoning, vague and ambiguous treaty language makes 
undisputable non-compliance a rare case, in view o f the fact that there is no international body that 
would authoritatively interpret them.128 On the contrary, clear and precise obligations are more likely 
to be complied w ith.129 Another consideration in favour o f concrete international rules, as akin as 
possible to national legislation, is that this kind of international law does not require further 
elaboration by the national legislator, a feature characterising Community Regulations. This would 
mean that ratification would be enough to make them part o f the specific set o f rules governing their 
subject-matter within a state,130 and the issue o f what formal steps a government must take to 
implement international law would lose many o f its complications.131 A related technique that has 
been proposed introduces detailed schedules o f performance as part o f the substantive set o f 
obligations, so that the parties are asked to take small steps at a time, while each subsequent step 
is conditioned on all other parties having done what they had promised to do.132
Moreover, international law regulating activities that are ‘visible’, basically involving a 
small number o f actors, is more likely to be complied w ith,133 as the example o f regulating 
production instead o f consumption of ozone-depleting substances demonstrates. A related approach 
that seems especially promising in the environmental sphere recommends the introduction o f what 
Mitchell describes as ‘premonitory’ control measures,134 better known to international lawyers as 
the various expressions o f the preventative approach to regulation. This will often entail restricting
124 Chayes, Handler Chayes & M itchell, op.cit n. 123, pp.49 et seq.
125 See R.B.M itchell, Intentional Oil Pollution a t Sea - Environmental Policy and Treaty Compliance, 1994, pp.52-65.
126 Ibid, pp.3 and 53.
127 Ibid, p.55, and see pp.312-8 for some recommendations on how to make the best choice o f  the primary rule system.
I2S Ibid, pp.33-4,
l2y See E.Brown Weiss & H.Jacobson, ‘Assessing the Record and Designing Strategies to Engage Countries’, in Brown 
W eiss & Jacobson (eds.), op.cit. n.123, pp.523-5.
130 Kiss and Shelton note that environmental treaties commonly lay down a framework o f  international rules which 
requires supplementing or completion through internal legislation, what is som etimes referred as ‘non-self-executing’ 
treaties; nevertheless, the nature o f  each provision must be assessed in its own merit, as there are often clauses capable 
o f  immediate implementation in the national legal system, op.cit. n .l ,  p,98; and infra, Chapter 7, pp.309-10.
131 See Sands, op.cit. n .l , pp. 143-48
132 See L.E.Susskind, Environm ental D iplom acy - N egotiating M ore Effective G lobal A greem ents, 1994, p .l 19.
133 M itchell, op.cit. n.125, pp.55-6; and Brown W eiss & Jacobson, op.cit. n.129, pp.521-3.
134 See M itchell, op.cit. n .125, pp.63-4.
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the most ‘transparent’ activity that might not be environmentally harmful itself but which will make 
harmful activities impossible, for example, through the obligation to install catalytic converters on 
automobiles at the stage o f manufacturing, or the duty to increase clean energy production.
With regard to vessel-source pollution, for instance, there has been an increasing level of 
compliance with and enforceability of international standards, as the law evolved from the largely 
ineffective OILPOL,135 to the well-respected MARPOL. This is explained by Mitchell on the basis 
o f compliance-inducing choice o f primary rules: When tanker operators proved unwilling to abide 
to discharge prohibitions, international law imposed on shipowners the burden to construct and 
equip their tankers in ways that essentially prevent oil discharges.136 The history o f dumping 
regulation, which is basically the only other source o f marine pollution that international law has 
constrained with substantive rules for a considerable amount o f time, supports the above 
assumptions. A transparent system o f explicit authorisations in order to undertake dumping 
activities, and an incremental tightening up o f  the law, recently reaching the clarity o f total 
prohibition, have helped mitigate the problem.
It is obvious that designing primary rules according to the above standards has the added 
advantages o f discouraging deviating behaviour, o f making violations easily detectable and 
sanctions and remedies quasi automatic. Its main weakness is also obvious: It is less likely that 
states will consent to such ‘sharp’ international commitments. The qualifications very often 
encountered in the text o f the revised Barcelona Convention and Protocols are evidence to that.
With regard to compliance-information systems, transparency - referring both to the amount 
and quality o f the information collected and the degree o f analysis and dissemination o f this 
information - is considered a key factor.137 This element can be enhanced by making rewards for 
compliance dependent on governments supplying such information or allowing inspections; by 
increasing information flow between parties; by reducing the costs or, reversely, increasing 
resources dedicated to monitoring; by financing the development o f  improved verification 
technologies; by providing permanent fo ra  to analyse the data gathered and to inquire further into 
actions - or inactions - and the reasons behind them; and by expanding the number and variety o f 
actors authorised to collect, analyse and disseminate information.138
The relevant experience with marine pollution from ships and dumping, as well as that in 
the context o f MAP, is characterised, on one hand, by improvements in monitoring and verification
135 See P.S.Dempsey, ‘Compliance and Enforcement in International Law - Oil Pollution o f  the Marine Environment 
by Ocean V essels’, 6 N W  J. o fln t'l L. <£■ Bus,, 1984, pp.459-561.
136 See M itchell, op.cit. n.125, especially Chapters 7 and 8.
137 See ibid, pp.57-8; and A.Chayes & A.Handler Chayes, ‘Compliance Without Enforcement: Stale Behaviour under 
Regulatory Treaties’, 7 N egotiation J., 1991, p.321.
138 M itchell, op.cit. n.125, pp.58-9 and pp.338-22 on recommendations regarding the design o f  a more effective 
compliance information system.
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techniques, but, on the other, by largely ineffective reporting systems,139 Only in the context o f  the 
1982 Paris Memorandum o f Understanding on Port State Control, has the reliability and efficiency 
o f information-gathering and detection o f violations shown considerable progress,140 but this 
arrangement cannot be duplicated in other regulatory areas as will be explained in Chapter 6.
Turning to the non-compliance response system, one cannot help remarking that what 
Professor Kiss considers a notable feature o f the Barcelona Convention system, namely that there 
are no provisions for individual benefits that a Party can derive while, on the other hand, there is 
a series o f unilateral obligations that everybody assumes,141 is actually a major weakness. Providing 
positive inducements or incentives, i.e. benefits in the form o f money payments or other goods that 
are legally contingent upon compliance with the treaty and administered through treaty-defined 
procedures,142 mainly education in the broadest sense1,43 financial and technology transfers, and 
market-based incentives - or disincentives, such as tradeable emission permits and taxes, increases 
the likelihood o f compliance by public and private actors that will seek to explore these rewards.
A shortcoming o f the inducement strategy is that, while it involves great costs, it is 
dispersed indiscriminately to all participants in an environmental regime, and thus is unnecessarily 
directed to actors that would have complied anyway.144 An idea that seems to be taking this flaw into 
account is the posting of bonds upon signing o f an international environmental agreement, that 
would be paid back upon performance or sacrificed in the case of non-compliance.145
From an opposite perspective, explicit attribution o f enforcement powers in the event o f 
treaty violations, or, to put it differently, removal o f “the international legal barriers... that constrain 
those countries with incentives to enforce”,146 as well as ‘privatisation5 o f the benefits and costs o f 
enforcement activity are also thought to be factors working in favour o f some concrete response that 
would deter violations and punish offenders. An example o f such ‘removal o f legal barriers’ is 
provided by the universal port state jurisdiction as enunciated in the LOSC, while ‘privatisation’ 
o f the enforcement activity is achieved through the introduction o f EEZs, both relating to control 
o f shipping activities.147
The contradistinction with developments in the area o f land-based pollution - on which the 
success o f  any meaningful effort at mitigating marine degradation largely depends - is
l3‘J See ib id , Chapter 4, with regard to reporting under IMO instruments; and infra, Chapter 5, pp.200-9.
140 See M itchell, op.cit n.125, pp. 135 et seq.\ and infra , Chapter 5, pp.212-7.
Ht See A.Kiss, ‘Un Modele Mediteranden de Protection des Mers Regionales’, in J.-Y Cherot and A.Roux (eds.), D roit 
M editeraneen de I'Environnement, 1988, pp. 159-60.
142 Chayes & Chayes , op.cit. n,137, p,318,
143 See M itch ell, op.cit. n.125, pp.46-7 and 59-63.
144 See ibid, p .60.
145 See Susskind, op.cit. n . l 32, pp. 117-8.
146 M itch ell, op.cit. n.125, pp.62 and 323-4.
147 See infra, Chapter 7, pp.296-7.
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overwhelming. It is true that the development o f techniques similar to those described above in this 
field face considerable restrictions. These mainly stem from the fact that these techniques cannot 
deal with pollution occurring exclusively within a single jurisdiction, where the polluting activity 
is also carried out; in other words, when there is no transnational element. This is true even in cases 
o f  transfrontier land-based pollution, since the polluter is usually outside the jurisdiction o f other 
states. Other factors making such techniques inapplicable are that land-based pollution standards 
are not usually unified minimum requirements as is the case with standards applicable to ships; that 
international regimes with regard to land-based pollution are general grounded in the common 
interest in the quality o f the marine environment rather than in the protection o f the interests o f 
individual states; and that the relevant obligations are rather promotive than prohibitive.1'18
An approach that seems more promising is the attribution o f enforcement powers to 
international institutions, such as those granted to the European Commission or the International 
Sea-bed Authority, and to NGOs and individuals, which are likely to be used in a constructive 
m anner.149 Public pressure at the permanent organs o f a treaty regime, from national and 
international NGOs and the media are thought to become increasingly effective,150 but are largely 
left unaccommodated by formal legal arrangements. Even the review o f compliance records 
assigned to the Meetings o f the Parties is a highly politicised process, despite its inclusion - in these 
or sim ilar terms - in almost all modern environmental agreements. The issue, then, is how to 
formalise these processes in a way that would give them some legal predictability and certainty. 
Relevant suggestions focus on establishing one or more international authorities with rigorous 
inspection and enforcement powers;151 the inclusion o f environmental matters in the international 
security agenda;152 the creation o f official citizen complaints channels; allowing international 
standing for individuals; developing the notion o f a ‘right to a clean and healthy environment’ as 
a human right with the concomitant procedural rights, such as access to information and to judicial 
and administrative proceedings, and participation in environmental impact assessments and other 
levels o f decision-making;153 or even establishing a ‘Green Amnesty International’.154
148 See Q.M eng, Land-Based Sources o f  M arine Pollution, 1987, pp.233-5.
H'J See Sands, op.cit. n .l ,  pp. 160-3.
150 See, for example, M itch e ll, op.cit. n. 125, pp.61 -2; 0 .  Young, Com pliance an d  P ublic A uthority, 1979, pp.22 and 
44.
151 See K.Sachariew, ‘Promoting Compliance with International Environmental Legal Standards: Reflections on 
Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms’, 2 YB.l.E.L., pp,5I-2; and G.H.Brutland, ‘The Road from R io’, 96 Technology 
Rev., 1993, p.63, on such an authority with regard to carbon dioxide emission targets.
152 See A.Tim oshenko, ‘Ecological Security: Global Change Paradigm’, 2 Colo.J. o f  Env 7 <£ Int 7 L.& Pol., 1990, 
p. 127; and P.Sands, ‘Enforcing Environmental Security: The Challenge o f  Compliance with International O bligations’, 
46(2) J. o f  ln t 7 A ff, 1993, pp.382-7.
153 See Susskind, op.cit. n. 132, p. 114, where it is suggested that all UN members sign a protocol equivalent to the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
154 See ibid, pp.l 14-7.
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It must, finally, be noted that a treaty regime in operation has other repercussions as well 
that correlate to the dimension o f time and are significant for present purposes. As Mitchell aptly 
summarises, “treaty institutions facilitate the creation o f new information and knowledge and 
thereby change perceived interests” .155 New knowledge makes compliance more likely because it 
brings the high costs o f environmental degradation to light. Treaty operation also encourages “a 
process o f  social learning by which governments and other actors come to alter their values and 
objective functions” .156 Involvement in regular discussions in itself increases the understanding and 
perceived importance o f the issue. Peter Haas has even argued that developing and disseminating 
information on Mediterranean marine pollution through MAP, and helping place the ‘epistemic 
community’ o f the region in domestic policy positions has been the main factor explaining diverse 
or increasing levels o f compliance with treaty rules regulating M editerranean pollution.157
Two central presuppositions related to the points made above guide the subsequent 
assessment o f compliance-control mechanisms. First, that any meaningful analysis o f compliance 
with international environmental law has to deal with both state and private actors, since the 
ultimate target o f regulation, in the environmental sphere, is more often individual than government 
behaviour. This is because even when international commands are directly addressed to states, these 
commonly involve public control or regulation o f  private activities, land-based pollution regulations 
being a primary exam ple.158 Now, if the most formidable obstacles to establishing more stringent 
methods and rules to deal with state non-compliance lie in “the abiding constraints o f the state 
system” itself, the persisting value of sovereignty and the fact that “ in a decentralised legal system, 
no obligation can be imposed without consent and that states continue to be extremely resistant to 
the creation o f  any coercive mechanisms for enforcement”,159 the central problem with directly 
addressing private compliance is that only recently have individuals started to be acknowledged as 
legitimate actors in international law interactions, and consequently there are very few relevant legal 
institutions or concepts that one can build upon. At the same time, however, this open-endedness 
provides an opportunity to devise methods to circumvent the inadequacies o f the state-centred 
approach. From an opposite point o f view, private actors are equally, if  not more, important in the 
role o f enforcers o f international environmental standards, because it is exactly the constituency of 
concerned citizens and their associations that have an interest to see that environmental protection 
rules are abided with.
155 M itchell, op.cit. n.125 p.64.
156 ib id , p .65,
157 See P.Haas, Saving the M editerranean  - The P olitics o f  International Environm ental C o-operation , 1990. Chayes 
and Chayes take this idea still further by contending that inertia towards compliance is even generated with time among 
national bureaucracies, op.cit. n. 137, pp.325-7.
15K See M itchell, op.cit. n.125, pp.53 and 307-9; and Chayes & Chayes, op.cit. n.137, p.318.
1S‘J A.Hurrell and B.Kingsbury, ‘The International Politics o f  the Environment: An Introduction’, in A.Hurrell and
B. Kingsbury (eds.), The International P olitics o f  the Environment, 1992, pp.22-3.
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Secondly, all efforts at analysing the factors that enhance treaty-related compliance can be 
efficiently summarised in what has been branded “the strategic triangle o f compliance” consisting 
o f incentive, ability, and authority.160 In other words, when considering ways to bring about greater 
respect for international environmental norms, one should seek to find or create actors with adequate 
incentives, practical ability, and legal authority to implement and enforce these rules.
3.2.2, State Responsibility/Sanctions and Civil Liability.
As has been made apparent from the preceding account, the state responsibility model of 
control over compliance with international obligations is the most traditional o f all possible 
approaches. There has been extensive literature 011 the limitations o f state responsibility, as it has 
evolved so far, and on its marginal value and scope o f application as a means o f enforcing 
environmental obligations.161 Chapter 5 will discuss its failings in greater detail; suffice it hereto  
say that the basic inadequacies o f this mechanism are inherent: It reacts ex post to infringements of 
international law, as opposed to preventing them; it brings directly under scrutiny only state 
violations and requires an ‘injured state’ that would be willing to challenge a breach o f international 
law and initiate the cumbersome procedure o f international dispute settlement. More importantly, 
it is “ inherently bilateral and confrontational in character”.162 To put it bluntly, state responsibility 
is an age-old notion that cannot be adapted to the needs o f modern international environmental law 
unless it radically changes its fundamental tenets. Hence, it is not surprising that it has never been 
invoked in the context o f the Mediterranean regional regime for the protection o f the marine 
environment, nor in many other contexts for that matter, and that the efforts at developing the notion 
to address infringements of environmental obligations in particular have been as yet abortive.163
Indeed, modern environmental law requires a preventative approach to ensuring 
compliance, a community response to non-coinpliance with obligations to protect the global 
commons, and preventative remedies. Judicial tribunals are thought to be ill-equipped to provide 
solutions taking these considerations into account; negotiations, and especially in an informal 
setting, are preferred because they allow for flexible and equitable solutions, not necessarily dictated 
or contemplated by international law as it stands, but accommodating all interests.164
160 See M itchell, op.cit. n.125, especially at pp.305-7.
161 See, among others, A.Kiss, ‘Present Limits to the Enforcement o f  State Responsibility for Environmental Damage’, 
in F.Francioni & T.Scovazzi (eds.), International R esponsibility f o r  Environm ental H arm , 1991, pp.3-14; M .Spinedi, 
‘Les Consequences Juridiques d'un Fait Internationalement lllicite Causant un Dom mage cl l'Environnement’, in ibid, 
pp.75-124; A.E.Boyle, ‘State Responsibility for Breach ofObligations to Protect the Global Environment’, in W.E.Butler 
(ed.), Control over Com pliance with International Law , 1991, pp.69-80; M .Koskenniemi, ‘Breach o f  Treaty or Non- 
Compliance? Reflections on the Enforcement o f  the Montreal Protocol’, 3 YB.I.E.L., 1992, pp, 125-8; and J.Brunnde, 
‘The Responsibility o f  States for Environmental Harm in a Multinational Context - Problems and Trends’, 34 C. de D., 
1993, pp.827-45.
162 Birnie & Boyle, op.cit. n . l l ,  p. 136.
163 See infra, Chapter 4.
164 See Birnie & Boyle, op.cit. n .l 1, p. 137.
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The exceptional pattern of near-compulsory adjudication adopted in the LOSC is in this 
context arguably justified by the ‘package d ea f nature o f a Convention primarily concerned with 
allocation and control o f  legal power,165 whereas in most environmental regimes the purpose is one 
o f facilitating co-operative solutions to common problems, making institutional supervision a more 
appropriate means o f control and development.
On the other hand, the threat or use o f sanctions, in a treaty framework or under general 
international law, which is an equally traditional remedy for non-compliance, has proved somewhat 
more flexible, so that variations of this approach linking environmental compliance to other issues, 
for instance trade or other economic activities, or threatening withdrawal o f membership privileges 
are increasingly finding their place in international environmental regimes,166 but, importantly, only 
in the broader framework o f a more modern international enforcement mechanism, such as the ones 
examined below.
International civil liability schemes present rather different characteristics: With this device 
international law aims at harmonising civil liability laws in individual countries, thus targeting 
private parties as opposed to states, and at giving standing to the victims o f  pollution to claim 
reparation for environmental damage through national courts. Despite its potentially preventive 
function, and the internalisation o f costs and application o f the polluter pays principle it achieves,167 
this model presents its own important limitations. The basic limitation relates to the nature o f civil 
liability which is not a system o f  control over compliance with international/national standards 
proper. Moreover, it too provides an ex post response; it applies mainly to transboundary damage; 
and, as it stands today, a substantial part o f environmental damage goes uncompensated.168
In order to enhance its deterrent effect so as to make it more relevant to compliance control 
the last two characteristics need to be altered. In this connection, there is currently a tendency to 
abandon the notion o f transboundary damage and address liability for environmental harm within 
national borders, which, together with the recent emergence o f attitudes which favour compensation 
for pure environmental loss and the development o f relevant techniques within national legal 
systems, points to a potential fruitful turning point for international regulation o f  liability issues.169
If>i According to Birnie & Boyle, ib id ,  p. 182.
166 See Brown W eiss & Jacobson, op.cit. n. 129, pp.547-8; and infra, Chapter 4, pp. 150-3.
167 See infra, Chapter 4, pp. 153-4.
I6K See ibid, p. 167-74.
m  See ibid, pp. 174-8.
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3.2,3. The ‘Comprehensive Institutional Approach’.170
In recent years, international environmental lawyers have given much attention to the 
emergence and workings o f the institutional structures operating in environmental treaty regimes. 
These structures provide permanent, flexible, non-confrontational and formalised fo ra , where 
conventional sets o f rules can be continuously refined and complemented, and where procedures to 
supervise implementation and to address relevant difficulties or even non-compliant behaviour, can 
be developed. In other words, they can accommodate all three aspects o f the treaty-compliance 
system, as described above.
Chayes and Chayes have distinguished between an ‘enforcement m odel’ o f compliance and 
a co-operative ‘managerial m odel’, the latter being suited in today’s conditions.171 They, in fact, 
suggest that “the fundamental instrument for maintaining compliance with treaties at an acceptable 
level is an iterative process o f  discourse among the parties, the treaty organization, and the wider 
public”,172 what Professor Brown Weiss labels “the sunshine strategy9. This approach relies 
heavily on ongoing bargaining,174 publicity and community pressure to enhance respect for the 
law ,175 in acknowledgement o f the reality that consensus-building through negotiation is and will 
continue to be the principal method o f dealing with compliance problem s.176 In addition, it fits in 
well with the developing theory o f ‘trust’,177 whereby states are seen as caretakers, ‘trustees’ o f their 
environment rather than sovereigns thereupon.178 Hence, formal mechanisms o f legal settlement - 
diplomatic or judicial - are undermined, as the judicial function, i.e. interpretation o f the legal 
norms, response to non-compliance, and settlement o f disputes, is internalised.179
As it inexplorably links law-making with compliance, this model could be said to by-pass 
the problem o f international enforcement and instead o f pinpointing violators o f international rules 
as the latter stand and take appropriate corrective action, either in the form o f sanctions or assistance, 
it rather adapts, interprets and changes the rules themselves. This is by no means said by way of
170 For a discussion o f  the merits and limitations o f  the ‘institutional’ approach, see, among others, A, E. Boyle, ‘Saving 
the World? Implementation and Enforcement o f  International Environmental Law through International Institutions’, 
3(2) J. o f  E n v ’l L ., 1991, pp.229-45; T.Gehring, ‘International Environmental Regimes: Dynamic Sectoral Legal 
Systems’, 1 YB.I.E.L, pp.35-56; and Kiss & Shelton, op.cit. n .l, pp.56-7 and 98-101, who introduce the notion o f ‘soil 
responsibility’ to describe the institutionalised non-compliance response system.
171 Chayes & Handler Chayes, op.cit. n,123.
172 Ibid, p.25.
173 See E.Brown Weiss, ‘Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Agreem ents’, 27(4) E n v’l Pol. 
& L, 1997, pp.297-303.
174 See Chayes & Chayes, op.cit. n.123, pp.272-4.
175 On the legitimating function o f  international law see M.Virally, ‘Panorama du Droit International Conlemporain’,
183 Recenil des C o w s ,  p .9; T. Franck, The Power o f  Legitim acy am ong N ations, 1990; and Chayes & Chayes, op.cit. 
n. 166, on the ‘new sovereignty’ concept that depends on active participation in the major treaty ‘clubs’.
176 See Chayes & Chayes, op.cit. n.137, p.328; Handl, op.cit. n.74, p.327; and Susskind, op.cit. n.132, p .101.
177 See E.Brown W eiss, In Fairness to Future G enerations, 1989,
178 For a discussion o f  this concept in the Mediterranean context, see E.Raftopoulos, ‘The Barcelona Convention 
System: An International Trust at Work’, 7(1) I.J.E.C.L., 1992, pp.27-41.
177 See Gehring, op.cit. n.170, pp.50-4.
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criticism; as was already mentioned above and will be further explained in Chapter 6, this process 
can actually lead to considerably enhanced effectiveness o f the respective international regime.
This paradigm will be thereafter referred to as ‘the comprehensive institutional m odel’, 
because it is characterised by the establishment and regular operation o f an array o f international 
organs with predetermined roles in every aspect o f  the life o f international environmental regimes. 
It will moreover be discussed in Chapter 6 as a prim a facie  traditional mechanism, not in terms of 
general international law, but rather in the context o f  international environmental law. This is due 
to the fact that it has already been long-established and wide-spread in international regimes of 
environmental protection - in that sense, it is the ‘mainstream’ approach but also because, strictly 
speaking, it does not introduce any new legal concepts, at least in its simpler version actually 
practised in the Mediterranean.
Having said that, one o f  its more valuable contributions to the evolution o f compliance 
control in international environmental regimes is that it endows international organs with the 
authority to follow-up and scrutinise state behaviour after treaty rules are established. In this sense, 
although it does not take effective control off the hands o f individual states, it brings to the forefront 
international institutions representing the collective interest and thus having their own dynamic as 
almost independent actors.
But when it comes to ability to effectively follow-up and enforce international 
environmental standards, these organs have to rely almost exclusively on monitoring and reporting 
carried out by the parties whose behaviour is supposed to be scrutinised. Thus, the independent role 
o f international institutions is undermined as it exceedingly depends on individual states and their 
attitudes towards the said obligations. Therefore, notwithstanding its qualities,180 the ‘comprehensive 
institutional approach’ is highly politicised. Professor Boyle has in the past assessed the experience 
o f the existing institutional arrangements, and on a rather negative note has remarked that they are 
no different from any other political institution in that “they are no more than the expression of their 
members’ willingness or unwillingness to act” .181 In this connection, openness and transparency of 
processes becomes crucial, as these are elements that contribute towards increased public shaming 
and the ensuing pressure put on states to respect their commitments, and involve other actors of the 
international society, such as the public, and especially N G O s,182 in the follow-up o f international 
environmental norms that they care to see fulfilled.
That said, the ‘comprehensive institutional model’ can be tightened by introducing stricter 
and more formalised ‘non-compliance procedures’, which might involve, for instance, compulsory
1(10 On the system ’s political and psychological merits see Kiss & Shelton, op.cit. n .l ,  p .100.
11.1 Boyle, op.cit. n. 170, p.231.
11.2 On the increasing significance ofN G O  involvement, see Chayes & Chayes, op.cit. n.123, Chapter 6 and pp.259-70; 
P.J.Sands, ‘The Role o f  Non-Governmental Organizations in Enforcing International Environmental Law’, in Butler 
(ed.), op.cit. n.161, pp.61-8; and J.Cameron, ‘Compliance , Citizens and N G O s’, in J.Cameron, J.Werksman & 
P,Roderick (eds.), Im proving Com pliance with International Environm ental Law , 1996, pp.29-42..
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and more independent inspection and monitoring; introduction o f complaints procedures;183 
increased use o f independent data to supplement and correct national reports coupled with the 
establishment o f independent compliance review bodies;184 and/or firm organisational links between 
the different supervision techniques applied in a given treaty system so as to form what may be 
called a ‘supervision package’.185 In this connection, o f particular importance is the inclusion of 
financial mechanisms of assistance in the institutional arrangements o f treaty regimes in order to 
balance the stronger enforcement element that underlies stringent compliance control, and provide 
effective solutions to the difficulties identified which very commonly stem from lacking resources.
There are o f course considerable difficulties involved in such an evolution and the 
proliferation o f ‘compliance control procedures’ has not been impressive.186 In fact, the institutional 
structure o f M AP presents all the weaknesses o f the traditional paradigm, and the scope for 
improvements does not seem promising at present, notwithstanding the fact that the issue of 
developing a non-compliance procedure has been on the MAP agenda since 1978.187
Now, it is commonly accepted that the most developed system o f international law-making, 
follow-up, and enforcement is that o f the European Union. Its compliance control mechanism is 
characterised by the existence o f a relatively independent organ, the Commission, with extensive 
follow-up and enforcement powers, combined with a most effective tool o f pressure, namely the 
management o f huge funds. These powers are - importantly -exercised in a series o f formal and 
informal stages, and may culminate to adjudication by a highly respected tribunal, the ECJ.188 In this 
case, the international institution is, indeed, a law enforcer proper; there are also some other 
elements, including citizen involvement in initiating compliance control, and the flexibility o f the 
possible courses o f  action the Commission can take to address infringements o f  Community law, 
that make this model more effective than any other. That is not to say that there are still no 
weaknesses to overcome; in fact the merits o f the system are only relative and actual compliance 
with environmental standards in particular is far from perfect at Community level.189
Be that as it may, this model can not be replicated in other international environmental 
regimes, not because it is fundamentally sni generis,190 but because it is a product o f  an entire 
integration process that has been going on for many decades now and which has resulted in a 
regional legal order - and web o f interests - covering a very extensive range o f  subjects, apart from
183 See Murrell & Kingsbury, op.cit, n,159, pp.27-8.
184 See O.Greene, ‘International Environmental Regimes: Verification and Implementation R eview ’, 2(4) E n v’l Politics, 
1993, pp. 155-73.
185 See Sachariew, op.cit n.151, pp.50-1.
186 See infra, Chapter 5, p.223.
187 See ibid, pp. 190-3.
188 Sec ibid, pp.231-8.
189 See Chapter 7, pp.318-21
190 Sec P. Sands, ‘European Community Environmental Law: The Evolution o f  a Regional Regim e o f  International 
Environmental Protection’, 100(8) YaleL.J., 1991, pp.2518-20.
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environmental protection. Its relevance to the Mediterranean stems both from the fact that the 
Mediterranean M ember States are subject to it, and from the lessons that can certainly be learned 
from its actual operation for the Barcelona regime as a whole, especially with regard to the 
importance o f elaborating on the monitoring and reporting requirements.191
3.2.4. Financial Mechanisms and Provision of Resources to Facilitate Compliance.192
As noted in previous Sections, the approach which places particular significance to 
compliance facilitation through the availability o f international funding for environmental projects 
gained considerable impetus in the 80s and early 90s, and has the advantage o f addressing what is 
perceived as a core reason for non-compliance, namely lack o f material resources. This realisation, 
together with increasing acceptance of the ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ concept, have 
led to considerable developments at the global level, such as revisions o f the policies of international 
banks and the establishment o f GEF. Institutional funding mechanisms forming part o f conventional 
regimes, such as those provided for under the Montreal Protocol, the Biodiversity and the Climate 
Change Convention, are evidence to this trend, and have the important merit o f linking the provision 
of financial resources with concrete actions in compliance with treaty provisions.
The significance and complications o f international financial mechanisms devoted to the 
attainment o f environmental objectives, as well as the related but distinct issue o f transfer o f 
environmentally sound technology, are increasingly appreciated by the international community as 
central concerns in the effort to translate legal undertakings into tangible practice, especially after 
the pivotal relevant developments that have taken place in the early 90s.193 Edith Brown Weiss has 
in this connection asserted that “the dominant issue in international environmental law for the 1990s 
is likely to be one o f equity, who pays whom how much to clean up the environment or develop in 
an environmentally sustainable way” .194
However, it seems that most o f these ambitious pronouncements have to date remained in 
paper, as, in the light o f real life, the Rio enunciations seem to be more a product o f political 
expediency than sincere commitments. In 1994, Gunther Handl put this in rather strong terms:
“ Indeed, the Rio assumption that governments might be able to honor the huge financial 
commitments - estimated to amount to more than $600 billion per year for the period of 
1993-2000 -... now looks downright naive.”195
Notwithstanding this apprehension, the Fourth Section o f Agenda MED 21 adopted in 1994, 
the same year that bleak forecast was made, aspiring to adapt the global Agenda 21 to the special
191 See infra, Chapter 5, pp.223-31.
192 See generally, Sands, op.cit. n .l ,  Chapter 19.
193 See Agenda 21, Chapter 19.
194 E.Brown W eiss, 'Introductory N ote’, 28 1989, p. 1302
193 Handl, op.cit. n.74, p.309.
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features and needs o f the Mediterranean region, deals with implementation o f  the strategy for 
sustainable development in the area in the same spirit.196 The first issue raised here is again that o f 
financial resources and mechanisms required,197 and various co-operative actions to this effect are 
suggested, such as reviewing bilateral funding agreements in the light o f sustainable development; 
allocating a share o f Northern countries’ GDP to international public assistance; reducing 
developing states’ debts or converting a proportion thereof into activities for environmental 
protection; raising funding, especially multilateral public funding, from banks, notably the World 
Bank and the European Investment Bank (EIB), and UN institutions; develop multilateral, regional 
or sub-regional projects and use the funding available to address problems concerning the world 
environment; and strengthening M AP’s role, capacities, and financial resources. Moreover, transfer 
o f environmentally-sound technologies and capacity-building are thought to be particularly 
significant for the implementation o f sustainable development in the M editerranean.198
Despite its current centrality, this approach finds its limit at the need it creates for a 
continuous commitment for transfer o f  funds from rich to poor countries. The prediction that 
budgetary constraints in developed countries which are the principal donors will probably halt or 
at least not increase funding o f international economic incentive systems,199 in the absence of 
overwhelmingly urgent needs, such as the closure o f the Chernobyl nuclear plant, seems justified.200 
Moreover, it is suggested that the ‘trust funds’ established under environmental treaties today 
present “problems o f transaction costs and operational inefficiency similar to the ‘treaty congestion’ 
syndrome which has already been diagnosed in environmental law. The real risk here is that acute 
‘trust fund congestion’ could lead to chronic funding fatigue”.201
Be that as it may, the GEF Council 1995 decision that funding would be withheld from any 
countries failing to meet their obligations under the relevant treaty for which funding was being 
provided underlines the positive developments that may take place in the future.202 Accordingly, 
Chapter 7 will be exclusively devoted to the issue o f compliance incentives and assistance, because 
it has the potential to play a very significant role in the context o f the international regime for the 
protection o f the Mediterranean in particular. Although, as was already noted, this approach is 
especially constructive in the broader framework o f the ‘comprehensive institutional model’,
m  Agenda MED 21, Novem ber 1st 1994, Doc. MED 21/PC 2/R ev.3, N ov.94.
,y7 Chapter XXX111.
,ys See Chapter X X X IV .
Iyy See Chayes & Chayes, op.cit. n . l37, pp.318 and 320.
2C0 See Handl, op.cit. n.74, pp.308-9, where it is submitted that the most significant failure o f  states to date in living 
up to their UNCED commitments relates to the provision o f  new financial resources and technology to developing  
countries. But see A.Steer & J.Mason, ‘The Role o f  Multilateral Finance and the Environment: A  V iew  from the World 
Bank’, 3(1) Indiana J.of Global Leg.Studies, 1995, pp.35-45, for a more optimistic view  maintaining that multilateral 
financial institutions will substitute individual stales in providing necessary resources.
201 See Sand, op.cit. n,76, p.29; and Sjdberg, op.cit. n.103, p .161,
202 See E.Brown Weiss, ‘The Five International Treaties: A Living History’, in Brown W eiss & Jacobson (eds.), op.cit.
n. 123, p .171.
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separate treatment is dictated by the fact that relevant funding actually comes from various other 
sources as well; what is more, in the Mediterranean, there is much scope for linking Community 
funding to non-member states, with the achievement o f specific treaty targets for pollution 
abatement, in the new stage o f intra-regional co-operation known as the ‘Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership’.203
3.2.5. Com pliance Control and Enforcement under National Law.
In Chapter 2 it was pointed out that the world community in general, and Mediterranean 
states in particular, have accepted that there exists a common interest in controlling activities carried 
out within exclusive national jurisdictions and in protecting the quality o f the marine environment 
in each country. M odern international environmental law is, in fact, directed primarily towards 
taking measures against harmful activities within the territory of each state, and in substance bears 
on the same polluters as national law.204 Furthermore, some international obligations are so tightly 
defined that a compatible implementation involves a specific legal position for individuals205 
As Professor O ’Connell remarks:
“One can predict that the need for enforcement will increase as environmental law develops 
more concrete, detailed and wide-reaching rules. International environmental law already 
resembles domestic law more than it does other areas o f  international law. The reason is 
clear: environmental protection has less to do with state-to-state affairs than with the 
activities o f individuals, which are the focus o f most domestic law. Due to increased action 
and technological complexity, the corporate-type world o f traditional international law has 
shifted to the world o f local administration. Although much o f environmental law continues 
to primarily rely on compliance inducement, the need for enforcement will undoubtedly 
increase. But what kind o f enforcement will be necessary?”206
It is true that international law has, as yet, not accommodated that international community 
interest; it has not greatly interfered in the domain of national enforcement and has not set relevant 
harmonised procedural standards, as has been done for example in the human rights area. Such a 
development, it is submitted, could be a potentially useful by-pass to the inherent inadequacies of 
the other approaches to compliance control, inasmuch as the existing compliance-control arsenal o f 
the highly developed - when compared to the international - national legal orders could be explored 
and enhanced.
See infra, Chapter 6, pp.274-8. 
m  See J.Ebbesson, C om patib ility o f  International an d  N ational Environm ental L aw , 1996, p.xix.
205 Ibid, p .56-62.
206 M .E.O ’Connell, ‘Enforcement and the Success oflnternational Environmental Law ’, 3(1) Indiana J. o f  G lobal 
Leg.Stud., 1995, p.57 et seq.
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It will be demonstrated in Chapter 7 that already today the possibility exists - at least in 
principle - o f enforcing international standards in domestic jurisdictions through the courts. 
However, the situation is not satisfactory as it stands. In this context, international regulation, in the 
form o f procedural public rights, would enable citizens to be fully informed about the environmental 
implications o f any activity within state borders, and participate in the decision-making, follow-up 
and enforcement stages with regard to international - and national, for that matter - standards in their 
country. Giving private persons and NGOs access to information and standing would empower them 
to effectively challenge both private and government actions or inactions that disregard or directly 
violate such standards in administrative and judicial fo ra . In other words, it would give those actors 
that are adequately concerned to speak for the common interest - have the necessary incentive - the 
practical ability and legal authority to become active in the compliance control effort.
To this effect, there are three sets o f legal concepts and rules to build upon: The procedural 
public rights and concomitant duties that are incrementally being established, mainly in relation to 
prior environmental impact assessment and access to environmental information; and the concept 
o f equal access in domestic legal systems in order to seek redress for transboundary environmental 
damage, which can be widened to introduce a state duty to guarantee access to judicial and 
administrative proceedings for environmental matters in each country, irrespective o f transnational 
elements. These procedural rights will be examined separately in Chapter 8, as it is submitted that 
they represent the most advanced and promising expression o f the idea that international law can 
legitimately regulate internal procedures directed towards better enforcem ent o f the substantive 
standards it lays down. Together with the recent emergence o f treaty rules in the NAFTA framework 
whereby the parties undertake to effectively enforce their own domestic legislation for the protection 
o f the environment,207 they indeed point to a shift o f focus towards bridging the gap between 
elaborate international regulation and ineffective control over compliance.
As will be shown in Chapter 7, this approach is closely linked with the content and 
formulation o f the primary rules established at the international level, and the extent they restrict 
state discretion as to the way they will have to be implemented, in view o f  the fact that many 
jurisdictions demonstrate considerable reluctance when it comes to interpreting international law in 
a way that would impose considerable burdens on the state. Its main weakness, however, lies in the 
fact that the exercise of public rights is inexplorably linked with the width and depth o f democracy 
and the development o f civil society and environmental awareness in each country. These 
prerequisites are not always present in Europe, let alone in the rest o f the Mediterranean region, and 
in this respect there is not much scope for outside intervention.
207 See infra, Chapter 8, pp.358-62.
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Chapter 4.
Th e  Tr a d it io n a l  A p p r o a c h  to  N o n -C o m p l ia n c e  w ith  
I n t e r n a t io n a l  E n v ir o n m e n t a l  L a  w: S ta te  
R e s p o n s ib il it y  a n d  Civ il  L ia b il it y .
This Chapter examines the traditional non-compliance mechanisms o f state responsibility 
and civil liability as they apply in particular to the field of international environmental law: The first 
Section discusses these features o f the state responsibility concept that make it ineffective when it 
comes to responding to breaches o f international environmental law. The second Section goes on 
to examine the civil liability approach arguing that, although, as it stands today, it also has a limited 
significance in relation to violations o f international law, this approach nevertheless has a greater 
potential for evolving into an effective tool for enhanced enforcement o f international environmental 
obligations within national jurisdictions.
4.1. State Responsibility in International Environmental Law.1
In international law, violation o f a legal norm is deemed to bring into existence a set o f 
‘secondary’ rules that allocate obligations and rights, an enforcement mechanism generally referred 
to as 'state responsibility’. Indeed, the principle whereby a state is responsible for any breach of 
international obligations incumbent upon it is one o f  the cornerstones o f  the international legal 
system, since “public opinion generally holds that the effectiveness o f a legal order depends on the 
good functioning o f  responsibility for the violation o f its rules”.2 However, precise formulation of 
the legal relationships created from such an infraction and the consequences flowing from it has 
turned out to be a task fraught with formidable difficulties;3 the fact that the International Law 
Commission (1LC) has been working on the codification o f the topic for more than thirty years is 
illustrative o f  the controversy surrounding the issues involved.4
1 On state responsibility in general, see 1.Brownlie, System o f  the Law o f  Nations: S tale R esponsibility, Part I, 1983; 
and M .Spinedi and B.Sim ma (eds.), United N ations Codification o f  State R esponsibility, 1987.
2 See A.Kiss, ‘Present Limits to the Enforcement o f  State Responsibility for Environmental Dam age’, in F.Francioni 
& T.Scovazzi (eds.), International Responsibility fo r  Environm ental H arm, 1991, p. 11.
3 See ILC, Commentary on Draft Article 1, YB.I.L.C., 1973, V o l.11, pp .173-6.
4 See ILC, Draft Report o f  the o f  the International Law Commission on the Work o f  its Forty-Eighth Session, Chapter 
III, S tate Responsibility, A /C N .4/L.528/A dd.2, 16 July 1996. For a characteristically critical view  o f  the ILC’s work, 
see Ph. Allot, ‘State Responsibility and the Unmaking o f  International Law’, 29 Harv.I.L.J., 1988, pp. 1-26.
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International law on state responsibility for breach o f environmental obligation,5 despite 
considerable preoccupation of international scholars with the issue,6 follows the slow evolution of 
general state responsibility rules, and has not often been resorted to.7 In fact the Trail Smelter case 
is the only instance that a country has conceded to being responsible for damage caused to a 
neighbouring state by pollution originating in its own territory.8 All subsequent environmental 
instruments are either silent on this point or delegate further clarification o f the rules on 
responsibility to the future, and typically single out liability for transboundary damage from all 
possible breaches o f environmental obligations as the subject most susceptible to elaboration. The 
instruments examined in Chapter 2, and the Barcelona Convention and Protocols in particular, are 
no exception to this pattern.
Having said that, the LOSC calls for the development and application of state responsibility 
standards, while reaffirming the general rule o f responsibility and consequent liability o f states for 
breach o f their environmental obligations (Art.235(l)), At the same time, it seems to move further 
by disconnecting these notions from loss or damage to the interests or environment o f other states,9 
which implies that states are responsible even for failure to fulfil their duties vis-a-vis their own 
marine environment or the high seas, and by apparently introducing liability even when there is no 
breach o f obligation (strict liability).10 The emphasis that the LOSC places on domestic civil liability 
rules as opposed to international state responsibility is rather realistic and mirrors the present state 
o f international law, that prefers procedures to obtain compensation for transboundary 
environmental damage to be pursued at the inter-individual rather than the inter-state level.11 This 
is achieved by means o f civil liability regimes that will be discussed in Section 4.2.
It should be said at this point that it is normal for treaties not to speak about the conditions 
and juridical consequences of any breach o f the obligations they pronounce; what is actually
5 Note that most o f  the relevant literature is concerned, for reasons that will becom e apparent, with 'transboundary 
environmental harm1, and not breach o f  environmental obligations as such.
6 See, among others, P.-M .Dupuy, La Responsabilite Internationale des E tats p o u r les D om m ages d'Origine 
Technologique et Industrielle, 1976; A.Kiss & D.Shelton, International Environmental Law, 1991, at Chapter VIII; and
F.Francioni and T.Scovazzi (eds.), op.cit. n.2. On the specific area o f  marine pollution, see, e.g. G.Handl, ‘International 
Liability o f  States for Marine Pollution’, XXI Can. YB.I.L., 1983, pp .85-117; and B.D.Sm ith, State R esponsibility and  
the Marine Environment - The Rules o f  D ecision, 1988.
7 In fact, Kiss asserts that there has been no serious attempt to apply state responsibility rules since the Trail Smelter 
arbitration in 1941, op.cit. n.2, p.9. Based on the absence o f  state practice, Zemanek goes as far as maintaining that there 
is no general principle o f  state responsibility for environmental harm, see K.Zemanek, ‘State Responsibility and 
Liability’, in H.Neuhold, K.Zemanek & W.Lang (eds.), Environmental Protection and International Law, 1991, pp.l 87- 
8 .
1 Trail Smelter Arbitration. 3 R.I.A.A., 1941, p. 1907.
y See A .E.Boyle, ‘Marine Pollution under the Law o f  the Sea Convention’, 79 A.J.I.L., 1985, p.367.
10 See B.Kwialkowska, The 200-M ile EEZ in the New Law o f  the Sea, 1989, p .l 87.
11 See Kiss, op.cit. n.2, pp.4 and 9-11.
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exceptional is for the former to contain both ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ obligations. When an 
instrument is silent, it is general international law that determines these issues.52
4.1.1. The Constituent Elements o f  State Responsibility.13
Under general international law, responsibility comes into play when an act or omission,14 
attributable to a state, breaches one o f its international obligations.15 Two elements are therefore 
required, a subjective one, “conduct consisting o f an action or omission is attributable to the State 
under international law”, and an objective element, “a breach o f an international obligation o f the 
State”.16 It is very important to note in this context that ‘dam age’ is inherent in any breach o f 
international obligation, and does not, therefore, constitute a third separate element o f state 
responsibility.17
As far as the subjective element is concerned, it is sometimes said that in modern 
international law there is attribution to states o f almost any private activity within their jurisdiction 
or control.18 However, in the environmental sphere, responsibility does not involve real attribution, 
but rather breach o f the duty to control private activities; in other words, the responsibility o f a state 
is only occasioned by acts o f private persons, and derives from some separate conduct attributable 
to the state and related to these acts.19
Turning now to the objective element, i.e. conduct failing to honour an international 
obligation, Draft Article 16 o f the ILC attempts to delineate the meaning o f  international breach; 
it reads as follows:
“There is a breach o f an international obligation by a State when an act o f that State is not
in conformity with what is required o f  it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or
character.”
12 In any case, the absence o f  conventional provisions on responsibility in environmental treaties should not be viewed  
as evidence o f  their ‘soft" character, see M.Spinedi, ‘Les Consequences Juridiques d’un Fait Inlernationalement lllicite 
Causant un Dommage A l'Environnement’, in Francioni & Scovazzi (eds.), op.cit. n.2, pp.78-9.
13 Sec, generally, E.J. de Arechaga, ‘International Responsibility’, in M .Sorenson (ed.), Manual o f  Public 
International Law, 1968, pp.534-40.
14 Responsibility for omission was found to exist in, e.g., the US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran Case, 1980 
l.C.J. Reports, p.392 at paras,66-68.
15 For a discussion o f  such possible acts or om issions in breach o f  obligations under the London Convention, see
G.Kasoulides, ‘State Responsibility and Assessm ent o f  Liability for Damage Resulting from Dumping Operations’, 26 
San D iego  L.Rev., 1989, pp.509-10.
16 See ILC, Slate Responsibility, Draft Article 3, UN D oc.A /C N .4/L .569, 4 August 1998.
17 For a detailed discussion o f  this issue, see A.Tanzi, ‘Is Damage a Distinct Condition for the Existence o f  an 
Internationally Wrongful Act?’, in Spincdi & Sim m a(eds.), op.cit. n, 1, pp. 1-33.
18 For a criticism o f  that notion, see ‘Developm ents - International Environmental Law ’, 104 Harv. L.Rev., 1991, 
pp. 1507-8.
19 See Commentary on Draft Article 11, YB.I.L.C., 1975, Vol.II, p.71 e tse q ..
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The proposed definition seems to be essentially circular, and some authors suggest it is redundant.20 
It actually seems that the ILC included that formulation because it wanted to stress that what 
constitutes an international breach is a matter to be decided entirely by international law,21 as 
opposed to domestic legal systems, and to imply that even partial contradiction with an international 
obligation may entail responsibility.22 In fact, it is sufficient that at least some aspect o f the state 
conduct is not in conformity with what is legally prescribed by a specific rule.
The ILC subsequently made a distinction that provides some considerable insight into the 
substantive content o f international rules and the multiplicity o f ways they can be violated. It is the 
distinction between obligations o f ‘conduct’ and o f ‘result’ in Draft Articles 20 and 21 23 According 
to them, fulfilment o f an obligation o f conduct (or o f means) requires the use o f  specifically 
determined means. Obligations o f result, on the other hand, leave states freedom in the choice of 
means, even to the extent that if the initial means chosen fail to achieve the required result, states 
have the right to resort to other means to that end. International law can be even more permissive, 
allowing for the accomplishment o f a secondary result in discharge o f an international duty. An 
example can be found in environmental treaties prohibiting certain activities, e.g. the illegal 
seaborne movement of hazardous waste, as proscribed in the Basel Convention, and at the same time 
requiring states that have not succeeded in preventing such actions to simply punish the culprits; in 
such an instance, the state would be internationally responsible only in so far as it has failed to 
impose punishment and not before.
Obligations o f result predominate in instances where international regulation aims at 
bringing about a certain situation within domestic legal systems, although it sometimes specifies the 
use o f a certain course o f conduct in order to achieve this target. Hence, the real difference between 
the two types o f obligations is whether they address the particular actions - or omissions - a state 
must undertake in order to achieve the desired result. It is not surprising, therefore, that it would 
often be difficult to distinguish between the two;24 for instance, an obligation forbidding dumping 
o f hazardous waste into the sea is an obligation of conduct prohibiting official undertaking o f such 
activities, but also o f result requiring the use o f whatever means necessary to guarantee that 
dumping is not carried out by private actors under state jurisdiction. Besides such two-faceted 
international rules, there are also cases where the degree of precision regarding the means specified 
in a norm is so minimal that makes it akin to a mere obligation o f result.
20 See, e.g., R .Pisillo-M azzeschi, ‘Termination and Suspension o f Treaties for Breach in the ILC Works on State 
R esponsibility’, in Spinedi & Sim m a(eds.), op.cit. n .l , p.64.
21 See S.Rosenne, Breach o f  Treaty, 1985, pp.45-84, on the meaning o f  breach in the law o f  stale responsibility.
22 See ILC, Second Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc, A /C N .4/498, 17 March 1999, at para..7.
23 See ibid, paras.52-80. Note that these articles were deleted from the draft in 1999, see ILC, Draft Articles on Slate 
Resposibility, UN D oc,A /C N .4/L .574, 1999.
24 See B.Graefrath, ‘N ew  Trends in State R esponsibility’, 20 Thesaurus Acroasium , 1993, pp. 118-9.
143
There is no scarcity o f relevant examples within the body o f international law examined in 
Chapter 2; indeed, the majority o f international instruments addressing marine pollution in the 
Mediterranean area stipulate the adoption o f ‘appropriate legislation’, more often alongside other 
measures and policies that are deemed suitable to bring about the required control and protection. 
The ILC insists that these rules, however vague, remain obligations o f conduct since they give some 
indication o f what the ‘appropriate measures’ might be, even when the particular course o f action 
is only implicitly underlying the general context o f  a convention.25 It follows that adoption of 
‘appropriate legislation’ forms an integral part o f the commitment states have undertaken at the 
international level and cannot be overlooked or bypassed. But when the means mentioned are only 
indicative, in the sense that they are not a binding course of action and the state concerned may just 
ignore them and choose some other conduct instead, then the obligation is one o f  result. The 
substantial difference then is one o f mere wording.
In any case, as far as obligations o f means are concerned, when the specific conduct o f a 
state and its organs is not in conformity with that actually prescribed, there is a direct breach o f the 
obligation in question without any other prerequisites, such as that the breach should have some 
kind o f harmful consequences. With regard to obligations o f result, on the other hand, the factor 
determining if a breach has occurred is whether the desired result has in concrelo been achieved or 
not. It is irrelevant in this context that measures which would have in theory seem more suitable 
have not been taken, or that a state has adopted some unfruitful course of action that it hoped would 
be successful, or even that, conversely, it has adopted a measure likely in principle to obstruct the 
achievem ent o f  the result required, but which in itself does not create a situation fundamentally 
incompatible with this result. This evaluation is made even more difficult by qualifications, often 
inserted in the formulation o f  obligations o f result, such as those requiring, e.g., elimination o f land- 
based pollution, ‘as far as possible’, thus giving an extremely relative content to the desired result.
One last issue that should not be disregarded in this connection is the nature o f general 
treaty commitments concerning co-operation among parties. Their vague and uncertain phrasing has 
led some international lawyers to express doubts as to their binding nature and as to the possibility 
o f  enforcing international responsibility for their breach.26 In relation to the first point, it is 
submitted that an undertaking to co-operate might at first sight seem simply hortatory, but usually 
acquires a much more specific content if read together with the institutional structures and 
procedures that are set up by the instrument in which the former is contained.27 As to the second 
point, it is true that it is difficult to conceive how a state can substantiate a concrete breach o f an
25 Sec YB.i.L.C., 1977, V ol.11, Pari Two, pp .16-7, giving the example o flL O  Conventions which implicitly call for 
the adoption o f  legislation.
26 See R.Pisillo-M azzeschi, ‘Forms o f  International Responsibility for Environmental Harm’, in F.Francioni &
T.Scovazzi (eds.), op.cit. n.2, p. 18.
27 See infra, Chapter 5, pp. 186-90.
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obligation to co-operate, so as to invoke the law o f state responsibility. However, the example used 
by Pisillo-Mazzeschi in support o f the suggestion that breach of such obligations cannot entail state 
responsibility, i.e. the 1979 Geneva Long-Range Air Pollution Convention’s express stipulation that 
it does not contain rules on state responsibility, may well be read reversely. It could well be an 
indication that state responsibility standards are in principle applicable, if there is a need to exclude 
them explicitly.
4.1.2. The Requirement o f ‘Fault’.
Let us now turn to one o f the questions that has plagued international lawyers, namely 
whether responsibility requires fault - dolus or cidpa, or in its more advanced form failure of due 
diligence, or it is ‘strict’, shifting the burden o f proof from the victim to the perpetrator, who has 
to prove that a defence exists, or even ‘absolute’,28 not admitting any defence whatsoever.
In international law, responsibility has been traditionally based on fault.29 Nevertheless, it 
has been convincingly argued that when treaty or custom is silent, the default regime is one of 
‘strict’ (‘relatively objective’ in European continental doctrine) responsibility, whereby the state will 
be held liable for any breach o f international law by its organs unless it can show that compliance 
was impossible for reasons not caused by the state itself.30 It is true that states - and the ICJ, for that 
matter - generally do not require proof o f negligence or ill-intent before protesting, or adopting 
counter-measures against, violations o f international, and especially treaty, rules.31 In the same vein, 
the ILC Articles do not require fault and can, therefore, be construed as supporting this general 
regime.32
That said, in international environmental law, most treaties lay down undertakings to 
prevent pollution qualified in more or less precise terms, e.g. to “take all appropriate measures”, 
“using the best practicable means” (LOSC, Art. 194), and thus create obligations o f ‘due diligence’ 
and not absolute ones.33 Some, however, contain specific prohibitions o f polluting activities to 
which, according to some jurists, corresponds strict responsibility. In fact, many have tried to prove 
the existence o f a strict responsibility rule,34 especially in relation to the marine environment,35 their
2S In fact, there is only one treaty devoted specifically to international responsibility for damage that may relate to the 
environment, namely the 1972 Space Objects Liability Convention, establishing a rule o f  absolute responsibility.
29 For the different views, see P.-M.Dupuy, ‘Le Fait Generaleur de la Responsabilitd Internationale dcs Etats’, 188 
R eceail des Conrs, 1984/V , pp .28-110.
30 See B.Conforli, International Law and the Role o f  D om estic Legal Systems, 1993, p. 166.
31 Ibid, p. 167.
32 Ibid, p. 168.
33 See Developm ents..., op.cit. n.18, p .1495; and Pisillo-M azzeschi, op.cit. n.26, p p .19-20.
3,1 On view s in favour o f  strict or absolute liability in international environmental law in general, existing 
independently o f  any breach o f  obligation, and finding its legal basis on general principles o f  law, equity, sovereign 
equality or good neighbourliness, see S.Schneider, W orld Public O rder o f  the Environm ent, 1975, Ch.6; G.Handl, 
‘Liability as an Obligation Established by a Primary Rule o f  International Law ’ XVI Neth.YB.I.L., 1985, p.77;
(continued...)
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main evidence being proliferation o f civil liability conventions establishing a rule o f strict liability 
to which the states themselves are ultimately submitted. On the other hand, it is often argued that 
the concept o f strict responsibility is not supported by state practice, and, moreover, it might not be 
entirely useful either as the ensuing compensation is limited and might leave part o f the cost of 
transboundary damage with the innocent victim.36
This controversy might have lost some o f its significance, however, since ‘due diligence’ 
is no longer equated with fault,37 having become a more objective test consisting in violation o f a 
substantive obligation without going into the motives or knowledge o f the non-compliant state. 
Hence, the - arguably - most important element o f responsibility, the burden o f proof, seems to have 
been reversed, so that the accused state now has to prove that it has exercised the required due 
diligence.38 In fact, each case has to be considered separately on its own merits, and state 
responsibility will come into play when a specific environmental obligation is breached, be it 
conventional or customary such as the general rule demanding prevention o f significant damage to 
other states or common areas (Principle 21, Stockholm Declaration; Principle 22, Rio Declaration). 
The latter has attracted most o f the attention, as it is deemed to offer the maximum potential for 
some real life application o f legal theory.
This last principle is also connected with much o f the controversy surrounding the work of 
the ILC on the topic o f ‘international liability for the injurious consequences o f acts not prohibited 
by international law’, which began in the late seventies.39 In fact, the Commission did not seem to 
share the conclusion that the burden o f proof in relation to ‘due diligence’ has been reversed in 
international environmental law. Hence, in an effort to overcome the obstacle o f having to prove 
failure o f ‘due diligence’ in order to substantiate a claim o f state responsibility for transboundary 
environmental harm, and also desiring to ensure that when such harm is effected by otherwise 
perfectly beneficial activities, the latter would not be rendered illegal under international law, it 
undertook the task o f formulating a set o f primary obligations governing ‘ultra-hazardous’, or ‘high-
continued)
L.F.E.Goldie, ‘Concepts o f  Strict and Absolute Liability and the Ranking o f  Liability in Terms o f  Exposure to Risk’, 
ibid, p .175. More modest is the notion o f ‘ultra-hazardous activities’ which entail strict or absolute responsibility, see
C.W.Jenks, ‘Liability for Ultra-Hazardous Activities in International Law’, 117 Recenil des Cours, 1966/1, p. 105; and 
infra, pp. 145-6.
35 The seminal work in this context is that by Smith, op.cit. n.6, esp. at Chapter 8; see also Kasoulides, op.cit. n . l5, 
pp.513-6, with regard to dumping.
36 See, e.g., A .E.B oyle, ‘Making the Polluter Pay? Alternatives to State Responsibility in the Allocation o f  
Transboundary Environmental C osts’, in Francioni & Scovazzi (eds.), op.cit. n.2, pp.364-5.
37 See F.O.Vicufia, ‘State Responsibility, Liability, and Remedial Measures under International Law: N ew  Criteria 
for Environmental Protection’, in E.Brown Weiss (ed.), Environmental Change and International Law: New Challenges 
an d Dim ensions, 1992, p. 152.
3ti See, e.g., Kasoulides, op.cit. n . l5, p .510, with regard to due diligence obligations arising out o f  the London 
Convention,
3') See, among others, C.Tomuschat, ‘International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out o f  Acts not 
Prohibited by International Law: The Work o f  the Internationa] Law Com m ission’, in Francioni & Scovazzi (eds.), 
op.cit, n.2, pp.37-72; and Conforti, op.cit. n,30, pp.170-1.
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risk’ activities, causing transboundary harm. The whole project has enormous theoretical 
complications,"10 and has been subjected to intense criticism, which is basically premised on the idea 
that what is in issue when considering whether a state is internationally responsible is the content 
o f the rule allegedly infringed, and that, usually, it is not an activity that is prohibited as such, but 
the harm it causes."11 All this contention caused considerable delays and strenuous re-drafting and 
has led to a complete change o f focus which currently lies in ‘prevention o f transboundary damage 
from hazardous activities’,42 while the whole issue o f  whether the ILC should continue is being 
reconsidered.43
4.1.3. The Consequences o f State Responsibility.
Once international responsibility is established, the question is what are the consequences 
flowing from it. The prevalent opinion maintains that a new legal relationship is created involving 
‘secondary’ norms,44 and requiring the culprit state to make adequate reparation.43 Moreover, a right 
o f  the injured party to impose proportional counter-measures is recognised. In other words, there 
are two kinds o f juridical consequences from an internationally wrongful act, namely new 
obligations to provide reparation, and the faculty (or right) o f injured states to apply counter­
measures (or sanctions).46
4.I.3 .I. Remedies for Breach o f International Obligation.
The remedies available to address an internationally wrongful act include cessation of the 
illegal act, and reparation which may entail restitution in kind; compensation; satisfaction; and 
assurances and guarantees o f non-repetition.47 Thus, the first duty incumbent upon the culprit is to 
repeal the act which violates its international obligation.48 The second remedy, i.e. to re-establish 
the preexisting situation, or to provide restitution in kind is the central consequence o f state 
responsibility. However, this might entail disproportionate expense, or be unfeasible; then the
4U For an insight into these difficulties, see Flandl, op.cit. n.34, p.49-79.
41 See, e.g., Brownlie, op.cit. n .l ,  p,50; A .E .Boyle, ‘State Responsibility and International Liability for Injurious 
Consequences o f  Acts Not Prohibited by International Law: A Necessary Distinction?’, 39 I.C.L.Q., 1990, pp. 1-26; and 
Smith, op.cit. n.6, pp.40 et seq  and 124 el seq.. For support o f  the ILC approach, see D.B.M agraw, ‘Transboundary 
Harm: The International Law Commission Study on “international Liability”, 80 A .J.l.L ., 1986, pp.305-30; and 
M .E,O ’Connell, ‘Enforcing the N ew  International Law o f  the Environment’, 35 Ger.YB.J.L., 1992, p.308.
42 See ILC, Report o f  the Commission to the General Assem bly on the Work o f  its Fiftieth Session, YB.I.L.C., 1998, 
Chapter IV.
43 ILC, Report o f  the Com mission to the General Assembly on the Work o f  its Fifty-First Session, YB.I.L.C., 1999, 
Chapter IX.
44 See J.Combacau & D.Alland, ‘“Primary” and “Secondary” Rules in the Law o f  Stale Responsibility: Categorizing 
International Obligations’, XVI Neth.YB.I.L., 1985, pp.81-109.
45 See the Chorzow Factory Case, 1928 P.C.I.J., Ser.A, No. 13, p.47.
46 See Spinedi, op.cit. n . l2, p.79.
47 See generally, C.Gray, Judicial Remedies in International Law, 1987, pp.77-108; Spinedi, op.cit. n. 12, pp.85 et seq . ; 
and Commentary on Draft Articles 5-1 Obis (now Arts,41-46), YB.I.L.C., 1993, Vol.II, Part Two, pp.55-83.
48 For example, in the Martini Arbitration, it was ordered that a judgement rendered by the Supreme Court o f  
V enezuela be annulled, see 2 R.I.A.A., 1930, pp.976 et seq..
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perpetrator has to supply equivalent reparation, which will usually be in the form o f pecuniary 
compensation or indemnity.49
Compensation covers ‘economically assessable damage’, i.e. damage caused to the injured 
state’s territory, organisation, and property, and that caused to physical or juridical persons under 
its jurisdiction.50 The question that still remains, however, is whether compensation triggered by an 
internationally wrongful act covers purely ecological loss, according to the principle that reparation 
should address as far as possible all the consequences o f the illegal act, or not;51 or, to put it 
differently, what constitutes environmental damage in the context o f state liability. Indeed, the only 
clear treaty definition is found in the Convention on the Regulation o f Antarctic Mineral Resources 
Activities (CRAMRA, Art. 1(15)), while most other instruments - e.g., the LOSC (Arts. 1(4) and 
194(5)) - merely define ‘pollution’, which might be a useful starting point, but it certainly cannot 
be used interchangeably with ‘environmental damage’. State practice has not provided more 
assistance, so that the threshold at which environmental damage would entail liability will depend 
on the specific context, and especially on the requirements o f the legal standard that is infringed.52
Satisfaction, on the other hand, covers non-material goods, including legal and moral 
damage. Satisfaction might come in the form o f pecuniary compensation,53 or o f a judicial 
declaration o f the unlawfulness o f  an act.54 Guarantees against non-repetition can also be viewed 
as a form o f satisfaction, and may include specific measures that a state is asked to take,55 such as 
modification o f legislation or adoption o f administrative arrangements.56 In the environmental 
context, this will often be more significant and meaningful than award o f compensation in cases
^  Although there are instances where it takes other forms, see, e,g,, Protocol to the 1974 Nordic Convention on the 
Protection o f  the Environment, where the injured party can demand the purchase o f  his real property; and the 1964 
Finland-USSR Agreement concerning Frontier Watercourses (Arl.5), where the injured party is allowed a new benefit 
to make up for his losses.
50 See YB.I.L.C., 1993, V ol.11, Part Two, p.72. lovane, in La Riparazione nella Theoria e nella P rassi deU'Ulecito 
Internazionala , 1990, cited in Spinedi, op.cit. n.12, pp.83-4, maintains that the specific cases where there have been 
claims and awards o f  reparation (in the sense o f  pecuniary compensation) concern solely certain categories o f  illegal acts, 
not including those resulting in environmental damage. This view is also supported by Conforti, op.cit. n.30, pp.200-1. 
But Spinedi thinks it is important that during the ILC work, no state has doubted the proposition that all illegal acts 
engage new obligations, including that o f  compensation for damages caused, see op.cit n. 12, p .84, especially at fn.21 
and accompanying text.
51 Som e authors, such as Spinedi, reply affirmatively going as far as maintaining that there are no maximum or 
minimum limits to the compensation due for such loss, see op.cit. n.12, pp .103-6,
52 See P.Sands, Principles o f  International Environm ental Law, V o l.1 , 1995, pp.635-7.
53 See, e.g. the I'm A lone Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A., p. 1618; and Gray, op.cit. n.46, pp.85-92, for a discussion o f  the 
relevant literature, case law and treaty provisions. The author concludes that “there is no compelling authority that a mere 
breach o f  international law without injury to nationals or material damage to the state should be met by an award o f  
damages by a tribunal”, but nevertheless "a state is able to claim damages... for those injuries for which the same remedy 
would be available... under a ‘generalized municipal law standard”’, p.91. See contra, Zcmanek, op.cit. n .l, p .192, 
asserting that under the law as it stands compensation is due for immaterial damage.
M See, e.g. the Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. Reports, p.35.
55 See, e.g. the Trail Smelter Arbitration, loc.cit. n.8, p. 1934 e tseq .
56 See YB.I.L.C., 1993, Vol.II, Part Two, p.83; and Spinedi, op.cit. n.12, pp.l 12-3.
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where there has been no transboundary harm, especially when the obligation breached relates 
exclusively to the responsible state’s own environment.
4.I.3.2. The Question o f Standing.
As has been already noted, damage is not a necessary prerequisite under the rules o f state 
responsibility. On the other hand, a central feature o f these rules is that they require an ‘injured 
state’ that will initiate the international enforcement process, which makes the problem o f standing 
central in the operation of state responsibility.57 In this connection, the ILC believes that, in 
international law, there is an absolute correlation between a legal obligation and a corresponding 
subjective right;58 it follows that ‘injured state’ is that whose rights have been infringed by an 
international wrongful act and has standing to invoke the culprit’s responsibility.59
This idea presupposes a bilateral context which has been long superseded by the 
proliferation o f multilateral conventions purporting to regulate various domains and establishing 
obligations which “do not run between the States parties at all but rather oblige the contracting 
States to adopt certain ‘parallel’ conduct within their jurisdiction...”.60 The ILC has tried to 
accommodate the new reality by defining ‘injured states’ in a multilateral treaty context. Firstly, it 
has endorsed the notion o f ‘self-contained regimes’ (or ‘objective regimes’)61 that may include ad  
hoc definitions o f ‘injured parties’: Although in principle the origin o f the obligation infringed 
upon, be it conventional or customary, does not affect any related responsibility, there are some sub­
systems o f international law based on treaty that contain, apart from primary, also secondary norms, 
which would be applicable should a breach occur, leaving general international rules o f state 
responsibility only a residual role.62 The most obvious example o f such a regime is that o f the 
European Union.63
But even absent any secondary rules defining ‘injured states’, Draft Article 40(2)(f) 
provides that in a multilateral treaty context, “any other State party to the... treaty” will be an 
‘injured state’, “ if  it is established that the right [infringed] has been expressly stipulated in that
57 On standing before the 1CJ, see Gray, op.cit. n.47, pp.211-5,
58 See Commentary on Draft Article 3, YB.I.L.C., 1973, Vol.II, p.182; and Commentary on Draft Article 5, Part 2, 
YB.I.L.C., 1985, Vol.II, Part Two, p.25.
y) See Draft Article 40 and Commentary, YB.I.L.C., 1985, Vol.II, Part Two, pp.25-7.
60 See B.Sim ma, ‘Bilateralism and Community Interest in the Law o f  State Responsibility’, in Y.Dinstein (ed.), 
International Law at a Time o f  P erplexity  (Essays in Honour o f  Shabtai Rosenne), 1989, p.823.
61 See US Diplom atic and Consular Staff in Teheran Case, loc.cit. n. 14, p.40. The term was first introduced by 
B.Simma, in ‘Self-Contained Regim es’, XVI Neth.YB.I.L., 1985, p .135.
62 See Commentary on Draft Article 17, YB.I.L.C., 1976, Vol.II, Part Two, pp.80-1; and Commentary on Draft Article 
2, Part 2, YB.I.L.C., 1983, Vol.II, Part Two, pp.42-3. See also XXV Neth. YB.l.L., 1994, dedicated to the topic. For some 
critical observations on this concept, see P.Stunna, ‘Law o f  Treaties Reflected in State Responsibility Rules’, 19 
Thesaurus Acroasium, 1992, pp.568-71. See also M.Koskenniemi, ‘Breach o f  Treaty or Non-Compliance? Reflections 
on the Enforcement o f  the Montreal Protocol’, 3 YB.I.E.L., 1992, pp.134-7, on the Montreal Protocol as a ‘self-contained 
regime’; and M.A.Fitzinaurice, ‘International Environmental Law as a Special Field’, X X V  Neth. YB.l.L., 1994, pp. 181- 
226.
63 Sec infra, Chapter 5, pp.231-7; and Chapter 7, pp.321-8.
149
treaty for the protection o f the collective interests o f the States parties thereto” .64 The 1CJ has 
authoritatively stated in this context that “a legal right or interest need not necessarily relate to 
anything material or ‘tangible’, and can be infringed even though no prejudice o f a material kind 
has been suffered”,65 but went on to reject the notion o f actio popularis in international law by 
saying that “such rights or interests, in order to exist, must be clearly vested in those who claim 
them, by some text or instrument, or rule o f law...” .
There is some opinion, however, in favour o f recognising an actio popularis in international 
law, especially in treaties o f the CRAMRA type,66 pointing to the “contradiction o f finding that an 
obligation could exist which could not be enforced through dispute settlement procedures” 67 In this 
context, the Barcelona Traction case is very significant in that it recognised that with regard to 
certain obligations owed to the world community as a whole, i.e. erga omnes, all states possess a 
‘legal interest’ in their fulfilment.68 The potential existence o f such obligations is gaining 
acceptance, even in relation to environmental interests,69 especially areas beyond national 
jurisdiction; in fact, as Spinedi argues, in these cases the only kind o f obligation that can possibly 
be conceived is an obligation erga omnes.70 According to this line o f  reasoning, the idea o f a legal 
interest is a legal fiction invoked when international law wants to vest ‘third states’ with standing 
to challenge a breach o f a legal norm, especially when there is no particular injured state to seek 
remedy for an infraction, e.g. when environmental damage is caused to a common space,71 or in 
instances when the violation relates to an obligation towards the perpetrator’s own environment.
The real question, then, is to determine the relevant norms in concrete terms and to decide 
whether states ‘not directly injured’ have the same rights as those ‘directly injured’,72 since remedies 
available to third states may be limited according to the circumstances o f the breach.73 Be that as it 
may, most international lawyers are in favour o f collective remedial action, i.e. measures adopted 
by global, regional, or specialised organisations having authority and interest in the subject o f the
54 See Commentary on Draft Arl.40, YB.I.L.C., 1985, Vol.II, Part Two, p.27.
65 See the South-W est Africa Case (Second Phase), 1966 I.C.J. Reports, p.32.
66 Sec, e.g., K.Leigh, ‘Liability for Damage to the Global Com mons’, 14 Austr.YB.I.L., 1993, pp.50-52.
67 See the Nuclear Tests Cases, 1974 l.C.J. Reports, per Judge Petren, at p.303; and also The SS Wimbledon Case, 
1923 P.C.J.J., Ser.A, N o .l;  and the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Case (Provisional 
Measures), 1984 I.C.J. R eports, at pp. 196-8.
68 See the Barcelona Traction. Light and Power Co.Ltd. Case, 1972 I.C.J. Reports, p .32.
09 See M.Ragazzi, The Concept o f  International O bligations Erga Omnes, 1997; and A.de Hoogh, O bligations Erga 
Omnes and International Crim es, 1996.
70 See Spinedi, op.cit. n.12, p.91.
71 See J.l.Charney, ‘Third State Remedies for Environmental Damage to the W orld’s Common Spaces’, in Francioni 
& Scovazzi (eds.), op.cit. n.2, pp. 156-7; and A .E .B oyle, ‘State Responsibility for Breach o f  Obligations to Protect the 
Global Environment’, in W .E.Butler (ed,), Control over Com pliance with International Law , 1991, pp.69-81.
72 Sec Spinedi, op.cit. n.12, pp.89-90
73 See Charney, op.cit. n.71, p p .158-9 and 161-2,
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violation;74 in Gray’s words, “as far as the concept o f responsibility to the international community 
as a whole is a reality this is through the functioning o f international organisations rather than any 
formal judicial procedure”,75
Having said that, expert opinion agrees that when an obligation erga omnes is breached, 
all states connected with the norm establishing the obligation are, in principle, authorised to demand 
cessation o f the illegal act, acting even individually; the same applies also to restitution.76 But it 
remains ambiguous what is the exact content o f reparation and any possible exceptions77 Hence, 
the majority o f opinion deems compensation an inappropriate remedy when damage has occurred 
to common areas only, or to the environment o f the author state alone.78 It is characteristic that not 
even in the advanced CRAMRA setting has the Commission competence to require compensation 
by a state in breach o f conventional obligations, notwithstanding its capacity to resort to national 
courts and require compensation by private operators.
4.1.3.3. Counter-M easures.79 
Counter-measures are generally measures aiming at securing performance o f an 
international norm, and - notwithstanding confusing terminology - include retortions, which are 
lawful as such, reprisals, which would be unlawful were they not undertaken in response to a breach 
of international obligation,80 and sanctions, which are most commonly used to describe measures 
adopted by international organisations. Inclusion o f such self-help measures, and especially 
reprisals, in the law o f state responsibility is mainly due to the reality that mere rights and 
obligations of reparation result in endless regression, given that breach o f the obligation to provide 
reparation would itself be a wrongful act etc.81 These measures do not create a new legal 
relationship, however, but are merely coercive action with a view to restoring the violated legal 
order, similar to that o f sentencing or execution of judgm ents under municipal law.
More specifically, retortions do not entail violation of a rule, but rather a form of unfriendly 
behaviour, e.g. the scaling down o f diplomatic relations, or commercial co-operation, or even
74 See, e.g., ibid, p .160; and O ’Connell, op.cit. n.41, pp.311-3.
75 Gray, op.cit. n,47, pp.214-5.
76 See, e.g., ibid, pp.92-3 and 101.
77 See ibid, pp.93-5. Note, e.g., that the ILC has chosen to exclude restitutio in integrum  when it is proven ‘excessively 
onerous’, see Draft Article 43.
78 See Spinedi, op.cit. n.12, pp. 106-8; but the author draws on human rights compensation to admit by analogy that, 
at least in multilateral treaty context, there can be an organ assigned to receive such a sum awarded as damages, see 
pp. 108-9.
79 See generally ibid, pp.l 14 et seq. On the legality o f  counter-measures for breach o f  treaty obligation, see the Air 
Services Agreement Arbitration. XVIII U.N.R.I.A.A., p.529.
80 See Commentary on Draft Arts. 13 and 14, Part 2 (now Draft Arts.47-50), Official Records o f  the General Assembly, 
Fiftieth Session, Supplement N o .10 (A /50/10), 1995, pp .144-73.
81 See generally, P.Malanczuk, ‘Counter-Measures and Self-Defence as Circumstances precluding W rongfulness in 
the International Law Com m ission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility’, in Spinedi & Sirnma (eds.), op.cit. n .l,  
pp. 197-286.
economic sanctions imposed by individual states outside the UN collective security system and 
within the framework o f international trade law. As such, they are not subject to special limitations. 
Reprisals, on the other hand, have to be proportionate to the alleged violation, although not perfectly 
equivalent, i.e. they may concern a totally unrelated rule. In any case, they cannot involve the threat 
or use o f force,82extreme economic or political coercion, infringements o f the inviolability of 
diplomats, derogations from basic human rights, or any other conduct in contravention of 
peremptory norms o f general international law,83 and in general departure from obligations erga 
om nes.SA For breach o f  such obligations international institutions are solely responsible to decide 
on an appropriate response.85
A form of reprisal is reciprocal non-compliance, i.e. suspension o f  the operation o f an 
agreement vis-a-vis a party in breach o f a fundamental provision, as envisaged in Article 60 o f the 
Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties. Article 60(2), in particular, provides that any state party 
to a multilateral treaty has standing to assert unilateral or collective remedies against another party 
that has violated a provision o f the treaty, although a state not specially affected by the breach may 
seek remedies only “through collective decisions o f the states parties”.86 This response - and a 
fortiori termination o f the operation o f a treaty, works well in a bilateral reciprocal relationship,87 
but is inappropriate for a multilateral regime of environmental protection.88 Fisher, for one, thinks 
that reciprocity tends to be destructive o f the regime as breaches accumulate and the law is finally 
disregarded, while on the other hand, it rarely deters a particular breach otherwise desirable.89
Expulsion and withdrawal o f membership privileges, with the bad publicity, political 
isolation and the resulting possible loss o f access to services and resources attached, is a form of 
sanction available to the parties of a treaty that is thought to have some considerable potential,90 and
82 See Art.2(4) o f  the UN Charter; and the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Case (Merits), 
1986 I.C.J. R eports, p. 14.
83 See R.Jennings & A.W atts (eds.), Oppenheim's International Law, V ol.11, 1992, p p .135-44.
84 See Spinedi, op.cit, n.12, pp.l 18-9; and A.Rosas, ‘Stale Responsibility and Liability under Civil Liability Regim es’, 
in 0 . Bring & S.Mahmoudi (eds.), Current International Law Issues: N ordic P erspectives (Essays in Honour o f  Jerzy 
Sztucki), 1994, p. 176.
85 Sec Commentary on Draft Art.30, YB.I.L.C., 1979, Vol.II, Part Two, p .l 18-9.
86 Spinedi argues that ‘non-directly injured states’ in a multilateral context can also adopt individual reactive action, 
op.cit. n.12, pp.l 19-24.
87 On the right to suspend the operation o f  or terminate a treaty follow ing a breach, see, among others, Lord McNair, 
The Law o f  Treaties, 1961, Chapter XXXVI; and G.Haraszti, Some Fundamental Problem s o f  the Law o f  Treaties, 1973, 
Chapter VII.
88 See A.Chayes & A.Handler Chayes, ‘Compliance Without Enforcement: State Behaviour under Regulatory 
Treaties’, 7 N egotiation J., 1991, pp.317-8; R.Wolfrum, ‘Means o f  Ensuring Compliance with and Enforcement o f  
International Environmental Law’, 272 Receuil des Cours, 1998, pp,56-7; and Rosas, op.cit. n.84, esp. at p .175.
89 R.Fisher, Im proving Com pliance with International Law, 1981, p. 139, and Chapters III and IV.
90 On the compliance-inducing role o f  these factors, see O.R. Young, International C ooperation  - B idlding Regimes 
fo r  Natural Resources and the Environment, 1989, p.71-6; and R. Axelrod, The Evolution o f  C ooperation, 1984.
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can be readily implemented at no cost, unlike economic sanctions.91 This course o f action has been 
never resorted to in the environmental sphere so far, as it is thought that it “degrades the value of 
the regime for those who remain” as well.92 However, it has recently been brought back to the 
limelight through its inclusion in the indicative list o f measures against defaulting parties in the 
ozone non-compliance procedure examined in the next Chapter. Actual practice will, o f course, be 
the ultimate test o f whether this old notion can acquire new content and be used effectively as a 
response to non-compliance in an environmental context. In fact, treaties can give each contracting 
state the express right to implement sanctions in reaction to breaches o f the rules established 
therein,93 but this is more than anything a merely theoretical possibility. In practice, it is the creation 
o f institutionalised and centralised control mechanisms, which helps concretise the common interest 
o f contracting parties, using the power to coerce through co-operation and pressure as opposed to 
confrontation.
It must also be said at this point that although sanctions have been long understood as 
official state, i.e. government, unilateral or collective action, they are increasingly used by other 
actors, such as corporations, NGOs and the general public, initiating measures against governments, 
corporations or even individuals in an informal, self-organised manner without legitimisation under 
international law.94 In this context, attribution o f formal legal powers to NGOs appears again 
significant, but also calls for a radical revision o f the established structure o f the international legal 
order.
A variation o f this approach gaining acceptance as an enforcement tool o f increased 
effectiveness is the use o f sanctions linking environmental compliance to other issues, for instance 
trade or other economic sanctions, not necessarily directed against governments but against nationals 
or corporations in breach o f international obligations.95 This type o f response can be undertaken 
either in a multilateral or unilateral setting, the main example o f the latter approach being US 
legislation imposing economic sanctions against states which violate international conservation
91 See M .P.Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement, 1980, esp.at Chapter 6, and pp. 129-31. For 
critical view s on sanctions as a response tool for non-compliance with international law in general, see A.Chaycs &
A.Handler Cliayes, The N ew Sovereignty  - Com pliance with International Environm ental A greem ents , 1995, at Part I.
92 See Chayes &Chayes, op.cit, n.91, at Chapter 3.
93 See, e.g., ECSC Treaty, Arl.88, whereby Member States may refuse to perform their basic obligations in response 
to the non-performance o f  an obligation by another Member State, but only with the authorisation o f  the Commission, 
and through specific proceedings which may include referral to the ECJ. N o similar rule can be found in the EEC Treaty, 
and the ECJ has furthermore indicated that unilateral measures o f  reprisal are never permitted in the EEC system, see 
Case 232/78, 1979 E.C.R., p.2739.
94 See D.Tolbert, ‘Global Climate Change and the Role o f  International Non-Governmental Organisations’, in 
R.Churchill and D.Freestone (eds.), International Law and G lobal Climate Change, 1991, pp. 104-6.
95 See L.Jenkins, ‘Trade Sanctions: An Effective Enforcement T ool’, 2(4) R.E.C.I.E.L., 1993, pp.362-9; 
Wolfrum,o/j.c/7. n.90, pp.58-77; R.B.M itchell, Intentional O il Pollution at Sea - Environm ental P o licy and Treaty 
C om pliance, 1994, p p .51 ,63  and 324-5; and Chayes and Chayes, op.cit. n.88, p.318.
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treaties to which the US is a party.96 However, the Mexican Tuna decision o f the GATT panel shows 
that the legitimacy and potential o f such course o f action is still very much in doubt.97 A relevant 
example in a multilateral context is provided by the CITES Standing Committee Recommendation 
that Parties ban trade in wildlife products with China for violating prohibitions on trade in 
rhinoceros horns and tiger parts.98
There is, indeed, some scope for examining the utility o f such an approach in the framework 
of the EU - third Mediterranean countries relationship. If  provision o f funds, for instance, was 
conditioned upon performance o f certain environmental measures required under international 
and/or Community environmental law, failure to execute the latter could bring about termination 
of future funding; that in traditional international law terms and in an inter-state context would be 
a reprisal, which, however, could be effective in inducing compliance with the said environmental 
conditions.99
4.2. International Regimes o f Civil Liability for Pollution Damage.
Let us now examine the development and application o f civil liability regimes, which, as 
already noted, is the model international environmental law favours in order to remedy 
environmental harm. What should be made clear from the start is that this is not a type of 
international enforcement for breach o f obligation as those already described, but rather a method 
to repair damage caused by pollution incidents - as opposed to cumulative damage from operational 
pollution - and compensate victims using the domestic legal machinery through minimum 
harmonisation. Hence, apart from the general underlying duty not to cause harm, breach of 
obligation does not appear as a central theme any more, since the object o f regulation is the private 
polluter as such - as opposed to states - in implementation o f the ‘polluter pays’ principle.100
Having said that, civil liability regimes contain primary obligations entered into by States 
with respect to persons under their jurisdiction. “Civil liability can thus be one way o f satisfying 
State liability”,101 by preventing and punishing conduct that would be in contradiction with 
international undertakings should the state itself be the actor. When viewed in this way, state 
responsibility will arise when compensation by a private person is precluded due to the state’s
% Through the Packwood-M agnuson Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act o f  
1978; and the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen’s Protective Act o f  1967, see Chayes & Chayes, op.cit n.90, pp.88-96.
97 See U.S. - Tuna Import Measures, B .1.S.D ./29S/91, 1982.
98 See E.Brown Weiss, ‘Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental A greem ents’, 27(4) Env 7 Pol. 
& L „  1997, pp.298-9.
99 See O ’Connell, op.cit. n.41, p .3I9; and infra, Chapter 7, p.290.
1(10 See Boyle, op.cit. n.36. See also Barcelona Convention, Art.4(3)(b); ASEAN Convention, Art. 10(d); 1992 
W atercourses Convention, Art.2(5)(b); 1992 Paris Convention, Art.2(2)(b); and 1992 Baltic Convention, Arl.3(4), 
upholding this principle with regard to marine environmental damage.
101 Leigh, op.cit. n.66, p .140; and see similar reflections in Kasoulides, op.cit. n.15, pp.505-6.
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failure to perform its treaty obligations, e.g. failing to enact appropriate legislation, and that 
responsibility will be strict.102
Finally, there is another prima facie  connection o f civil liability with inducing compliance 
with international environmental obligations, i.e. its deterrent effect;103 in other words, the threat o f 
being held liable may help make private actors more conscious in abiding with international anti­
pollution standards in their everyday activity.
The subsequent Sections will examine civil liability provisions in treaties for the protection 
o f the marine environment, civil liability instruments, as well as the issue o f  compensable pollution 
damage.
4.2.1. Civil Liability in International Conventions for the Protection o f the Marine 
Environment.
Liability issues are addressed in the LOSC in a manner reminiscent o f earlier formulations, 
such as Principle 22 o f the Stockholm Declaration calling for co-operation with a view to 
developing international law on liability and compensation concerning environmental damage to 
areas beyond national jurisdiction.104 Hence, the LOSC envisages the development and application 
o f that body o f law, but also gives some indication of the elements it should include: Pursuant to 
Article 235(3), relevant rules should aim at assuring “prompt and adequate compensation in respect 
o f all damage caused by pollution o f the marine environment” by establishing “criteria and 
procedures for payment o f adequate compensation, such as compulsory insurance or compensation 
funds”. Parties are also required to make remedies available in their legal systems in respect o f 
damage caused by natural or juridical persons under their jurisdiction (Art.235(2)).105
An earlier formulation can also be found under the London Convention, which, in Article 
X, states:
“In accordance with the principles o f international law regarding state responsibility for 
damage to the environment o f other states or to any other area o f the environment, caused 
by dum ping o f wastes and other matter o f all kinds, the Contracting Parties undertake to 
develop procedures for the assessment of liability and the settlement o f disputes regarding 
dumping.”
102 See Kasoulides, op.cit. n. 15, pp.514-6, with regard to dumping.
103 Wolfrum, op.cit. n.88, p. 107. Notwithstanding the controversy surrounding the deterrent role o f  liability, see, e.g., 
S.E.Gaines, ‘International Principles for Transnational Environmental Liability: Can Developm ents in Municipal Law 
Help Break the Impasse?’, 30 Harv.J.L.J., 1989, 326-8; and A.Bianchi, ‘The Harmonization o f  Laws on Liability for 
Environmental Damage in Europe; An Italian Perspective’, 6(1) J. Env'l L., 1994, p.28 at fn.28.
104 It is characteristic o f  the very slow progress that as the Stockholm Declaration called for co-operation with a view  
to developing o f  the law regarding liability for environmental damage to areas beyond national jurisdiction, so did the 
Rio Declaration (Principle 13) twenty years later, albeit in somewhat broader term.
105 In this respect Article 235 is deemed insufficient, because it omits reference to a similar duty incumbent upon the 
victim ’s state, see Boyle, op.cit. n.9, p.368.
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This Article does not recognise that, under international law, a state incurs responsibility 
for environmental damage to other states or to the environmental areas beyond national jurisdiction 
as such, but it does acknowledge certain principles that could be applied to damage to the 
environment even beyond the limits o f national jurisdiction; in this context, it is noteworthy that it 
was the first time such a provision was included in a treaty.
Despite its merits, the provision has been described as ‘extremely prim itive’,106 and a 
concrete liability regime for dumping has yet to be developed,107 notwithstanding a 1985 Resolution 
o f the Consultative Meeting o f the Parties calling upon the Parties to develop procedures for the 
assessment o f liability and the relevant work that ensued.108 Kasoulides thinks that this idea is 
ripening among Contracting Parties, and that a more effective interpretation and application of the 
Convention, based on customary law, the LOSC, the Draft ILC Articles and several other liability 
agreements is called for, which should entail strict and limited liability o f the operator coupled with 
a system of state funds to compensate for damage exceeding the liability ceiling of private operators, 
as well as for gradual, long-term damage, and unidentified pollution.109 However, there is every 
indication that these ideas are not ripe enough y e t , since no consensus could be reached during the 
1996 revision process even on a deadline for the development o f a liability regime.
The Barcelona Convention negotiators also left liability and compensation issues to be dealt 
with in the future. In the 1995 revision, these issues were still unresolved, and the undertaking to 
“co-operate in the formulation and adoption o f appropriate rules and procedures for the 
determination o f liability and compensation for damage resulting from pollution o f the marine 
environm ent” (Art. 16) remained vague.110 As a matter o f fact, discussions on the possibility o f 
establishing an Inter-State Guarantee Fund to compensate victims of marine pollution are being held 
since 1976.111 Under the work plan produced by the Fifth Meeting o f the Parties, appropriate 
procedures were to be adopted by 1989, and the Fund to be established by 1990.112 However, still 
today no such development seems imminent.113
106 G.J.Timagenis, International C ontrol o f  Marine Pollution, 1980, pp.274-5.
107 On the enormous difficulties in and unlikeliness o f  developing a concrete regime o f  state responsibility for dumping 
o f  radioactive materials, see J. Juste, ‘L'Immersion en Mer de Ddchets Radioactifs et Responsabilite Internationale’, in 
Francioni & Scovazzi, op.cit. n.2, pp.207-30.
108 LDC .21(9), 27 September 1985; and see Kasoulides, op.cit. n.15, pp.499-500, on ensuing deliberations.
10!) Ibid, pp.5 11-23.
110 Cf. 1992 Convention on the Protection o f  the Black Sea against Pollution, Art.XVI, where more specific 
obligations with regard to compensation and liability, such as availability o f  recourse for victims, are set out.
111 See Fined Act o f  the 1976 Conference, Resolution 4.
112 See UNEP, Report o f  the Fifth Ordinary M eeting o f  the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection 
o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and its Related Protocols, UNEP/IG .74/5, 28 September 1987, p.30.
113 Note that the latest relevant initiative consists in inviting the Secretariat to convene a meeting o f  legal and technical 
experts to review the relevant draft in 1995, see UNEP, Report o f  the Ninth Ordinary Meeting o f  the Contracting Parties 
to the Convention for the Protection o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and its Related Protocols, 
UNEP(OCA)/M ED 1G.5/16, 8 June 1995, Annex XIII, p,2.
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The related Protocols do not add anything new and are rather typical examples of 
environmental conventions completely undermining a response that comes in play after harm has 
been done and/or an international rule has been disregarded, focussing on prevention instead. This 
can be best illustrated by Article 12(1) o f the revised Land-Based Protocol, which provides for 
preventive consultations o f the Parties concerned when pollution originating from a Party “ is likely 
to prejudice directly the interests” o f others, that is before damage has actually occurred.
Having said that, the Offshore Protocol, although following the paradigm o f the Convention 
in that it delegates the issue to future negotiations (Art.27(l)), moves somewhat further: It stipulates 
that pending preparation and adoption o f appropriate procedures for the determination o f liability 
and compensation, the Parties shall take all measures to ensure that liability for damage caused by 
offshore activities is imposed on the operators, and that they shall be covered by appropriate 
insurance and be required to pay prompt and adequate compensation, on the basis o f strict and 
limited liability (Art.27(2)).114 Thus, although it does not harmonise civil liability rules in all 
countries, it does lay down the minimum standards that have to be satisfied throughout the 
M editerranean region. Furthermore, the Protocol provides that the Parties “shall endeavour, in 
accordance with their legal systems and, where appropriate, on the basis o f an agreement, to grant 
equal access to and treatment in administrative proceedings” to persons affected by pollution caused 
by offshore activities in other states (Art.26(4)). It is, thus, unfortunate that this example is not 
followed in the Hazardous Waste Protocol. The latter does direct its Parties to set out, “as soon as 
possible”, guidelines for the evaluation o f damage, as well as rules and procedures for liability and 
compensation in relation to harm caused from the transboundary movement and disposal o f 
hazardous wastes (Art, 14), but does not establish any minimum requirements in this connection.
4.2.2. International Conventions on Civil Liability for Pollution Damage.
The only clearly shaped regimes o f civil liability are, in fact, established under completely 
separate conventions, and have no direct connection with substantive international regulation 
governing pollution o f the marine environment. The relevant instruments that will be subsequently 
examined are the 1969 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC), the 1971 
International Convention on the Establishment o f an International Fund for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage (Fund Convention), the 1996 Convention on Liability for Damage in Connection 
with the Carriage o f Hazardous and Noxious Substances at Sea (HNS Convention); the 1999 
Potocol on Liability and Compensation to the Basel Convention; and the 1993 Convention on Civil
114 Note that the French and Community delegations expressed a reservation pending consideration with regard to that 
paragraph, see UNEP, Final Act and Protocol o f  the Conference o f  Plenipotentiaries on the Protocol for the Protection 
o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation o f  the Continental Shelf and 
the Seabed and its Subsoil, UNEP(OCA)/M ED 1G.4/4, 14 October 1994.
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Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment (Dangerous 
Activities Convention),115
4.2.2.I. 1969 CLC and 1971 Fund Convention.
in the specific area o f marine pollution, only with regard to damage caused by oil tankers 
involved in accidents have there been significant long-standing international commitments and 
schemes aiming at achieving global uniformity and ensuring that adequate compensation is awarded 
to victims,116 under the 1969 CLC and the 1971 Fund Convention.
The main elements o f the CLC consist in the establishment o f strict liability imposed on 
shipowners for oil pollution damage (A rt.lll(l)), with only exceptional defences, such as war and 
natural disasters, third party sabotage, or deficient navigational aids (Art.III(2) and (3)); the fixed 
ceiling o f compensation - the limit o f  liability in each specific case depends on the tonnage o f the 
ship - except in incidents resulting from “the owner’s actual fault or privity”, when liability is 
unlimited (Art.V); the compulsory insurance required to guarantee the shipowners’ ability to 
compensate coupled with a right o f direct action against the insurer (Art. VII); and the specification 
o f the competent forum , which is the court o f the Party in whose territory the damage occurred 
(Art.lX). The Parties have to implement this regime in domestic law: They have to ensure that 
competent authorities certify that ships under their flag are covered by insurance, and that no ship 
enters or leaves a port without such a certificate (Art.VII(lO) and (11)); that national courts have 
the necessary competences (Art.IX(2)); and that foreign judgm ents are recognised (Art.X).
A shipowner involved in an accident falling under the scope o f the Convention has to 
establish a fund with the court under whose jurisdiction the relevant claims fall (Art.V), The CLC 
tries to ensure that there will be no liability beyond that fund, and any other assets o f the owner will 
remain out o f the reach o f claimants during litigation. Should, however, the amount prove 
insufficient to cover claims in their entirety, the maximum available is to be distributed pro rata 
among claimants. The owner is entitled to participate in the distribution himself, in order to recover 
expenses he incurred in the course o f combatting the adverse effects o f  the spillage.
It should be noted in this context that often damage is not confined to the territory or 
territorial sea o f one state, but extends to two or more; for instance, in the Haven  incident in April 
1991, pollution reached three adjacent CLC states, namely Italy, France and Monaco, but all claims
115 The nuclear civil liability conventions are also applicable in the Mediterranean, but as has been already noted their 
subject matter is excluded from the scope o f  this thesis. On the limited utility o f  these conventions, as demonstrated by 
the Chernobyl accident, see P.Slrohl, ‘Reflexions sur la Responsabilitd pour les Dom m ages Nucl6aires dans l'Espace 
M aritime’, XI Annuaire de D roit M aritim e et Aero-Spatial, 1991, pp.55-60; and P,Sands, Chernobyl: Law and  
Communication, 1988.
116 Notwithstanding the recent N1IS Convention, see infra, pp .161-2; see also E.Gold & C.Petrie, ‘Pollution from 
O ffshore Activities. An Overview o f  the Operational, Legal and Environmental A spects’, in C.M .de la Rue (ed,), 
Liability fo r  D am age to the Marine Environment, 1993, pp.22I-2, for a brief discussion o f  the 1977 Convention on Civil 
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation o f  Seabed Mineral Resources which 
has not been influential as it did not attract an adequate number o f  ratifications.
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were made against the sole fund established by the shipowner in Italy.157 The choice o f forum  
allowed for the liable party in such instances is an obvious defect o f the Convention, as the owner 
will choose the jurisdiction more favourable to his case and institute his fund in a way that would 
compel the victims to have their claims heard in that jurisdiction.
The Fund Convention purports to supplement this scheme by spreading the costs involved 
to the oil industry as w ell,118 i.e. oil importers contributing according to the quantities o f oil they 
receive each year (Art. 10). The money levied is administered by an international body, the 
International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPC Fund). More specifically, states have to 
furnish the Director o f the Fund with details on the persons liable to contribute and data on the 
relevant quantities o f oil received by such persons (Art. 15(2)).119 Under paragraph 4 o f the same 
Article - added by the 1984/1992 amendments - a state that does not fulfil the above obligation is 
liable to compensate the Fund for any resulting economic loss.
Accordingly, the Fund Convention comes into play when full compensation cannot be 
obtained under the CLC, either because the shipowner has a defence, or he is incapable o f meeting 
his obligations, or - more frequently -120 the specific damage exceeds the limit o f liability (Art.4(l). 
This Convention has also, until recently, served to partially relieve shipowners o f the increased 
liability under the CLC. At the time o f the first Fund Conference, partial indemnification o f the 
shipow ner’s liability which was made dependent on his actual compliance with the four most 
important conventions concerning maritime safety and pollution avoidance - including the 1954 
OILPOL, later superseded by MARPOL - was hailed as an environmental victory that would 
encourage a responsible attitude on the part o f shipowners. It is, hence, unfortunate that this 
provision has been repealed by the 1984/1992 amendments.
The Fund may be exonerated in certain situations, e.g. war, or when the owner did not 
comply to international standards, or when damage was caused due to his “wilful misconduct” 
(Art.4(2) and 9). In such instances, the Fund has rights o f recourse against both the shipowner or
117 See infra, p. 177.
118 It should be noted that the additional compensation schemes o f  a private nature, namely the 1969 Tanker Owners 
Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP) drawn up by tanker owners and bareboat 
charterers; and the Contract Regarding a Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution (CR1STAL) which involved 
major consumers o f  oil, as well as oil companies and traders, were not renewed after they expired on 20 February 1997; 
it was deemed that over the years they eroded as more states became Parties to the CLC and Fund Conventions, and 
could henceforth act only as disincentives for countries that had not yet ratified these treaties, see IOPC Fund, Annual 
R eport 1995, p.31. On the operation o f  these schemes, see I.C. White, ‘The Voluntary Oil Spill Compensation 
Agreements - TOVALOP and CRISTAL’, in de la Rue (ed.), op.cit. n .l 16, pp.57-69.
119 The 1997 annual contributions were in the amount o f £64 million. The countries w hose nationals contributed most 
in the General Fund in 1997 were Japan (22.83% ), Italy (11.96% ), the Republic o f  Korea (9.39% ), the Netherlands 
(8.54% ), France (7.99% ), and the UK(6.2%). It must be noted that the total levy is not comparable from year to year; 
thus, in 1981 it was £500,000, in 1983 £24,106,000, in 1984 there was no levy, whereas, in 1993, it reached a record 
o f  £78 million, see IOPC Fund, op.cit. n .l 18, p.25.
120 Fifty-eight out o f  sixty-one incidents dealt with by 1992 fell under this category, see M.Jacobsson, ‘The 
International Conventions on Liability and Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage and the Activities o f  the 
International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund’, in de la Rue (ed.), op.cit. n .l 16, p.40.
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his guarantor and third parties, which it exercises as a matter o f principle especially in most sizeable 
pollution incidents.121 This provision is especially important for present purposes; What it really 
amounts to is unlimited liability for the shipowner who fails to observe international regulations for, 
among others, pollution avoidance.
Three factors, namely the use o f experienced surveyors and lawyers, the co-operation with 
the P & I Clubs (insurance companies) and the Director’s authority to make relatively high payments 
without prior approval by the Executive Committee, enable the Fund to make settlements o f claims 
and payments o f compensation in most cases in a relatively short period o f  time. All small and 
medium sized claims are normally paid within a month o f agreement being reached.122 Even the 
larger claims have been settled within reasonable periods o f time after the incident. The actual time 
needed for settlement is almost entirely dependent on the quality o f documentation submitted in 
support o f the relevant claims. When settlement cannot be reached, claims can be brought before 
the courts o f the contracting state where damage occurred against the Fund itself.123
Having said that, the specific amounts payable soon proved to be too low to meet inflation, 
and the Conventions have been amended to provide for higher limits o f com pensation,12'1 reaching 
a total o f £192 million soon after the 1992 Protocols entered into force. The 1984/1992 amendments 
also extended the area o f application of the Conventions so as to cover, apart from the territorial seas 
o f Parties, their EEZs as well, and introduced several other changes, the most important being the 
reviewed definition of ‘pollution damage’ so as to partially cover impairment o f the environment 
as such (Art.2(3)(a)). In fact, the main criticism that have been articulated against the oil liability 
regime established under the two Conventions centers exactly on their attitude towards compensable 
‘pollution damage’ that seems to exclude ecological loss per se\ this issue will be discussed in 
greater detail below.
Another weak point is the Conventions’ coverage which is restricted to damage in the 
territory or marine areas under national jurisdiction and does not address the problem o f high seas 
pollution. It is additionally limited to ‘persistent oils’ and only when carried by a tanker as cargo or 
fuel. Furthermore, the claimant must normally identify the particular source o f oil, sometimes a 
difficult task given the multitude o f possible sources. This means that often there will be no 
compensation for damage from unidentified oil slicks which are themselves the product o f normal 
operational tanker activities o f benefit to oil transportation interests in general. As far as accidents
121 See IOPC Fund, Annual R eport 1987, pp. 10-6, on the case o f  the Tanio; and IOPC Fund, op.cit. n .l 18, pp.37-8, 
on the Rio O rinoco  case.
122 See Jacobsson, op.cit. n.120, p.48.
123 See, e.g. the Patmos Case, infra, p. 174-7.
!2‘t On the relevant negotiations, see M.GOransson, ‘The 1984 and 1992 Protocols to the Civil Liability Convention, 
1969 and the Fund Convention, 197P, in de la Rue (ed.), op.cit. n .l 16, pp.71-82.
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are concerned, in theory, the Fund is liable even for spills resulting from incidents involving 
unidentified tankers. However, in practice, no state has succeeded in proving such a case so far.125
Finally, it should be pointed out that some provision appears necessary for lessening the 
burden o f proof for the innocent victim .126 Even where the source o f the spill can be easily 
identified, great difficulties arise in demonstrating the extent and exact causation o f damage. It has 
been argued in this context that the Fund should have the option o f undertaking an independent 
investigative role.127 While this could become an onerous task, the suggestion certainly points to the 
absence o f an independent organisation that could provide both expert advice on combatting 
pollution incidents and independent assessments o f the costs o f preventive measures and pollution 
damage to all Parties.
On the other hand, some very significant accomplishments were achieved through the 
operation o f the CLC and Fund Convention.128 Together the two instruments form a uniform 
international scheme whereby compliance is required with only one set o f regulations, all claims 
from an incident can be consolidated under one jurisdiction, and any judgm ents rendered are 
automatically enforceable in all Parties. Furthermore, in utilising strict liability, the CLC is an 
important development in international law, as is the more nearly absolute liability imposed on the 
Fund.
Another positive feature o f the regime is that the Fund Convention creates an inexhaustible 
fund, the resources o f which are determined by the demands on it. If the Fund were required to pay, 
for example, a total o f $45 million compensation for a number o f incidents in one year, 
contributions required from cargo-owners for the following year would be adjusted to satisfy such 
payment. In other words, while the Fund does guarantee compensation regardless of the frequency 
o f oil spills that may occur in the future, it does not require contributions until after the event. Most 
national funds would not have such flexibility and would require contributions to be made in 
advance to a dormant fund.
There are also more general advantages that the fund system presents. As regards the 
victims, it provides a guarantee o f solvency o f the party liable. Set up immediately after the 
occurrence o f an incident, the fund o f the CLC type prevents the victim from having, after a 
judgment has been awarded, to hunt down the party liable in order to obtain payment. The latter will 
be inclined to set up a type o f fund under the CLC which enables him to limit his liability, while the 
1971 Fund offers the added advantage o f spreading major risks throughout the oil industry.
125 See, e.g., IOPC Fund, op.cit. n .l 18, pp.84-5, on a rejected Moroccan claim; and IOPC Fund, Annual Report 1993, 
pp.55-6, on a similar Portuguese claim
126 See R.M .M 'Gonigle & M.Zacher, Pollution, P olitics and International Law - Tankers a t Sea, 1979, p. 198.
127 See, e.g. L.FIunter, ‘The Proposed International Compensation Fund for Oil Pollution Dam age’, 4 J. o f  Marit. L. 
& Com., 1972, p. 117.
128 For an assessment o f  the achievements and pitfalls o f  the two instruments, see M ’G onigle & Zachcr, op.cit. n.126, 
pp. 192-9.
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Additional innovative developments are evident in many other areas o f  the Convention: The 
mandatory insurance requirements are to be applied to states not party to the Convention; and 
compensation from the Fund is to be paid to a state Party to the Convention whether or not the flag 
state o f  the polluting ship is a party (CLC, Art.VII(l 1); Fund Convention, A rts.5(3) and 4(1 )(a)).
It seems that in average the combination of the two schemes operates efficiently in awarding 
adequate compensation, although calls for delimitation have recently appeared,129 as there are always 
instances o f major accidents where the amount of claims considerably exceeds available funds. Such 
was the case in the Haven incident at Genoa,130 or the grounding o f the Exxon Valdez with an 
estimated cost o f  $2 billion for mere clean-up operations.131 Nonetheless, the most practical and 
probably most convincing argument in favour o f this international system which allows for 
settlement o f  oil pollution claims - as opposed to making judicial resolution unavoidable - is 
provided by the actual experience o f relevant litigation outside this regime, as best exemplified in 
the judicial proceedings instigated by the Amoco Cadiz incident.132
4.2.2.2. 1996 HNS Convention.
A Convention, parallel to the CLC and Fund, covering liability for hazardous pollutants 
other than oil had been long under preparation. A Conference to that effect, held in London in 1984, 
ended with no result; the main reasons for that failure were the new and untried ideas put forward, 
and basic disagreements among the various industrial components involved in the carriage of 
hazardous and noxious substances, i.e. shipowners and cargo interests on the apportionment of 
liability.133 It has, in fact, proved more difficult to create a liability regime for this sector o f sea­
borne trade than it was for the carriage o f oil. Complex legal and technical problems surround a 
comprehensive definition o f  those substances that actually present an environmental hazard, and 
the insurance coverage that is needed.
The persistent effort was vindicated, however, in 1996 with the conclusion o f the HNS 
Convention. The compensation system adopted in this instrument is two-tier, on the pattern o f the 
oil liability regime.134 The shipowner has strict but limited liability - with exceptions similar to the
129 See, for example, D. Wilkinson, ‘M oving the Boundaries o f  Compensable Environmental Damage Caused by 
Marine Oil Spills: The Effect o f  Two N ew  International Protocols’, 5(1) J .o fE n v'l L., 1993, pp.79-82; and G.Gauci, 
‘Limitation o f  Liability in Maritime Law: An Anachronism?’, 19(1) M ar,Pol., 1995, pp.65-74.
130 See W ilkinson, op.cit. n . l29, p.47; and infra, p. 177.
131 See M.Rdmond-Gouilloud, ‘The Future o f  the Compensation System as Established by International Conventions’ 
in de la Rue (ed.), op.cit. n .l 16, p.91.
132 See the Am oco Cadiz Case, 2 LLoyd's R eport, 1984, p.304. For the jud ge’s own account o f  the litigation, see 
F.J.McGarr, ‘Inadequacy o f  Federal Forum  for Resolution o f  Oil Spill Dam ages’, in M.L. Spaulding & M.Reed (eds.), 
Oil Spills - M anagem ent and Legislative Im plications, 1990, pp.78-97.
133 See P.Wetterstein, ‘Trends in Maritime Environmental Impairment Liability’, 1994(2) LLoyd's Marit. & 
Comm.L.Q., p.232.
134 See A.Renfigo, ‘The International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the 
Carriage o f Hazardous and Noxious Substances at Sea, 1996', 6(2) R.E.C.LE.L., 1997, p p ,191-7. For an analysis o f  the 
1984 draft and proposals for improvement, see Wetterstein, op.cit. n.133, pp.241-5; R.Cleton, ‘Liability and
(continued...)
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CLC - during the carriage o f hazardous and noxious substances, linked with the obligation to 
maintain insurance or other financial security. The relevant substances - carried in bulk or in 
packaged form - are defined by reference to existing lists utilised in IMO instruments, such as the 
IMDG Code and others (Art. 1(5)). As a second tier, the HNS Fund is set up - administered by an 
international body along the lines o f the IOPC Fund - to which cargo interests will contribute by 
paying charges levied on HNS carriage, in order to provide compensation for damage resulting from 
the carriage o f HNS by sea to the extent that the protection afforded by the first tier is inadequate 
or unavailable. The system is finally complemented by jurisdictional and procedural rules for the 
adjudication o f relevant claims in front o f national courts.
As far as the Convention’s relationship to the general maritime liability instruments, 
especially the 1976 Convention on Limitation o f  Liability o f Owners o f Sea-Going Ships,135 is 
concerned, it is provided that the HNS Convention supersedes any previous instrument to the extent 
there is a conflict; however, for countries that are not - or will not be - bound by the HNS 
Convention, the general agreements will remain applicable in the future (Art.42).
Lastly, it is worth noting that compensable damage has been defined by terms similar to 
those contained in the 1984/1992 Protocol to the CLC (Art. 1(5)) discussed below, and covers 
“reasonable measures o f reinstatement” o f the environment; it remains to be seen whether the same 
difficulties will arise in a uniform interpretation and application of the definition in specific cases. 
The aggregate limits o f compensation under the NFIS Convention are also similar to those included 
in the 1992 Protocol to the Fund Convention. This is a rather unfortunate choice in view o f the 
much greater potential threat to the marine environment that spills o f HNS present.136
4.2.2.3. Protocol on Liability and Compensation to the Basel Convention,
In order to fufill the mandate o f Article 12,137 the parties to the Basel Convention entered 
into lenghty negotiations with a view at formulating uniform rules on liability and compensation for 
damage resulting from transboundary movement and disposal o f hazardous waste.138 The most 
contentious issues during the drafting stage concerned the basis o f liability, i.e. whether it will be
l34(...continued)
Compensation for Maritime Carriage o f  Hazardous and N oxious Substances (H N S)’, in de la Rue (ed.), op.cit, n .l 16, 
pp.173-88. On the 1991 draft, see R.S.Schuda, ‘The International Maritime Organization and the Draft Convention on 
Liability and Compensation in Connection with the Carriage o f  Hazardous and N oxious Substances at Sea: An Update 
on recent A ctivity’, 46 Univ. o f  Miami L.Rev., 1992, pp .1040-50; and M.I.Drcl, ‘Liability for Damage Resulting from 
the Transport o f  Hazardous Cargoes at Sea’, in A.Couper & E.Gold (eds.), The M arine Environm ent and Sustainable 
Development: Law, Policy and Science (Law o f  the Sea Institute Twenty-Fifth Annual Conference Proceedings), 1993, 
esp, at pp.370-3.
135 See generally, P.Griggs & R. Williams, Lim itation o f  L iability fo r  M aritime Claim s, 1991.
136 See Rengifo, op.cit. n.134, p. 195.
137 See Final Act o f  the Conference o f  Plenipotentiaries on the Global Convention on the Control o f  Transboundary 
M ovements o f  Hazardous Wastes, Resolution 3, reprinted in 19 Env'l Pol.&  L., 1989, p .76,
l3s See P.Lawrence, ‘Negotiation o f  a Protocol on Liability and Compensation for damage Resulting from 
Transboundary M ovem ents o f  Hazardous Wastes and their D isposal’, 7(3) R.E.C.I.E.L., 1998, pp.249-55; and
B.Rulinwa, ‘Liability and Compensation for Injurious Consequences o f  the Transboundary M ovement o f  Hazardous 
W astes’, 6(1) R.E.C.I.E.L., 1997, pp.7-I3.
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based on fault or will be strict or absolute, the desirability o f a Fund, and the persons to whom 
liability should be channelled.139
In 1999 the parties adopted a Protocol that aims to provide a comprehensive regime for 
liability and adequate and prompt compensation in the event o f an incident during movement of 
hazardous wastes, including incidents in the course o f illegal traffic in those wastes (A rt.l).140 It 
covers traditional ‘damage’, i.e. loss o f life, injury, damage to property, and direct loss of income, 
but also the costs o f measures o f reinstatement o f the impaired environment, and the costs o f 
preventive measures (Art.2(2)(c)). The exporter is strictly liable for any incident that occurs at each 
stage o f a transboundary movement, until the disposer takes possession of the waste; then, the latter 
assumes liability for any possible damage (A rt.4(l)).m However, if the state o f import has listed the 
specific waste as hazardous and the state o f  export has not, the importer is liable (Art.4(2)). 
Moreover, unlimited, fault-based liability is introduced for any person that acted in contravention 
with the Basel provisions or committed malicious or negligent acts (Art.5 and 12(2)). In this 
connection, the 1991 Report o f the Working Group interestingly featured both state and civil 
liability considerations; however, the former element has been subsequently removed from the scope 
o f the Protocol (Art. 16). This move has been severely criticised on the grounds that the problem of 
illegal - and, therefore, most likely to cause environmental damage - traffic will not be addressed, 
if there is no residual liability o f the state o f origin for any resulting damage. The financial limits 
o f liability are, unlike all other similar regimes, left to be determined by national law (Art. 12(1) and 
Annex B); only minimum  limits are set depending on the size o f shipment, and not on any 
qualitative indicator o f hazard risk. No special fund is established to cover the costs that exceed the 
limits, although the possibility to do so in the future is not excluded (Art. 15). Finally, the regime 
is complemented by a series o f other provisions on compulsory insurance, time limits, and 
competent courts as in all similar arrangements.
4 .2 .2 .4 .1993 Dangerous Activities Convention.
The only other instrument of potentially global application existing so far - but not in force, 
nor likely to come into force soon - and covering damage from various environmentally hazardous 
activities is the 1993 Dangerous Activities Convention.142 This treaty, although regional (Council 
o f Europe), is open to accession by all states after its entry into force, and aims “at ensuring 
adequate compensation... and also providing for means of prevention and reinstatement” (A rt.l) for
l3‘J It should be noted that although the Bamako Convention also assigned the task o f  formulating specific liability rules 
to a future date, it specifically requires the imposition o f  strict, unlimited, joint and several liability on hazardous waste 
generators (Art.4(3)(b)).
HU Text at UNEP, Report o f  the Fifth M eeting o f  the Parties to the Basel Convention..,, UNEP/CHW .5/29, 10 
December 1999, Annex 111.
Ml For critical concerns on this and other provisions expressed by the Australian and Canadian delegations, see 
http://ww w.iisd.ca/basel/cop5/.
142 See D. W ilkinson, ‘The Council o f  Europe Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities 
Dangerous to the Environment: A Comparative Overview’, 2(5) Eur.Env'l L.Rev., 1993, pp. 130-4.
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damage caused in the course o f activities involving substances inherently dangerous to the 
environment.
In a remarkably broad definition, ‘damage’ to the environment (Art.2(c) and (d) connotes:
“loss or damage by impairment o f the environment in so far as this is not considered to be
damage... [to life or property] provided that compensation for impairment o f the
environment, other than for loss o f profit for such impairment, shall be limited to the costs
of measures o f re-instatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken;143
the costs o f preventative measures and any loss or damage caused by preventative
measures...”;
while the ‘environment’ includes natural resources, property forming part o f the cultural heritage, 
and the characteristic aspects o f the landscape; but not pollution damage at ‘tolerable levels’ under 
local circumstances. This qualification seems to allow for considerable variation between different 
localities and much scope for judicial discretion in specifying what may be ‘tolerated’ in a certain 
place.
‘Dangerous activities’ are defined by reference to substances involved (A rt.2(l) and (2)), 
and cover the production, handling and storage, use and discharge o f substances presenting a risk 
to man, the environment, and property, according to certain criteria; activities involving modified 
organisms; and all waste treatment facilities and waste disposal sites. Nuclear damage falling within 
the scope o f relevant international instruments or that o f any no less favourable domestic law is 
excluded,144 as is damage during carriage other than carriage by pipeline and carriage performed 
entirely within an installation or on a site inaccessible to the public (Art.4), which also excludes 
seaborne transport o f oil, or hazardous waste.
The Convention covers incidents - significantly including continuous or series o f 
occurrences - that will happen after its entry into force within the territory o f  Parties irrespective o f 
where the damage actually occurs, or alternatively incidents that happen elsewhere but the law of 
a Party becomes applicable by virtue o f conflict o f law rules (Art.3). The operator o f the activity, 
i.e. the person exercising control thereupon,145 is strictly liable for any damage during his period of 
control over activities undertaken professionally, including the operation o f sites or installations for 
the incineration, treatment, handling or recycling o f waste, and the production, storage, use or 
release o f dangerous substances, hazardous micro-organisms, or genetically modified organisms 
(A rts.5 and 6). Possible exonerations include damage caused by war, or exceptional natural 
phenomena; the intent o f a third party; an order o f public authority; or “a dangerous activity taken 
lawfully in the interests o f the person who suffered the damage, provided that it was reasonable to
143 ‘Measures o f  reinstatement’ are defined in Art. 1(9) as “any reasonable measures aiming to reinstate or restore 
damaged or destroyed natural resources or, where reasonable, to introduce the equivalent o f  these resources into the 
environment’. For a brief discussion o f  the complex legal problems that ‘reasonable m easures’, and ‘the equivalent’ o f  
the resource destroyed might pose in real-life application, see Bianchi, op.cit. n . l03, p.29.
144 On the legal questions that might arise in this connection, see Sands, op.cit. n.52 , p.674.
145 On the meaning o f  operator see, Bianchi, op.cit. n .l 03, pp. 131-3.
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expose the latter to such risks” (Art.8). Finally, Parties have to ensure that the operator is covered 
by a financial security scheme or adequate financial guarantee (Art. 12).
Competent courts are those o f the place where the damage arose; or where the dangerous 
activity was conducted; or where the defendant has his habitual residence (Art. 19). Courts are 
required, when considering evidence o f the causal link between the damage and the incident “to take 
due account of the increased danger o f causing such damage inherent in the dangerous activity”.This 
Convention importantly provides for public access to information and gives legal standing to 
environm ental NGOs to resort to the administration or even the courts in order to challenge 
dangerous activities.M6
A Party may formulate reservations regarding a condition o f  reciprocity in the application 
o f the Convention to damage suffered in the territory o f non-parties; non-acceptance o f claims by 
environmental groups; and exoneration o f operators for damage caused by substances, genetically 
modified organisms or micro-organisms, if  he proves that scientific knowledge at the time o f the 
incident did not allow the involved risk or dangerous properties to be discovered. It is further 
provided that as between EU members Community rules prevail. A notable feature o f the regime 
established by this Convention is that instituted under Article 31, whereby when relevant 
Community rules are modified the Convention itself is modified by a ‘tacit amendment’ procedure; 
hence, Community law radically influences the international regime.
Evidently, this instrument endeavours to strike a balance between competing interests; what 
remains to be seen is its actual application and the use that the industry, the victims together with 
their advocates, and most importantly the courts, are going to make o f its broad and sometimes 
obscure wording. That does not diminish its paramount importance, however, as the first 
international instrument that establishes civil liability standards for damage to the environment, 
irrespective o f any transboundary effect, to be applied within national borders. In this sense, it 
provides another example o f the shifting focus o f international law towards activities carried out 
exclusively within domestic jurisdictions, and, furthermore, addresses to a greater or lesser extent 
current concerns with regard to harm caused by cumulative pollution, and to attribution o f standing 
to interested citizens and NGOs in order to challenge polluting practices and, thus, indirectly enforce 
environmental protection rules.
4.2.4. Civil Liability for Environmental Damage in Com m unity Law.
This changing focus o f international regulation to environmental degradation within 
national borders is also reflected at the EU level. Hence, alongside the work carried out in the 
framework o f global, regional, or sectoral marine pollution conventions, there is on-going debate 
within the Community with a view to developing uniform rules o f civil liability for environmental
146 See infra, Chapter 8, pp.343-4 and 351.
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damage. In this context, the Commission, after some years o f preparation, came up in 1989 with a 
proposal for a Council Directive on civil liability for damage caused by waste,1'17 which was 
intended to apply to damage, i.e. death or injury, and impairment to the environment in the 
territories o f Member States, and their EEZs, and provided for strict, unlimited, jo in t and several 
liability o f the producer/s o f waste. Significantly, it made remedies available to NGOs not having 
suffered direct damage, and envisaged the possibility o f an additional European fund to cover 
instances when the liable party cannot provide full compensation or cannot be identified.
This project was, nonetheless, abandoned for a more comprehensive liability instrument, 
according to the Fifth Environmental Action Programme, which refers to the need for establishing 
a mechanism for restoring environmental damage in implementation o f the ‘polluter pays’ principle. 
To this effect, a ‘Green Paper’ on remedying environmental damage was produced,148 recently 
followed by a ‘White Paper’.149 Therein, it is envisaged that an integrated compensation 
systemwhich would combine liability rules with a jo in t compensation mechanism through which 
certain damages would be shared within the economic sector more closely connected to the source 
o f damage.150 Forthcoming Community action is expected to harmonise Member States laws - which 
at the moment vary considerably - beyond the minimum provided for in the 1993 Dangerous 
Activities Convention and lay down detailed rules on issues such as the definition o f environmental 
damage, means o f redress, and legal standing.151 The future Community regime is proposed to 
include coverage o f both environmental damage (site contamination and loss o f  biodiversity) and 
traditional damage (harm to health and property); and a strictly-defined scope o f application linked 
with Community legislation. More specifically, it is proposed that contaminated sites and traditional 
damage be covered only if caused by a Community-regulated hazardous activity, while damage to 
biodiversity, only if protected under the Natura 2000 network. Liability would be strict when caused 
by inherently dangerous activities and fault-based when it involves damage to biodiversity caused 
by non-dangerous activities. The operator o f the activity would be the liable party. There are 
different options regarding the form of the envisaged regime, with a Community Directive thought 
to be the most coherent.
147 COM (89) 282 final - SYN 217, 1989 O.J. (C 2 5 1 )3 ;  amended in COM (91) 219 final - SYN 217, 1991 O.J. (C 
192)6 .
148 COM (93) 47 final, 14 May 1993.
149 See EC Commission, White Paper on Environmental Liability, CO M (2000) 66 final, 9 February 2000.
150 See H.Bocken, ‘Financial Guarantees for Environmental Liability. Alternatives to Liability Insurance5, 27(4) Env'l 
Pol. L„ 1997, esp. at pp.315-7.
151 See Bianchi, op.cit. n . l03, pp.32-41; and Sands, op.cit. n.52, p.670, C f  L.Kramer, E.C .Environm ental Law, 4th 
ed., 2000, p. 123.
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4.2.5. The Assessment o f Compensable Pollution Damage.
Arguably, the single most important element in the concept o f civil liability for pollution 
damage is the scope and content o f the definition o f damage itself, and especially the extent to 
which pure environmental loss is covered. Providing coverage for such a loss might open the way 
for the transformation of civil liability into a more valuable tool o f indirect enforcement of 
international environmental obligations. This is because it would signify a move away from the 
traditional notions o f property damage and financial loss, and would, thus, allow for a considerable 
widening o f the circle o f persons that could raise a valid claim o f compensation. Local authorities 
and NGOs in particular would be conceivably in a position to take action against polluters - 
substituting to some extent for insufficient state action, not only in cases o f accidents that produce 
major damage, but also in instances where long-term and cumulative pollution impairs the 
environment, as does, for instance, land-based pollution o f the sea. This would significantly advance 
the emerging trend o f international civil liability regimes to address much more important, although 
less obvious, damage caused by day-to-day polluting activities, as illustrated in the 1993 Dangerous 
Activities Convention, which would in turn considerably extent the preventive and compliance- 
inducing role o f civil liability standards.
It is, hence, worthwhile to proceed to a closer examination o f the notion o f  compensable 
pollution damage, in relation specifically to the marine environment, and especially oil pollution, 
where most o f the relevant developments are taking place.
5.2.4.1. General Considerations.
In instances when the marine environment has been substantially polluted, there are various 
types o f damages possible to have occurred which should in principle be compensated in order to 
restore the pre-existing situation. First, there might be monetary damages, either expenses actually 
incurred or lost profits. The former are the easiest to prove and receive reparation for, and usually 
involve clean-up costs. In this connection, the actual course o f action that a state takes when faced 
with an emergency o f this sort cannot be normally challenged before a court. A decision, for 
example, not to use chemical dispersants in shallow waters, in order to avoid harm to ecosystems, 
which increases the degree o f pollution o f the coasts, should not in principle lead to a reduction of 
the damages to be awarded, as long as the expenses involved are reasonable.152
In several cases, there are also perturbations o f an economic nature that involve loss of 
profits as a result o f a pollution incident. This can be expressed in general terms as the difference 
between the normal results that would have come about in the absence o f the extraordinary event 
and the actual results. This difference - and consequently the outcome in terms o f money awarded - 
depends on the period after which the situation returns back to normal and the method o f
152 See F.Bonnieux & P.Rainelli, Catastrophe Ecologiqite et D om m ages Econom iques - P roblem es d'Evaluation a 
P artir de I'Amoco-Cadiz, 1991, pp. 191-2.
168
evaluation.153 The question where the line should be drawn, between claims which are admissible 
and those which are too remote, has always been a fertile source o f  argument. In common law 
jurisdictions, a distinction has been drawn between cases where financial loss is sustained as a result 
o f physical loss or damage to property owned by the claimant, and those where the claimant suffers 
only ‘pure economic loss’.154
Mainstream opinion maintains that it is not right to compensate all claims, however remote 
or indirect, merely because they can be causally attributed to the incident.155 Tourism and fishing 
industries are widely accepted as legitimate claimants o f lost profits. Nevertheless, the chain reaction 
that a grave pollution incident triggers may extend beyond these sectors; it is, for example, a 
controversial issue whether compensation should be paid not only to fishermen who lose earnings 
from reduced catches o f wild fish, but also to seafood processing companies who purchase the fish 
from the fishermen. It is feared that if such claims were to be generally accepted, then this could all 
too readily lead to further extensions of the concept o f ‘pollution dam age’, to include still remoter 
parties such as wholesalers who buy the processed food, and ultimately retail suppliers or 
restaurateurs. Similar extensions may also be anticipated in the tourist industry, in which claims 
have already been attempted for reduced earnings due to ‘loss o f image’ allegedly affecting an entire 
region, including areas which are geographically remote from the polluted location.156
Secondly, there can arise non-monetary damages, such as losses due to ‘opportunity costs’, 
which refers to the value o f material goods, e.g. staff and financial resources that would normally 
have been put to a more productive use, and might in practice involve remuneration for the salaries 
o f the employees mobilised, including overtime and transportation costs.157 Non-monetary damages 
stem also from reduction o f amenities, i.e. nuisances suffered by the local population in their 
eveiyday life, such as oil smell or equipment traffic or the unavailability o f the public services that 
are devoted to the decontamination battle, or even reduction o f the enjoyment - both passive and 
active - that the areas affected can offer, like seaside recreational activities or fishing. Here, we 
clearly pass to the realm o f non-commercial values and the degree o f  speculation when trying to 
translate them into a monetary award is a significant obstacle.
Finally, ‘pure ecologic loss’ can give rise to non-monetary damages, and has indeed been 
used as grounds for claims either requesting compensation for the actual marine biomass lost, or for
153 For a different approach to those issues in the Am oco C adiz  case that would have benefited the victims more than 
the Court’s adopted strategy, see ibid , pp. 192-4.
154 See e.g. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint Case, 275 US 303, 1927; and the more recent UK case o f  Murphy 
v. Brentwood District C ouncil. iV.L.R. , 1990/3, p.414.
155 See CM1 Working Group, ‘CMI Colloquium on Environmental Damage Assessment; D iscussion Paper’, in de la 
Rue (ed.), op.cit. n .l 16, pp.256-7.
156 See, e.g. the Caltex Oil (Australia") Ptv.Ltd. v. The Dred&e ‘W illemstad’ Case, 136 C.L.R., 1976, p .529.
157 Usually the ‘opportunity cost’ is treated solely from the aspect o f  the value o f  the alternative sacrificed when there 
is a loss o f  profit, see Bonnieux & Rainelli, op.cit. n. 152, pp. 194-5.
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its restoration.158 Evaluation o f the damaged ecosystems again involves speculatory techniques. 
W hat is more, until recently the dominant notion has been that wildlife and ecosystems are ‘res 
nullius’ and thus cannot give rise to a claim based on property concepts. Considerable difficulties 
o f a philosophical, legal and practical nature are also involved in evaluating damage to water arease, 
when it comes to the cost o f restoration not yet undertaken or compensation o f irreparable natural 
resources. But placing a monetary value on natural objects, including living animals, aesthetic 
views, and water purity, may be essential if one is to fully protect natural resources.
Now, there are at least two problems in defining a measure for natural resource damage, i.e. 
what to measure, and how to measure it.159 Despite the fact that different methods have been 
developed for evaluating environmental damage, they have been criticised as too inaccurate, 
stereotyped and arbitrary. These approaches do seem to have methodological shortcomings and they 
do not take into sufficient account differences in environmental damage situations, e.g. the 
migrations of sea animals, impacts on reproductive cycles, the long-term effect o f sunken oil on the 
ecosystem itself etc. Nonetheless, it is possible that lawyers, economists, scientists etc. will be able 
to develop more rational and accurate methods o f evaluation in the future.160 In this connection, it 
is also important that methods o f quantifying environmental harm be accepted at the international 
level so that the claimants do not get different treatment depending on national approaches.
Let us now examine the only international civil liability regime that has, in real life, 
grappled with the issue o f compensable pollution damage, i.e. that o f oil liability.
4.2.4.2. The Operation o f the CLC and the Fund Convention with regard to 
Compensable Pollution Damage.
As early as 1975 Lance D.Wood observed that the ‘social value’ o f the CLC and Fund 
Convention largely depends on the meaning to be given to the vague terms ‘dam age’, ‘loss’, and 
‘contamination’ in their definition o f ‘pollution damage’, which will ultimately judge whether the 
objective o f making the oil transportation and distribution industries will “pay for all oil production 
costs as fully as is practicable”.161
In fact, over the years the Fund developed certain principles governing the admissibility o f 
claims. The Assembly and the Executive Committee have taken a number o f decisions in this 
regard; relevant principles have also been developed during negotiations o f the Director with 
claimants. The compensation policy developed by the Fund administrators involves damages to 
property, such as fishing gear, beaches etc., either destroyed or in need o f clean-up; economic losses 
suffered by those depending directly on earnings from coastal or sea-related activity, e.g. fishermen,
158 See infra, pp. 172 and 174-7.
I5y See Welterstein, op.cit. n.133, pp.238-40.
160 See also infra, at fn.181.
161 L.D. W ood, ‘Requiring Polluters to Pay for Aquatic Natural Resources Destroyed by Oil Pollution’, 8 Nat.Res. 
Lawyer, 1975, p.573.
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seaside hoteliers etc.; and expenses for clean-up operations at sea or on the coast, together with 
reasonable preventive measures aiming at minimising pollution damage, and “reasonable measures 
o f reinstatement” o f the environment, significantly excluding ‘pure ecological loss’.162
The particular elements o f compensable damage, according to the Fund’s practice are costs 
o f clean-up operations; salvage operations; damage to property; and some damage to the 
environment.
More specifically, most legal systems will recognise that money spent on measures to 
prevent or minimise the effect o f oil pollution should be recoverable. However, the definition of 
‘preventive m easures’ would appear not to apply to what has been called ‘pure threat removal 
measures’, i.e. measures which are so successful that there is no actual spill o f oil from the tanker 
at all. Accordingly, the Fund has in the past taken the position that if  a spill occurs, only damage 
caused or costs o f measures taken after the spill are compensable, and consequently costs o f so- 
called pre-spill measures are not compensated. This has now changed after the entry into force o f 
the 1984/1992 amendments, whereby relevant expenses will be recoverable even when no spill 
occurs, provided that there was a “grave and imminent danger” o f pollution damage. In any case, 
if a tanker is damaged and oil is spilt, the costs o f measures to prevent more oil from escaping into 
the sea are regarded as being, in principle, compensable to the extent they will be deemed 
‘reasonable’.163
As far as salvage operations are concerned, averting or minimising a pollution incident and 
thereby reducing the liability o f the vessel has not been a ‘cure’ recognised by the traditional law 
o f salvage. In other words, if the salvage operation was not successful in terms o f saving tangible 
property, the salvor was entitled to no remuneration, the so-called ‘no cure, no pay’ principle.164 This 
was obviously a blatantly outdated approach which 1MO tried to rectify by giving environmental 
protection incentives to salvors through the 1989 International Convention on Salvage.165 Pursuant 
to it, the salvor must carry out salvage operations with ‘due care’ to, inter alia , prevent or minimise 
damage to the environment. Despite the fact that the ‘no cure, no pay’ principle is upheld, the salvor
162 In the same vein as in the Commonwealth o f  Puerto Rico v. the S.S Zoe Colocotroni Case, (U S Court o f  Appeals, 
1st Circ.1980), 628 652.
163 It should also be noted that in several cases the question has arisen as to the admissibility o f  claims from a 
government or from other public bodies relating to certain costs which would have arisen even i f  the incident had not 
occurred, i.e. ‘fixed costs’ as opposed to ‘additional costs’, i.e. expenses incurred by the public authorities as a result 
o f  the incident and which would have not arisen had the incident and the operations relating to it not taken place, e.g. 
extra costs for overtime and other allowances to the personnel (what was referred to above as ‘opportunity costs’), see
Jacobsson, op.cit. n.120, pp.49-51; CM1 Colloquium, op.cit. n .I55 , p.252-3; and the decision in Maritime Services
Board o f  N ew  South Wales v. Posiden Navigation Inc (The Stolt Sheaf and the World Encouragement). 1 N.S.W.L.R., 
1982, p.72. The Fund has adopted a position whereby only those expenses which relate closely to the clean-up period 
in question and which do not include general administrative costs or remote overhead charges should be compensated, 
see B.Browne, ‘Oil Pollution Damage Compensation under the Civil Liability Convention 1969', in S.A.M.McLean (ed.), 
Com pensation fo r  D am age - An International P erspective, 1993, p. 150. .
164 See generally, D.W .Steel & F.D.Rose (eds.), Kennedy's Law o f  Salvage, 1985,
165 See C.Redgwell, ‘The Greening o f  Salvage Law’, 14(2) M ar.Pol., 1990, pp. 142-50.
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is in any case entitled to a special compensation equivalent to his expenses. Successful pollution 
prevention operations reward the salvor with increased special compensation, whereas negligence 
in respect to environmental protection deprive him o f it.
As far as the Fund’s practice is concerned, broadly speaking, the cost o f  salvage operations 
is regarded as pollution damage if  their primary purpose is to prevent or minimise such damage. 
Usually this is not the case; in most instances, the prime objective o f salvage is to protect the ship 
or cargo concerned. This often narrow distinction has given rise to disagreement. An example of 
such a dispute arose out o f the collision between the Greek tanker Patmos and the Spanish tanker 
Castillo de M onlearagon  o ff the coast o f Calabria, Italy.166
In some recent incidents, on the other hand, it has been established that salvage operations 
had dual purposes, both to prevent and minimise pollution and to save the vessel and cargo.167 It 
then became necessary to consider how the costs for these operations should be distributed between 
salvage and pollution prevention, and, in this connection, the Executive Committee has taken the 
view that such distribution would have to be made on the basis o f an assessment o f the facts o f every 
individual case.
When damage to property is at issue, most jurisdictions recognise the principle of restitutio 
in integrum or compensation for the reduction in value or for the necessary costs o f repair. The same 
can be said o f  consequential losses suffered by owners or users o f  property that has been 
contaminated or damaged.168 Thus, for example the fisherman whose fishing gear has been damaged 
by pollution may lose earnings during the time he is prevented from fishing, pending the cleaning 
o f his nets or the purchase of new equipment. Generally speaking, most systems o f law will 
compensate the fisherman for his loss o f earnings.169
But when it comes to ‘pure economic loss’, relevant claims are regarded by the Fund as 
being recoverable only by claimants who depend directly on earnings from sea related or coastal 
activities. For example, loss o f earnings suffered by fishermen, hoteliers and restaurateurs at seaside 
resorts would be recoverable, but losses suffered indirectly would not be so; by the same token, loss 
o f tax revenues by municipal authorities would not.
In the 1984/1992 negotiations, a provision was put forward to the effect that no particular 
significance should be attached to the fact that it is not expressly required that the loss be a direct
160 Twelve claims totalling 18.3 million pounds related to salvage operations and related measures, and as such the
Fund resisted them. As a result o f  that, two o f  the claims were withdrawn, but the others became the subject o f
proceedings in the court o f  M essina in 1986. In its judgment, the Court made a general statement to the effect that
salvage operations could not be considered as preventive measures, since the primary purpose o f  such operations was
that o f  rescuing ship and cargo; this applied even if  the operations had the further effect o f  preventing pollution. On the
basis o f  this principle, the claims were either rejected in full or substantially reduced by the court, see Browne, op.cit.
n. 159, p. 151. On the other important aspects o f  the Patmos Case, see infra, pp. 174-7.
167 See Jacobsson, op.cit. n.120, p.51.
168 See Browne, op.cit. n . l63.
169 See also supra, p. 168.
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result o f the impairment,170 but this formula was dropped from the final text. This was not because 
o f a wish to widen the definition, but because it was clear that this phrase would probably have a 
different significance in different legal systems. It was expected, instead, that national courts would 
develop their own criteria for placing reasonable limits on the scope o f recoverable claims for 
economic loss.
The Fund does not normally accept claims by governments for damage to the environment
as such, on the grounds that they are unquantifiable. In other words, the Fund has persistently
denied compensation for environmental damage when quantified in abstraclo in accordance with
theoretical models, as it has been requested, e.g. by Soviet and Italian courts.171
Unfortunately, the texts, as well as the travaux preparatoires, o f the CLC and Fund
Conventions did not clarify the precise purport o f ‘pollution damage’. The problem was actually
discussed during the CLC Conference, but the question concerning compensation for ecological
damage was not tackled;172 whereas in the course of preparation for the Fund Convention, the
problem o f compensation for damage to living and non-living resources was considered, but not the
question o f ecological damage as such.173
As a matter o f fact, the problem o f compensation for damage to the marine environment was
put before the Fund for the first time after the Antonio Gramsci incident in 1979. In that case, the
government o f the USSR had lodged with the Soviet courts a claim o f an abstract nature for
compensation for ecological damage. The amount claimed had been calculated in conformity with
a mathematical formula contained in a USSR statute at a rate o f  2 roubles per cubic metre o f
polluted water estimated according to the quantity o f oil spilt.174 After its Resolution, the Fund
Assembly set up a Working Group to examine whether the claim was admissible under the CLC and
Fund Conventions. It concluded that compensation could be granted only if a claimant who has a
legal right to a claim under national law had suffered ‘quantifiable economic loss’.175 This opinion
was confirmed by the Assembly in 1981 and the Executive Committee in 1988.
In fact the 1984/1992 amendments formally uphold the Fund’s stance, and define ‘pollution
damage’ in Article 2(6) as:
“(a) loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination resulting from the escape or 
discharge o f oil from the ship, wherever such escape or discharge may occur, provided that 
compensation for impairment o f the environment other than loss o f profit from such
170 See CMI Working Group, op.cit. n.155, p.257.
171 See Remond-Gouilloud, op.cit. n . l31, pp.92-3.
172 See M.C.Mafiei, ‘The Compensation for Ecological Damage in the ‘Patmos’ Case’, in Francioni & Scovazzi (eds.), 
op.cit. n.2, p.388.
173 Id.
174 For details o f  the USSR legislation which is still applicable in the Russian Federation, see A.K olodkin et al, ‘Some 
N ew  Trends in Legislation o f  the Russian Federation and its Attitude towards Conventions with Regard to Marine 
Pollution’, in de la Rue (eds.), op.cit. n .l 16, pp.33-8.
175 Sec IOPC Fund, 1988 Annual Report, pp.61-2.
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impairment shall be limited to costs o f reasonable measures o f reinstatement actually
undertaken or to be undertaken;
(b) the costs o f preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by preventive
measures.”
That clearly means that not all ecological damage is repaired. Moreover, paradoxes are 
likely to occur, e.g. as Maffei points out, non-commercial species unique to the damaged area and 
which cannot be replaced if  they become extinct do not fall within the purview o f the liability 
regime; but if the species is not so rare and can be replaced, what is admittedly a ‘lesser damage’ 
than the previous one, then it is compensated for by means o f ‘restoration costs’.176
A study o f the incidents that has provoked claims to the Fund up to the end o f 1995 shows 
that in the overwhelming majority what is agreed and paid by the Fund concerns clean-up costs and 
less often damage to fisheries,177 from the eighty-two cases, only in one is there a small amount of 
money given in compensation for what was described as ‘pollution damage’, that is 6,250 Swedish 
Krowns to the Swedish Government for pollution caused by the USSR tanker Volgoneft 263.
The F und’s attitude is indicative o f the actual constraints and limits o f a compensation 
system which has not developed a consistent methodology o f evaluation that would permit 
quantification o f the environmental asset p er se or o f lost use values with the ensuing requirement 
to give standing to a broad range of actors;178 and arguably o f any such system purporting to rectify 
environmental damage ex post facto.
At the end o f the day, and despite the Fund’s consistent practice, it will come to national 
courts to decide which losses are compensated and to what extent, should a conflict o f interpretation 
arise. On this point, legal practice varies greatly from country to country.179 National courts will have 
to establish criteria in order to arrive at a reasonable delimitation o f the right to compensation for 
loss o f  profit. Moreover, since a successful claim for pure economic losses under national law 
generally seems to presuppose that an individual defined right has been infringed, national courts 
will have to decide to what extent such compensation is awarded when the right is exercised on a 
public basis, as is the case with reduction o f amenities like recreational fishing, use o f beaches etc.180
All said, what is really interesting is that governments do not seem to actually claim 
compensation for environmental damage that often. Clearly, there are exceptions to this rule, most 
notably in Italy, where both the Administration and the Judiciary seem to persistently favour 
compensation for pure ecologic loss, as will be shown in the next Section. Some recent relevant 
cases may have some influence on the future interpretation o f the Conventions by other national
176 Maffei, op.cit. n . l72, p.390.
177 See IOPC Fund, op.cit. n .l 18, pp .122-37,
178 See Wetterstein, op.cit. n.133, p.246.
m  For the Italian practice, see infra, pp. 174-7.
180 See Wetterstein, op.cit. n . l33, p.236.
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courts, and consequently present a special interest. It must be noted here that the US is leading in 
the effort to assess pure environmental damage so as to make it susceptible to compensation, 
especially after the Exxon Valdez incident.181 On the contrary, M editerranean countries, with the 
exception o f Italy, do not seem to share the same concerns;182 in fact, Spain, Greece, France, and 
Algeria, which are the only other countries in the region that had submitted claims to the Fund by 
the end o f 1995,183 are totally in line with the latter’s policy.184
4.2.4.3. The Attitude of the Italian Administration and Courts towards 
Compensable Pollution Damage: A Case Study.
Two major oil pollution incidents, involving the tankers Patmos and H aven,185 have so far 
been the object o f heated controversy between Italy and the Fund on the question o f the nature of 
environmental harm that is susceptible to compensation. Nonetheless, it would be safe to assume 
that the friction will continue, as the Italian government has reserved its position in connection with 
environmental damage caused by the Agip Abruzzo, until investigation into the effects o f the spill 
it caused has been completed.186
Following collision o f the Greek tanker Patmos with the Spanish tanker Castillo de 
M ontearagon  in the Strait o f Messina in 1985, the Ialian Ministry o f M erchant Marine lodged a 
claim o f Lit 5 billion for ecological damage, based on a broad interpretation o f the relevant Articles 
o f the C LC .187 In its 1986 decision, the competent Tribunal o f M essina rejected the M inistry’s 
approach and gave a restrictive interpretation o f  relevant provisions: It held that Article II o f the 
CLC refers to “damage caused on the territory” and not “to the territory” meaning that compensation 
was due for damage to things which lie on the territory or the territorial sea and not for damage to
181 See among others, C.Cartwrighl, ‘Natural Resource Damage Assessment: The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill and its 
Implications’, 17 Rutgers Computer & Technology L.J., 1991, pp.451-494; C.B.Kcnde, ‘Liability for Pollution Damage 
and Legal Assessm ent o f  Damage to the Marine Environment’, 11(2) J. o f  Energy & Nat. Res. L., 1993, pp.105-20;
C.M .Augustyniak, ‘The Econom ic Valuation o f  Services Provided by Natural Resources: Putting a Price on the 
‘Priceless’5, 45 Baylor L.Rev., 1993, pp.389-403; S.A.Austin, ‘The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s 
Proposed Rules for Natural Resource Damage Assessm ent under the Oil Pollution A ct’, 18 H arv.Env'l L.Rev., 1994, 
pp.549-61; S.W .Smithson, ‘The Department o f  the Interior should Incorporate Current Water Body M odeling 
Techniques in the Natural Resource Damage Assessm ent Model for Coastal and Marine Environments’, 20 Rutgers 
Computer & Technology L.J., 1994, pp.701-723; and Kasoulides, op.cit. n.15, pp.521-2, See also State o f  Ohio v. The 
US Department o f  the Interior (D.C.Cir. 1989), 880 F .2d  432.
182 At the beginning o f l9 9 6 , all Mediterranean countries, except Israel, Lebanon, Libya, and Turkey, were Parties to 
the Fund Convention, while Egypt was under observer status, see IOPC Fund, op.cit. n .l 16, pp. 12-3,
183 It would be fair to note in this context that very few tanker accidents occurring in the Mediterranean - live by the 
end o f  1995 - seem to have involved damages calling for the operation o f  the Fund, the overwhelm ing majority o f  such 
incidents happening in the seas o f  Japan and Korea, see ibid, pp. 122-37.
I1W Sec, e.g., the Spain claims arising from the Aegean Sea  incident, ibid, pp.56-8; the Greek claims arising from the 
Iliad  incident, ibid, p.75; the Algerian claims concerning the O ued Gueterini incident, ibid, pp. 126-71 and the French 
claims arising from the Haven  incident, IOPC Fund, Annual Report 1994, p .51.
185 See generally, Maffei, op.cit. n .l72, pp.38I-94; and A.Bianchi, ‘Harm to the Environment in Italian Practice: The 
Interaction o f  International Law and Dom estic Law’, in P. Wetterstein (ed.), Harm to the Environment: The Right to 
Com pensation and A ssessm ent o f  D am ages, 1997, pp. 103-29.
186 See IOPC Fund, op.cit. n. 118, p.41.
187 Note that citizen suits to recover ecological damage are not allowed in Italy, but local authorities do have standing 
in such cases, see Bianchi, op.cit n . l85, pp. 106-7.
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the territory or the territorial sea as such. Furthermore, it was held that only real rights over property 
can be violated by private persons, and since the territorial sea is not state-owned property but rather 
an area where the state exercises sovereign rights - and the same applies mutalis mutandis to the 
marine flora and fauna damage to it could not be compensated to the Ministry.
That decision was expectedly appealed against by the Italian government, which took the 
position that its claim relates to actual damage to the marine environment and to actual economic 
loss suffered by the tourist industry and fishermen. For this reason, it maintained that the claim was 
not in contravention of the interpretation o f the definition o f pollution damage adopted by the Fund 
Assembly. The Fund Executive Committee rejected the Italian arguments and maintained that 
compensation for economic loss suffered by the tourist industry and fishermen could only be 
claimed by the individual persons having suffered the damage who, in addition, had to prove the 
amount o f the economic loss sustained.188
The Court interpreted the CLC in the light o f the 1969 International Convention relating 
to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases o f Oil Pollution Casualties, Article 1, which allows Parties 
to “take such measures on the high seas as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave 
and imminent danger to their coastline or related interests from pollution or threat o f pollution of 
the sea by oil, following upon a maritime casualty...” . Article 2(4) of the same Convention defines 
‘related interests’ as “the interests o f a coastal state directly affected or threatened by the maritime 
casualty, such as: (a) maritime coastal, port or estuarine activities, constituting an essential means 
o f livelihood for the persons concerned; (b) tourist attractions o f the area concerned; (c) the health 
o f the coastal population and the well-being of the area concerned, including conservation o f living 
marine resources and o f wildlife”. Accordingly, the CLC definition o f pollution damage was thought 
to be wide enough to include damage to the coast and related interests, including those concerning 
environmental values. Why the Court felt compelled to resort to the Intervention Convention is not 
clear, and its whole reasoning has led to some substantial criticism.189
Furthermore, the Court noted that the problem o f ecological damage has an economic 
character even if it does not correspond to an arithmetical concept; it consists in the economic 
importance that destruction, degradation, or alteration of the environment has p er  se and also vis-a- 
vis the community which gets benefit out o f the environmental resources and out o f the sea, such 
as food, tourism, health, scientific and biological research.190 It follows that the state has to protect 
this benefit. The court said that
188 See 10PC Fund, op.cit. n .125, p.35.
189 See Maffei, op.cit. n.172, p.387-8; and Bianchi, op.cit. n.185, pp .116-8.
190 It must be noted that the 1980 Resolution o f  the Assem bly was referred to by the Tribunal o f  M essina to support 
its findings; on the contrary, the Court o f  Appeal ignored it, although it constituted ‘authoritative interpretation’ o f  the 
Convention com ing from its supreme organ, see 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties, Art.31(3).
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“The environment must be considered as a unitary asset,... including natural resources, 
health and landscape, the damage to the environment prejudices immaterial values, which 
cannot be assessed in monetary terms according to market prices, and consists o f the 
reduced possibility o f using the environment. The damage can be compensated on an 
equitable basis, which may be established by the courts on the grounds o f an opinion of 
experts....”
Moreover, the state representing the national community and protecting its interests was given 
standing to sue; this importantly meant that the government’s claim was grounded neither on the 
costs incurred for restoration nor on any other economic loss suffered by the state as such.
The Court did in fact appoint experts to calculate the environmental damage suffered; but 
in 1990 they concluded that, except for fishing activities, there was lack o f data to evaluate damage, 
and that it was for the court to make the evaluation. The experts found that some fishermen were 
prevented from fishing for 15 days and that this damage could be quantified at not less than Lit 1 
billion. Their report was contested by the Fund, the owner o f Patmos and the P & 1 Club arguing 
that the surveyors had exceeded their mandate, since the damage allegedly suffered by fishermen 
and the tourist industry was not damage to the marine resources but economic loss, and that, in any 
event, the experts had admitted that the damage to the tourist industry could not be quantified. They 
also referred to the fact that, as regards damage to the environment properly speaking, the experts 
had used expressions such as ‘non-existent’, ‘negligible’, ‘m odest’, ‘o f  short duration’ and 
‘reversible’.
The Court o f Appeal did request clarifications from the experts, and in April 1992, a second 
report was produced, in which the experts stated that their conclusions were only hypothetical and 
not confirmed by factual evidence. The quantity o f water affected by oil was estimated, and how the 
oil m ight affect the plankton and the development and growth o f fish was then considered. A 
mathematical formula was used to calculate a quantity of fish which allegedly were not born or did 
not develop, due to lack o f nutrition. The experts stated that only a percentage o f the quantity o f fish 
not having come into existence would have been caught and gave a nominal value to the relevant 
quantity. An allowance was also made for the days when fishing was banned following the incident, 
to take account o f loss o f earnings, while damage to the beaches was excluded because neither the 
authorities nor the tourist operators had submitted relevant claims.
The final judgment, issued in December 1993,191 awarded the Italian state Lit 2,100 million 
(£827,000) for damage to the marine environment. There was no indication in the judgment o f how 
this sum was precisely calculated. However, it is clear that the Court reduced the amount claimed 
on the grounds o f contributory negligence on the part o f the Italian authorities, which had made 
improper use o f detergents, and also because some o f the polluted area lied outside Italian territorial
191 See Ministero de la Marina Mercantile e Ministero deli’interno v. Patmos Shipping Co.. The United Kingdom  
Steamship Co.. and International Oil Pollution Fund (Court o f  Appeal o f  Messina, 1993), reprinted in 9 Rivista Guiridica 
dell 'Ambiente, 1994, pp.683-94. For a summary o f  the decision, see 10PC Fund, op.cit. n. 184, pp.38-9.
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waters, and consequently could not give rise to a valid claim under the CLC. It appears that the 
Court assessed the amount o f compensation on the basis o f a certain quantity o f fish which was not 
brought into existence as a result o f pollution, and took also into account damage to plankton and 
benthos. It thus rejected the experts’ view that only loss o f fish which would have been caught 
should be considered, in view o f the fact the claim related to environmental damage in terms of loss 
of enjoyment suffered by the collectivity. As a result o f the amount awarded, which did not exceed 
the shipowner’s limitation amount, the Fund was not called to make any payments, and thus was 
not entitled to appeal.
This issue o f ‘pure ecological loss’ came again to the spotlight, after the Haven accident off 
Genoa in April 1991,192 which resulted in claims o f £683 million for oil pollution damage launched 
in Italy, France, and Monaco. O f these £311 million (Lit 765 billion) were requested by the Italian 
Government in relation to environmental damage, and more specifically to restoration o f an area of 
phanerogams (type of seed plants), and consequent beach erosion; wreck removal; atmospheric and 
marine damage restored by the natural biological recovery of the resources; and irreparable damages 
to the sea and atmosphere.
In view of the protracted legal proceedings, aggravated by problems o f  time-bar, the Fund 
entered into negotiations with the claimants with a view to arriving at a lump-sum settlement. From 
the amount of £56 million offered by the Fund, only an ex gratia payment o f Lit 25 billion by the 
shipowner/UK Club was to go towards meeting claims o f pure ecological damage. The Italian 
Government, however, was reluctant to accept the deal. This caused a very heated debate in the 
Fund’s Assembly, some delegates going as far as suggesting that the Italian attitude with regard to 
environmental damage might have grave consequences for the future o f the international oil 
compensation system as a whole; at the same time, the French were pressing for compensation to 
be paid to their claimants without waiting for an overall settlement.193 All this pressure produced 
results only as late as 1998, when Italy announced its agreement to the overall settlement package.194
The limitations in the types o f damages covered by the international instruments and the 
Italian reasoning in the Haven case, raise a question as to what extent, if any, contracting states to 
the CLC may legislate for recovery o f pollution claims outside the Conventions. As was already 
mentioned, where the CLC applies, compensation thereunder is to be the sole and exclusive remedy 
for claims in respect o f pollution damage caused by the incident. But where claims are excluded 
from the scope o f the Convention, difficulties may arise if this is interpreted as opening the door for 
alternative remedies under national laws outside the CLC. It appears, for example, that under 
general environmental laws both France and Italy allow some claims for non-pecuniary losses o f a
m  For an account o f  the incident, the claims and the Fund's response, see, IOPC Fund, op.cit, n .l 18, pp.42-54.
193 See ib id , pp.52-4.
194 See N.Gaskell, ‘Developm ents in International Maritime Law’, 28(3-4) Env 7 Pol. & L., 1998, p. 166.
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type which is not recognised in other contracting states, and which would not be admitted under the 
1984/1992 Protocols.195 It is feared that if claims o f this nature were to be admitted against 
shipowners for oil pollution in addition to claims under the CLC, the uniformity o f laws which the 
Conventions were designed to achieve would be undermined. The difficulties would be 
compounded by the fact that such claims would fall outside the shipowner’s limit o f liability, and 
would therefore impose an additional burden on top o f his limitation fund. This leads some authors 
to argue that it should be established that the CLC provides an exclusive remedy for all claims for 
oil pollution from ships, and the sole basis for determining the admissibility or otherwise o f claims 
in Contracting states.196 However, such a development would hinder the possibility o f a progressive 
evolution o f the notion o f compensable pollution damage and would bar the widening o f the circle 
o f persons with standing to raise relevant claims.
4.3. Concluding Remarks.
The preceding discussion revealed a multiplicity o f shortcomings in the state responsibility 
approach to control over compliance with international environmental obligations,197 and in the civil 
liability regimes as they stand. To sum them up, the state responsibility mechanism has an inherently 
reactive, bilateral and confrontational character,198 that does not fit well in the modern co-operative 
environment o f international environmental regulation. It can be used if and when a major dispute 
between two or more states arises, more likely involving transboundary damage, and cannot serve 
the purpose o f monitoring and encouraging compliance with international environmental standards 
on a continuous basis. Moreover, there are considerable difficulties in proving breach o f obligation, 
especially when the behaviour prescribed by international law is not unequivocal, such as the 
standard o f care - ‘due diligence’ or ‘strict liability’ - that is required; in establishing the causal link 
between specific activities and environmental impairment and evaluating the latter, bearing in mind 
that pure ecological costs and systemic damages have not been addressed by traditional state 
responsibility principles; and in legally identifying the author o f dam age.199 There are additional 
restrictions with regard to standing; even if a broad defintion o f ‘injured’ states is accepted and 
obligations erga omnes in the environmental sphere are endorsed, state responsibility remains a 
strictly inter-state affair and firmly excludes individuals and their associations from the circle o f
195 See CMI Working Group, op.cit. n. 155, p.260. See also Sands, op.cit. n.52, pp.670-1, on the possibility o f  applying 
a future liability instrument adopted at Community level to damage not covered by the international Conventions.
196 See CMI Working Group, op.cit. n.155, p.260.
197 See also supra, Chapter 3, at fn. 161.
198 See C.Tinker, ‘State Responsibility and the Precautionary Principle’, in D.Freestone & E.Hey (eds.), The
P recau tionary Principle an d  International Law  - The Challenge o f  Im plem entation, 1996, pp.53-71; and P.Birnie & 
A .Boyle, International Law an d  the Environment, 1992, p. 136.
199 See Kiss & Shelton, op.cit. n.6, pp.350-60; and Wolfrum, op.cit. n.90, pp.77-109..
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actors empowered to control compliance with international standards. All these flaws make this 
approach blatantly ineffective as a means o f enforcing international law on marine pollution, in 
particular from land-based sources, in case no transboundary harm can be invoked.
That said, the practical and theoretical obstacles to successfully pursuing a state 
responsibility claim also partially account for the absence o f state practice, notably in the 
M editerranean context; however, they are not unsurmountable.200 More important is the political 
consideration, what Dupuy calls “un sentiment diffus de solidarite” among the ‘ internationale des 
pollueurs’,201 which has led to very limited use o f this approach in the environmental domain, even 
in cases where all the necessary elements existed.202 This is best illustrated by the attitude o f states 
when faced with major pollution incidents with undeniable transboundary impact, such as the 
Chernobyl, Bhopal and Sandoz cases, and a large number o f major oil spills.203 It is notable that 
most commentators agree that in both the Chernobyl and Sandoz cases breaches o f international 
treaty obligations had actually been committed.204 Only in the context o f nuclear pollution is there 
some practice o f invoking state responsibility even today,205 but only when this kind pollution is 
consciously caused by nuclear tests, the legality o f which is a matter o f intense international 
controversy which creates the necessary adversary climate.
Hence, it is not surprising that the ILC ’s attempts to develop and reform the law o f state 
responsibility have not been a success up to now. Similarly, U NEP’s efforts to develop respective 
rules in an environmental context as was foreseen in Principle 22 were faced with the reluctance of 
states and are in a stalemate. In this light, Kiss and Shelton’s conclusion that “thus far it does not 
appear that states are willing to engage in the delicate process o f defining the conditions and scope 
o f international responsibility for environmental damage” seems entirely justified.206
200 See P.-M.Dupuy, ‘L’Etat et la Reparation des Dommages Catastrophiques’, in Francioni & Scovazzi, op.cit. n.2, 
pp .141-2
201 See ib id , pp. 142-5, esp. at 142.
202 Hence, som e characterise international liability in the environmental sphere as a ‘stillborn regim e’, see 
Developm ents..., op.cit. n.18, pp. 1498-504.
203 See Kiss & Shelton, op.cit. n.6, pp.360-3; and Dupuy, op.cit. n.200, pp. 128 and 134-41,
201 See, e.g., Dupuy, op.cit. n,201, pp. 136-41; and 1-l.U.J.d’Oliveira, ‘The Sandoz Blaze: The Damage and the Public 
and Private Liabilities’, in Francioni & Scovazzi, op.cit. n.2, pp.430-4. D ’Oliveira notes that by follow ing the course 
of private international law as opposed to the public one o f state responsibility, the claim s submitted were settled almost 
entirely within three years, pp.440-1. It has, however, also been suggested that the real difference between the fate o f  
the two incidents lies rather in the political and diplomatic pressure exerted on Switzerland, as opposed to the leniency 
with which the Soviet Union was treated, see D.F.McClatchey, ‘Chernobyl and Sandoz One Decade Later: The Evolution 
o f  State Responsibility for International Disasters’, 25 Georgia. J. o f  h it 'I & Com p.L., 1996, pp.659-80. For an account 
o f  the abortive international efforts to clarify state responsibility standards provoked by the Chernobyl accident, see 
M.Politi, ‘The Impact o f  the Chernobyl Accident on the States’ Perception o f  International Responsibility for Nuclear 
Dam age’, in Francioni & Scovazzi, op.cit. n.2, pp.473-99.
205 See the Nuclear Tests Cases, (Interim  Measures), 1973 I.C.J. Reports, p.99; (Jurisdiction), 1974 I.C.J. Reports,
p.253; and Recmest for an Examination o f  the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 o f  the Court’s Judgment o f  
20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Zealand v. France) Case. 1995 I.C.J. Reports, p .288,
206 Kiss & Shelton, op.cit. n.6, p.362.
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Then, what has been called ‘soft responsibility’ through ‘moral pressure’ exercised during 
operation o f the permanent organs establish under multilateral treaties becomes increasingly 
important, as the usual concept o f responsibility is “progressively dissolved” in a broader approach 
to environmental problems, namely a growing regional co-operation.207 It is indeed in this setting 
o f follow-up effected in international environmental institutions established by treaties that the threat 
or use o f counter-measures, this most traditional remedy for non-compliance, find some scope of 
fruitful application and potential evolution to better meet today’s needs.208 These mechanisms o f 
collective supervision will be discussed in detail in the next Chapter.
International civil liability schemes, on the other hand, despite their potentially deterrent 
function and the internalisation o f costs and application o f the ‘polluter pays’ principle they achieve, 
present their own important limitations. Their basic flaws consist in providing an ex post response, 
typically in relation to transboundary pollution damage, for a very limited range o f activities, in 
practice only oil pollution accidents - and that with important qualifications. Exclusion o f 
operational pollution and the practice of the lOPC Fund regarding the types o f compensable harm, 
show that a substantial part o f environmental damage remains uncompensated and thus indirectly 
undeterred.
In the specific context o f MAP, the futile effort, since 1978, to develop a regional system 
o f liability and to set up an Interstate Guarantee Fund does not leave much space for optimism. 
Nevertheless, it seems worthwhile to work on the idea o f an agreement - or at least o f participation 
in the regime established under the Dangerous Activities Convention - that would set uniform 
standards regarding liability for damage to the marine environment, applicable to all national legal 
orders, irrespectively o f the existence o f transnational elements in each particular case. In any case, 
such a proposal will probably have to wait until some norms are established at Community level, 
in view o f the resistance o f the Community to unreservedly commit to even some very basic relevant 
liability principles at the adoption o f the Mediterranean Offshore Protocol.
All said, several jurists insist on the value and feasibility o f developing the law on state 
responsibility and liability for marine pollution damage, land-based pollution included,209 and 
especially favour a regime o f  objective, strict responsibility,210 albeit recognising the complex 
problems that such a development would present.211 In this connection, the 1990 Guidelines on
207 See Kiss, op.cit. n.2, pp. 13-4.
208 See infra, Chapter 5, p.220-1; and Chapter 6, p.290.
2uy See Q.M eng,, Land-Based Sources o f  M arine Pollution, 1987, pp.234-5, calling for the development o f  
international law on state responsibility for land-based marine pollution as a special branch o f  international law through 
special treaty-making.
210 See Smith, op.cit. n.6, at Chapter 8, and Kasoulides, op.cit. n.15, pp.518-20, who advocates strict and unlimited 
liability in relation to certain specified and major breaches o f  dumping regulations.
211 See, B.Kwiatkowska, ‘Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources: Current Problems and Prospects’ 14(3) 
O.D.I.L., 1984, pp.329-30, where also other authors supporting the idea are cited; and R .M .M ’Gonigle, ‘“Developing
(continued...)
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responsibility and liability regarding transboundary water pollution produced by an ECE Task Force 
show a trend to combine civil law liability systems with public international law o f state 
responsibility, so as to achieve comprehensive protection of the environment and individual victims 
o f pollution.212 In this vein, the definition o f environmental damage - actual, potential, or merely 
threatened, which is designed to apply to both legal approaches, is one o f the broader ever, as it 
covers ‘detrimental changes in ecosystems’ not confined  to measures o f  restoration and 
reinstatement or equivalent reparation.
From a different perspective, the emphasis on developing national rules o f liability under 
Principle 13 o f the Rio Declaration, the on-going discussion at Community level for a civil liability 
instrument, proposals to establish interstate funds to compensate unidentifiable environmental 
damage, and the adoption o f the 1993 Dangerous Activities Convention show a tendency to broaden 
the notion o f transboundary damage and address liability for environmental harm within national 
borders. Together with the recent emergence o f attitudes endorsing compensation for pure 
environmental loss (Italy), and the continuing development o f relevant techniques within national 
legal systems (USA), they reinforce the trend - that will be more fully explored in Chapter 8 - 
towards establishing a comprehensive set o f procedural standards that would enable citizens and 
NGOs to pursue control over compliance with international environmental law within state borders.
21'(...continued)
Sustainability and the Emerging Norms oflnternational Environmental Law: The Case o f  Land-Based Marine Pollution 
Control’, XXVUI Can, YB.I.L., 1990, pp.204-5.
212 Text in ECE, ENVW A/R.45, 20 November 1990, Annex; and sec A,Rest, ‘Ecological Damage in Public 
International Law’, 22(1) Env'l Pol. & L,, 1992, pp.34-5.
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Chapter 5.
Th e  Tr a d it io n a l  A p p r o a c h  to  N o n -C o m p l ia n c e  w ith  
In t e r n a  tio n al  E n v ir o n m e n t a l  L a  w : Th e  
C o m p r e h e n siv e  I n s t it u t io n a l  M o d e l .
The present Chapter reviews the comprehensive institutional model adopted since the early 
1970s in practically all environmental treaties, especially in connection to its compliance-control 
features and their development in the Mediterranean area. Separate discussion is devoted to the 
principal follow-up techniques used in this context, namely monitoring, reporting and co-operative 
supervision in the context o f the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris 
MOU). There follows an examination o f two more advanced, and thus potentially more effective, 
non-compliance models, i.e. the ‘non-compliance procedure’ under the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and the European Union mechanism, in order to highlight 
those elements that could be potentially extended or duplicated, thus enhancing the effectiveness 
o f compliance control in the Mediterranean context.
5.1, The Follow-up Function o f International Environmental Institutions.
In Chapter 3 we traced the evolution o f  institutional structures operating within
environmental treaty regimes.1 These organs provide permanent, flexible, non-confrontational and
formalised fo ra  that continuously refine and complement international standards, and develop
procedures to supervise implementation and address relevant difficulties or even non-compliant
behaviour. Expressing this general feeling, Agenda 21 (para,39.7) reads:
“The Parties to international agreements should consider procedures and mechanisms to 
promote and review the effective, full and prompt implementation. To that effect, States 
could, inter alia:
(b) Consider appropriate ways in which relevant international bodies, such as UNEP, might 
contribute towards the further development o f such mechanisms.”
1 See supra Chapter 3, pp. 112-3, 115-6 and 122-3; and, among others, A.E.Boyle, ‘Saving the World? Implementation 
and Enforcement o f  International Environmental Law through International Institutions’, 3(2) J. o f  Env'l Law, 1991, 
pp.229-45; T.Gehring, ‘International Environmental Regimes: Dynamic Sectoral Legal System s’, I YBJ.E.L., pp.35-56; 
A .K iss & D.Shelton, in ternational Environm ental Law, 1991, pp.56-7 and 98-101; and, more generally on the 
contemporary role o f  international organisations, A.Chayes & A.Handler Chayes, The N ew Sovereign ty - Com pliance 
w ith In ternational R egulatory Agreem ents, 1995, pp. 124-7 and Chapter 12. For an international political science 
perspective on the functions and effectiveness o f  these institutions, see, among others, O.R.Young, International 
C oopera tion  - Building Regim es fo r  N atural Resources an d  the Environment, 1989; and P.M .Haas, R.O.Keohane & 
M.A.Levy (eds.), institutions fo r  the Earth - Sources ofEffective International Environmental Protection, 1994.For early 
works along the same lines, see A.Thompson Feravu, ‘Transnational Political Interests and the Global Environment’, 
28 In t’l Org., 1974, pp.31-55; and L.Caldwell’s In Defence o f  Earth: International Protection o f  the B iosphere, 1972.
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The special role assigned to international organs is grounded on the dynamic character o f 
modern environmental regimes,2 which require a continuous process o f review o f their substantive 
provisions in the light o f new scientific and technical findings,3 and close follow-up to improve 
compliance with their provisions in the light o f updated assessments o f their effectiveness in dealing 
with their subject-matter. Hence, under the comprehensive institutional model, the governing bodies 
o f environmental treaties - whether these are the Meeting of Parties or ad hoc Commissions, being 
at the same time technical and political organs,4 become central in the operation o f regimes that 
require much more than mere establishment o f substantive regulation.
More specifically, law-making by such international institutions can contribute to 
facilitating treaty implementation,5 in view o f  the fact that ambiguity and indeterminacy o f treaty 
language, as well as “the temporal dimension o f the social, economic and political changes 
contemplated by regulatory treaties” - which accounts for ‘framework’ treaties and grace periods 
for compliance - are commonly blamed for non-compliance phenomena.6 Sachariew even goes as 
far as maintaining that “...the processes o f applying and o f making international environmental law 
become almost indistinguishable: assessment o f compliance may well merge into legislative action 
to adjust... a standard or rule that has given rise to a compliance issue” .7 W hat is more, procedural 
duties involving general and emergency co-operation for the protection o f the marine environment 
operate purely at the international level,8 are extremely relative and subjective, and can be followed- 
up and ‘enforced’ only through effective action and peer pressure within the respective international 
structures.
That said, international organs typically also have research and exchange o f information 
powers, and, most importantly, explicit supervisory authority, namely the power to develop specific 
compliance control and response mechanisms that go beyond the typical reporting and monitoring 
techniques that are commonly found in the actual treaty texts.9 Hence, in some instances, special 
committees are set up under environmental regimes with the specific mandate to supervise 
implementation o f the legal obligations established under the respective instruments according to
2 See Ghering, op.cit., n .l ,  pp.35-56.
3 See supra, Chapter 2, pp.62-7,
4 See Ghering, op.cit. n .l , p.36.
s See A.Handler Chayes, A .Chayes & R.B.M itchell, ‘Active Compliance Management in Environmental Treaties’, 
in W.Lang (ed.), Sustainable Developm ent and International Law, 1995, pp.84-8.
6 See Chayes & Chayes, op.cit. n .l ,  pp.9-17; Kiss & Shelton, op.cit. n .l, pp.98-9; and supra, Chapter 2, pp.58-9.
7 See K.Sachariew, ‘Promoting Compliance with International Environmental Legal Standards: Reflections on 
Monitoring and Reporting M echanisms’, 2 YB.I.E.L., 1991, p.33.
8 See supra, Chapter 2, pp.86 et seq.
9 See W.Lang, ‘Compliance Control in International Environmental Law: Institutional N ecessities’, 56(3) Z.A.O.R. V., 
1996, pp.687-9.
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prescribed procedures.10
In Chapter 2 we discussed the general duty o f institutional co-operation, as reflected in the 
LOSC provisions authorising regional elaboration o f marine protection norms, and in general 
regional co-operation, especially in the case o f semi-enclosed seas.11 The Barcelona Convention and 
Protocols stipulations regarding co-operation in the formulation and adoption o f protocols, and 
common programmes, measures and standards, have also been already exam ined.12 The permanent 
institutional arrangements that facilitate this continuous interaction in the Mediterranean are laid 
down in Articles 17-20 and involve the establishment of several organs, namely a Secretariat, a 
Meeting o f  Contracting Parties, a Bureau, Standing Committees, and Regional Centres. The same 
pattern o f a  Secretariat combined with at least a periodic Meeting o f Parties and other subsidiary 
organs is followed under the other applicable international instruments. Hence, the Marine 
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) is the body responsible for the monitoring and 
updating MARPOL; the Consultative Meeting o f the Parties administers the London Convention 
(Art.XIV); and the Basel Convention has a Conference of Parties (Art. 16).
The case o f the MEPC is a good illustration of how, even absent formal compliance-control 
provisions, follow-up work can be effected within appropriate institutions. Although there is no 
formal provision for a non-compliance procedure in MARPOL, the Marine Environment Protection 
Committee (MEPC), which moreover is the body responsible for the monitoring and updating o f 
the Convention, acts as the forum  where relevant pressure is exercised.13 MEPC has been 
preoccupied on several occasions with compliance questions, especially information thereon - or 
the lack o f it - as furnished through the mandatory reporting procedure.14 But the more substantial 
bulk o f its work involves elaboration o f procedures and guidelines to improve and enhance effective 
control and inspection of vessels in order to ensure that they comply with international regulations 
for the protection o f the marine environment.
Furthermore, in 1992 a Sub-Committee on Flag State Implementation (FSI) was established, 
with the main task o f identifying necessary measures to ensure effective and consistent global 
implementation o f IMO standards at the tripartite level - flag/port/coastal state - and making relevant 
proposals.15 It is important to note, however, that IM O’s initial efforts were directed towards 
producing a well-focussed ‘Flag State Compliance Committee’, but these were diluted by states
10 See infra, pp.217-23.
11 See supra, Chapter 2, pp .90-l.
12 See supra, Chapter 2, pp.59-60.
13 There is substantial Mediterranean participation in the MEPC: The 1994 Thirty-fifth Session, for instance, was 
attended by fifty-nine countries, including Algeria, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Malta, Morocco, 
Spain and Tunisia,
14 See infra, pp.205-7.
15 See MEPC, Report o f  the Joint MSC/MEPC Working Group on Flag State Compliance, Annex I, reprinted in FSI 
1/3/1, 23 December 1992, Annex, p.5.
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representing powerful shipping interests, such as Liberia.16 Be that as it may, it seems that IMO 
countries have endorsed the necessity o f such a standing/crow  and participate quite widely in its 
work; that said, Mediterranean participation is not equally impressive.17
More precisely, the FSI’s objectives include: identification o f the range o f the flag state 
obligations emanating from IMO treaty instruments; assessment o f the current level o f 
implementation o f IMO instruments; identification o f those areas where flag states have difficulty 
in fully implementing IMO instruments; assessment o f the problems in the involvement o f the states 
party to the IMO instruments in their capacity as port states, coastal states and countries involved 
in training and certifying officers and crew; identification o f the reasons for the 
difficulties;formulation o f proposals to assist parties in implementing and complying with IMO 
instruments, these proposals to be implemented by the organ or by states; and monitoring of the 
performance o f actions taken.
Already at its First Session, the FSI issued Draft Preliminary Guidelines to Assist Flag 
States,18 pursuant to which national administrations should improve the adequacy o f measures taken 
to give effect to the conventions which they have ratified and ensure that they are effectively 
monitored;19 and Guidelines for the Authorization o f Organisations Acting on Behalf o f the 
Administration,20 in order to promote uniformity o f inspection and maintain high standards. 
Moreover, it has formulated a global strategy for port state control surveyors training, within the 
framework o f each Memorandum o f Understanding on Port State Control.21
All this amounts to an impressive and valuable effort at identifying the problem areas 
affecting implementation o f international standards and recommending appropriate corrective 
action. However, it stops well short o f an actual compliance-control mechanism that would pinpoint 
concrete breaches o f international undertakings and proceed to a well-defined course o f action to 
address these phenomena. Much more effective in this respect is the model o f co-operative 
supervision by national port authorities, discussed in Section 5.2.3.
Let us now turn to the operation o f the organs o f the MAP system.
16 See X V 1(20) O il Sp ill Intelligence Report, 27 May 1993, p,4. It is equally true that this reality has provoked 
reactions; for instance, the Paris MOU PSCC publicly takes the view  that the FSI should be more concerned with flag 
slate difficulties and less with port state control, see Paris MOU, J993 Annual Report, p .6.
17 For instance, the First Session was attended by 46 countries which included Algeria, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, 
Malta, Morocco, Spain and Syria; while the Second and Third had 54 and 50 participants respectively, including Cyprus, 
Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Malta and Spain.
18 See FSI, Report to the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine Environment Protection Committee, FSI 1/21, 
18 May 1993, Annex 3, pp.2-4; endorsed as Interim  Guidelines to A ssisi Flag States, in IMO Assem bly Resolution 
A .740(18) and amended in A .847(20).
I<J See also Chapter 8, at fn.13.
20 See FSI, op.cit. n.18, Annex 2, pp,3 etseq .. The Guidelines were endorsed in IMO Assembly Resolution A .739(18).
21 FSI, op.cit. n.18, Annex 10; and see infra, pp.212-7, on the Paris Memorandum o f  Understanding.
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5.1.1. Institutions o f the M AP System.
The institutional arrangements envisaged by the Barcelona Convention are straightforward, 
but at the time o f their inception they were rather innovative, as they establish organs entrusted with 
the task o f maintaining the conventional regime in actual operation for an indefinite period o f time, 
as well as adapting it to the changing circumstances so as to better fulfill its objectives. These organs 
are the Secretariat, the Meeting o f the Parties, the Bureau, Standing Committees, and a series of 
Regional Activity Centres.
UNEP, and in particular its Executive Director, is commissioned with secretariat functions, 
i.e. to convene and prepare the Meetings o f Contracting Parties and future conferences; to transmit 
notifications, reports and information to the Parties; to receive, consider and reply to enquiries and 
information from the Parties, as well as NGOs and the public, when such requests relate to matters 
o f common interest or activities carried out at the regional level; to regularly report to the Parties 
on the implementation o f the Convention and Protocols; to perform the functions assigned to it by 
the Protocols, and such other functions as may be assigned to it by the Parties; and lastly to ensure 
the necessary coordination with other international bodies (Barcelona Convention, Art. 17). In 1981, 
many o f these functions were transferred to the Mediterranean Co-ordinating Unit for MAP 
(MEDU/M AP) located in Athens, which now acts as the de fac to  Secretariat and the overall 
coordinator o f MAP and the Convention.22
The Meeting o f the Parties is the governing body o f the legal regime, and is to hold ordinary 
sessions once every two years - eleven such meetings have taken place to date - and extraordinary 
ones whenever deemed necessary upon request o f the Secretariat or o f at least two Parties 
(Art. 18(1)). Each Party has one vote (Rules o f Procedure for Meetings and Conferences, Rule 42).23 
Unless otherwise provided, substantive decisions, recommendations and resolutions are adopted by 
a two thirds majority o f the Parties present and voting (Rule 43), whereas procedural decisions are 
taken by simple majority (Rule 43). Voting is understood to come into play only when consensus 
cannot be reached;24 it arguably is, then, the exception and not the rule, as can be proved by a quick 
examination o f the frequency o f  voting during the Meetings o f the Parties.
With the tacit agreement o f  two thirds o f the Parties, non-parties, such as states members 
o f the UN or its specialised agencies (Rule 6), the UN and its specialised agencies (Rule 7), any 
interested intergovernmental organisation (Rule 8(1.A)), and any international non-governmental
22 Sec UNEP, Report o f  the Second Meeting o f  the Contracting Parlies to the Convention for the Protection o f  the 
Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and its related Protocols and Intergovernmental Review  M eeting o f  Mediterranean 
Coastal States on the Action Plan, Cannes, 2-7 March 1981, UNEP/1G .23/11, 1981.
23 As adopted and amended at M eetings o f  the Parties, see UNEP/IG.14/9, 1979, Annex VII; UNEP/1G.23/1 1, 1981, 
Annex VII; UNEP/IG .43/6, 1983, Annex XI; and UNEP(OCA)/M ED IG. 1/5, 1989, Annex V (3.5).
24 Sec UNEP, Report o f  the Intergovernmental Review Meeting o f  Mediterranean Coastal States and First Meeting o f  
the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and its Related 
Protocols, UNEP/IG .14/9, 1979, Annex IV, p.3.
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organisation with a direct concern in the protection o f the Mediterranean (Rule 8(1.B)) could 
acquire observer status, i.e. participate in Meetings without a right to vote and present any 
information or report relevant to the objectives o f the Convention. At the 1995 revision o f the 
Barcelona Convention, this has been formally endorsed in new Article 20.
Attendance at the Meetings is usually very high; with the exception o f  Libya and Lebanon, 
the rest o f the countries practically never fail to send a delegation. It is also noteworthy that several 
NGOs observe every Meeting; for instance, the Ninth Meeting o f the Parties was observed by an 
impressive twenty-nine NGOs, ranging from Greenpeace International to the European Chemical 
Industry Council and the Mediterranean Association to Save the Sea Turtles.25
As is increasingly the case in environmental treaties which are to operate for a long period
o f time, the Meeting o f the Parties is the organ that keeps under review the implementation of the
Convention (Art. 18(2)). More specifically, it has:
To review generally the inventories carried out by the Parties and competent international 
organisations on the state o f marine pollution and its effects in the Mediterranean;
• To consider reports submitted by the Parties under article 26;
• To adopt, review and amend as required the Annexes to the Convention and the Protocols,
in accordance with a procedure laid down in Article 17;
• To make recommendations regarding the adoption o f any additional protocols or any 
amendments to the Convention or the Protocols in accordance with articles 15 and 16;
• To establish working groups as required to consider any matters related to the Convention
and the Protocols and Annexes;
• To consider and undertake any additional action that may be required for the achievement
o f the purposes o f the Convention and the Protocols; and
To approve the Programme Budget.
Meetings o f the Parties of the Protocols are held in conjunction with that o f the Barcelona 
Convention and have corresponding tasks (Dumping Protocol, Art. 14; Emergency Protocol, Art. 12; 
Athens Protocol, Art. 14; Offshore Protocol, Art.30; Hazardous Waste Protocol, Art. 15).
As the rules on land-based sources are in particular need o f evolution and further 
elaboration, the Meeting o f the Parties of the Athens Protocol, besides its general duty to keep under 
review the implementation o f  the Protocol, to consider information submitted by the Parties, to 
revise and amend Annexes and to take any other appropriate action, is in particular responsible for 
the formulation and adoption o f programmes and measures by a two-thirds majority; the adoption 
o f common guidelines, standards or criteria; and the issuing o f recommendations (Arts. 14 and 
15(1)); the same pattern is followed in the Hazardous Wastes Protocol (Arts. 15 and 16). However,
25 See UNEP, Report o f  the Ninth Ordinary M eeting o f  the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection 
o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and Related Protocols, Barcelona, 5-8 June 1995, UNEP(OCA)M ED IG.5/16, 
8 June 1995, Annex 1, pp.27-36.
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it is not clear to what extent these resolutions, recommendations and decisions are binding, at least 
on those found in the minority in each instance; it has, in fact, been argued that it is a common 
understanding that the said acts o f the Meetings, unless otherwise provided as in the course of 
adopting or amending Annexes, do not constitute legally binding acts in a strict sense, and that they 
are, more than anything else, political understandings and/or undertakings, which, thus, do not 
demand specific performance susceptible to compliance control.26
Having said that, point (vi) above shows that the functions enumerated in the Convention 
are merely indicative; the Meeting o f the Parties may and should do whatever it takes to ensure 
effective implementation o f  the agreed rules. Hence, it is vested with considerable discretion and 
power which, if used effectively, can contribute to better performance by states o f their contractual 
obligations. An illustration o f this power is provided by a recommendation adopted at the Sixth 
Meeting o f the Parties authorising the Secretariat to address an appeal to the Parties urging them to 
ratify the Basel Convention on the Control o f  Transboundary M ovement o f  Hazardous Wastes, to 
prepare an assessment o f the nature o f such movements in the M editerranean including transit 
movements, to suggest a mechanism to assist the Parties in monitoring the movement o f hazardous 
wastes in and through the Mediterranean and their disposal, and finally to prepare a draft legal 
instrument on the subject.27
The provisional procedure o f preliminary consultation in relation to the Dumping Protocol, 
as was developed over a period of years, provides another example o f how this discretionary power 
has operated in practice: The Fourth Meeting of the Parties laid down definitions of the expressions 
“non-toxic”, “ rapidly converted” or “trace contaminants” found in Annex 1 o f  the Protocol and went 
even further into something reminiscent o f  dispute settlement by recommending a provisional 
procedure in order to avoid misunderstandings between the Parties when these definitions are 
invoked to justify dumping.28 According to it, when a Party envisages dumping o f an Annex 1 
substance on the grounds that it is “non-toxic” or “ is rapidly converted” or it exists only as “a trace 
contaminant”, it must inform the Secretariat as soon as possible, and at least four months before the 
proposed operation is carried out, with all appropriate information. The Secretariat transmits this 
information to the other Parties which have one month to respond. If  a Party wishes to protest, it has 
to state the reason why it deems the particular activity to be detrimental and thus not allowable. It
26 See J.J.Ruiz, ‘The Evolution o f  the Barcelona Convention and its Protocols for the Protection o f  the Mediterranean 
Sea against Pollution’, in E.L.Miles & T.Treves (eds.), The Law o f  the Sea: New Worlds, New D iscoveries, 1993, p.217; 
and cf. 1992 Paris Convention, Art. 13(2), whereby decisions o f  the Commission are explicitly given binding force, while 
states still retain a discretion as to whether to opt out within a specified time-limit.
27 See UNEP, Report o f  the Sixth Ordinary M eeting o f  the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection 
o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and its related Protocols, Athens, 3-6 October 1989, UNEP(OCA)/M ED  
1G. 1/5, 1 N ovem ber 1989, Annex V, p .l
28 See UNEP, Report o f  the Fourth Ordinary M eeting o f  the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection 
ofth e Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and its Related Protocols, Genoa, 9-13 September 1985, UNEP/IG.56/5, 30 
September 1985, pp.35-9.
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may also propose other methods of conversion or disposal o f the wastes. This response is sent to the 
Secretariat which forwards it to the Party concerned and, if so asked, to the other Parties. Upon 
request o f a Party, the envisaged dumping operation is postponed, should this be possible, until the 
case is examined in a future Meeting o f the Parties. In the absence o f mutual agreement to refer the 
case to a future Meeting o f the Parties or to resolve the question bilaterally, the state envisaging the 
dumping activity notifies the others, through the Secretariat, o f the measures to be applied, giving 
the reasons that make the operation necessary, before the Parties consider the matter in a Meeting. 
In case the dumping operation has been carried out without an agreement on its necessity or on the 
manner it is to be executed, the Parties consider the issue in their next Meeting. Before the actual 
dumping takes place, the possibility o f convening an extraordinary M eeting upon request o f three 
fourths o f the Parties, pursuant to Article 14 o f the Protocol, is o f course open.
This is representative o f the instrument’s operation and elaboration after it is concluded. 
The more so, since the dumping recommendation stressed that this procedure could not substitute 
further efforts to improve the definitions o f the expressions cited. On the contrary, the experience 
acquired through this notification and consultation procedure can show the way to unequivocal 
interpretations of these formulations. Hence, this is not primarily a dispute settlement process, and 
certainly not one involving any binding decision. The recommendation was silent on the potential 
power o f the Meeting o f the Parties to resolve the matter in an authoritative way, that is to authorise 
or ban the operation, thus replacing the state which has jurisdiction over the activity, especially in 
case the M eeting is convened after the actual dumping has occurred. Rather it is the interaction 
itself, exchange o f information, reasoning by both sides, and exhaustive debate that is sought here 
in order to reveal flaws in the definitions and improve them. O f course, during this process, strength 
o f arguments and collective pressure will arguably ‘persuade’ a Party with a weak case, in which 
case one may speak o f a ‘soft’ dispute settlement mechanism. But the main effect is to 
internationalise what usually stays within the realm o f national domain, i.e. implementation of 
international obligations, especially when they do not directly affect other states, and remove a large 
part o f the concomitant discretion to interpret relevant rules. After the recent revision of the 
Dumping Protocol this procedure is henceforth inapplicable,29 but a similar consultation provision 
has been endorsed for instances o f emergency (Art.9).
Finally, one should note that at the 1995 revision o f the Barcelona Convention, there has 
been an attempt to spell out more concretely these broad powers o f the Meeting of Parties with 
regard to compliance control. Thus, new Article 27 stipulates that the Meetings shall - as opposed 
to the mere possibility that existed previously - assess compliance, albeit on the basis o f the Parties’ 
own reports, and “recommend the necessary steps to bring about full compliance...”. This provision 
is very significant, for present purposes, and will be thoroughly discussed in the next Section.
29 See supra, Chapter 2, pp.75-6.
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Between the periodic Meetings o f the Parties, the Bureau (Art. 19), composed o f six 
members elected at the Meetings observing the principle o f equitable geographical distribution, 
exercises the management of the system and takes interim  decisions: It reviews implementation o f 
MAP; supervises the work o f the Secretariat; follows the work o f the standing subsidiary bodies, 
ie. the Socio-Economic Committee, which reviews the socio-economic programmes o f MAP, and 
the Scientific and Technical Committee, with corresponding duties for the scientific and technical 
programmes,30 and o f the other institutional structures (MEDU/MAP, RACs etc.); decides on 
programme and budget adjustments, and on response in case o f emergency situations.3’
Finally, besides REMPEC,32 the other Regional Activity Centres (RACs) o f the MAP 
system are national centres carrying out regional functions on behalf o f the Mediterranean 
community, supervised by the Co-ordinating Unit in accordance with the decisions o f the Meeting 
o f  Parties. The ones most relevant to the present study are the Blue Plan (BP) RAC in Sophia 
Antipolis, France; the Priority Actions Programme (PAP) RAC in Split, Croatia; the Environment 
Remote Sensing (ERS) RAC in Palermo, Italy; and the Cleaner Production (CP) RAC, in Barcelona, 
Spain.33
5.1.2. Compliance Control at the Meeting of the Parties to the Barcelona Convention 
and Related Protocols.
The authority o f the Meeting o f the Parties to the Barcelona Convention to consider and 
undertake any action that may be required for the achievement o f the purposes o f the Convention 
and the Protocols (Barcelona Convention, Art.l4(vi)) has considerable potential for furthering and 
improving performance o f conventional obligations. Examples o f that broad discretionary power 
have already been given; one could here recall just one such instance, i.e. the detailed guidelines and 
work plan, issued in 1987, on the development of programmes and measures for the implementation 
o f the Athens Protocol.34 What is more, as Peter Haas has convincingly argued, ‘epistemic 
communities’ emerging within MAP institutions, i.e. national experts conferring regularly and thus 
developing a common culture and increased awareness, help develop stronger national pollution
30 Their establishment - in substitution o f  the meetings o f  national focal points for M ED-POL, ROCC, Blue Plan, PAP 
and SPA  - was decided at the Fifth Meeting o f  the Parties, see UNEP, Report o f  the Fifth Ordinary M eeting o f  the 
Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and its Related 
Protocols, Athens, 7-11 September 1987, UNEP/IG.74/5, 28 September 1987, p.24; their terms o f  reference are laid 
down in UNEP, Refocusing o f  the Mediterranean Action Plan on Environmentally Sound Integrated Planning and 
Management o f  the Mediterranean Basin, UNEP(OCA)/M ED 1G.1/Inf.4, 1989, Annex 111 and II respectively.
31 See UNEP, Report..., op.cit. n,30, Annex 1; and UNEP, Report o f  the Eighth Ordinary M eeting o f  the Contracting 
Parlies to the Convention for the Protection o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and related Protocols, Antalya, 
12-15 October 1993, UNEP(OCA)/M ED IG.3/5, 15 October 1993, p.5.
32 See supra , Chapter 2, p.88,
33 For the sake o f  com pleteness, it should be noted that there are two more RACs in the framework o f  MAP, namely 
the Specially Protected Areas RAC in Tunis, Tunisia, and the Secretariat for the Protection o f  Coastal Historic Sites in 
Marseille, France.
34 See UNEP, Report..., op.cit. n.30, pp.68-77.
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controls.35
But when it comes to direct and formal compliance control, it appears that Mediterranean 
states acting within the Meetings o f Parties remain rather unconcerned. It is true that various 
delegations usually recapitulate their country’s progress during the discussion that follows the 
Executive Director o f U NEP’ presentation o f a report on the implementation o f MAP in the 
preceding biennium, but that exercise remains on a rather political and hortatory plane. Although 
there are always distinct agenda items on the implementation of the Convention and Protocols, they 
have apparently never accommodated any debate on compliance as such, save frequent reference 
by the Co-ordinator to the failing reporting procedures and relevant recommendations.36 It is, 
moreover, notable that NGOs have not been particularly active in this respect, despite their observer 
status at the Meetings.37
That is certainly not what the negotiators o f the 1976 Barcelona Convention envisaged 
when they adopted Article 21, which read:
“Compliance Control.
The Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate in the development o f procedures
enabling them to control the application o f this Convention and the Protocols.”
This provision requires some special attention: On one hand, its wording is too general to 
signify any ‘hard’ obligation; the Parties “undertake to co-operate” with a view to developing 
procedures that are, however, left unspecified. Moreover, Article 18 had already designated the 
follow-up body, making Article 21 superfluous at first sight. On the other hand, as one has to 
interpret a legal text in such a way as not to render a part o f it useless, some meaning must be given 
to this provision. Hence, it could be argued that Article 21 created a separate obligation on each 
state, running parallel to that o f Article 14 which is addressed to the organ and not the Parties as 
such, to work with a view to devising suitable procedures for controlling compliance. This way, it 
stressed the importance o f a continuous supervision if the objectives o f the whole system are to be 
achieved, and at the same time admitted that relevant mechanisms were underdeveloped; in fact, the 
only concrete measure envisaged by the Parties at that time was a reporting procedure.
Notwithstanding the afore-mentioned mandate, no formal process to monitor compliance 
and enforce against delinquent states was put in place until the June 1995 revision Conference,38 
where the following formulation was adopted:
“Article 27. Compliance Control.
35 See P.Haas, Saving the M editerranean - The P olitics o f  International Environm ental Cooperation, 1990, esp. at 
pp.155-64 and 224-47.
36 See infra, p.203.
37 Notwithstanding a process o f  Secretariat consultation with NGOs focussing on the activities and prospects o f  MAP,
see, e.g., UNEP, Report o f  the Consultation with Non-Governmental Organizations, UNEP(OCA)/M ED W G.l 6/3, 1990.
3!f Under the 1987 Programme Calendar, development and adoption o f  such procedures was to be completed by 1990, 
see UNEP, Report..., op.cit. n.30, p.31, but that target was never achieved.
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The Meetings of the Contracting Parties shall, on the basis o f  periodical reports 
referred to in Article 20 and any other report submitted by the Contracting Parties, assess 
the compliance with the Convention and the Protocols as well as the measures and 
recommendations. They shall recommend, when appropriate, the necessary steps to bring 
about full compliance with the Convention and the Protocols and promote the 
implementation o f the decisions and recommendations.”
One cannot help noticing that this ‘procedure’ is by no means new, or even a ‘compliance 
control procedure’ proper. As a matter o f fact, it does not contain a single element that does not 
already exist under Article 18 o f the Barcelona Convention. When trying to discover the reasons 
behind such conspicuous inability/unwillingness to address the issue, one is faced with a notable 
absence o f references. The legislative history o f both the old and the new provisions is indeed very 
hard to trace. In fact, there are no accessible detailed records o f the 1976 or the 1995 Conference, 
so research has to be confined to the reports o f Conferences and Meetings o f Experts that examined 
amendments to the Convention and Protocols. From these, it can be seen that the initial (1994) 
revision proposal submitted by the Secretariat envisaged a special organ,39 preferably the Secretariat 
itself, which would
“be vested with the authority:
(a) to assess, on the basis o f periodic reports o f Article 20 or o f any other report, their 
compliance with the Convention, its Protocols and the Decisions and Recommendations 
adopted by the Meetings;
(b) to decide upon the steps to bring about full compliance and to assist a Contracting party 
to carry out its duties.”40
This suggests an increased appreciation by the Secretariat o f the lack o f specific, international and 
national, reporting and compliance-control mechanisms, “which are indispensable if the Barcelona 
system wants to improve its effectiveness”.41 However, the proposal was not favourably met,42 and 
was eventually redrafted it in its present form.43 The formulation adopted does not seem to have 
generated much discussion. In fact, the Legal Counsellor o f MAP who was actually responsible for 
drafting the provision admits that the final version is no more than an attempt to reproduce the
3y See UNEP, Proposed Amendments to the Convention for the Protection o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution 
and its Related Protocols, UNEP(OCA)/M ED W G.82/3, 1994, p.22.
4U Cf. the respective article o f  the 1992 Paris Convention for the Protection o f  the Marine Environment o f  the North- 
East Atlantic: “ Article 23. Compliance. The Commission shall: (a) on the basis o f  periodical reports... and any other 
report submitted by the Contracting parties, assess their compliance with the Convention and the decisions and 
recommendations adopted thereunder; (b) when appropriate, decide upon and call for steps to bring about full 
com pliance with the Convention, and decisions thereunder, and promote the implementation o f  recommendations, 
including measures to assist a Contracting party to carry out its obligations.”
41 See UNEP, Results and Analysis o f  the Meeting o f  the Legal and Technical Experts to Examine Amendments to the 
Barcelona Convention and its Related Protocols and the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP)(prcpared by the Secretariat), 
15 December 1994, p.4.
42 See UNEP, Report o f  the M eeting o f  Legal and Technical Experts to Examine Amendments to the Barcelona 
Convention and its Related Protocols and the Mediterranean Action Plan (M AP), UNEP(O CA)/M ED W G.82/4, 1994, 
p.7.
43 See UNEP, Proposed Amendments to the Convention for the Protection o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution, 
UNEP(OCA)/M ED W G.91/3, 1995, p. 10.
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relevant article o f the 1992 Paris Convention, in a way that would be acceptable to the Barcelona 
Parties.44 In this endeavour, the most important elements o f a distinct non-compliance procedure, 
i.e. the authority o f an organ other than the Parties themselves to assess and decide - as compared 
to issuing recommendations - on compliance issues, together with the possibility o f providing 
assistance to states faced with difficulties, were done away with. The only innovatory element 
retained from the initial proposal was the provision o f Article 14(2), whereby “ [t]he Secretariat may, 
upon request from a Contracting Party, assist that Party in the drafting o f environmental legislation 
in compliance with the Convention and the Protocols” . The qualitative difference between what had 
been contemplated and what was actually adopted is obvious: The full ‘authority’ o f the Secretariat 
to decide on measures to improve compliance and assist parties to that effect has been replaced with 
a mere advisory role, and that only upon request from a government.
In short, Mediterranean states have shown to date no willingness to endow their collective 
organ with anything more than a traditional ‘soft’ and informal supervisory function, let alone 
transfer such powers to a more independent expert body, such as the Secretariat. It is in fact only 
in the context o f MED POL monitoring, i.e. outside the formal, ‘hard’ treaty rules, that there is to 
date some indication of procedures being developed that have the potential to lead to more vigorous 
and meaningful compliance control, as will be shown below.
5.2. Supervisoiy Techniques in the Mediterranean.
The first essential prerequisite for a meaningful compliance-control system is the gathering 
o f relevant information, without which there is no factual basis to assess the extent o f non- 
compliance or its causes, and consequently no corrective measure can be contemplated.Such 
information enhances the transparency element that, as previously stated, is necessary for any 
effective control over compliance.45 The main sources o f compliance information are self-reporting, 
which is the most significant and widely used; inspections by government officials or independent 
third parties; citizen complaints;46 and ambient monitoring and research, either under governmental 
control or by independent bodies and experts.47
Self-reporting and state-controlled monitoring are those generally preferred by countries 
participating in environmental regimes as they do not involve overriding state powers and
4,1 From interview with the author.
45 See Handler Chayes et a i ,  op.cit. n.5, pp.81-3; and supra, Chapter 3, pp, 126-7. See also R.Wolfrum, ‘Means o f  
Ensuring Compliance with and Enforcement o f  International Environmental Law’, 272 Receuil des C o w s , 1998, Chapter 
II.
46 See infra, p.233.
47 See, e.g., 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.
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sovereignty.48 Both o f them serve a dual function, i.e. they provide information on implementation 
o f and compliance with international rules and feed back on the improvements needed.49
The importance o f these techniques in the context o f international marine pollution 
regulation is actually acknowledged in the LOSC, whereby states are urged to co-operate in 
promoting studies, undertaking scientific research and encouraging the exchange o f information and 
data with regard to pollution o f the marine environment, either at a global or regional levels, with 
a view to establishing the scientific criteria for the formulation o f rules and standards for pollution 
prevention and control (Arts.200-201). States are additionally encouraged to “observe, measure, 
evaluate and analyse... the risks or effects o f pollution o f the marine environment” (A rt.204(l)), to 
“keep under surveillance the effects o f any activities which they permit or in which they engage in 
order to determine whether... [they] are likely to pollute the marine environment” (Art.204(2)), and 
publish relevant reports (Art.205).
The application o f these information-gathering techniques in the Mediterranean context will 
be subsequently examined, together with another related mechanism, the co-operative regime of 
supervision under the Paris Memorandum on Port State Control, which importantly presents some 
additional features, as it goes beyond mere collection and exchange o f information to a type of 
enforcement action.
5.2.1. M onitoring o f  the Marine Environment.
Monitoring provides the necessary data to assess the state o f  a particular environment and 
furthermore produces information about three broad categories o f problems: model verification, to 
check the validity o f assumptions and predictions used as the basis for sampling design or permitting 
and for evaluation o f management alternatives; trend monitoring, to identify and quantify longer- 
term environmental changes anticipated as possible consequences o f  human activities; and last but 
not least, compliance control, to ensure that activities are carried out according to regulations and 
permit requirements.50 The first two categories ideally form the basis o f international regulation of 
the sector monitored.
However, this technique has important limitations.51 Hence, in the face o f multiple and 
complex impacts, monitoring sometimes fails to provide adequate information for decision-making, 
resolve controversies related to specific discharges, and ensure environmental protection and 
restoration. Furthermore, it is frequently difficult to quantify and interpret observed effects in terms
48 See Sachariew, op.cit. n . l , p.40.
4<J See ib id , pp.32-3, 35-6 and 41.
50 See Committee on a Systems Assessm ent o f  Marine Environmental Monitoring, Marine Board, Commission on 
Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council, M anaging Troubled W aters - The Rote o f  Marine 
Environm ental M onitoring , 1990, pp.8 and 20.
51 Ibid, pp. 15-6.
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meaningful to society, as they are not usually closely linked with research programmes or other 
types o f pollution information designed to identify sources and understand the transport, fate, and 
effects o f effluents or to elucidate natural environmental processes. Besides, monitoring programmes 
are often not designed to address public concerns directly or to provide information needed by 
managers or public policy makers. Meaningful communication with, and participation o f  the public 
and decision-makers in the development of monitoring schemes is thus rarely achieved.
Having said that, even when compliance control is not explicitly mentioned, monitoring, 
although not providing compliance assessment in legal terms, becomes a means o f supervision in 
all those instances where an environmental agreement contains specific obligations for its parties. 
What is monitored, then, is not only the condition o f a given environment, but also its response to 
control measures already put into practice and the degree o f achievement o f  the objectives set by 
the legal instrument.52 O f course, to fulfil this function, monitoring has to be part o f a regime 
involving more or less concrete rules and establishing an organ competent to receive monitoring 
results and to review treaty implementation;53 consequently, it is directly relevant to assessing 
compliance only when international law mandates either quantitative standards or specific 
technologies, as Chayes and Chayes rightly point out using the example o f  the primary choice of 
quality objectives rather than emission standards in the Athens Protocol.54
All international instruments applicable in the present context include some sort o f 
monitoring scheme. The London Convention Parties, for instance, are required to monitor, 
individually or jointly, the condition o f the sea to demonstrate compliance o f  their at-sea dumping 
and incineration practices with the overall intent o f the Convention and the requirements of the 
Annexes (A rt.V I(l)(d) and Resolution LDC 36(12)). A t the same time, the Scientific Group on 
Dumping is continuously working towards identifying principles that should govern monitoring 
programmes, as well as more practical and relevant techniques. But the prime example o f systematic 
monitoring is provided by the 1979 Geneva Convention which established an ambitious co­
operative programme for the monitoring and evaluation o f the long-range transmission o f air 
pollutants in Europe (Art.9), supported by long-term financing as determined in the 1984 Protocol.
If  one turns to the MAP context, monitoring of the marine environment is principally 
carried out under the Co-ordinated Pollution Monitoring and Research Programme (MED POL).
52 ibid, pp.36-7. In this vein, the Fifth Consultative Meeting o f  the London Convention defined ‘monitoring’ as “...the 
assessment o f  changes in the marine environment caused by dumping operations. This com prises two components: 1. 
M onitoring for the purposes o f  surveillance o f  the marine environment is meant as the assessm ent o f  the spatial and 
temporal changes in the distribution, fates and effects o f  contaminants introduced by specific dumping operations; and 
2. M onitoring as part o f  scientific investigation and research programmes is aimed at increasing knowledge o f  the 
processes that control the transport, fates and effects o f  contaminants released to the marine environment through 
dumping”, see LDC V/12, para.4.17.
53 Chayes & Chayes, op.cit. n .l ,  p.37.
M See ibid, pp. 187-8; and supra, Chapter 2, p.63.
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This Programme started with just seven pilot projects (MED POL - Phase I),55 “due to limitations 
in facilities and scarcity o f trained scientists”,56 and involved more than eighty national research 
centres in sixteen Mediterranean states. In 1981, the Long-term Pollution Monitoring and Research 
Programme (MED POL - Phase II) was initiated,57 covering twelve research projects, essential in 
providing the technical background for the adoption o f concrete measures, especially with regard 
to land-based pollution,58 and four different but complementary monitoring activities; monitoring 
o f sources o f pollution; monitoring o f coastal areas, including estuaries; monitoring o f offshore 
reference areas; and monitoring o f transport o f pollutants through the atmosphere; data quality 
assurance; and assistance.
MED POL II has been substituted by MED POL - Phase III in 1996.59 At that stage of 
maturity, which will last until the year 2005, effort is concentrating on monitoring o f and research 
on contaminants and pollutants in the marine and coastal environment and interpretation/assessment 
o f the relevant results; generation o f information on the sources, levels, amounts, trends and effects 
o f marine pollution; development o f capabilities for assessing the present and future state o f the 
marine environment; formulation o f proposals for technical, administrative and legal programmes 
and measures for the prevention and/or reduction o f  pollution; strengthening o f capabilities o f the 
national institutions; and assistance to Parties for the implementation o f  recommendations adopted.
Most importantly for present purposes, MED POL III acknowledges compliance control as 
one o f its central objectives.60 Hence, it intends to monitor, on a continuous basis, the 
implementation o f action plans, programmes and measures for the control o f pollution adopted or 
recommended by the Contracting Parties; to identify problems experienced in the implementation 
o f the above, and formulate proposals that may assist in overcoming these problems; and to keep 
the Parties regularly informed about the status o f the implementation o f the adopted action plans, 
programmes and measures. This is going to be achieved through analysis and evaluation at a 
national, sub-regional or regional level o f  data and information generated by the Parties; compliance 
monitoring programmes carried out by national MED POL collaborating institutions; analysis and
55 Namely baseline studies and monitoring o f  oil and petroleum hydrocarbons in marine waters; o f  metals, particularly 
mercury, in marine organisms; and o f  DDT, PCBs and other chlorinated hydrocarbons in marine organisms; effects o f  
pollutants on marine organisms and their populations; and on marine communities and ecosystem s; coastal transport o f  
pollutants; and coastal water quality control (M AP, 11(2)).
5t> MAP, 11(2). Professor Raftopoulos sees the necessity o f  a pilot phase as a 'system constraint’. It is coupled with the 
need to transfer environmental technology to those o f  the participating states that are incapable o f  meeting the kind o f  
concerted action required by this component (social constraint), see E.Raftopoulos, The B arcelona Convention and  
Protocols; The M editerranean Action Plan Regime, 1993, p.6.
57 See UNEP, op.cit. n.22, Annex V.
58 See supra, Chapter 2, pp.64-5, The main findings are described in UNEP/ECE/UN1DO/FAO/UNESCO/WHO/1AEA, 
Pollutants from Land-based Sources in the Mediterranean, UNEP Regional Seas R eports and Studies N o.32, UNEP,
1984.
5'J See UNEP, Report o f  the Extraordinary Meeting o f  the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection o f  
the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and its Protocols, UNEP(OCA)/M ED 1G.8/7, 2 August 1996, Annex IV.
60 Ibid, pp. 19-22
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evaluation o f  data and information received through the national co-ordinators from national 
compliance monitoring programmes; target-oriented research in support o f national compliance 
monitoring programmes; and preparation o f relevant consolidated reports. Significantly, assistance 
is to be provided through the Secretariat to developing countries requesting training o f their national 
experts, or technical advice to their national institutions participating in monitoring the effectiveness 
o f the implementation o f pollution control measures and reporting on national compliance thereon. 
This is by far the most straightforward acknowledgment o f the importance o f compliance control 
that the MAP Parties have ever come up with; it is not inconsequential, however, that this has been 
achieved in the context o f a monitoring programme and not o f the formal legal regime laid down 
in the Barcelona Convention and Protocols.
Note should also be made o f the operation o f a series o f sub-regional arrangements in the 
M editerranean which establish additional fora, namely jo in t commissions, for the exchange of 
information, and deliberation o f local marine pollution issues. There are three such instruments in 
the region: The 1974 Agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia on Co-operation for the Protection 
o f the Waters o f the Adriatic Sea and Coastal Zones from Pollution; the 1976 Agreement between 
Italy, France and Monaco concerning the Protection o f the Waters o f the Mediterranean Shores and 
covering most o f the contracting parties’ waterfront, i.e. the Ligurian Sea (also known as the 
RAMOGE project); and the 1979 Agreement for the Protection o f the Ionian Sea Waters signed by 
Italy and Greece; while a new one concerning the Sicilian/Tunisian Channel (Italy, Malta and 
Tunisia) has been under consideration at least since 1987.61
The principal value o f these early instruments is that, in their application, they officially 
involve in the planning and decision-making process the Mediterranean “epistemic community” - 
either in the form o f non-governmental organizations, such as the International Commission for the 
Scientific Exploration o f the Mediterranean Sea (ICSEM) and the Federation of Institutions 
Concerned with Studies o f the Adriatic, or national laboratories,62 a trend fully developed within 
MAP.
As a matter o f fact, the legal instruments of MAP do not include compliance monitoring 
among the distinct monitoring duties they enunciate. More specifically, under the Barcelona 
Convention, the Parties must “endeavour to establish” complementary or jo in t programmes and a 
pollution monitoring system for the area (Art. 12(1)). In this context, provision is made for special
61 See UNEP, Report..., op.cit. n.30, p.25. There also other activities that have not acquired formal legal status, such 
as the 'Adriatic initiative’ launched by Italy and involving a process o f  bilateral and multilateral co-operation in co­
ordination with MAP activities in order to protect the environment o f  the Adriatic Sea, sec UNEP, op.cit. n.27, p.6 and 
Annex V, p.21. In this context Italy and Yugoslavia implement a sub-regional joint programme for the protection and 
development o f  the Adriatic..
62 See B.Boxer, ‘Mediterranean Pollution: Problem and R esponse’, 10 O.D.I.L., 1982, p,334; and Haas, op.cit. n.35, 
pp. 148-9.
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annexes prescribing common procedures and standards for pollution monitoring (A rt.l2(3)).63
Particular monitoring and research activities are called for under the Athens Protocol. In 
fact, monitoring has to be carried out at the earliest possible date, within the framework o f Article 
12 o f the Convention, in order to systematically assess the levels o f pollution along Mediterranean 
shores, in particular with regard to activities and sources to be controlled under Annex I; relevant 
information has to be periodically provided and the effects o f programmes and measures 
implemented under the Protocol evaluated (Art.8).
In the same vein, pursuant to the Offshore Protocol, the Parties undertake to require 
operators of offshore installations to measure, or to have measured by qualified experts, the effects 
on the environment o f the activities they carry out, in the light o f the nature, scope, duration and 
technical methods employed in these activities and o f the characteristics o f the area; and to report 
on them periodically or upon request by the competent authority for the purposes o f an evaluation 
by the latter, according to a procedure established in its authorisation system (Art. 19). This is a very 
interesting provision because it assigns the duty in question to the operator and not to public 
authorities, whilst entrusting supervision over this monitoring to the latter and apparently connecting 
relevant findings with the authorisation. In other words, both the performance o f monitoring and 
the resultant information on the quality o f the marine environment affected determine the fate of the 
actual offshore exploitation activities. The above requirement importantly complements the 
environmental impact assessment needed for the initial authorisation to be granted (Arts.5(1 )(a), 
6(1) and Annex IV);64 in this way, an extended and comprehensive system o f continuous control 
o f the impact o f offshore operations is put in place.
Be that as it may, despite the great amount o f effort and resources spent on M ED-POL and 
the undeniable progress in the development of a co-operative scientific and informational structure 
and understanding achieved, in 1985 the Executive Director o f UNEP deplored the non-existence 
o f a Mediterranean basin-wide monitoring network producing data on a regular basis.65 This 
situation, has repercussions on national infrastructure and organisation o f scientific monitoring 
which, in turn, forms an essential part o f the follow-up mechanism required in order to provide data 
on the actual implementation and the results achieved after specific pollution control measures are 
agreed upon - and o f course influences the quality and viability o f the rules themselves.
63 These criteria were rather developed in the context o f  MED POL - Phase 11, see UNEP, Long-term Pollution 
M onitoring and Research Programme (M ED POL - Phase 11), Basic Criteria for the Implementation o f  National 
M onitoring Programmes, Athens, 28 Sept.-2 Oct. 1981, UNEP/W G.62/3/Rcv, 1, 1982. In A nnexes 1 and 11, a model 
agreement between UNEP and each Party is laid down, with a view at assisting the latter implement their National 
Monitoring Programmes in a uniform manner. Although proposals on the establishment o f  joint monitoring areas were 
submitted at the Barcelona Conference, they did not meet with consensus and thus were abandoned, see B.de Yturriaga, 
‘Convenio de Barcelona de 1976 para la Protecci6n del Mar Mediterraneo contra laContam inacion’, 2(1) Rev.Inst.Eur.,
1976, p.94.
M And see infra , Chapter 8, p.334.
65 See UNEP, op.cit. n.28, Annex III, pp.2-3.
199
Specific monitoring requirements under the Athens Protocol similarly do not seem to have 
been effectively met. By 1987, for example, some Parties had yet to designate the national 
authorities responsible for pollution monitoring,66 which led the Deputy Executive Director o f 
UNEP to stress that essential information on the courses o f pollution and pollutants inputs into the 
Mediterranean are not being supplied by the Contracting Parties, although these sources (large cities, 
industrial complexes, rivers) are quite visible and extensive data on them are published in open 
literature.67 In 1993, it was again noticed that several countries - albeit not identified - were still 
w ithout a fully operational monitoring programme,68 while in 1997 the year 2000 was set as the 
target date for the effective operation o f a wholesome monitoring system in each country.69 What 
is more, as will be seen in the next Section, the Barcelona Parties do not transmit reports as they 
should; consequently, they do not communicate their monitoring data - assuming they conduct 
systematic monitoring at all.
5.2.2. Reporting.
This last point brings us to reporting, arguably the most indispensable element o f an
environmental treaty regime, especially when the latter calls for a continuous legislative,
administrative and enforcement effort at the national level,70 such as is required under the Barcelona
system. To date, reporting is indeed the principal technique used in the context o f the supervisory
function o f international environmental institutions - albeit with varied success.71 Its importance
was plainly acknowledged during the UNCED; hence, Agenda 21 (para.39.7) reads:
“The Parties to international agreements should consider procedures and mechanisms to 
promote and review the effective, full and prompt implementation. To that effect, States 
could, inter alia'.
(a) Establish efficient and practical reporting systems on the effective, full and prompt 
implementation o f international legal instruments;
The content o f the reporting obligation - usually on an annual or bi-annual basis - varies, 
but it usually covers at least measures taken in implementation o f the relevant international 
agreement. It may include statistical information on production, imports and exports; on the grant 
o f permits and authorisations, including relevant criteria; on implementing measures, and relevant 
decisions taken by national authorities; scientific information gathered by monitoring; and
66 See UNEP, Report..., op.cit. n.30, p.51.
67 ib id , Annex III, p.3.
6* See UNEP, op.cit. n .3I, p.7.
69 See UNEP, Report o f  the Tenth Ordinary Meeting o f  the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection 
o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and its Protocols, UNEP(OCA)/M ED 1G.11/10, 3 December 1997, Annex 
IV, Appendix II, p.44.
70 See Sachariew, op.cit. n.7, p.40.
71 See, e.g., US General Accounting Office, International Environment - International Agreements are not Well 
Monitored, G AO /RCED-92-43, January 1992, p.23; and Chayes & Chayes, op.cit. n .l , Chapter 7.
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information on breaches or violations by persons under the jurisdiction or control o f the reporting 
state. The essential objective o f the obligation is to furnish the collective organs with information 
on the various aspects o f the parties’ activities in implementation o f their commitments and the 
results achieved. In this context, the most important contribution o f  that data, especially in case a 
wholesome system o f compliance control is not in place, is to increase transparency and thus make 
it possible to exercise informal pressure towards more stringent observance o f  the rules commonly 
set.
Its main weakness, on the other hand, lies in the origin o f the report: It is the exact actor 
whose actions are under scrutiny that is endowed with the task o f self-reporting, which makes the 
whole process rather unreliable, as it is likely that each state will not reveal any major breach of its 
obligations when it engages in this exercise. One way to tackle this problem is to accept reports from 
other more independent and thus arguably more reliable sources, e.g. citizens, NGOs or even 
international inspectors,72 but it does not seem that this solution has gained any acceptance in the 
MAP system as yet. Another technique that can produce more reliable information is to design 
detailed standard formats that would restrict states’ discretion regarding the kind and extent o f 
information they may submit.
In fact, reporting has considerable potential for inducing compliance,73 because of its non- 
adversarial nature and the fact that it exposes non-compliant behaviour to public scrutiny, but, to 
this effect, it has to be viewed as an entire process involving gathering o f information and 
submission at a precise deadline; processing, study and assessment from an international body; 
formulation o f an aggregated report on implementation, which requires uniform and comparable 
national reports, ideally in accordance with an established format; and finally feedback from the 
international body on the contents o f the compilation.74 It is, therefore, worthwhile to look in some 
detail at the reporting requirements laid down in the international instruments that are applicable 
in the Mediterranean, as well as the actual operation o f this technique within respective regimes, 
namely MAP, MARPOL, the London Convention, and the Basel and Bamako Conventions.
5.2.2.I. Reporting under the Barcelona Convention and Protocols. 
According to Article 26 o f the Barcelona Convention, the Parties have the procedural 
obligation to transmit to the Secretariat reports on
(a) the legal, administrative and other measures taken by them for the implementation of [the] 
Convention, the Protocols and o f the recommendations adopted by their meetings;
(b) The effectiveness o f  the measures referred to in (a) and problem s encountered in the 
implementation o f  the instruments,
72 See Sachariew, op.cit. n.7, pp.48-9; and U.S General Accounting Office, op.cit. n .71, p.42.
73 See K iss & Shelton, op.cit. n .l, p. 100, who argue that “the strength o f  the system is both psychological and 
political”.
n  See Sachariew, op.cit. n.7, pp.40 et seq.
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in such form and at such intervals as the Meetings o f the Parties may determine. In preparation for 
the 1995 revision, the Secretariat proposed that the reporting provision should, inter alia, cover, in 
particular, preventive and enforcement measures,75 but that significant additional requirement was 
plainly rejected.
Monitoring results and data are also covered by the reporting obligation. The Secretariat has 
then to transmit all information to the other Parties and thus enable them to exercise control over 
each one’s performance through the standing organs. The Secretariat itself did not use to have any 
duty comparable to that o f the EC Commission,76 i.e. to report on the implementation o f the 
Convention and Protocols to the Meeting o f the Parties, until recent amendment o f the relevant 
provision (A rt.l7(vi)).
Under the Dumping Protocol, national authorities have to keep records o f the nature and 
quantity o f the waste to be dumped and o f the location, date and method o f dumping 
(Art. 10(1 )(c)).77 These records are to be transmitted to the Secretariat and through it to the Meeting 
o f the Parties (Art. 14(2)(b)).78 It appears that there are no particular problems in the implementation 
o f the Dumping Protocol, and that no dumping of matter prohibited under it takes place.79 However, 
not all states had designated the competent national authorities by 1985; the Fourth Meeting of the 
Parties urged them to do so, and also to transmit ‘nil’ reports, even when there are no permits 
granted or dumping activities taking place in order to have a complete picture o f the actual 
situation,80 but such a practice has not yet been adopted.
Under Article 6 o f the Emergency Protocol, each Party undertakes to disseminate 
information concerning the competent national organisation or authority responsible for combatting 
pollution o f the sea; the competent national authorities responsible for receiving reports o f pollution 
o f the sea and for dealing with matters concerning measures o f assistance between Parties; as well 
as new ways in which pollution o f the sea may be avoided, new measures o f combatting pollution 
and the development o f research programmes. This dissemination o f know-how is crucial for the 
strengthening o f the response capacity in less-developed countries. In the same vein, states have to 
communicate such information to the regional centre, which in turn will make it available to any 
interested country.
Mediterranean states have not had a record o f regularly reporting emergency situations to
75 See UNEP, op.cit. n.42, p.22.
76 See infra, p .229.
77 Cf. 1986 Noumea Dumping Protocol, Art. 14, whereby Parties have to instruct their maritime inspection services to 
report any incidents or conditions which give rise to suspicions that dumping in contravention o f  the Protocol has 
occurred or is about to occur.
7B See UNEP, op.cit. n.28, p.35; and UNEP, op.cit. n.31, Annex IV, p.8, for relevant recommendations.
79 See B.Vucas, ‘The Protection o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution’, in U.Leanza (ed.), The Internationa! 
Legal regime o f  the Mediterranean Sea, 1987, p.429. For example, six states had reported dumping by special or general 
permits by 1985, and there were no reported cases o f  emergency dumping
8U See UNEP, op.cit. n.28, pp.32-3.
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REMPEC; that is why, in 1987, they agreed that they should  report at least all spillages or 
discharges o f oil in excess o f 100 cubic metres as soon as they have knowledge o f them using a 
Standard Alert Format.81 Moreover, they reaffirmed that each state should  update annually the 
information provided to REMPEC on national organisation and the competent authorities in charge 
o f combatting marine pollution; specific national regulations aimed at preventing accidents likely 
to cause marine pollution; national regulations regarding the use o f products and combatting 
techniques; bilateral or multilateral agreements signed with other Mediterranean Parties; research 
programmes, experiments and major exercises on the various aspects o f marine pollution response; 
and purchase o f major items o f  equipment.82
Submission by states o f information on measures taken, results achieved and difficulties 
encountered is also the favoured follow-up method o f the Land-Based Sources Protocol (Art. 13). 
Such information must include, among others, statistical data on the authorisations granted under 
Article 6; data resulting from monitoring; quantities o f pollutants discharged; and programmes and 
measures implemented in implementation o f the substantive provisions.83 M oreover, when specific 
measures or criteria are adopted, they are usually accompanied by a concrete requirement to provide 
the Secretariat with “the fullest information possible” on legislation and administrative measures 
on existing national standards and criteria, on measures taken in implementation o f the above, and 
o f relevant monitoring data.84
Lastly, the M eeting o f  the Parties to the Offshore Protocol has a mandate to determine 
procedures for the submission and collection o f information that the Parties will provide regarding 
measures taken, results achieved, and the difficulties encountered in the application of the Protocol 
(Art.25). Almost identical wording is adopted in Article 11 of the Hazardous Waste Protocol, which, 
however, includes another - arguably more significant - relevant provision, whereby “any Party 
which has a reason to believe that another Party is acting or has acted in breach o f its obligations” 
informs the Secretariat thereof and, “simultaneously and immediately”, the state against whom the 
allegations are made (Art. 13(1)). What is more, the Secretariat is actually empowered to carry out 
a verification o f the substance o f the allegation through consultation with the Parties concerned and 
submit a relevant report to the Meeting o f the Parties (Art. 13(2)). Although it is not specified what, 
if anything, the latter is expected to do when it receives this report, this is a rather strong provision, 
obviously inspired by a similar procedure established under the Basel and Bamako Conventions 
examined below, but it remains to be seen how and whether it will be put into effect after the
81 UNEP, Report..., op.cit. n,30, p.84.
82 Ibid , p.86.
83 According to the work plan approved at the Fifth Meeting o f  the Parties, a procedure for the collection and 
submission o f  information from the Parties on measures taken, results achieved, and difficulties encountered in the 
application o f  the Protocol was to be formulated by MEDU and WHO by December 1986, see ibid, p.71, but this target 
was not met.
8,1 See, e.g., ib id , pp.79 and 81; and UNEP, op.cit. n.27, Annex V, pp. 10, 13 and 14,
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Protocol enters into force, and indeed whether it will lead to any responsive action in a manner that 
would add some real substance to the compliance-control provision o f the Barcelona Convention.
All said, despite these unambiguous undertakings, Mediterranean countries have to date a 
rather poor reporting record, as is demonstrated by the Meeting o f the Parties’ regular issuing of 
Recommendations urging states to submit annual or bi-annual reports. The same countries that adopt 
these Recommendations, however, fail to observe them when they return home.83 Hence, in the 
1985, 1987 and 1991 Meetings, the necessity of establishing an annual general report on measures 
taken in application o f the Convention and Protocols, ought to be presented to the Secretariat by the 
30th June each year, was reaffirmed.86 In fact, the target year on which all Parties had to submit their 
annual report was 1987.87 However, by 1991, the Executive Director o f UNEP was noting that only 
four countries were doing so;88 unfortunately he did not even name them, and thus we do not have 
even that small piece o f information considering that actual reports are not publicly accessible. In 
the same vein, the Programme Calendar 1986-1995 included the target o f developing reporting 
formats required under the Dumping, Emergency and Athens Protocol by 1990.89 To this end, the 
Secretariat distributed questionnaires, which were in turn not returned in time, if at all. By 1991, 
only France and Spain had completed the questionnaires on land-based sources sent to all Parties 
in 1989, whereas no answers were received to a letter asking for information on the implementation 
o f existing or new legislation related to the measures against pollution adopted by the Parties since 
1985.90
In short, although it can never be assumed that a failure to report directly implies that the 
negligent state is not respecting its substantial obligations, one can safely conclude that reporting 
under the Barcelona Convention and Protocols does not fulfil its proper role. Even in the rare 
instances when it actually takes place, it is not being put in any constructive use, nor is it available 
to the public, or used to increase transparency and collective pressure towards better compliance in 
any way.91
85 See UNEP, op.cit. n.27, Annex IV, p,4; UNEP, op.cit. n.31, p.7 and Annex IV, p.3.
86 UNEP, op.cit. n.28, pp.25; UNEP, Report,.., op.cit. n.30, p.51; and UNEP, Report o f  the Seventh Ordinary Meeting 
o f  the Contracting Parlies to the Convention for the Protection o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and related 
Protocols, UNEP(OCA)/M ED 1G.2/4, 11 October 1991, p. 15.
87 UNEP, Report,.., op.cit. n.30, p.27,
88 UNEP, op.cit. n.27, Annex HI, p.4.
89 id.
90 See ibid, Annex III, p.4 and Annex IV, p.2; and also UNEP, op.cit. n.31, p.7.
91 But even in the m ost developed regimes o f  marine protection o f  the North and Baltic Seas, measures to verify 
compliance are not very effective. Monitoring is mainly left to individual countries, and reports on national measures 
are scarce and voluntary, although there are standardised formats and I-IELCOM reports require information even on 
em issions from individual factories, see P.M.Haas, ‘Protecting the Baltic and North Seas’, in Haas, Keohane & Levy 
(eds.), op.cit. n .l ,  pp .169-70; but cf. O.Greene, ‘Implementation Review and the Baltic Sea Regim e’, in D.G.Victor, 
K.Raustiala. & E.B .Skolnikoff (eds.), The Implementation and Effectiveness o f  International Environmental 
Commitments: Theory and Practice, 1998, pp. 177-220.
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S.2.2.2. Reporting under MARPOL.
M ARPOL reporting requirements are very extensive indeed and vary considerably. The 
basic ones are found in the main body o f the instrument, but there is also a range o f relevant duties 
imposed in the special Annexes. The more typical reporting requirements are found in Articles 11 
and 12, whereby the Parties undertake to furnish the IMO with the texts o f laws, orders, decrees, 
regulations and other instruments related to the scope o f the Convention; a list o f nominated 
surveyors or recognised organisations to which the state has delegated the power to act in the 
administration o f matters relating to the design, construction, equipment and operation o f ships 
carrying hazardous substances, including specific responsibilities and conditions o f the authority 
delegated;92 a sufficient number o f specimens o f certificates issued; a list o f reception facilities, 
including their location, capacity and other characteristics; official reports or summaries thereof in 
so far as they show the results o f the application o f the Convention; and an annual statistical report 
o f penalties actually imposed for infringement o f the Convention (Art.l 1(1)). IMO has to notify the 
other Parties o f  the receipt o f all such communications and circulate all information, save the texts 
o f  legislative instruments (A rt.l 1(2)). Every time a casualty occurs, the flag administration can 
choose to supply IMO with information concerning the findings o f  the relevant investigation, if it 
considers it helpful in determining what changes in MARPOL might be desirable (Art. 12). Article 
4(3) further requires flag administrations to promptly inform the Party which has referred an alleged 
violation, and IMO, o f the action taken in response. Article 6 instructs all states to furnish such 
evidence to the flag state and reiterates the Iatter's obligation to report on the action taken (paras.3 
and 4).
In addition, when a state allows a ship to be exempted from the construction requirements 
o f Annex 1 and/or to apply an alternative, it must, within 90 days, notify IMO o f the exemption and 
the reasons therefore and/or particulars o f the alternative requirements; IMO has to circulate all 
information to the other Parties (Annex I, Regs.2(4)(c) and 3(2)). The same applies to special ballast 
arrangements in existing tankers (Reg.l3D (3)), and to alternative cargo transfer systems designed 
to reduce outflow o f oil (Reg.23(5)). Similar stipulations apply to equipment exemptions under 
Annex II (Annex II, Reg.2(6)). When carriage o f a liquid substance in bulk which has not been 
categorised is involved, the Parties involved must communicate the particulars o f the substance and 
o f the provisional assessment they have to make, not later than 90 days after carriage (Reg.3(4))
With regard to special areas, where all discharges o f noxious liquid substances are 
prohibited, states bordering these areas have to notify IMO - at least six months in advance - o f the 
collectively agreed date from which the special requirements shall apply; typically, this will coincide 
with the effective operation of reception facilities indispensable for the prohibition to be meaningful 
(Annex II, Reg,5(13)). The same applies to garbage reception facilities under Annex V (Reg.5(4)).
n  See also Annex I, Regulation 4(c); Annex II, Regulation 10(2).
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Importantly, each Party has to notify IMO for transmission to the other states concerned o f all cases 
where noxious liquid substances or oil reception facilities are allegedly inadequate (Annex II, 
Reg.7(4); Annex I, Reg. 12(5)). A similar stipulation is found in Annex IV on sewage reception 
facilities (Reg. 10(2)), and Annex V on garbage (Reg.7(2)).93
The record o f reporting under MARPOL has significantly improved if compared with its 
predecessor, OILPOL,94 but is still relatively poor; for instance, in 1994, MARPOL had been ratified 
by eighty-three countries whose fleets comprised over 90% o f the world merchant marine, but only 
a few - around 20% o f the Parties by 1992,95 especially industrialised countries, submit the 
mandatory annual reports that would furnish the appropriate data on which to evaluate 
performance.96
IMO has been criticised as failing to put into effective use the reports it does receive by 
analysing them or making data therein comparable,97 although it has admittedly been active with a 
view to improving the quantity and quality o f information it receives. In 1985, for instance, it 
established a standard reporting format to facilitate comparisons,98 while at its Thirty-second 
Session, it decided to develop different formats each focussing on distinct requirements; to set a 
deadline for submission; to insist that ‘nil’ reports, i.e. no incidents or inadequacies, are 
indispensable to complete the picture; to request the Secretariat to carry out periodic evaluations of 
the information submitted; and to issue at each MEPC session a list o f coastal and port states which 
have not submitted annual reports and flag states which have not responded to allegations.99
An analysis o f the reports transmitted since 1983, when MARPOL entered into force, until 
the end o f 1991 has been carried out by AIDEnvironment, an NGO based in Netherlands, and 
submitted to the MEPC by Friends o f the Earth International.100 This study has a limited scope, as 
it focuses on investigating reports under Articles 4(3) and 11, and information contained therein 
with regard to enforcement o f discharge regulations. Nevertheless, it is very helpful in identifying 
certain flows in feed-back on the application o f MARPOL that can be safely generalised, and is a 
good illustration o f how effective NGO involvement in the follow-up process can be.
The main conclusion o f the study is that the data submitted to IMO are, in general, lacking
93 See also Guidelines for the Implementation o f  Annex V, paras.5 and 6, whereby all information on the development 
and use o f  shipboard equipment for processing garbage and o f  relevant port facilities should be forwarded to IMO in
order to stimulate further studies and development by all Parties o f  the appropriate technologies.
94 See P.S.Dempsey, ‘Compliance and Enforcement in International Law - Oil Pollution o f  the Marine Environment 
by Ocean V essels’, 6 NW.J. o fln t'l L. & Bus., 1984, 459-561.
95 See MEPC, Overview o f  mandatory reporting requirements under MARPOL 73/78 - N ote by the Secretariat, MEPC 
36/21/3, 5 August 1994, p.L
96 Sec 1994(2) IM O New s, p. 13.
97 See, e.g., R.Mitchell, ‘Intentional Oil Pollution o f  the Oceans’, in Maas, Keohane & Levy (eds.), op.cit. n. 1, p.231.
9* M EPC/Circ.138, 15 May 1985; re-circulated as M EPC/Circ.228, 29 March 1990.
99 See MEPC, Report o f  the Thirty-second Session, MEPC 32/20, 24 March 1992, p.35.
1011 See, G.Peet, O perational D ischarges from  Ships - An Evaluation o f  the A pplication  o f  the D ischarge Provisions 
o f  the MARPOL Convention by its Contracting Parties, 1992.
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in both quantity and quality, which is attributed to incomplete reporting by most Contracting States, 
and to the standard format used. Therefore, one cannot assert with any certainty whether the entry 
into force o f M ARPOL has resulted in a decrease o f the number o f operational discharges o f oil 
from ships. This is more so in relation to Annex II substances: Since April 1987, when the Annex 
entered into force, only seven alleged discharges had been reported - one in port by Yugoslavia. 
Similarly, since the end o f 1988, when Annex V entered into force, only two Parties - the US and 
Germany - had reported discharges o f garbage, it is characteristic, in this connection, that the author 
o f  the study feels unable to resolve whether there are hardly any discharges o f substances like 
noxious chemicals or garbage, or whether states are not making adequate efforts with regard to their 
detection - although he feels that the latter is more likely. Furthermore, the analysis shows that in 
58,2% o f cases referred to flag states, reports on action taken had not been submitted. Again, one 
should be cautious when drawing conclusions on whether this implies non-compliance with the 
substantive obligations or with ju st the reporting duty.
What is unequivocal is that most Parties to MARPOL do not subm it statistical reports on 
penalties for violations o f the Convention. O f the 1,075 reports analysed in which the location of 
the violation was identified, only some forty concerned the waters o f  the Southern hemisphere. 
Importantly, three-hundred cases involve infringements that occurred in the Mediterranean Sea, 
which is the leading region from this aspect. Thus, although enforcement efforts seem to be largely 
made in the vicinity o f industrialised states, the Mediterranean as a whole seems rather well off in 
this respect.101
A closer examination o f the data shows that only six Parties had - up to 1991 - submitted 
reports for each year since the entry into force o f MARPOL, including two Mediterranean states, 
Greece and Cyprus. More than thirty Parties had never submitted a report to IMO, including 
Algeria, Lebanon, Spain, Syria and Tunisia, while M alta and Turkey had ju st become parties in 
1991. The rest had furnished information for one or a few years only.102 Interestingly, France had 
submitted a report only for the first year of M ARPOL’s application and Italy and Israel for the first 
three and four years respectively, and had stopped since; the reasons for this phenomenon are 
unclear, and the study does not offer any possible explanations.103
The study attempts to identify possible reasons, in addition to mere non-compliance with
101 But it seems that most o f  the ‘detection effort’ actually takes place in the Northern waters o f  the basin. Another point 
stressed in the study with regard to the methods o f  detection is that only three countries, namely Germany, Greece and 
Italy, had submitted regular reports indicating that port inspection was the source o f  detection, while a substantial number 
o f  countries, in fact active in the field o f  port inspection, had not submitted reports about these activities, not even 
through a joint report by the Secretariat o f  the Paris MOU, ibid, pp. 11-2.
102 For example, Egypt had reported for three out o f  the five years o f  membership, and Yugoslavia for three out o f  
eight.
103 It should be noted in this context that even when reports are filed, it should not be presumed that they provide 
complete information. Hence, Cyprus com pletes only one o f  the eight format sections, seem ingly that referring to flag 
state response action, Egypt two, and Greece an average o f  five. It is, furthermore, characteristic that only Greece 
completes the annual statistical report on penalties, see Peet, op.cit. n.100, Annex 14.
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the substantive provisions o f the instrument, for this poor performance.104 It suggests that it is 
probable that in some cases there was no information to be reported, when no discharges were 
detected and no ships flying the flag o f the countries concerned have been involved in alleged 
discharges, despite the importance o f even ‘nil’ reports for a realistic assessment o f the regime’s 
operation. There is also some evidence demonstrating that Parties have been active in the 
enforcement o f MARPOL, but have not forwarded relevant information to IMO; this is inferred by 
a number of reports where a flag state reacts to a referral by a port or coastal state, which apparently 
has been submitted to the former but not to IMO.
The MEPC took into account the findings o f this investigation and the recommendations 
to make reporting more practical and useful contained therein, and approved revised reporting 
formats, at its Thirty-fourth Session in 1993.105 The ensuing discussion at the FSI, in the light o f the 
mere sixteen annual reports received for 1991 and 1992,106 reveals the attitude o f Parties:107 Some 
delegations questioned the purpose and usefulness o f compulsory annual reporting, as the record 
had shown that only a small number o f states had responded over many years. In fact, the Sub­
com m ittee decided to refer the matter to the MEPC for consideration and decision on whether to 
continue this procedure or amend the relevant articles o f MARPOL in order to abolish it altogether.
However, MEPC took the view that there is no question o f changing MARPOL 
requirements for mandatory reporting, and urged compliance with the respective duties. In view o f 
the fact that, during 1993, the Secretariat had received complaints from Parties about what they saw 
as increased requirements o f the new formats,108 the MEPC discussed whether the high threshold 
o f relevant requirements may be one o f the reasons for the problem, and further requested FSI once 
again to consider existing arrangements with a view to identifying the nature o f difficulties 
experienced, including possible recommendations on assistance in training o f  personnel responsible 
for dealing with reports under M ARPOL.109
Once more, one can clearly see IMO putting a great amount o f effort into improving the 
effectiveness o f the reporting mechanism. However, absent, on the one hand, state willingness and, 
on the other, any inducing or coercive strategy, results are and are likely to remain scanty.
5.2.2.3. Reporting under the London Convention.
London Convention Parties are required to keep records o f  and send reports on the nature
104 See ibid., p.6.
105 See MEPC 34/23/A dd. 1, Annex 11; circulated as M EPC/Circ.266, 18 October 1993.
106 Including Croatia, Cyprus and Greece. By the end o f  1994 fifteen states had provided information for 1993, among 
them Croatia, Greece and Spain, see FSI 3/4/1, 28 Novem ber 1994, Annex 1.
11)7 See MEPC, op.cit. n.95, pp.2-3.
108 See FSI, Report to the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine Environment Protection Committee, FSI 3/4/2, 
28 November 1994, p.2. In the view  o f  several Parties, som e practical formats such as the one-line entry used in other
reports should be considered.
lw Ibid, at para.21.14.
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and quantity o f all matter permitted to be dumped, and the location, time and method o f dumping 
(A rt.V I(l)(c)), and on permits issued for the incineration o f wastes at sea (Annex I, Addendum, 
Regulation 9). Under the 1996 Protocol this requirement will also extend to the quantities actually 
dumped (Art.9.1.2.). Reports on the general permits issued have to reach the Secretariat annually, 
either directly or through an organ established under an appropriate regional agreement, whereas 
special permits have to be notified immediately after they have been issued.110 Accordingly, general 
permits issued by Mediterranean states could be channelled through the MAP Secretariat, and there 
is no reason why this could not be extended to cover special permits as well. This way, the problem 
o f discharging the reporting obligations could be relegated to the regional level, and dealt with 
simultaneously for both instruments.
Parties are also under a duty to transmit information on monitoring o f the conditions o f the 
seas for the purposes o f the Convention, carried out individually or in co-operation with other 
Parties and international organisations (Art.VI(l)); on the approval o f marine incineration facilities 
(Annex I, Addendum, regulation 3); on the dumping o f wastes or other matter without a permit in 
cases o f fo rce  majeure, or in any case which constitutes a danger to human life (Art.V (l)); on 
emergency dumping o f  substances otherwise prohibited to be dumped at sea (Art.V(2)); on 
measures adopted in addition to those required by the Convention itself with regard to ‘black list’ 
substances (Art.IV(3)), and to criteria and measures which have to be taken into account when a 
permit is issued (Art.VI(3)); and on the application o f the Convention to vessels and aircraft entitled 
to sovereign immunity (Art.VII(4)).
It is expected that when the 1996 Protocol enters into force the reporting requirement will 
also cover administrative and legislative measures taken in implementation o f the instrument, 
including a summary o f enforcement measures (Art.9.4.2.), as well as the effectiveness of these 
measures and any problems encountered in their application (Art.9.4.3.)
The Consultative Meeting o f the Parties has adopted reporting formats and procedures for 
the notification o f the above information, but it seems that these do not make a big difference with 
regard to actual performance o f relevant duties. It is characteristic that during 1991 and 1992 
approximately two thirds o f  the Parties had not lodged any reports - including ‘nil’ reports - with 
the Secretariat.111 However, the Consultative Meeting does not seem to envisage more drastic action
110 See LC, Reporting requirements under the London Convention 1972 - Note by the Secretariat, LC 17/W P.l, 3 
October 1994, p .l.
111 See LC, Report o f  the Seventeenth Consultative Meeting, LC 17/14, 28 October 1994, p. 13. By 1993 and since 
entry into force in 1975, the reporting record o f  the Mediterranean Parties was as follows: France had been reporting 
without failure throughout the period, as had Malta; Greece had only failed to do so once, and so had Italy and Spain; 
Croatia had provided information for 1992, which was the first year after it joined the regime, while for Egypt the 
Convention had just entered into force; Cyprus had not reported for the two years it had been a Party, and Slovenia had 
not sent any information for the first year it joined in; Monaco had missed out nine o f  its fifteen years o f  participation, 
while Morocco had missed ten out o f  fifteen, Tunisia three out o f  sixteen, and Yugoslavia had submitted three reports 
during its sixteen year participation; finally, Libya, which was a party since 1976 had never provided any information,
(continued...)
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to improve the situation than advising, from time to time, the Secretaiy-General o f IMO “to outline 
in writing to Parties their obligations...”.112
In view o f the above, it is not surprising that data compilation proceeds at a veiy slow pace, 
and by August 1994 had covered permits issued in 1985 and 1986.113 Bearing in mind that the 
reports include only permits issued in the years specified and thus do not reflect dumping during 
this period under licenses issued before, and also that some o f the activities authorised may have 
taken place after 1986, some tentative conclusions may be drawn on the pattern o f dumping in the 
Mediterranean. Firstly, it must be noted that o f the Mediterranean Parties having provided 
information for 1985, Greece, Monaco, Morocco and Tunisia have submitted ‘n il’ reports, whilst 
they all failed to report for 1986; similarly, Yugoslavia had not provided any data for both years.114 
Only France, Italy and Spain seem to be engaged in dumping operations, with Spain issuing only 
one permit each year involving an Atlantic site. France, which is the main actor in this context, has 
authorised dumping o f industrial waste only in the Atlantic, whereas more than one million tonnes 
o f dredged material have been allowed to be discarded in the Mediterranean during that two year 
period.115 Italy authorised the dumping of 154,898 tonnes o f dredged material in the Mediterranean 
in 1985, while in 1986 it allowed the disposal o f 197,391 tonnes o f T i0 2-production waste, but it 
did not communicate information on the site; it would nevertheless seem reasonable that it be 
somewhere in the seas around its coasts.116 On condition that this reporting reflects the real situation 
and that no uncontrolled dumping takes place in the region, one might infer from the above that 
dumping is - or at least was ten years ago - an issue only for the highly industrialised states o f the 
region and that mainly involving, ‘less hazardous’, dredged materials rather than industrial waste.
5.2.2.4, Reporting under the Basel and Bamako Conventions.
Under the Basel Convention, the Parties have the duty to supply information relating to 
wastes defined as hazardous in national legislation, in addition to these listed in the Annexes, and 
any requirements concerning transboundary movement procedures applicable to such wastes, that 
must be carried out within six months o f becoming a Party to the Convention, and any subsequent 
changes (Art.3); the designation o f the agencies acting as focal points and their competent 
authorities, which must be effected and notified within three months o f  the date o f the entry into 
force o f the Convention for them, and all changes regarding this designation (Art.5(2) and (3)); 
decisions to consent totally or partially to the import of hazardous or other wastes for disposal within
11'(...continued) 
see LC, op.cit. n .l 10.
112 See LC, Report o f  the Sixteenth Consultative Meeting, LC 16/14, 15 December 1993, p.7.
113 See LC, Final Report on Permits Issued in 1985 and 1986, LC.2/Circ.339, 8 August 1994,
IH Ibid, Annex 1, p.2 and Annex 2, p.2.
115 Ibid, Annex 1, p .3 and Annex 2, p.3.
116 Ibid, Annex 1, p.4 and Annex 2, p.3.
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the area under their national jurisdiction (Art.l3(2)(c)); decisions to limit or ban the export o f 
hazardous wastes (A rt.l3(2)(d); copies o f each notification concerning any given transboundary 
m ovement o f hazardous wastes and the response to it, when a Party that may be affected by that 
movement has requested so (Art. 13(4)); and any accidents occurring during the transboundary 
movement o f hazardous wastes, which are likely to present risks to human health and the 
environment in other states (Art. 13(1)).
The more general reporting obligation involves submission o f an annual report containing 
information on the designated competent authorities and focal points; on the transboundary 
movement o f wastes in which they have been involved, including the amount o f  wastes exported, 
their category, characteristics, destination, any transit country and disposal method as stated on the 
response to notification, the amount o f wastes imported with the previously mentioned details, 
disposals which did not proceed as intended, and efforts to achieve a reduction o f the amount of 
hazardous wastes subject to transboundary movement; on the measures adopted in implementation 
o f the Convention; on available qualified statistics which have been compiled by them on the effects 
on human health and the environment o f the generation, transportation and disposal o f wastes; on 
bilateral, multilateral and regional agreements and arrangements entered into; on accidents occurring 
during transboundary movement and disposal and on the measures undertaken to deal with them; 
on disposal options operated within the area o f their jurisdiction; on measures undertaken for 
development o f technologies for the reduction and/or elimination o f  production o f wastes; and on 
any other matters that the Conference o f the Parties will deem relevant (Art. 13(3)). Almost identical 
requirements are laid down in Article 13 o f the Bamako Convention.
Importantly, any Party which has information indicating that another Party is in breach of 
its conventional obligations is under a duty to inform the Secretariat thereof and the interested Party 
(Basel, Art. 19; Bamako, Art. 19). Relevant reports are transmitted through the Secretariat to the 
Conference of the Parties which is the body responsible for reviewing effective implementation of 
each Convention (Basel, Art. 15; Bamako, Art. 15). Interestingly, the Bamako Convention assigns 
the Secretariat with the power and duty to verify such allegations and submit relevant reports.
The latter instrument also provides for a ‘Dumpwatch’ (Art.5(4)), but its exact function is 
not determined; it is ju st stated that it has to be a national body and co-ordinate its activities with 
other governmental and non-governmental bodies. It seems reasonable to expect that these organs’ 
work would have some affinity with that o f the Secretariat in verifying alleged violations. In any 
case, as the Convention has just recently entered into force, all the above provisions have yet to be 
tested in practice.
On the other hand, the Secretariat o f the Basel Convention - soon after the latter’s entry into 
force (24 May 1992) - gave signs o f a commendable activity with regard to the gathering and 
transmission o f information provided by the Parties. Acknowledging the special importance of the
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information provided through reporting for the implementation o f the treaty rules, the Secretariat 
diligently compiles the information received and publishes it,117 for use “not only by its Contracting 
Parties, but also by third states, interested organisations, private sector, industry and NGOs”.118 This 
effort can serve as a guiding example for other environmental regimes, and especially those having 
to deal with technical and complex information o f the Basel type, and facing considerable 
difficulties in producing a comparable work, notably in the context o f IMO instruments.
Having said that, when one turns to the substance o f reporting under the Basel Convention, 
as carried out so far, a less ideal picture emerges. From the sixty-eight states bound by the 
Convention by 1994, thirty provided some kind of information pursuant to Article 13; only two from 
the then thirteen Mediterranean Parties appear in this list, namely Syria and Cyprus, which have 
submitted reports for 1993. The record is not impressive as far as the quality and quantity of 
transmitted information is concerned either. Thus, Syria only communicated its adoption o f a total 
ban on the import o f hazardous wastes;119 while Cyprus referred to a draft law and relevant 
regulations, whereby “the import o f hazardous wastes is to be strictly controlled”, without further 
specifications.120 The latter also provided some data on the quantities of hazardous wastes generated 
in the country; on the national measures taken for the reduction o f production o f such wastes; on 
the disposal options operating within its area o f jurisdiction; on a comprehensive study, in the 
framework o f M ETAP,121 concerning hazardous wastes management in the country, and on the basis 
o f which future measures are currently at the planning stage; and on a polluting incident that 
occurred in Cyprus in 1987, during transboundary movement and disposal o f PCB.122 However, the 
situation is improving with time; in the last report compiled by the Secretariat more or less complete 
data were received by ten Mediterranean countries, namely Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, 
Morocco, Slovenia, Spain, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.
Having examined all the reporting mechanisms o f the major treaty regimes applicable in 
the Mediterranean, a common overall pattern seems to emerge: Notwithstanding extensive relevant 
requirements and efforts within various institutions to facilitate and promote submission of reports, 
states prove disinclined to provide the required information; even when they do so, both quality and 
adequacy o f reports submitted is sub-standard. At the same time, the organs responsible to put data
117 UNEP, Basel Convention Secretariat, Reporting and Transmission o f  Information Required under the Basel 
Convention - Compilation o f  Information Received May 1992 - March 1994, U N E P/SBC /94/7, Geneva, June 1994; 
latest issue, UNEP, Basel Convention Secretarial, Reporting and Transmission o f  Information under the Basel 
Convention for the Year 1997, Basel Convention Series/SBC N o:99 /011, Geneva, October 1999.
llK UNEP, 1994, op.cit, n .l 17, p.i.
119 Ibid, p .6.
120 Ibid, pp.5 and 7.
121 See infra, Chapter 6, p.281-3.
122 UNEP, 1994, op.cit. n.l 17, pp.26, 25, 23, 16 and 18, and 22 respectively.
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gathered into effective use remain mostly inactive.
5.2.3. Co-operative Supervision - The Paris MOU.
Building on customary law-of-the-sea principles and the LOSC, fourteen Western European 
states decided in 1982 to put in place a co-operative network of maritime authorities in order to 
enhance the effectiveness o f their port control systems in dealing with sub-standard ships. Pursuant 
to the then-signed Paris Memorandum o f Understanding on Port State Control in implementing 
Agreements on Maritime Safety and Protection o f the Marine Environment,123 the maritime 
authorities o f each contracting Party have to maintain such a system and carry out methodical 
inspections on board ships, with the purpose o f ensuring that they comply with international 
standards set out in six conventions (Section 1.2),124 including MARPOL, and other listed IMO 
documents setting out procedures or guidelines (Section 2.1-2), without discrimination to flags.125 
It must be noted, however, that each port authority undertakes to apply only those instruments in 
force and to which the relevant country is a party (Sections 2.3, 8.1); consequently, the Paris MOU 
does not in effect create a uniform package o f standards, unless all states actively adopt the said 
instruments as part o f their domestic law, which is not the case as yet.126
It should also be clear that, although usually viewed as an enforcement mechanism, the 
Paris MOU is merely a regime o f co-operative supervision concluded among national maritime 
authorities, in view o f the fact that under this instrument no formal proceedings are opened or 
penalties imposed by port authorities in case a violation or deficiency is detected. That, o f course, 
does not preclude the exercise o f the port states’ enforcement powers in pursuance o f international 
conventions or national legislation,127 but the fact remains that the Paris MOU Parties simply 
undertook to co-operate in a harmonised system o f inspection and not to enter into new contractual
123 See generally G.C.Kasoulides, P ort State C ontrol and Jurisdiction: Evolution o f  P ort S tate Regim e, 1993. The 
Parties o f  the Paris MOU are the maritime authorities of: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, The Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, Finland, Ireland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain; in 1989 the USSR, succeeded 
by the Russian Federation, and in 1993 and 1994, Poland and Canada respectively joined the regime. There is also a 
number o f ‘co-operating maritime authorities’, namely o f  the USA, Croatia and Japan.
124 N am ely, the 1974 SOLAS, which lays down uniform rules o f  navigation, machinery, and in general construction 
o f  ships; MARPOL; the 1972 COLREG, which lays down rules and procedures for vessel conduct and movement, and 
authorises IMO to adopt non-mandatory traffic separation schemes; the 1966 Convention on Load Lines, which 
determines loading limits for vessels above a certain tonnage; the 1976 Convention Concerning Minimum Standards 
in Merchant Ships (ILO Convention 147); and the 1978 Convention on Standards, Training, Certification and 
Watchkceping for Seafarers, the last two aiming at ensuring that crews are adequately trained and that conditions o f work 
on board ships as such that risk o f  accidents “due to human error” are minimised.
125 On the discussion this provision has provoked, see Kasoulides, op.cit, n .I23 , pp.155-7.
126 Significantly, port authorities have to make sure that ‘no more favourable treatment’ is given to ships flying the flag 
o f  slates that have not become parlies to the various instruments (Section 2.4; Annex 1, Section 1.3), which means that 
these ships are expected to comply with the same international standards, see ib id , p. 152.
127 It appears that no such proceedings had been initiated at least during the first years o f  the Paris M O U ’s operation, 
see ibid, p. 158.
213
and binding obligations.128
In that context, their underlying objective was to effectively restrict operation o f sub­
standard vessels in Paris MOU waters, while at the same time leaving intact the primacy o f flag state 
responsibility for such compliance (Fourth preambular paragraph). To achieve this purpose, they 
take advantage o f the fact that the private actors targeted by international regulation habitually enter 
various jurisdictions in the course o f their business. Consequently, it is possible to directly supervise 
them, certify any breaches committed and communicate the relevant data to the other participants 
in the network, without awaiting for classic flag state action to be undertaken and reported through 
relevant treaty mechanisms.
The key points o f this regime are the duty o f inspection by qualified surveyors (Section 
3 .5),129 particularly o f ships which may present a special hazard, such as oil tankers and gas and 
chemical carriers, and o f ships that have had ‘several recent deficiencies’ (Section 3.3), and the 
power to detain a ship from proceeding to sea in case repairs are needed (Section 3.6-8).130 
Inspection basically consists o f checking the ship’s documents; further inspection action may be 
undertaken only if valid documents are absent or when there are ‘clear grounds’ for believing that 
they do not substantially meet pertinent requirements (Section 3.1), especially when a report or 
notification by another port authority, or a complaint by the master, crew member, or any interested 
person or organisation, has been received (Section 3.2). When inspection is concluded, the port 
authorities have to provide the master with a document o f a specific form giving the results o f the 
inspection and details o f any action taken (Section 3.10, Annex 3). Port authorities are in principle 
to abstain from further inspecting a vessel found faultless for a period o f six months (Section 3.4).
The Port State Control Committee (PSCC) is the main executive body o f the Paris MOU 
assigned with the general task o f reviewing the operation and effectiveness o f the arrangement, the 
promotion of the harmonisation o f relevant procedures and practices, the drawing up o f guidelines 
for carrying out inspections, the development o f procedures for the exchange o f information etc. 
(Section 6.3).131 SIRENAC (Systeme d ’Information relatlf aux Navires Controles) is the most vital 
element o f the regime and was initially laid out as an ‘open’ system allowing for considerable
128 See ibid, p. 151.
125 In this context, seminars for surveyors have been regularly organised, with regular financial assistance from the EU. 
They aim at promoting harmonisation o f  inspection procedures throughout the region and a forum  for experience 
exchange and discussion. Over the years the seminars have served to identify problems related to enforcement; in the 
event that such problems cannot be solved in situ, the matter is submitted to the PSCC, which then either makes a policy 
decision or refers the matter to IMO, see Paris MOU, 1992 Annual Report, p. 19.
130 There are in fact considerable variations between Parties in their detention frequencies and practices, see EC, 
Common Policy on Safe Seas, P ort State Control in Europe, 1993, pp.41-2.
131 There is also a Secretarial to assist the Committee and facilitate exchange o f  information (Section 6.4), and a 
Computer Centre, located at Saint-Malo, France, where all inspection records are inserted into a common file and thus 
made accessible to all Parties (Section 4, Annex 4). The system is still developing so as to permit quick and easy 
exchange o f  information and follow-up and eliminate duplicate inspections and delays o f  the same vessel, see 
Kasoulides, op.cit. n,123, pp. 150-1.
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freedom for individual operators to enter updates to it. Its operation, however, showed that 
procedures had to be strictly disciplined and harmonised to the maximum possible extent to make 
data comparable and useful.132 Under its completely re-designed phase, the system - which is now 
called SIREN AC-E and became operational in 1993 - is expected to become more user-friendly and 
refine the collection o f data and the resulting quality o f statistical material. It is interesting to note 
in this context that in order to improve mandatory reporting to the IMO o f port states’ interventions, 
as required by relevant instruments, and to alleviate the administrative burden on port states’ 
administrations, much effort has been put in adjusting the port state control inspection report into 
a format which may be used for dual purposes,133 in the hope to increase the number of port state 
reports to the IMO.
Having said that, access to the information gathered was initially resisted by the Parties, 
because “the... assumption that every detained ship would imply a sub-standard ship would not 
necessarily have to be valid”.134 Therefore, in principle only the overall data was released and no 
disclosures that could stigmatise owners or operators were made. Nevertheless, the demands of 
inter-regional co-operation, development o f SIREN AC-E, and increased political attention caused 
by accidents led to a reversal o f this policy:135 In 1993, it was decided that third parties with a direct 
interest in the operation o f a ship, such as flag states and shipowners, could be provided with 
relevant information against reimbursement o f  expenses incurred. In subsequent years, there was 
a further relaxation o f this process to the point that today detention lists can be found in Lloyd’s List 
and even on the Internet.
As far as actual operation o f the agreement is concerned, each port authority undertook to 
achieve an annual total o f inspections of 25% o f the estimated number o f foreign vessels which 
entered its ports during the preceding twelve month period, within three years from the coming into 
force o f  the instrument (Section 1.3). Although this target took a long time to be reached, it was 
finally realised in 1993.136 On the other hand, regional coverage, i.e. the percentage of inspected 
ships in the region as a whole, is thought to be around 85%. This is a rather large figure which has 
even led to countries in the periphery o f the region indicating that they find it increasingly difficult 
to select ships which have not yet been inspected - what is called the ‘end-of-the-Iine effect’.137
Now, under Section 3.3 o f the Paris MOU, priority in inspections is given to certain ship
132 To this effect, regular meetings o f  the competent officers are held, see Paris MOU, op.cit. n .l 29, p.20.
133 See ib id , p.25.
134 See Paris MOU, 1993 Annual Report, p. 19.
135 SQ d b id , pp. 19-20.
136 See Paris M OU, op.cit. n. 134, p.29.
137 See Paris MOU, op.cit. n.129, pp.4 and 32. In these ten years, som e 125,000 inspections on 95,000 ships had been 
carried out, while over 4 ,000  ships were detained for unseaworthiness. The cost to maritime administrations was 
calculated at ECU 20 million (=$25 million), whereas the shipowners loss o f  revenue due to detentions was estimated 
to amount to ECU 120 million.
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types, on the grounds that they involve intrinsic dangers related to the numbers o f persons on board 
or the nature o f the cargoes carried. The flag has not been a selection criterion which seemed 
inconsistent with the provision o f  Section 1.2. In view o f various suggestions, especially from the 
EC Commission to improve the effectiveness of port state control by making more selective use of 
available resources, the PSCC found it necessary to review the ‘non-discrimination as to flag’ 
principle.138 Hence, it is now not considered contradictory with this principle, if the parties identify 
ships or flag states “with a notorious deplorable safety record” as priority cases for inspection.139 
Nevertheless, it was decided that the assessment o f flag states liable o f being placed on the priority 
list should be carried out with extreme care and as objectively as possible; consequently, it was 
thought appropriate to nominate those states which had shown an above average detention record 
in the last three consecutive years. Assessment o f the priority list - which in the future seems likely 
to be based on other relevant criteria as well - is entrusted to a subsidiary organ, the Working Group 
on Harmonization,140 while final adoption rests with the PSCC. An amendment o f the Paris MOU 
to that effect was made, and the first list published in 1993.141 A M editerranean country, namely 
Syria, was the leader o f the relevant chart with detentions in 25% (51.85% in 1993) o f its ships that 
were inspected from 1991 to 1993 - as compared with an average rate o f 6.41% .142
As far as operational discharges are concerned, however, the Paris MOU does not fully 
utilise the LOSC provisions. Hence, under Section 5, port authorities are urged to collect evidence 
for infringements o f traffic separation schemes and discharge offences when requested by another 
authority and in relation to activity within the jurisdiction o f the latter, but they cannot prosecute in 
such instances, nor when they have obtain evidence o f high seas violations. Nonetheless, in the 
Fourth Ministerial Conference on Port State Control (Paris, 14 March 1991), it was decided to act 
on the control o f compliance with operational requirements, in order to address the results o f 
investigations o f recent major shipping disasters, which demonstrated that these were due to human 
failure, including non-compliance with or even non-existence o f adequate operational standards, 
rather than to failing o f shipboard equipment.143 IMO followed with Assembly Resolution 
A .681(17), which provides port states the first opening to exercise control on compliance with 
operational requirements, while formal amendments to MARPOL are under consideration. In the 
early stages after this evolution, most surveyors showed some reluctance, mainly due to inexperience
138 See ibid, pp.23-4.
139 See Paris MOU, Annex I, at Section 1.2 as amended
140 This is a working group to monitor implementation matters. It held its first session in early 1993, and is currently 
working on specifying uniform detention criteria, as different authorities adhere to different detention procedures, and 
a uniform definition o f  a 'sub-standard’ ship, see Paris MOU, op.cit. n.134, pp.22-3.
141 Ibid, p.49.
142 Syria is by no means the only Mediterranean country that figures on the list and is targeted as a priority case: 
M orocco (13.64% ), Egypt (12.57% ), Lebanon (12.50% ), Malta (12.26% ), Cyprus (10.83% ), Turkey (10,15% ) and 
Algeria (10.08% ) also have an unreputable record.
143 Paris MOU, op.cit, n .129, p.6.
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in this field, but as more experience is gained over the years confidence is being built.144
The overall lesson learned from the first fifteen years o f  the Paris MOU seems to be that 
no one region can eradicate the operation o f sub-standard ships by itself. The best possible result 
it could achieve is to keep them at ann-length, ready to re-enter only when the commercial benefits 
o f the shipowner exceed the risk o f his ships being detained. As soon as that happens, they appear 
to return in an even more deteriorated state.145 This also largely explains the increasing trend in 
detentions noted over the last few years. That said, the number o f inspections does not give an 
unequivocal indication o f the effectiveness o f the Paris MOU, especially due to the ‘at random’ 
pattern thereof.146 Generally, there is an increasing trend in delays and detentions.147 Deficiency 
rates, i.e. rates between the number o f deficiencies and the number of inspections or o f individual 
ships involved, also increase.148 This phenomenon is mainly attributed to deterioration o f an 
increasingly ageing fleet; whereas flagging out to flags o f convenience, and attempts to save money 
in manning and maintenance have accelerated it.149 Nevertheless, changes in detention procedures, 
and the more careful selection o f ships for inspection may also account for the trend,150 gradually 
making the Paris MOU mechanism more focussed and effective.
All said, co-operation under the Paris MOU, setting aside on-going shortcomings in 
computerising the system o f inspections and ensuring adequate information exchange,151 is 
positively evaluated.152 It must be noted in this connection, that Directive 95/21 concerning the 
enforcement, in respect o f shipping using Community ports and sailing in the waters under the 
jurisdiction o f the Member States, o f  international standards for ship safety, pollution prevention 
and shipboard living and working conditions (the Port State Control Directive), shares exactly the 
same objectives as the Paris MOU, i.e. to harmonise inspection and detention criteria and thus 
mitigate strategic selection o f  European Union ports by sub-standard ships,153 and effectively 
duplicates the provisions o f the latter so as to cover all Member States territory.
144 See ibid, p.21.
145 Ibid, p.5.
146 Sec also Paris MOU, op.cit. n . l34, p. 16, on the difficulties that the Working Group on Harmonization finds in 
assessing the regim e’s effectiveness.
147 See Paris MOU, op.cit. n . l29, pp.31-3.
148 MARPOL equipment flows - mostly related to Oil Record Books, retenlion-of-oil-on-board systems, oily-waler 
separators, and oil-discharge-monitoring-and-conlrol systems - gradually multiply as well; in 1993, they accounted for 
4.65%  o f  the total, see Paris MOU, op.cit. n .l 34, p.47.
149 See ibid, pp.30-2.
150 Ibid, pp.32-3. This is supported by the spectacular increase in the number o f  deficiencies noted in 1993 (48.46%  
o f  the total inspections).
151 See EC, op.cit. n . l30, p.43.
152 See Declaration o f  the 1986 Ministerial Conference on Port State Control - ‘Safe Ships on Clean Seas’, Paris MOU, 
1986/87  Annual Report, Annex 7; and Fourth Ministerial Conference on Port State Control, Declaration on Safe 
Operation o f  Ships and Pollution Prevention, 1991, reprinted in Kasoulides, op.cit. n.123, Annex V.
153 See E.M .Berggren, ‘N ew  EC Directive on Port State Control’, 5(2) R.E.C.I.E.L., 1996, pp. 181-2.
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The success o f  the Paris MOU has, moreover, led to wide-spread response to an IMO 
Assembly invitation to develop respective arrangements in other parts o f  the world.154 Such 
initiatives are being taken in the context o f  the 1992 IMO Global Programme for the Protection of 
the Marine Environment aiming at assisting developing countries in ratifying, implementing and 
enforcing international standards by building indigenous capacities.155 In this context, preparation 
began in 1994 for the conclusion o f such an agreement for the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, 
which would be a fruitful expansion o f the model in the entirety o f the M editerranean region, since 
it is apparently considered that the great gap in economic and infrastructure development in the 
South and the East do not allow for an actual adherence o f these countries in the European regime. 
The M emorandum o f Understanding on Port State Control in the M editerranean Region 
(Mediterranean MOU) was eventually signed in 1997 by maritime authorities o f Algeria, Cyprus, 
Egypt, Israel, Malta, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey,156 The Mediterranean MOU allows for an 
interim  period o f two years prior to its full implementation in order to put in place an effective 
system o f port state control in each participating country that would be able to carry out inspections 
at 15% o f the estimated total number o f foreign merchant ships entering the ports during the year. 
During this period, IMO and the European Commission are to support a technical co-operation 
programme to train surveyors and inspectors o f the countries involved.
Despite these positive developments, it is apparent that such a mechanism can only apply 
in the area o f shipping, as it is based on an assumption that the target o f supervision moves through 
various jurisdictions that exchange information and form a control network difficult to bypass. 
Unfortunately, in other areas o f marine pollution regulation, especially in relation to land-based 
sources, this course o f action is simply impossible, since polluting activities are carried out almost 
entirely within a single jurisdiction.
5.3. Non-Com pliance Procedures.157
The processes described in the previous Sections can be considerably tightened by 
introducing stricter and more formalised ‘non-compliance procedures’, which might involve, for 
instance, compulsory and more independent inspection and monitoring; introduction o f complaints
154 Hence, three similar agreements are in place to date, namely the 1992 Latin American Agreement o f  Cooperation 
on Port State Control (Acuerdo de Vina del Mar); the 1993 Asian-Pacific and the 1996 Caribbean Agreements for 
Cooperation on Port State Control, see F.Plaza, 'Port State Control: Towards Global Standardization’, 1994(1) IMO 
News, pp. 13-20.
155 See ‘IMO Global Programme Helps Fight against Pollution’, 1993(2) IM O N ew s , pp. 14-7.
156 See 1M O/FAX8/1997.
157 On the role o f  non-compliance procedures, see, among others, G.Handl, ‘Controlling Implementation o f  and 
Compliance with International Environmental Commitments: The Rocky Road from Rio’, 5 Colo.J.lnt'l Env'l L. & Pol'y, 
1994, pp.327-30.
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channels;158 increased use o f  independent data to supplement and correct national reports coupled 
with the establishment o f independent compliance review bodies;159 and/or firm organisational links 
between the different supervision techniques applied in a given treaty system so as to form what may 
be called a ‘supervision package’.160
The 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is, in many 
aspects, a very advanced international regime that pays particular attention to compliance control 
and enforcement issues. In this connection, it is indicative that it features provisions, in the form of 
trade restrictions, that make it enforceable even against non-parties (Art.4).161 Be that as it may, by 
1990 it was realised that the reporting procedure did not function as planned, as many Parties were 
not forthcoming with complete data. This provoked considerable discussion and even calls to extend 
trade restrictions to non-complying Parties, including those failing to subm it data.162 In response, 
the Montreal Protocol Meeting o f the Parties took prompt steps to address these concerns: It 
established an A d  Hoc Group o f Experts on Reporting which found out that the majority of non­
reporting states were developing countries basically unable to comply w ithout technical assistance 
from the treaty organisation,163 and immediately afterwards introduced a formal ‘non-compliance 
procedure’.
The ‘non-compliance procedure’ under Article 8 o f the Protocol provides a unique 
paradigm in international environmental law.164 It makes the Montreal Protocol a ‘self-contained 
regime’,165 that possesses a concrete formalised mechanism to monitor and correct deviations from 
legal prescriptions. According to it, any Party having a reservation as to another state’s 
implementation o f obligations under the Protocol, or indeed any party that finds itself, despite its 
best efforts unable to fully comply with its obligations may submit relevant information to the 
Secretariat and through it to the Implementation Committee.166 This is a subsidiary body established
158 See A.Hurrell & B.Kingsbury, ‘The International Politics o f  the Environment: An Introduction’, in A.Hurrell & 
B.Kingsbury (eds.), The International P olitics o f  the Environment, 1992, pp.27-8.
159 See O.Greene, ‘International Environmental Regimes: Verification and Implementation R eview ’, 2(4) Env'l 
Politics, 1993, pp. 155-73.
160 See Sachariew, op.cit. n.7, pp.50-1.
161 Sec B.Baker, ‘Eliciting Non-Party Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Treaties: U .S. Legislation and the 
Jurisdictional Bases for Compliance Incentives in the Montreal Ozone Protocol’, 35 Germ an YB.l.L., 1992, pp.333-65.
162 See E.P.Barratt-Brown, ‘Building a M onitoring and Compliance Regime under the Montreal Protocol’, 16 Yale 
J.Int'l L., 1991, pp.542-3.
163 UNEP, Report o f  the First Meeting o f  the Ad Hoc Group o f  Experts on the reporting o f  data, 
UNEP/O zL.Pro/W G 2/I/4, 7 December 1990.
164 For an account o f  its evolution, see M .Koskenniemi, ‘Breach o f  Treaty or Non-Com pliance? Reflections on the 
Enforcement o f  the Montreal Protocol’, 3 YB.I.E.L, 1992, pp.128-34; and D.G.Viclor, ‘The Operation and Effectiveness 
o f  the Montreal Protocol’s Non-Com pliance Procedure’, in D.G. Victor e ta l  (eds.), op.cit. n.91, pp. 137-76.
155 See supra, Chapter 4, p. 148.
166 See Decision II/5, in UNEP, Report o f  the Second M eeting o f  the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on substances 
that deplete the ozone layer, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, 29 June 1990; and Decision IV/5 and Annexes IV and V, in UNEP, 
Report o f  the Fourth M eeting o f  the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer,
(continued...)
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by the Second Meeting o f  the Parties and consisting o f ten members elected on the basis o f equitable 
geographical distribution and for a two-year term. It has the mandate to receive, consider and report 
on allegations o f  breaches o f the Protocol, and any information or observations submitted by the 
Secretariat in the course o f preparation o f annual reports based on information furnished by the 
Parties. It should be noted, however, that all information submitted can be classified as confidential. 
The Committee is also empowered, at the invitation o f the Party concerned, to carry out its own 
investigations within the territory o f the latter.
In effect, the Implementation Committee acts as an intermediate between the Meeting of 
the Parties and countries facing problems in implementing their commitments and seeks solutions 
to these problems. In this relation, a very important aspect o f its work consists in close co-operation 
and exchange of information with the Multilateral Fund for matters related to the provision of 
financial and technical assistance to developing countries. The M ultilateral Fund for the 
Implementation o f the Montreal Protocol is the permanent financial mechanism established by the 
Fourth Meeting o f the Parties.167 It is financed by developed-country Parties and allows for bilateral 
and agreed regional co-operation to be considered as a contribution as long as it relates to 
compliance with the Protocol, provides additional resources and meets incremental costs. More 
specifically, it covers the “agreed incremental costs” o f developing countries ozone-protection 
programmes on a grant or concessional basis; finances clearing-house functions to assist in 
identifying co-operation needs, to facilitate technical co-operation, to distribute information, to hold 
workshops and facilitate and monitor other co-operation available; and funds its secretarial services. 
A lmost all developing-country Parties - to the extent their annual consumption o f  controlled 
substances remains below certain limits - are eligible for assistance; should one Party not be eligible, 
it may still obtain support from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) for implementing the 
provisions o f the Montreal Protocol.168 The existence o f the Multilateral Fund is consequently very 
important, as it provides a strong incentive for state to fulfil their commitments according to 
schedule if they wish to receive financial support.169
It is very characteristic o f the direct relevance o f this mechanism to control over compliance 
with the Protocol, and o f the close interaction between the former and the non-compliance 
mechanism of the ozone regime, that the Implementation Committee regularly hears comments and 
advice from officials responsible for the administration o f the M ultilateral Fund, i.e. the
1G6(...continued)
UNEP/O zL.Pro.4/15, 25 N ovem ber 1992.
167 See UNEP, 1994, op.cit. n . l66, D ecision IV/17. The World Bank through its Ozone Projects Trust Fund (OTF), 
UNDP and UNEP are again the implementing agencies. By 1995, the Fund had provided $145 m illion for 24 projects 
in 20 developing countries, see World Bank/IBRD, hdainstreaming the Environment - The W orld Bank Group and the 
Environment since the Rio Earth Summit - F iscal 1995, 1995, p.70,
168 See UNEP, N ote by the Ozone Secretariat, U N EP/O zL.Pro.l994/Inf.2, 1 December 1994, p.2.
169 See Barralt-Brown, op.cit. n.162, p.539.
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implementing agencies, the Fund Secretariat, and the GEF Secretariat.170 Moreover, the Fund’s 
implementing agencies prepare reports reviewing all the problems encountered in data-reporting, 
and thus significantly promote the work of the Implementation Committee.171 In the same vein, data 
submitted to the Fund Secretariat in relation to progress made in implementing projects included 
in the country programmes is consolidated and verified against those submitted by the Parties to the 
Ozone Secretariat;172 this way, relevant information is cross-checked and any discrepancies 
investigated. But the most clear-cut link between compliance control and funding is reflected in the 
decision to condition the provision o f assistance on proper fulfilment o f the obligation to supply 
baseline data, and a threat to extend that requirement to the duty to make further reports on annual 
data.173
Through this complex mechanism, the Committee is able to operate as a dispute settlement 
forum  - importantly without prejudice to the possibility o f resorting to traditional means of dispute 
settlement - with a view to reaching “an amicable resolution o f the matter on the basis o f respect for 
the provisions o f the Protocol”. In any case, it has to report to the Meeting o f the Parties, which has 
the ultimate authority to decide any measures it deems appropriate to bring about full compliance 
with the Protocol. After receiving a report by the Committee the M eeting may, taking into 
consideration the circumstances o f the matter, decide upon and call for steps to bring about full 
compliance, including measures to assist Parties, and to further the Protocol’s objectives. There is 
an indicative list o f measures that can be taken encompassing:
* Appropriate assistance, including assistance for the collection and reporting o f data, 
technical assistance, technology transfer and financial assistance, information transfer and 
training;
* Issuing cautions; and
* Suspension, in accordance with the applicable rules o f  international law concerning the 
suspension of the operation of a treaty, o f specific rights and privileges under the Protocol, 
whether or not subject to time limits, including those concerned with industrial 
rationalisation, production, consumption, trade, transfer o f technology, financial mechanism
170 See, e.g., UNEP, Montreal Protocol Implementation Committee, Report o f  the Implementation Committee under 
the Non-C om pliance Procedure for the Montreal Protocol on the work o f  its Sixth Meeting, 
UNEP/OzL.Pro/lmpCom /6/3, 26 August 1993, pp.2-4; Report o f  the Implementation Committee... on the work o f  its 
Eighth Meeting, UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/8/3, 4 July 1994, pp.2-6; Report o f  the Implementation Committee...on the 
work o f  its Thirteenth M eeting, UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/13/3, 28 March 1996, pp .11-2; and Report o f  the 
Implementation Committee... on the work o f  its Fourteenth Meeting, UNEP/OzL.Pro/Im pCom /14/4, 26 August 1996, 
pp. 13-4.
171 See UNEP, Montreal Protocol Implementation Committee, Report o f  the Implementation Committee under the Non- 
Compliance Procedure for the Montreal Protocol on the work o f  its Twelfth M eeting, UNEP/OzL.Pro/Im pCom /I2/3, 
21 December 1995, pp.9-10.
172 See UNEP, Report o f  the... Thirteenth Meeting, op.cit. n .l 70, p. 12,
173 See D.G.Victor, ‘The Montreal Protocol’s Non-Compliance Procedure: Lessons for Making Other International 
Environmental Regimes More E ffective’, in W.Lang (ed.), The Ozone Treaties and their Influence on the B udding o f  
International Environm ental Regimes, 1996, p.77.
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and institutional arrangements.
In 1998, the Montreal parties decided to fine-tune the non-compliance mechanism and 
adopted some minor amendments to that effect.174 These mainly relate to time limits for the 
submission o f communication, to participation in the Implementation Committee, and to extending 
the mandate o f the latter to cover identification of the facts and possible causes relating to individual 
cases o f non-compliance.
This arrangement seems to produce results,175 and be as flexible as it should, considering 
its essentially political nature. One factor thought to contribute to this success is the fact that the 
Implementation Committee spent its formative years dealing with reporting failures thus gaining 
experience and establishing its place and reputation within the Montreal Protocol system without 
tackling sensitive substantive non-compliance cases.176 In fact, it was only in 1995 that the 
procedure was for the first time invoked in relation to formal submissions for non-compliance by 
five East European countries, namely Belarus, Bulgaria, Poland, Russia and Ukraine.177 The 
measures that the Meeting o f the Parties has adopted to date to correct the situation consist o f 
appropriate assistance that is hoped to help the laggard countries come into line. However, after 
several years have passed, and despite the progress achieved, full compliance is not effected and the 
above-mentioned countries, except Poland, together with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan have recently been cautioned that they may face the sanctions available to the 
Parties.178 This is a new phase o f maturity for the mechanism; the precise modalities and especially 
the repercussions o f such measures, if they are eventually taken, will be a very significant and 
innovative development for international environmental law in general.
Having said that, another factor that has contributed to the effectiveness o f this process so 
far is the fact that the Committee handles specific cases o f non-compliance and does not deliberate 
only on broad issues,179 such as those addressed by the MEPC and FSI. The impressive number o f 
compliance-related decisions adopted by consensus at the Seventh M eeting o f the Parties are 
characteristic o f the importance attached to these problems in the ozone regime and the significant
174 UNEP, Report o f  the Tenth Meeting o f  the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone 
layer, UNEP/OzL.Pro.lO/9, 3 December 1998, Decision X /10 and Annex II.
175 See, e.g., Report o f  the President o f  the Implementation Committee, in UNEP, Report o f  the Seventh M eeting o f  
the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer, UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12, 27 December 1995, 
at paras.3 5-44.
176 See Victor, op.cit. n.173 ,p,61.
177 See ibid, pp.5 9 -6 1.
178 See UNEP, op.cit. n .l 74, Decisions X /21, X/23-28; and UNEP, Report o f  the Eleventh M eeting o f  the Parlies to
the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer, UNEP/OzL.Pro. 11/10, 17 December 1999, Decisions 
X 1/24-25.
I7y See Victor, op.cit. n .l73, p.66.
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contribution o f the focussed work o f the Implementation Committee to that effect.180
However, experience has also revealed the difficulties involved in such an evolution. 
Koskenniemi, for one, is even sceptical o f its ultimate value, suggesting that the procedure 
established is o f an adversarial nature,181 and in risk o f being “used to enforce obligations which 
leave room for interpretation and to castigate bona fid e  application or excusable non-performance 
and to deepen the parties’ political and economic disagreements”, or even o f  becoming “an 
ineffective bureaucracy within which parties may hide the real difficulties they have in performing 
their obligations while avoiding judicial or arbitral scrutiny, or more subtle forms o f diplomatic 
persuasion to bring about conforming behaviour”.182 He also points out to the complicated legal 
issues involved in such an innovatory process that tries to deal in an ad hoc manner - leaving several 
issues unclear - with concepts and procedures, such as wrongfulness and breach o f obligation, or 
even dispute settlement, for which international law has in place a long-established, albeit 
unsatisfactory, set o f rules.183 Nonetheless, other analytical attempts come to justify the comparative 
legal autonomy o f sectoral environmental regimes,184 and even suggest that there is an emerging set 
o f distinct procedural principles on compliance control in international environmental law.185
These considerations, although intriguing in themselves, will have to be reinformed by the 
actual operation o f the non-compliance procedure, especially in view o f the possibility to have some 
type o f sanctions imposed in the near future. Nevertheless, the rather ‘secret’ and confidential nature 
o f deliberations in the Implementation Committee brings attention to the relevance o f another line 
o f criticism developed during the period o f formation o f the procedure. In 1991, there were already 
voices calling for the formal accommodation o f NGO participation in the process, for transparency
180 See UNEP, op.cit. n.175, Annex VII. These are: Decision VII/14 on the Implementation oi'the Protocol by the 
Parties; D ecision V1I/15 on Compliance with the Montreal Protocol by Poland; D ecision VII/16 on Compliance with 
the Montreal Protocol by Bulgaria; D ecision VII/17 on Compliance with the Montreal Protocol by Belarus; Decision  
V1I/18 on Compliance with the Montreal Protocol by the Russian Federation; Decision VII/19 on Compliance with the 
Montreal Protocol by Ukraine; D ecision VII/20 on Discrepancy between the data reported by a Party to the Ozone 
Secretariat and the data presented by that Party to the Executive Committee o f  the Multilateral Fund; and Decision  
VII/33 on Illegal imports and exports o f  controlled substances. See especially the discussion generated by Russia’s 
inability to carry out its commitments without financial support, For the follow-up to these D ecisions and the gradually 
improving compliance record o f  Russia, see UNEP, Report o f  the Eighth Meeting o f  the Parlies to the Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that deplete the ozone layer, UNEP/OzL.Pro.8/12, 19 December 1996, at VI; and UNEP, Report o f  the 
Ninth Meeting o f  the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer, UNEP/O zL.Pro.9/I2, 
25 September 1997, at V.
181 Koskenniemi, op.cit. n. 164, p. 131. On the contrary, Victor argues that experience with the actual operation o f the 
procedure shows that “there is some danger that too much is made o f  the need to be non-adversarial”, op.cit. n. 173, p.70.
182 See Koskenniemi, op.cit. n.164, p .133. For the view that these concerns are rather exaggerated, see Hand!, op.cit. 
n . l57, pp.329-30.
183 In this context, it should be borne in mind that although this kind o f  institutionalisation primarily aims at dispute 
avoidance, the need for ancillary classic - albeit flexible - dispute settlement mechanisms is still present, see 1-Iandl, 
op.cit. n.157, pp.329-30; R.E.Stein, ‘The Settlement o f  Environmental Disputes: Towards a System o fF lex ib le  Dispute 
Settlem ent’, 12 Syr.J. Int'i L. & Com ., 1985, pp.283-98; Wolfrum, op.cit. n .45, p. 100,; P.Sands, Principles o f  
International Environm ental Law, Vol.I, pp. 163 el seq.\ and Agenda 21, para.39.9,
184 See, among others, Gehring, op.cit. n .l , especially at p.56.
185 See T.Marauhn, ‘Towards a Procedural Law o f  Compliance Control in International Environmental Relations’, 
56(3) Z.A.O.R.V., 1996, pp.696-731.
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and disclosure o f information, as well as for the placement o f independent experts in the Committee, 
on the model o f human rights, the ILO, and nuclear weapons regimes.186 In fact, these seem to be 
the major weaknesses in the initial design o f the non-compliance procedure that should not be 
repeated in any future relevant development. In addition, the Implementation Committee has not yet 
addressed the industrialised countries’ obligations to provide funds, which, if continued, might 
undermine its reputation as an unbiased objective forum
Finally, it is worth noting that the Montreal Protocol model for compliance control has been 
duplicated in the case o f the Implementation Committee set up under Article 7 o f the 1994 Sulphur 
Protocol to the 1979 Geneva Convention,188 while relevant preparatory work under the Basel,189 and 
the Climate Change Conventions is currently in slow progress.190 Be that as it may, in other areas 
o f international regulation, especially in relation to marine pollution, it does not appear that states 
are willing to submit themselves to formalised compliance control while they take on more 
demanding obligations.191 As has been already made apparent, the scope for a similar evolution in 
the Barcelona regime, however desirable, does not seem to exist at present, especially in view o f the 
fact that the chance o f developing a meaningful ‘non-compliance procedure’ was allowed to be 
missed at the recent revision.
5.4. The European Union Model o f Compliance Control.
The Community paradigm o f law-making, follow-up, and enforcement is relatively more 
developed than any other international legal system, to the point that it has been referred to as “the
186 See, e.g., Barratl-Brown, op.cit. n.162, pp.519-70, especially at pp.547-69. However, the effectiveness o f the 
Montreal ‘non-compliance procedure’ might be attributed exactly to the fact “that the Parties know that the Committee 
is in the hands o f  fellow Parties (rather than independent experts), see Victor, op.cit. n ,173, p.69, and 78-9 with regard 
to enhanced NGO participation.
187 See Victor, op.cit. n.173, p.68.
188 See ‘Compliance and Sulphur Protocol’, 24(2/3) Env'l Pol.&  L., 1994, p p .132-3. The mandate o f lh e  Committee 
is to review the implementation o f  the Protocol and compliance by the Parties with their obligations, through reporting 
to the Executive Body (M eeting o f  the Parlies) and making appropriate recommendations (A rt.7(l)). The Parties, though, 
still retain the ultimate authority to adopt or reject such recommendations, and on decide on any relevant action, 
including measures to assist a Party in com plying (Arl.7(2)). It is also envisaged that this model could be expanded to 
cover all the Geneva Convention Protocols, sec P.Szdll, ‘Compliance Regimes for Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements - A  Progress Report’, 27(4) E nv'l Pol. & L., 1997, p.304.
m  Under Decision Ill/1 1, see UNEP, Third M eeting o f  the Conference o f  the Parties to the Basel Convention on the 
Control o f  Transboundary Movements o f  Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, UNEP/CH W .3/35, 28 November 1995; 
and K.Kummer, ‘The Basel Convention: Ten Years On’, 7(3) R.E.C.I.E.L., 1998, pp.232-3.
|yu See Werksman, J., ‘Compliance and the Kyoto Protocol: Building a Backbone into a “Flexible” Regim e’, 9 
YB.I.E.L., 1998, pp.48-101; S.Obcrthur, ‘UNFCCC - The Second Conference o f  the Parties’, 26(5) E nv'l L. & Pol., 
1996, p.200; and Szdll, op.cit. n . l88, pp.305-6. The 2000 Meeting o f lh e  Parties is actually going to discuss a complex 
text on a compliance procedure, see UNFCCC, Report o f  the Subsidiary Body for Implementation on its Twelfth Session, 
FCCC/SB1/2000/5, 18 July 2000, Annex III.
191 See Victor, op.cit. n .l 73, pp.75-6. It is characteristic that in the 1996 o f  the London Convention, consensus could 
not be reached on the contents and specific objectives o f  such a procedure and the issue was delegated to future 
negotiations to be held within two years o f  the Protocol entering into force, see R.Coenen, ‘Dum ping o f  Wastes at Sea: 
Adoption o f  the 1996 Protocol to the London Convention 1972', 6(1) R.E.C.I.E.L., 1997, p.58.
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only reasonably comprehensive and effective international (albeit regional) model”.192 However, it 
can not be replicated in other international environmental regimes, not because it is fundamentally 
sui generis™  but because it is a product o f an entire integration process that has been going on for 
many decades now and which has resulted in a regional legal order - and web o f interests - covering 
a very extensive range o f subjects, apart from environmental protection.
That said, some elements can be constructively duplicated, and certainly some lessons can 
be learned. These mostly relate to the specificity and detailed technical character o f Community 
legislation;194 to its ‘direct effect’ in Member States’ legal orders and the related citizen rights and 
participation in the enforcement procedure at both Community and national levels;195 to financial 
assistance directed to specific environmental actions;196 and to the existence o f  a relatively 
independent organ, the Commission, with extensive follow-up and enforcement powers, combined 
with a most effective tool o f pressure, namely the management o f huge funds. These powers are - 
importantly - exercised in a series of formal and informal stages, and may culminate to adjudication 
by a highly respected tribunal, the European Court o f Justice.
The following Sections examine the two basic techniques o f monitoring and reporting as 
employed in the Community legal order in relation to marine pollution regulation, and the actual 
compliance-control and enforcement procedures administered by the Commission and the European 
Court o f Justice.
5.4.1. M onitoring under Community Marine Pollution Legislation.
An obligation to monitor the protected environmental medium or the controlled emissions 
and furnish relevant data to the Commission is encountered in most environmental Directives. This 
type o f information, as already noted, is valuable for assessing the actual progress o f each Member 
State in implementing its duties under respective instruments, and provides a much more reliable 
indicator than simple notification o f formal transposition thereof;197 for example, a 1988 sampling
o f  beaches in France, Greece, Italy and Spain, who had all transposed the bathing waters Directive
into national law, showed that 25% had pathogens exceeding safe levels,198
192 P.Sands, ‘European Community Environmental Law: The Evolution o f  a Regional R egim e o f  International 
Environmental Protection’, 100(8) Yale L. J., 1991, p.2518.
193 On this point, see ibid, pp .2518-20.
194 See supra, Chapter 2, pp.67-74.
195 See infra, Chapter 7, pp.322-25.
196 See infra, Chapter 6, p.251 et.seq.
197 On the utility o f  extending monitoring obligations to all environmental Directives in order to facilitate the 
Commission’s task o f  controlling correct implementation thereof, see R.Wagenbaur, ‘The European Community Policy 
on Implementation o f  Environmental D irectives’, 14 F ord.I.L J., 1990/91, pp.474-5.
198 See World Bank/EIB, The Environm ental Program  fo r  the M editerranean  - P reserving a Shared H eritage and  
Managing a Common Resource, 1990, p,2. And note that by 1991, the quality o f  bathing waters still presented the major 
area o f  problematic application o f  Community environmental law in the water sector, see EC Commission, Eighth
(continued...)
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An instance o f an instrument that is applicable in the present context and lays down 
concrete monitoring obligations is Directive 79/923 on the quality o f shellfish waters, which calls 
for the monitoring o f designated waters, and specifies very precise conditions and methods that have 
to be respected, such as frequency, location o f  sampling points, and percentage of samples 
conforming to various parameters in order to establish compliance with Community standards 
(Arts.6 and 7). The same pattern is followed in Directive 76/160 concerning the quality of bathing 
waters.
In the same vein, Directive 76/464 concerning dangerous substances in water creates an 
obligation to monitor the emission o f discharges o f such substances and draw up relevant 
inventories. Its ‘daughter’ Directives lay down much more concrete monitoring duties: Hence, 
Directives 82/176 and 84/156 relating to mercury discharges establish monitoring procedures 
(Annex I), and reference methods to measure the presence o f mercury in water (Annex 111), but they 
also allow for other methods to be used if their limits o f detection, precision and accuracy are at least 
as good as those o f the prescribed ones (Arts.3(4) and 3(5) respectively). M onitoring is the 
responsibility o f each Member State, but where mercury discharges affect the water o f several 
States, the latter have to co-operate with a view at harmonising monitoring procedures (Arts.4 and 
5 respectively). Similar provisions are found in Directive 83/513 on cadmium discharges,199 
Directive 84/491 on HCH discharges,200 Directive 86/280 on certain other dangerous substances and 
amendments thereof, and Directive 82/883 on procedures for the surveillance and monitoring o f 
environments concerned by waste from the titanium dioxide industry.201 Similarly, Directive 80/68 
on the protection o f groundwater stipulates that the competent national authorities must monitor 
compliance with the permits granted to discharge certain noxious substances and the effects o f 
discharges on groundwater (Art. 13).
Finally, Directive 91/271 on urban waste water treatment instructs competent national 
authorities to monitor discharges from urban waste water treatment plants in order to verify 
compliance with Community requirements, in accordance with specified - or equivalent - control 
procedures (Art. 15(1) and Annex I D), as well as the amounts and composition o f  sludges disposed 
of to surface waters. Moreover, the waters themselves that are subject to discharges from urban 
waste water plants and direct industrial emissions have to be monitored, but only “where it can be 
expected that the receiving environment will be significantly affected” (Art. 15(2)). In the case of
|lJ8(...continued)
Annual Report to the European Parliament on Commission monitoring o f the application o f  Community law, COM (91) 
321 final; 1991 O.J. (C 338) 1, at p.43.
1H9 The monitoring procedures are laid down in Annexes I and IV; the reference method in Annex III; and the 
individual and joint monitoring duties in Art.4; while other methods o f  measurement are allowed under Art.3(5).
200 Annex 1, Annexes lit  and IV, Art.4, and Art.3(5) respectively.
201 See also Article 10 o f  Directive 92/112 on procedures for harmonising the programmes for the reduction and 
eventual elimination o f  pollution caused by waste from the titanium dioxide industry.
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discharges in less sensitive areas and in the case of disposal of sludge to surface waters, monitoring 
and other relevant studies are called for to verify that these activities do not adversely affect the 
environment (Art. 15(3)). All relevant information is made available on request by the Commission 
(Art. 15(4)), which, moreover, may formulate guidelines on monitoring in co-operation with the 
standing Committee o f Article 18 (Art. 15(5)).
O f equal importance are provisions relating to monitoring obligations not o f the Member 
states themselves, but rather o f the persons undertaking polluting activities. Directive 96/6Ion 
integrated pollution control provides the best example in this connection; pursuant to Article 9(5), 
the permit under which the covered installations are to operate must contain “suitable release 
monitoring requirements, specifying measurement methodology and frequency, evaluation 
procedure and an obligation to supply the competent authority with data required for checking 
compliance with the permit”.
Effective fulfilment o f all these requirements is expected to be considerably enhanced after 
the establishment, under Regulation 1210/90, o f the European Environment Information and 
Observation Network (EIONET) and the European Environment Agency (EEA) which screens, 
evaluates, validates, and processes existing environmental data and information and transforms this 
into meaningful and reliable information at a European level both for the Community, the Member 
States and the public at large.202 It should also be noted that the Agency is open to non-EU countries, 
and, in this connection the Bureau o f MAP is authorised to establish links o f co-operation especially 
between the Blue Plan, MED-POL and SPA/RAC and the Agency.203 The task of assisting the 
monitoring of environmental measures through appropriate support for reporting requirements, and 
advise M ember States on their respective monitoring systems has been recently added to the 
mandate o f  the Agency,204 which is essential but falls well short o f the enforcement powers 
envisaged by some.205
5.4.2. Reporting to the EC Commission.
As explicitly stated in the final provisions o f every single Directive, Member States are 
under an obligation to communicate to the Commission legislative measures taken in
202 See generally, D,A.Westbrook, ‘Environmental Policy in the European Community: Observations on the European 
Environment A gency’, 15 Harv.Env'l L.Rev., 1991, pp.257-73; and D.Gorny, ‘The European Environment Agency and 
the Freedom o f  Environmental Information Directive; Potential Cornerstones o f  EC Environmental Law’, 14(2) Boston  
Coil. Int'l and Com p.L.Rev., 1991, pp.279-99.
203 See UNEP, op.cit. n.27, p. 17. The first product o f  that co-operation is a short report on the state o f  the 
Mediterranean environment, see EEA, State and Pressures o f  the M arine and C oasta l M editerranean Environment, 
Environmental Issues Series N o .5, 1999.
204 See Council Regulation 933/1999, 1999 O J. (L 117) 1, Art. 1 (2)(ii).
205 The European Parliament envisioned a wider range o f  tasks for the EEA, on the US Environmental Protection 
Agency pattern, in particular competences to inspect and monitor enforcement o f  Community environmental law and 
to prepare environmental impact assessments for Community-financed projects, see 1990 O.J. (C 68) 50; and 1990 O J. 
(C 96) 112.
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implementation thereof (‘compliance notes’). The implementation date - usually two years after the 
adoption o f the Directive - is very important; should it pass with no information received, a 
procedure is initiated, comprising formal and informal communication and pressure, which might 
eventually end up before the ECJ. But that is only a first and general requirement with regard to 
submission o f information relating to national implementation. In fact, several o f the Directives 
examined in Chapter 2 impose further periodic reporting obligations which relate to national 
measures and programmes going beyond formal transposition to the broad objectives o f each 
instrument. In addition, M ember States have to furnish information on the authorisations granted 
for certain industrial activities, data gathered through monitoring o f specific pollutants and/or 
activities, as well as on actual implementation o f Directives.
More specifically, Directive 79/923 on shellfish waters contains a stipulation requiring 
submission o f information concerning waters designated as supporting shellfish life, as well as any 
revision of such designation; all national provisions establishing terms in deviation o f the uniform 
Community rules, where this is allowed; and in general, any information necessary for the 
application o f the Directive, but only when the Commission addresses a relevant reasoned request 
(Art. 13). Moreover, Member States have to submit regular detailed reports on designated waters and 
the basic features thereof, i.e. monitoring data, with the first report due six years following initial 
designation (Art. 14). Similar requirements are laid down in Directive 76/160 on the quality o f 
bathing waters.
Another illustration of extensive reporting requirements is supplied by Directive 76/464 on 
the control o f dangerous substances discharged into the aquatic environment, and its ‘daughter’ 
Directives: Pursuant to the framework instrument, Member States must establish a system o f prior 
authorisation for the discharge o f list 1 substances containing emission limit values - or quality 
standards, under certain conditions - at least as stringent as these specified in the ‘daughter’ 
Directives. They must, furthermore, establish pollution reduction programmes for list II substances, 
with specific deadlines for implementation. All information relevant to implementation o f these 
duties, i.e. including details o f authorisations and summaries o f the national programmes, as well 
as the results o f monitoring, must be submitted to the Commission, albeit at its own request. The 
mercury Directives follow suit by requiring information to be submitted on request concerning 
details o f authorisations laying down mercury emission standards, and the results o f  measurements 
made by the monitoring authorities and any relevant inventories (A rts.5(l) and 6(1) respectively). 
The Commission is under a duty to prepare a comparative assessment based on this information and 
forward it to the Council every five years (A rt.5(l) and (2), and A rt.6 (l) respectively). Analogous 
provisions are found in Directive 83/513 on cadmium discharges,206 and Directive 84/491 on HCH
205 The reporting duty o f  Member States is provided for in A rt.5(l); and that o f  the Com mission in A rts.5(l) and (2).
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discharges.207
Under Article 16 o f Directive 80/68 concerning groundwater, the Commission may request, 
on a case-by-case basis, notification o f the results o f  prior investigations needed in order to grant 
permits for the discharge o f noxious substances, o f details o f the authorisations granted, o f the 
results o f monitoring and inspection operations carried out, and o f the authorisation inventory 
compiled by the competent authorities.
Directive 78/176 on waste from the titanium dioxide industry requires Member States to 
send to the Commission programmes for the progressive reduction and eventual elimination of 
pollution, to be used by the latter in order to submit harmonisation proposals both as regards 
pollution reduction and the conditions o f competition (Art.9).208 There is also a duty to supply 
information on authorisations, results o f monitoring and any remedial action taken. Finally, Member 
States must submit a report on the progressive reduction o f pollution, eveiy three years, on the basis 
o f which the Commission must in turn report to the Council and the Parliament.209
Turning now to the waste sector, under Directive 84/631 on transfrontier shipment o f 
hazardous waste, Member States have to forward to the Commission the particulars o f  their 
authorities responsible to supervise such movements and o f the installations with a permit to dispose 
o f waste and any modifications thereof (Art. 12(1)). In addition, they have to draw up biannual 
reports on the implementation o f the instrument and on the overall situation with regard to 
transfrontier shipments concerning their respective territories, which will include information on 
such shipments arising from major accidents, any significant irregularities in shipments that has 
involved or may involve serious hazards for man or the environment, the quantity and type o f waste 
which has entered their territory for disposal, and the quality and type o f waste produced in their 
territory and subsequently exported (Art. 13). The Commission is due to submit regular reports on 
the basis o f these data (Art. 14).
It is worth observing at this point that the water Directives do not provide for ‘situation 
reports’ as do the waste Directives.210 These involve periodic reporting by M ember States on the 
actual conditions prevalent during the period covered with regard to the management and disposal 
o f wastes; in other words ‘situation reports’ constitute - at least potentially - accounts o f actual 
implementation o f Community rules on waste management but also o f the wider objectives o f the 
relevant Community policy in each country, on the basis o f which the Commission is enabled to
207 A rt.5(l), and 5(1) and (2) respectively.
208 See Council Directives 89/428 and 92/112 on procedures for harmonising the programmes for the reduction and 
eventual elimination o f  pollution caused by waste from the titanium dioxide industry.
N ot surprisingly, the picture is somewhat different, when it com es to earlier instruments. In fact, the latest the 
Directive has been adopted, the most it is likely to contain extensive reporting requirements. Thus, from the Directives 
relating to the biodegradability o f  detergents, only the latest, i.e. Directive 86/94, goes beyond requiring communication 
o f merely the text o f  relevant laws, and demands notification o f  “any measures” Member States take in implementation 
o f  its provisions (A rt.l).
210 See e.g. Directive 75/439 on the disposal o f  waste oils, Art. 16.
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prepare more meaningful assessments. Having said that, in this context as well the common pattern 
o f late and incomplete information inhibits positive follow-up by the Commission.211
A notable exception to this rule is Directive 91/271 on urban waste water which, indeed, 
makes such reports mandatory (Ait. 16). Situation reports on the disposal o f  urban waste water and 
sludge have to be drawn up evety two years by relevant national authorities, and, importantly, have 
to be published, i.e. made available to the public, as well as sent to the Commission.212 In addition, 
M ember States have ordinary reporting duties, i.e. to provide information on the comprehensive 
programmes for the implementation o f the Directive by 30 June 1994 and any relevant updates 
every two years after that date (A rt.l7(l)-(3)); whereas the Commission must compile and publish 
a biannual review and assessment report (Art. 17(5)). The record of Member States in respect o f all 
the above additional reporting requirements is rather poor, as only a minority - which does not 
include Mediterranean countries - has systematically transmitted relevant information.213
Furthermore, the Commission, as has been already noted, is under a duty to draw up 
consolidated reports on the implementation o f certain Community Directives and submit them to 
the European Parliament and/or Council. In this task it has been faced with considerable 
difficulties.214 For example, in a 1995 Report on the application o f Directive 79/923 on shellfish 
waters, it is stated that Member States did not respond adequately to a 1989 request for information, 
which made little comparable data available;215 in fact, reports were incomplete for all 
Mediterranean countries, except Italy which had not even designated such waters by 1995,216
These difficulties have been exacerbated by the fact that individual Directives featured 
stipulations that varied considerably as to both the frequency and content o f mandatory reports. In 
order to harmonise and make more complete and comparable on a sectoral basis the data furnished, 
the Commission submitted a proposal for a Council Directive standardising and rationalising reports 
on the implementation o f certain environmental Directives, which eventually became Directive 
91/692. The purpose o f this harmonisation was to help resolve the afore-said problems, and thus 
enable the Commission and the Member States to assess the progress made in implementing these 
Directives throughout the Community, and, at the same time, provide the general public with a 
source o f information on the subject (Third Recital). Most significantly, the Commission has
211 See, for instance, the 1989 Commission report on the application o f  four waste Directives, which was based on very 
limited information, DOC. SEC(89) 1455 final, 27 September 1989. The situation has recently improved to a certain 
extent, see EC Commission Communication, COM (97) 23 final, 27.02.1997.
212 C f  earlier Directives which allow for the non-disclosure o f  national data with regard to certain substances.
213 See EC Com mission, op.cit. n.198, p.208,
214 Sec EC Commission, Commission Proposal for a Directive on standardization o f  reports, COM (90) 287 final, 26 
July 1990, p.2, whereby the Commission draws in some cases its reports on the implementation o f  specific Directives 
on the basis o f  information from only a few  States, whilst in other cases, it cannot establish a report at all. See also 
L.Kramcr, E,C. Environm ental Law, 4th ed., 2000, p.283.
215 See EC Com m ission, Q uality o f  Fresh Water fo r  Fish and o f  Shellfish Water - Sum m ary Report on the State o f  
A pplication o f  the D irectives 78/659/EEC and 79/923/EE C , 1995, p.44.
216 Ibid, pp.52, 54, 56 and 59.
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expressed the hope that it will thus be able to proceed with its supervisory duties from information 
supplied from official sources instead o f relying on complaints from individuals and questions from 
Members o f the European Parliament.217 Accordingly, under Directive 91/692,218 relevant individual 
provisions are replaced by an across-the-board stipulation calling for the submission o f information 
to the Commission in the form o f a sectoral report, i.e. covering all pertinent Directives, once every 
three years (A rt.2(l)). The report for the water sector is to be drawn up on the basis o f a 
questionnaire or outline drafted by the Commission, and must be sent in within nine months o f  the 
end o f the three-year period covered by it (Art.2(l)). The first report is due to cover the period from 
1993 to 1995. Subsequently, the Commission is mandated to follow up with an overall report on 
the implementation o f the water Directives, within nine months from receiving the reports from the 
Member States. However, the first report has been delayed for several years, simply because 
Member States were too slow to produce theirs.219
The only exception to this pattern is provided for Directive 76/160 concerning the quality 
o f bathing water, for which a tighter data-gathering procedure was chosen on the grounds that the 
public needed to be informed o f the quality o f bathing water in the Community for the most recent 
period (Art.3 and Sixth Recital). Accordingly, the Member States are requested to send their 
relevant reports annually, starting from the end o f 1993, and the Commission to publish its 
consolidated report four months after receiving the former.
It should be noted in this connection that Directive 96/61 instructs states to send, every three 
years, to the Commission available representative data on the limit values laid down for specific 
categories o f controlled activities, and the best available techniques from which these values are 
derived (Art. 16(1)), and requires the Commission to establish reporting requirements on the overall 
implementation o f the Directive in accordance with procedures laid down in Directive 91/692 
(Art. 16(3)).
The Commission assisted by a committee composed by representatives of the Member 
States (Art.6) has indeed drawn up detailed questionnaires or outlines for the principal water 
Directives to be used by Member States as reporting formats. Commission Decision 92/446 lays 
down questionnaires with regard to Directive 76/464 on pollution caused by certain dangerous 
substances discharged into the aquatic environment and several o f the ‘daughter’ Directives 
regulating discharges from various industrial sectors; Directive 78/176 on waste from the titanium 
dioxide industry; Directive 79/923 on the quality required for shellfish waters; Directive 76/160 on
217 See EC Com mission, Eleventh Annual Report on monitoring the application o f  Community law, COM (94) 500 
final, 1994, p.70.
218 Note that the EP endorsed the proposal for this Directive with no amendment, sec relevant Opinion, 1991 O.J. (C 
19) 587.
2K See EC Com mission, First Annual Survey on the implementation and enforcement o f  Community environmental 
law, October 1996 to December 1997, SEC 1999/592, 27 .4.1999, p. 12.
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the quality o f bathing water; and Directive 80/68 concerning the protection o f groundwater.220 
M oreover, formats for the presentation o f national programmes on urban waste water treatment 
under Directive 91/271 are contained in Commission Decision 93/481.
Thus, national reporting obligations are now underscored by two complementary and legally 
binding texts, i.e. the relevant Article o f  each specific Directive and the said Decisions, the latter 
being addressed to Member States. That should not be taken to mean that these Decisions impose 
additional requirements; in fact, they are merely technical, and as precise as the reporting provisions 
o f the respective Directives themselves allow them to be. That said, the task o f filling in the 
questionnaires appears to be very demanding, as they require specific figures and details of 
implementing measures and not ju st general statements or description o f  future plans that would 
incidentally cover the control that Community instruments seek to impose. The issue o f how 
effective they will prove in addressing some o f the malfunctions o f the reporting system, as 
intended, is one to be assessed in the future; for the time being they do not seem to have had a great 
impact in the quality or timeliness o f information transm itted221
Lastly, a significant weakness o f the Community reporting system must not escape 
attention: Member States are under no obligation to provide information on the national measures 
giving effect to international environmental agreements, even those to which the Community is a 
party. There does not seem to be any substantive legal obstacle to the establishment o f such a duty, 
which could potentially contribute to a much more effective discharge o f the reporting obligations 
under international environmental agreements, by means o f consolidated reports on behalf o f all 
Member States parties to a specific international instrument, drawn up by the Commission.
5.4.3. The Non-Compliance Mechanism o f the European Union.
One o f the very essential tasks o f the Commission, with a view to securing the proper 
functioning and development of the common market, consists in ensuring the application of primary 
and secondary legislation (Article 211). Although in some areas the Commission has direct or 
indirect inspection rights in order to fulfil its mandate,222 this is not the case in the environmental 
field, despite some rare ‘fact-finding missions’ that actually take place.223
220 For the sake o f  completeness, reference should be made to the rest o f  the water Directives for which questionnaires 
are laid down in this Decision, namely Directives 78/659 on the quality o f  fresh waters supporting fish life; 75/440 and 
79/869 on the quality o f  surface water intended for the abstraction o f  drinking water; and 80/778 on the quality o f  water 
intended for human consumption.
221 Sec I<.r{Uner, op.cit. n.214.
222 For example, Commission Regulation 17/62, gives powers o f  direct inspection o f  private firms in the field o f 
competition; and Commission Regulation 2241/87, allows for inspection o f  the national inspection systems relating to 
the fishing sector.
223 See L. Kr£imer, ‘The Implementation o f  Environmental Laws by the European Economic Communities’, 34 German  
Y B .IL , 1991, p.37; and M.Hession, ‘The Role o f  the EC in Implementation o f  International Environmental Law’, 2(4) 
R.E.C.J.E.L., 1993, pp.345-6, arguing that lack o f  direct enforcement powers o f  the Com mission undermines the
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Ensuring the application o f Community legislation in Member States is indeed a very 
demanding job  involving confirmation that the Directives are both timely and correctly implemented 
in each M ember State.224 In its endeavour to perform this duty, the Commission uses an array of 
formal and informal - though confidential and very little publicised -225 procedures, starting from 
letters to the Member States merely to remind them o f the time limit laid down in an instrument, if 
close to expiry, and their transposition obligation, or periodic meetings with national authorities 
( ‘package’ or ‘ad  hoc meetings’, introduced in 1990) to discuss the factual or legal aspects o f all 
relevant problems,226 to actions before the European Court o f Justice.227
It must be reminded once more in this connection that although the Community is ultimately 
responsible for Member State compliance with environmental obligations laid down in international 
conventions to which it is a party,228 the Commission is strangely not informed o f national measures 
taken in implementation o f these international conventions, nor does it monitor compliance in any 
way, except when specific Community implementing legislation has been adopted. This is 
commonly the case only when international instruments contain trade provisions,229 unlike the 
Barcelona Convention and Protocols. Consequently, the chance o f a substantial contribution to the 
effective implementation o f the latter, at least by Mediterranean Member States, is missed. This 
practice has been repeatedly criticised as legally flowed: When entering into an international 
agreement, the Community as a whole undertakes to apply its provisions; it may well leave to 
individual Member States the task o f adopting implementing legislation, but if they fail to do so or, 
in general, violate the convention, then the Community as a collective entity is put in a position of 
having breached the relevant international commitment.230
223(...continued)
effectiveness o f  EC environmental law. See also Council Resolution o f  7 October 1997 on the drafting, implementation 
and enforcement o f  Community environmental law, 1997 O.J. (C 321) 1 at para. 16, where the idea o f  a system o f  
inspection at Community level is rejected.
224 For an explicit admission that the Commission finds it often very difficult to ascertain whether Community 
legislation has been properly transposed, see Commission o f  the EC Commission, Tenth Annual Report on the 
monitoring o f  the application o f  Community law, COM (93) 320 final, 1993, p.98,
225 See L.Kramer, Focus on European Environm ental Law, 1992, pp.225-7.
225 In this context, it is important to note the existence - since 1992 - o f  the ‘EC Network for the Implementation and 
Enforcement o f  Environmental Law’, made up o f  environmental enforcement authorities, with a view at exchanging 
information and experience in order to address issues o f  mutual concern and enhance the quality o f  enforcement, see 
infra, Chapter 7, p.321.
227 See Kramer, op.cit. n.225, pp .218-228; and op.cit. n.223 pp.9-53, for a very detailed description o f  the process. See 
also R. Williams, ‘The European Commission and the Enforcement o f  Environmental Law: An Invidious Position’, 14 
YB. o/Eur.L., 1994, pp.351 -99; J.Scott, EC Environmental Law, 1998, pp. 149-55; R.Macrory, ‘Community Supervision 
in the Field o f  the Environment’, in 1-I.Somsen (ed.), Protecting the European Environment - Enforcing EC  
Environm ental Law, 1996, pp.9-21; and J.H.Jans, European Environm ental Law, 1995, pp.143-50.
22S See supra, Chapter 2, p.96-8.
229 See, e.g., Case C -182/89, Commission v. France. 1990 E.C.R., p.1-4337, regarding implementation o f  CITES.
230 Kramer, op.cit. n.223, pp. 18 and 44-6; c f  A.Nollkaemper, The Legal Regime fo r  Transboundary Water Pollution: 
Betw een D iscretion  and Constraint, 1993, p.278, where it is maintained that each issue covered by an international 
agreement should be examined separately to assess whether it lies within the exclusive com petence o f  Member States 
or not.
233
Leaving that issue aside, Ludwig Kramer, former Head of DG XI, has publicly admitted that 
state reports are rarely a source o f information on effective implementation o f Community 
environmental rules.235 Citizens can help in this context by laying written complaints before the 
Commission concerning any national measures or practices contrary to Community environmental 
law. The value o f citizen complaints is highlighted by the fact that in any given year violations 
detected by the Commission’s own enquiries are only a fraction o f those brought to notice through 
written complaints.232 In 1997, the procedure under which the complainant had no right after filing 
his complaint changed, and now, should the Commission decide to file the complaint, the complaint 
has the right to be heard and present his observations.
When a breach comes in any way to the notice of the Commission, a ‘letter o f formal notice’ 
o f the alleged infringement is dispatched to the State concerned; if the Commission is not satisfied 
with the reply - or if there is no reply at all -, it delivers a detailed ‘reasoned opinion’ giving two 
months notice for compliance. Then, if the situation warrants it, it may initiate an action before the 
Court, asking for a binding declaratory judgm ent or even for interim  measures (Art.243).233 
However, most cases are settled before this stage with competent national authorities rectifying the 
situation after repeated pressure and contacts take place.234
There are three broad, and sometimes overlapping, grounds on which a state may be 
referred to the ECJ, namely failure to adopt and transmit to the Commission national measures to 
implement an environmental Directive; national measures not fully and correctly discharging the 
obligations imposed; and failure to apply national implementing provisions correctly.235 During this 
process, the Commission has a large measure o f discretion on whether to act, although its 
performance is scrutinised by the Parliament, especially during discussion o f the former’s annual 
report o f activities (EC Treaty, Art.200);236 at the end o f the day, the use o f this discretion depends
231 Kramer, op.cit. n.223, p.30.
232 Thus, in the water sector, 1990 ended with 140 complaints as compared with 22 cases otherwise detected. With 
regard to all environmental legislation, during the same year, there were 111 complaints against Spain, while 16 cases 
were otherwise detected; while the respective Figures for France were 47/2, for Greece, 40/4, and for Italy, 33/9, see ibid, 
pp.31-2; and EC Commission, op.cit. n.212, pp.43-4. Involvement o f  the public and NGOs is one o f  the most positive 
features o f  the Community system, but it does not go all the way to giving standing to sue in front o f  the ECJ, see infra, 
Chapter 8, pp.352-5.
233 See Case 57/89, Commission v. Germany. 1989 E.C.R., p.2849, where such measures where requested for an 
alleged breach related to the environment, but the application was eventually rejected on the grounds that ‘urgency’ had 
not been proved; Scott, op.cit. n.221, pp. 161-5; and L.Krdmer, E.C. Environm ental Law , 4th ed., 2000, p.294, arguing 
that “it will hardly ever be possible to demonstrate the urgency... since the pre-Court stage, during which no interim 
measures are possible, takes almost three years”.
234 Sec EC Commission, op.cit. n.212, p.42.
235 See Kramer, op.cit. n .2I6 , p. 16 et seq.
236 The EP can also influence the work o f  the Commission by other means: Article 193 o f  the EC Treaty allows a d  hoc 
Committees o f  Enquiry to investigate alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation o f  Community 
law, except when legal proceedings relating to the alleged facts are pending. Another procedure widely used by EP 
Members is the submission o f  questions to the Commission and the Council. Although answers are not always detailed 
or satisfactory, this device provides publicity and draws attention on the issue it involves. It is characteristic that, by 
1993, 3000 questions had been put on environmental issues, relating to specific problems or to a failure by Member
(continued...)
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both on material limitations and on political considerations. The Commission has frequently used 
its power in relation to environmental matters;237 the number o f infringement proceedings is 
generally on the rise, and in 1994 alone forty-two letters o f formal notice (ninety in 1993) and forty- 
six reasoned opinions (118 in 1998) were dispatched, whereas three cases were referred to the ECJ 
(thirty-seven in 1997).238
All said, the Commission itself has often stressed the fact that when it analyses the way 
legal measures o f environmental protection are put into effect “ it has neither the means to 
investigate the facts o f a specific case nor the powers to impose periodic controls on the Member 
States”,239 which implies that what it actually does falls well short o f a sweeping, comprehensive 
and totally adequate compliance control. That said, in the course o f these proceedings, the ECJ has 
developed a set o f consistent principles regarding implementation o f Community law in Member 
States which have far-reaching significance for compliance control and will be discussed in Chapter 
8 .
If  we now examine the record o f Mediterranean states in these proceedings, it appears that 
France does not have serious problems in implementing these pieces o f legislation that relate to the 
protection of the marine environment.240 On the contrary, Italy has a long list o f judgm ents against 
it,241 especially for infringements o f water Directives, 242the most recent relating to deficient 
implementation o f Directive 91/676 on nitrate pollution from agricultural sources, and o f Directive
236(... continued)
Stales to cany out Community obligations; most o f  these already filed seem to have com e from the Southern countries 
o f  the EU, see Lord Slynn o f  Hadley, ‘The European Community and the Environment’, 5(2) J. o fE n v ’l L., 1993, p.264.
237 In fact, systematic monitoring o f  the application o f  environmental legislation has started as late as 1984. Also note 
that to date only once has the ECJ dealt with a case brought by a fellow  state, namely France against the UK in relation 
to the mesh size for prawn fisheries in Case 141/78, France v. United Kingdom . 1979 E.C.R., p.2923.
238 See EC Com mission, Twelfth Annual Report on monitoring the application o f  Community law (1994), 
COM(95)50Q final, 7 .06 .1995, p.59; EC Commission, op.cit. n.219, p.38; and EC Com mission, Sixteenth Report on 
monitoring the application o f  Community law, COM (1999) 301 final, 9 .07.1999, p.56.
239 See EC Commission, op.cit. n.224, p. 101.
240 The more problematic area o f  regulation for France is that o f  air quality, see, e.g. Case C -14/90, Commission v. 
France. 1991 E.C.R., p.1-4331; Case C-13/90,1991 E.C.R., p.I-4327; and Case C -6 4 /9 0 ,1991 E.C.R., p.1-4335,
241 The history o f  judgments against Italy in relation to environmental Directives starts in 1979, see Case 21-79, 
Com mission v. Italy. 1980 E.C.R., p. 1; Case 91-79, 1980 E.C.R., p.1099; and Case 92-79,1 1980 E.C.R., p. 1115.
242 See Joined Cases 30 to 34/81, Commission v. Italy. 1981 E.C.R., p.3379, relating to failure to adopt, within the 
prescribed periods, the provisions needed in order to comply with Directives 75/439 on the disposal o f  waste oils, 75/440 
concerning the quality o f  drinking water, 75/442 on waste, 76/160 concerning the quality o f  bathing water, and 76/403  
on the disposal o f  polychlorinated biphenyls and polychlorinated lerphenyls. See also Case 429/85, 1988 E.C.R., p.843, 
relating to non-transposition o f  Community law on packaging and labelling o f  dangerous substances in time; Case 
322/86, 1988 E .C.R., p .3995, for failure to transpose into national law Council Directive 78/659 on the protection o f  
the quality o f  fresh waters capable o f  supporting fish life; Case 309/86, 1988 E.C.R., p .1237, relating to the Directive 
on methods o f  testing the biodegradability o f  surfactants; Case C -360/87, 1991 E.C.R., p .1-791, for failure to transpose 
the groundwater Directive; Case C-70/89, 1990 E.C.R., p.1-4817, on cadmium discharges; Case C -302/95, Judgment 
o f  12 December 1996, for non-transposition o f  the urban waste water Directive; and C-225/96, Judgment o f  4 December 
1997, for non-implementation o f  the shellfish waters Directive.
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76/464 on dangerous substances.243 Italy also has the ‘privilege’ to have been condemned for failure 
- without even giving any reasons for it - to fulfil its reporting obligations, and more specifically to 
transmit information to the Commission under various waste Directives.244 The Court has found in 
this connection that breach o f reporting obligations involves apart from violation of specific 
secondary provisions, also an infraction o f new Article 10 o f the EC Treaty which requires Member 
States to co-operate with the Commission so that the latter can perform its supervisory functions 
under Article 211. Besides, Italy is the only Mediterranean state that has a judgm ent against it for 
not complying with a ten-year-old decision of the Court relating to used oils.245
From the newer Members, Spain has several times appeared before the Court for 
infringements o f Community law relating to the protection o f the marine environment from pollution 
by dangerous substances under Directive 76/464,246 protection from nitrate pollution under Directive 
91/676, and violation o f  the bathing waters Directive 247 In 1995, Greece was referred to the ECJ 
for failure to adopt measures to control and reduce list II substances under the said instrument.248 
Greece has additionally been found in breach of its obligations for not transposing Directive 91/271 
on urban waste water treatment on time.249
In case a State does not comply with a judgm ent the available formal course o f action lies 
with the Commission: It may issue a ‘reasoned opinion’ requiring rectification within a specified 
time limit; if non-compliance continues, it may take further action in front o f  the Court alleging 
failure to comply with what is now Article 228. The Maastricht Treaty amended this Article which 
now allows the Commission to propose and the Court to uphold that a Member State not complying 
with an ECJ judgm ent is liable to a specified lump sum or ‘penalty paym ent’.250 It is further 
submitted that failure by a Member State to pay a fine could result in the freezing o f sizeable
243 Case C -195/97, Commission v. Italy. Judgment o f  25 February 1999; and C -285/96, Judgment o f  1 October 1998, 
respectively.
244 Case C -33/90, Commission v. Italy. 1991 E.C.R., p.1-5987; and Case C -48/89, 1990 E .C .R . , p.1-2425.
245 See Case C -366/89, Commission v. Italy. 1993 E.C.R., p.1-4201.
246 See Case C-192/90, Commission v. Spain, 1991 E.C.R., p.I-5933; Case C-355/90, 1993 E.C.R., p. 1-4221; and Case 
C -214/96, Judgment o f  25 Novem ber 1998.
247 Case C-71/97, Commission v. Spain. Judgment o f  1 October 1998, regarding designation o f  vulnerable zones; and 
C -274/98, 13 April 2000, regarding failure to establish action programmes under Directive 91/676. On the shellfish 
waters Directive, see Case C -92/96, Judgment o f  12 February 1998.
248 Cases C-232 and 233/95, Commission v. Greece. Judgment o f  11 June 1998, see 1995 O J. (C 248), pp.3-4; and 
C -384/97, Judgment o f  25 May 2000.
24y See Case C-161/95, Commission v. Greece. 1996 E.C.R., p.1-1979. See also a series o f  other judgments against 
Greece relating to breach o f  environmental Directives, in Case C -45/91, 1992 E.C.R., p .1-2509; Case C -170/94, 1995 
E.C.R., p.I-1819; Case C - l60/95, 1996 E.C.R., p.I-1971; and Case C -329/96, Judgment o f  26  June 1997.
250 It should be reminded that natural and legal persons can be subject to fines and other pecuniary obligations if  they 
violate community law; relevant decisions o f  the Council or the Commission and ECJ judgm ents are enforceable in 
Member States under the rules o f  civil procedure (Arts. 187, 192).
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payments from the Structural Funds, or o f transfers from other sources.251
The Commission held extended and intense talks with a view to defining its policy on 
imposition o f fines, complicated by the fact that the matter is fraught with political sensitivity and 
there are also difficulties in determining the precise amount o f these fines.252 Finally, in August 1996 
it came up with general criteria which are to be refined, once they have been applied to individual 
cases by the ECJ.253 The Commission initially notes that it does not intend to ask for a penalty in 
every case, when, for instance, the infringement is minor or there is no risk o f the offence being 
repeated. It, moreover, deems that a penalty payment as opposed to a lump sum option would be the 
most appropriate choice in most cases. As to the amount o f penalty, the Commission considers that 
this should be calculated on the basis o f three fundamental criteria, namely the seriousness o f the 
violation, which in turn depends on the importance o f the Community rules breached and the effects 
o f the infringement on general and particular interests;254 its duration; and the need to ensure that 
the penalty itself is a deterrent to further infractions, which suggests that it would be more than 
symbolic, and would be even higher if there is a risk o f repetition.
In accordance with these principles, the Commission submitted its first requests for 
financial penalties (ranging from ECU 26,000 to ECU 30,000 per day) in early 1997, but four out 
o f  the five cases were settled out o f court by the end o f  the year.255 Two new cases have 
subsequently been referred to the Court, one against Greece concerning the application o f the 
Directive on waste, while, in 1997, fifteen cases reached the 228 Article letter or ‘reasoned opinion’ 
stage.256 In fact, Greece found itself in the most embarrassing position o f being the first Member 
State against which a monetary penalty was imposed for failure to comply with a previous ECJ 
judgment.
The case notably involves long-standing infringements of environmental Directives, i.e. 
Directives 75/442 and 78/319 on the management o f wastes. The Commission has been concerned 
since 1987 about uncontrolled hazardous waste disposal in a river, 200 metres from the sea, in the 
area o f Chania, Crete. The first judgm ent ordering Greece to take appropriate measures to rectify
251 See D.Wiikinson, “Maastricht and the Environment: The Implications for the EC's Environment Policy o f  the Treaty 
on European U nion’, 4 (2 )7 . o fE n v'lL ., 1992, p.233; Kramer, op.cit. n.223, pp.24-5.
252 Statement by R.Bjerregaard, Environment Commissioner, reported in Greek newspaper, To Vima, 17 November 
1996, p.E6.
253 See EC Commission, Memorandum on applying Article 171 o f  the EC Treaty, 1996 O J . (C 242) 6; and Method
o f  calculating the penalty payments provided for pursuant to Article 171, 1997 O J. (C 63) 2.
254 In this connection, the Commission gives the example o f  loss o f  resources as a result o f  a breach relative to the 
protection o f  the environment from pollution to illustrate grave effects o f  an infringement to general and particular 
interests,
255 Sec EC Commission, op.cit. n.219, p.39.
256 Id. Seven out o f the ten cases in which the Commission applied for financial penalties by the end o f  1998 have been 
settled, see EC Commission, Sixteenth.... op.cit. n.238, ibid.
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the situation was issued in 1992.257 After exhausting all means o f pressure to comply, in 1997 the 
Commission applied for an order requiring Greece to pay EUR 24,600 per day o f delay from 
delivery of the new judgment. The Court indeed found that the alleged infringements were still 
committed and moreover that their duration and particular seriousness had a considerable impact 
on private and public interests and made it urgent to get Greece to observe its obligations. It 
consequently ordered the country to pay EUR 20,000 - calculated on the basis o f its appropriateness 
to the circumstances and its proportionality to the breach and the Member States’s ability to pay - 
for each day o f  delay in complying with the 1992 judgm ent from 4 July 2 0 0 0 258 The news o f the 
substantial daily fine had a big impact on the Greek public’s perception o f the Community 
enforcement mechanism which was for the first time seen as one that could make a difference. Most 
importantly, it created a lot o f commotion within the Greek government and administration which 
is currently taking decisive steps to build the appropriate facilities in the area even in the face of 
local opposition. It thus seems that an unwilling government can effectively be forced into 
compliance with Community standards, if  all else fails, with the threat o f a tangible and painful 
financial loss. However, this can only be an extraordinary measure, a last resort, that can be brought 
about only after many - thirteen in this case - years o f bad practice and legal breaches.
All said, the merits o f this system are only relative, and there are still weaknesses to 
overcome and considerable problems o f non-compliance and enforcement.259 To this effect, 
proposals have benn long put forward for further economic or criminal sanctions against states 
violating Community rules, and even a Community-wide ‘pollution police’ or inspectorate.260 More 
modest, but potentially more effective could be the intense use o f economic instruments 
supplementing legislation, as well as measures such as ‘green’ taxes, eco-labelling and 
environmental auditing;261 and the mobilisation o f the European public opinion.
In relation to the last point, it seems that Mediterranean NGOs, encouraged by the more 
advanced legal framework o f the EU, have emerged as more active participants during recent years. 
Their latest targets include the actual involvement o f the Fifth Community Action Programme for 
the Environment with the setting up o f a “Mediterranean Water and Natural Resources Management 
Community”, patterned on the ECSC, to promote common policies on resource management, water 
pricing, infrastructure, technology transfers and research and development, along with 
environmental education and training and cultivation o f public awareness; a Regional
257 Case C -45/91, 1992 E.C.R., p.1-2509.
258 Case C -387/97, Commission v. Greece. Judgment o f  4 July 2000.
259 See EC Commission, op.cit. n.217; European Environment Bureau, R eport o f  the Sem inar on the Implementation  
and Enforcem ent o f  E C  Environm ental L egisla tion , London, 27-28 Oct. 1986; L.Krdmer, ‘Rules and Enforcement’,
Environment S trategy Europe  1991, p.48.
200 Sec T.R.Crockett & C.B.Schultz, ‘The Integration o f  Environmental Policy and the European Community: Recent 
Problems o f  Implementation and Enforcement’, 29 Colo.J. o f  Trans 7 L, 1991, p. 169; and Kramer, op.cit. n.223, pp.52-3.
2(11 See Wtlgenbaur, op.cit. n.197, pp.455-77.
238
Environmental Court o f Justice with authority to order the implementation o f international treaties, 
impose clean-up costs, and grant standing to NGOs and citizens; and a Special Environmental 
Protection Fund to mitigate environmental damage caused by mass tourism in the region etc.262 The 
most likely course o f action, however, that the Commission plans to take and which is in fact the 
most promising is to shift attention to strengthening procedural rights within individual Member 
States in order to decentralise the whole enforcement process.263
5.5. Concluding Remarks.
To sum up the preceding discussion, let us start by noting that the comprehensive 
institutional approach to compliance with international environmental law is today well-established. 
This model relies on flexible, informal interactions within treaty institutions to scrutinise and 
promote compliance with substantive standards. However, because o f its heavily political character, 
there is a conspicuous need for openness and transparency, as well as involvement o f non-traditional 
actors, such as the public interested in the protection o f the environment, to make it more 
accountable and effective.
M onitoring and reporting are the main information-gathering techniques in this context. 
Under the Barcelona Convention and MAP in general, the Parties have extended monitoring 
obligations, but in practice a Mediterranean basin-wide monitoring network producing data on a 
regular basis does not exist, nor states transmit monitoring information under the Land-based 
Sources Protocol to the extent they should. In the same vein, one can safely conclude that reporting 
under the Barcelona Convention and Protocols does not fulfil its proper role. Even in the rare 
instances when it actually takes place, it is not being put in any constructive use, nor is it available 
to the public, or used to increase transparency and collective pressure towards increased compliance 
in any way. Similarly, very extensive reporting requirements under M ARPOL are accompanied by 
poor and incomplete response by its parties. The analytical work undertaken by AIDEnvironment, 
in this context, is a good illustration of how effective NGO involvement in the follow-up process 
can be.
In general, examination o f the reporting mechanisms o f the main international treaty 
regimes applicable to marine pollution o f the Mediterranean Sea points to a  common pattern: 
Notwithstanding extensive reporting requirements and efforts within various organs to facilitate and 
promote submission o f reports, states prove disinclined to provide the required information; even 
when they do so, both quality and adequacy o f reports submitted are sub-standard. At the same time, 
the organs responsible to put data gathered into effective use remain in most cases inactive.
262 See Crockett & Shultz, op.cit. n.260, p. 169.
263 See infra, Chapter 8, pp.354-5.
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More generally, in the Mediterranean context the Parties to the Barcelona Convention are 
not concerned with compliance control, despite Secretariat efforts. Notwithstanding positive 
indications to a future development o f some more streamlined procedures in the context o f MED 
POL, to date they have shown no willingness to endow their collective organ with anything more 
than a traditional ‘soft’ and informal supervisory function, which has not amounted - nor is likely 
to amount in the future - to much in terms o f real impact and actual follow-up practice.
IMO, on the other hand, makes an impressive effort at identifying the problem areas 
affecting implementation o f international standards and recommending appropriate correcting 
actions. However, it stops well short o f  an actual compliance-control mechanism that would 
pinpoint concrete breaches o f international undertakings and proceed to a well-defined course o f 
action to address these phenomena. Much more effective in this respect is the model o f co-operative 
supervision by national port authorities.
The Paris MOU establishes a supervisory mechanism, outside the MARPOL regime, 
allowing national authorities to exchange information and eventually form an effective control 
network difficult to bypass. Although the Paris MOU model can only be applied in the area o f 
shipping activities, conclusion o f a similar agreement covering the Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean can potentially make a difference in the effort to banish sub-standard shipping from 
the region.
Strengthening typical compliance control functions within the comprehensive institutional 
model can be achieved by introducing much more formal ‘non-compliance procedures’, such as the 
one under the Montreal Protocol. This permanent, streamlined mechanism explicitly provides for 
sanctioning or assistance measures to address noil-compliant behaviour, and seems to produce 
tangible results, although there is always room for further improvement. In fact, this model has 
much scope o f expansion to other international environmental regimes; unfortunately the 
Mediterranean one is not a likely candidate as yet, in view of the attitude o f states towards the issue, 
as well as the fact that the chance o f developing a meaningful non-compliance procedure was 
missed at the recent revision. The Montreal Protocol teaches another very significant lesson, namely 
that the acceptance and legitimisation o f stringent compliance control is closely linked with a treaty 
funding mechanism that would make resources available to the extent the parties meet their 
substantial and procedural obligations. This point will be further pursued in the next Chapter.
Lastly, it is in the context o f the European Union that one can find the most advanced and 
wholesome compliance-control mechanism, involving both political and informal, and judicial 
stages. Involvement o f the public and NGOs is one of the most positive features o f the Community 
system, and is certainly worth considering in the Barcelona context as well; so is the collaborative 
process o f interaction with national authorities called to implement environmental legislation, before 
the Commission resorts to the more adversarial enforcement procedures. Nonetheless, the
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Commission’s work is restrained by all kinds o f political, practical and other limitations - one o f 
which is that it does not exercise any control over compliance with international conventions to 
which the Community is a Party, such as the Barcelona Convention and Protocols - and ECJ 
judgm ents cannot be effectively and rapidly enforced as yet. In the same vein, monitoring and 
reporting on Community environmental law, despite their much more sophisticated and compulsory 
character, are still dysfunctional, and certainly the relevant record o f Mediterranean countries is 
poor. All said, the reaction to the very recent imposition o f a fine to Greece highlights the 
importance o f imposing monetary, or generally financial, loss as a consequence o f a legal breach, 
and conversely o f providing such incentives for compliance with international environmental 
standards. This is the subject o f the next Chapter.
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C h ap ter  6.
F in a n c ia l  a n d  Te c h n ic a l  In c e n t iv e s  a n d  A s s is t a n c e  to 
C om pl  y  w it h  In te r n a  tio n a l  E n v ir o n m e n t a l  
Ob l ig a  tio n s  i n  th e  M e d it e r r a n e a n .
A significant issue that has been raised several times in previous Chapters is that o f 
availability o f resources devoted directly to the implementation of legal undertakings and/or to the 
development o f requisite national infrastructure and capacity, and o f relevant mechanisms to assist 
Mediterranean states in their effort to fulfill their international obligations regarding protection of 
the marine environment from pollution. This Chapter is going to examine this subject in greater 
depth. But, first, it is worth considering whether all the concern about huge costs that have to be 
met, if  international environmental regulations are to be fulfilled, is overestimated; in other words, 
let us briefly explore what could be called ‘the myth o f excessively costly m easures’.
There is, indeed, much discussion regarding the cost that reduction of, chiefly, land-based 
pollution implies,1 and a presumption that it is actually very high to the extent it involves most o f 
the economic and social activity taking place not only in coastal areas but in the whole o f the 
watershed.2 That is often used as an excuse, mostly by developing states, for non-compliance with 
relevant environmental obligations. What seems to lie behind this defence, however, is an 
unwillingness to formulate policy priorities in an environmentally sustainable manner; should 
political will be present, then the cost-effectiveness of required measures is rather easier to 
substantiate.
In that vein, UNEP has realised that the costing o f programmes designed to abate land- 
based pollution and the assessment o f  benefits therefrom is a crucial step in environmental 
management and sustainable development o f coastal areas, and can contribute towards persuading 
governments that measures are feasible and worthwhile. Hence, it is currently attempting to measure 
these costs and benefits and has come up with general methodological guidelines to improve
1 See, among others, J.Ashvvorth, I.Papps & D.J.Storey, ‘Assessing the Effectiveness and Econom ic Efficiency o f  
an EEC Pollution Control Directive: The Control o f  Discharges o f  Mercury to the Aquatic Environment’, in J.-M. Graf
von der Sculenburg & G.Skogh (eds.), Law and Econom ics and the Econom ics o f  Legal R egulation , 1986, pp.207-25; 
on specific costs concerning the Mediterranean region, see infra, fn.4.
2 On this point, see supra, Chapter 1, pp.37-47.
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relevant estimates at the national level.3
In the context o f Mediterranean marine pollution, for example, where most o f UNEP’s 
earliest work on this theme has been done, the initial estimate for dealing with land-based pollution 
only - calculated in 1991 - came up with a figure between $25-100 billion for the next twenty years,
i.e. between $1-5 billion per annum, while the total cost o f halting degradation o f the marine 
environment from all sources would be two to three times higher.4 But, as the Executive Director 
o f UNEP stressed, “these figures are not as shocking as they may sound at first instance”, in view 
o f the fact that annual income from tourism alone was at the time the above estimate was made 
around $3 billion in Yugoslavia and $10 billion in France,5 which could be well lost if the 
environment degraded further.
Indeed, case studies on two areas, the Bay o f  Izmir in Turkey and the island of Rhodes in 
Greece, present some very interesting findings.6 The two sites represent two different, yet typical 
and complementary, situations, common throughout the Mediterranean: one a large coastal urban 
and industrial centre, the other an island with tourism as the main economic activity. It was 
estimated that in both cases the economic and social benefits from pollution control and abatement 
investments exceeded the costs by a factor o f  one under the most conservative scenario to a factor 
o f eight under the most progressive one.
N onetheless - and whatever the findings of relevant studies may be -, there are always 
instances where the countries concerned cannot readily come up with the funds needed for 
environmental investments even when the long-term economic benefits are acknowledged, or - more 
frequently - they do not make the required policy choice, i.e. they rather channel the available 
financial resources to other sectors that are viewed as more vital to the country’s development. Then, 
international financial and technical assistance with environmental conditions attached becomes 
both relevant and indispensable.7
This type o f  assistance can prove effective in more than one ways: It can act as a direct or
3 See UNEP, M eeting o f  Government Designated Experts to formulate a Draft Strategy for the reduction o f  the 
degradation o f  the marine environment from land-based sources o f  pollution and activities in coastal areas, Strategy for 
the Reduction o f  the Degradation o f  the Marine Environment from Land-Based Sources o f  Pollution and Activities in 
Coastal Areas (including an Annex on preliminary estimate on the costs associated with the protection o f  the 
Mediterranean Sea against pollution from land-based sources and activities in coastal areas), UNEP(OCA)/W G.14/3 
1991.
1 See UNEP, Report o f  the Seventh Ordinary Meeting o f  the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection 
o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and related Protocols, UNEP(OCA)/M ED IG.2/4, 11 October 1991, Annex 
111, p.5.
5 Id.
6 See UNEP, Costs and Benefits o f  Measures for the Reduction o f  Degradation o f  the Environment from Land-Based 
Sources o f  Pollution in Coastal Areas - A. Case Study o f  the Bay o f  Izmir - B. Case Study o f  the Island o f  Rhodes, MAP 
Technical R eports and Studies N o .72, 1993.
7 Professor Wolfrum considers balancing environmental commitments with potential econom ic benefits and provision 
o f  compliance assistance two very effective mechanisms to promote compliance in such cases, see R. Wolfrum,, ‘Means 
o f  Ensuring Compliance with and Enforcement o f  International Environmental Law’, 272 Receuil des Cours, 1998, 
pp.l 10-37.
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indirect incentive to comply with the said obligations. In other words, the countries concerned not 
only turn to these sources o f funding when they find it difficult to execute environmental projects, 
but also, reversely, undertake environmental investments so as to be able to benefit from available 
international funds. By the same token, it could even, if incorporated into the treaty regime, induce 
parties to accept some form o f meaningful compliance control, as observed in the Montreal Protocol 
framework.8
In Chapter 3 we traced the gradual acknowledgment o f the principle o f ‘common but 
differentiated responsibility’ and o f the centrality o f financial mechanisms in international 
environmental law.9 Although this process culminated at UNCED (Rio Declaration, Principle 7, 
Agenda 21, Chapter 33), already at the LOS Conference the importance and necessity of 
international assistance for the protection o f the marine environment, especially for developing 
countries, was appreciated. Hence, the LOSC provides that the latter be given special preference 
when calling on the specialised services o f international organisations or requesting technical 
assistance (Art.203).10 This aims at improving ‘the means at their disposal’ and enhance their 
capabilities to effectively administer their environmental obligations. In the same vein, Article 202 
commits all states to “promote programmes o f scientific, educational, technical and other assistance 
to developing states for the protection and preservation of the marine environment”; “provide 
appropriate assistance... for the minimisation o f  the effects o f major incidents which may cause 
serious pollution”; and for the preparation o f environmental impact assessments.
Moreover, in Part XIV, the general undertaking to promote the development and transfer 
o f marine technology on fair and reasonable terms focuses on developing states in need o f technical 
assistance with regard, among others, to the protection of the marine environment (Art.266). Special 
reference is made to the establishment and continuous strengthening o f national and regional marine 
scientific and technological centres in developing states in order to enhance domestic capabilities 
to preserve and protect their environment and resources (Arts.275-277), In the organisation o f the 
whole endeavour, centre stage is given to international institutions, such as those o f MAP which are 
examined below.
It is, therefore, essential to examine the various mechanisms o f financial and technical 
assistance that are currently operating at the international level to assist M editerranean states in the 
task o f fulfilling their duties o f marine environmental protection. The following sections will look 
into the four main mechanisms applicable in the case o f the Mediterranean Sea, namely funding and 
assistance in the framework o f MAP; financial assistance for environmental protection in the
8 See supra, Chapter 5, pp ,219-20.
9 See supra, Chapter 3, pp.l 18-20; and p. 135-6, for these concerns as addressed in Agenda MED 21.
10 What in human rights terms could be called ‘solidarity rights’, see A .Boyle, ‘The Role o f  Human Rights in the 
protection o f  the Environment’, in A .E.Boyle & M.R.Anderson (eds.), Human R ights A pproaches to Environmental 
Protection, 1996, pp.48 and 57-9.
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European Community framework; assistance under the World Bank/EIB Environmental Program 
for the Mediterranean; and GEF funding directed towards protection of the oceans. Discussion will 
be limited to these issues that relate closely to control over compliance with treaty norms as has been 
defined so far; therefore, it will not address questions of economic incentives, such as state aids and 
taxes, as these are still mainly national policy choices, nor o f bilateral environmental lending, or 
even o f intellectual property in relation to transfer o f technology, however topical these may be.11 
Besides, the immense field of international co-operation in scientific research is left out o f the scope 
o f the present Chapter, despite its significant impact in capacity-building.
6.1. Funding and Assistance in the Framework o f the M editerranean Action Plan.
6.1.1. The Mediterranean Trust Fund.
In its initial stages, the MAP system was faced with great institutional and financial 
constraints: Limited funds were available from UNEP and use was made o f existing international 
organisations and co-ordinating bodies (MAP, IV). By 1979 the Mediterranean Regional Trust Fund 
(the Trust Fund) was established to provide continuous and independent financial support for 
M AP.12 Its administration was entrusted to the Secretary-General o f the UN and, at his discretion, 
to the Executive Director o f UNEP (Annex IX, Art.2), according to the UN Financial Regulations 
and Rules and the Financial Rules o f the Fund o f UNEP, properly modified.
The initial recommendation o f the Parties was that the Fund be financed 50% by themselves 
and 50% by UNEP and the other UN organisations involved.13 This proposal met with firm 
resistance by UNEP which pressed for the countries o f the region to assume primary financial 
responsibility for the development of MAP activities. Finally, U N EP’s contribution was set at 
around 25% ;14 while from the other UN organisations only UNDP agreed to participate in M AP’s 
funding, but with no commitment as to a fixed percentage o f the budget.15
The Trust Fund - which is reviewed every two years - initially comprised two sections: 
Section 1 covered expenditures for activities directly derived from the Barcelona Convention and 
its Protocols, while Section II covered other activities under MAP (Annex IX, Art.3). Section I was 
composed o f contributions from Parties, according to a fixed scale, and voluntary contributions from
11 See, P.Sands, Principles o f  International Environm ental Law, V ol.l, 1995, Chapters 18 and 19, with relevant 
bibliography.
12 See UNEP, Report o f  the Intergovernmental Review  M eeting o f  Mediterranean Coastal States and First M eeting 
o f  the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and its Related 
Protocols, UNEP/IG.14/9, UNEP, 1979, Annex IX; and also Executive Director’s Report on the Establishment o f  a 
Mediterranean Regional Trust Fund for the Protection o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution, UNEP/IG, 14/7, 4 
December 1979.
13 See UNEP, Executive Director’s Report..., op.cit. n.12, p .l,
H Ibid, pp.2-3.
15 Ibid, p.3.
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other states and non-governmental sources (Annex IX, Arts.5 and 6). Section 11 costs were incurred 
by the above sources and the EC, according to a cost-sharing scheme (Annex IX, Arts. 10 and 11). 
This formalistic distinction was abandoned at the Sixth Ordinary Meeting o f the Contracting Parties, 
where a single budgetary programme was adopted.16
The budget - amounting to approximately US$ 6.5 million for 2001 - is geared towards 
meeting the administrative costs o f MAP, and funding MED POL and the CAM Ps,17 and typically 
covers the costs o f Conferences, Consultations, and Meetings o f the Bureau, Committees, the 
Parties, and Groups o f Experts; special consultants and studies for the various components of MAP; 
training courses; publications; salaries o f the staff o f the various units; assistance to institutions 
participating in MED POL, either in kind or in money; and assistance in the implementation o f the 
various components, usually in the form o f expert advice.
The larger part o f  available funds was, during the first years, channelled to MED POL 
projects; for example, in 1981, 65% o f the funds went to MED POL, 17% to REMPEC, 15% to the 
Blue Plan, and 2% to PAP.18 This does not come as a surprise, in view o f the fact that development 
o f the scientific assessment component o f MAP was a privileged field o f common action and a 
prerequisite for the elaboration o f concrete control rules. As the MAP as a whole and its legal 
component matured, however, this balance was altered, and in the 1995 budget, MED POL 
activities accounted for 21.4% o f the total expenses, with activities for the implementation o f the 
Barcelona Convention taking up 32.3%, management o f coastal areas 15.9%, programme support 
costs 10.7%, activities for the implementation o f the Emergency Protocol, including the operation 
o f REM PEC, 10.5%, activities for the implementation o f the Geneva Protocol, including the 
operation o f SPA/RAC, 6.3%, whilst those for the implementation o f  the Athens and Dumping 
Protocol an insignificant 2.6%.
A notable characteristic o f the Trust Fund is its scale system, under which contributions are 
determined equitably according to the financial capabilities o f the states. Although fair in its 
inception, this system grants an increased controlling power to the four major contributors, i.e. 
France, Italy, Spain and the EU ,19 and leads to a heavy dependence o f the overall implementation
16 UNEP, Report o f  the Sixth Ordinary Meeting o f  the Contracting Parlies to the Convention for the Protection o f  
the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and its related Protocols, UNEP(OCA)/MED IG. 1/5, 1 Novem ber 1989, Annex 
VI.
17 On MED POL, see supra  Chapter 5, pp. 195-7.
18 As calculated by P.Haas, in Saving the Mediterranean - The Politics o f  International Environm ental Co-operation, 
1990, p .126. The author considers that this proves the preoccupation o f  UNEP - which was still a main contributor at 
the time and had large discretionary control over the allocation o f  the budget from the position o f  administrator - to 
maintain its privileged alliance with the marine scientists o f  the region.
19 The contributions o f  the three first countries for the biennium 1994-1995 accounted for 68.61%  o f  the total (France 
30.32%, Italy 25.05%  and Spain 11.97%); if  EU (13.24% ) and Greek (10.14% ) contributions are added, then 91.99%  
o f  the total funds is reached, which leaves sixteen countries offering a slim 8.01% , see UNEP, Report o f  the Eighth 
Ordinary M eeting o f  the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection o f  the Mediterranean Sea against 
Pollution and related Protocols, UNEP(OCA)/M ED IG.3/5, 15 October 1993, Annex V, p .l .
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o f MAP on their conduct.20 This reality acquires more importance in view o f the fact that states are 
notoriously late in discharging o f their financial obligations.21 In fact, the Deputy Executive Director 
o f UNEP did not hesitate, in 1987, to threaten with closing down o f projects and regional centres, 
unless payments were immediately received, since the cash available at the time was sufficient to 
cover MAP costs for just one a month!22
In an effort to cure this malfunction,23 the Parties agreed to create a Revolving Fund, on an 
experimental basis.24 This Fund possesses an initial capital ($ 1,788,699) that is to be used for 
activities already approved, but which cannot be covered by the Trust Fund for reasons o f delays 
in the payment o f  contributions. Priority is given to activities involving countries lacking the 
necessary national capabilities, and the amounts used are re-deposited in the Fund, when 
contributions are eventually paid.
Pledges not forthcoming is not the only problem the MAP fund is faced with, however. In 
1987, the Fifth Meeting o f the Parties - significantly, the first after the adoption o f the ambitious 
Genoa Declaration - expressed a characteristic resistance to the Executive D irector’s proposals to 
increase the budget for the 1988-89 biennium by 15%.25 Both the developing and the developed 
Parties put forward various arguments against, ranging from “the precarious situation o f the world 
economy” to the specific financial burden for particular countries in the proposed budget. The 
general attitude which was reflected in the final decision was in favour o f  a modest increase o f 5%, 
and o f  a more ‘prudent’ and efficient management o f  existing financial resources. Thus, the 
acceleration o f activities as envisaged by the Genoa Declaration was halted,26 and in effect, a part 
o f M A P’s planned activities had to be cut down.
That was not the only time that financial allocations, however insubstantial, caused distress
20 However, Raftopoulos points out that the dynamic character o f  the institutionalised re-negotiation o f  the Fund every 
two years, and the public status o f  the contributors which is a factor restricting the discretionary exercise o f  their powers, 
as well as the possibility for any Party to make voluntary contributions, e.g. through the hosting o f  special offices and 
Centres, balance the excessive power o f  the main contributors, E.Raftopoulos, The Barcelona Convention and P rotocols 
- The M editerranean Action P lan R egim e , 1993, pp.70-2.
21 See e.g. UNEP, op.cit, n.16, Annex IV, p,4, where it is stated that in October 1989 contributions were $4 million 
in arrears. The same amount was overdue in 1991, see UNEP, op.cit. n.4, Annex 111, p.3; whereas by 1993 it had reached 
$4.5 m illion, see UNEP, op.cit. n.19, p .7, Having said that, som e countries o f  the region are sometimes genuinely  
incapable o f  meeting their financial obligations, see, for instance, the decision o f  the Parlies to waive Lebanon from 
paying its outstanding arrears up to the end o f  1990, in UNEP, op.cit. n.4, Annex IV, p .15 at F.9.1.
22 See UNEP, Report o f  the Fifth Ordinary Meeting o f  the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection 
o f  the Mediterranean Sea and related Protocols, UNEP/IG.74/5, UNEP, 28 September 1987, Annex 111, p.3.
23 And in view o f  a budgetary deficit o f  $2,423,731 in 1993.
2,1 UNEP, op.cit. n.19, p.21. Notwithstanding general approval, one representative expressed the hope that the 
existence o f  the Fund would not lead to further negligence in the payment o f  contributions; this is undoubtedly a 
potential side-effect o f  the new institution.
25 See UNEP, op.cit, n.22, pp.8 and 19-21.
26 See relevant remarks o f  the Executive Director, in ibid, p.22. Nevertheless, the Parties requested the Secretariat 
jointly with the EC to assess the costs o f  the specific objectives o f  the Genoa Declaration and the needs deriving from 
them, presumably for future consideration, see ibid, p .52.
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in a Meeting o f the Parties. A relevant account by Professor Vucas, present at the Fourth Meeting,27
which produced the Genoa Declaration itself, best describes the climate during such discussions:28
“On the other hand, every observer at the Genoa Meeting lost any enthusiasm he had for 
sincerity and friendly co-operation when the budgetary questions came up. During the last 
two days of the Meeting the main contributors fought with incredible persistence to lower 
the 10% increase..., suggested by the Secretariat... The smallest contributors (2,165 US$ 
annually!) insisted on adopting the same percent (10%) o f increase for all States; for each 
o f them it would mean an increase o f 217 US$ and for the biggest contributors 110,824 
dollars for 1986. Eventually the Meeting took the decision to raise the contributions o f all 
States by approximately 5%... Watching this long financial bargaining one had the 
impression that delegations thought they were negotiating contributions to a quite 
unnecessary and frivolous undertaking, and not attempting to satisfy the targets their heads 
adopted in the Genoa Declaration.”
The same pattern o f a 5% increase is followed almost without exception every time a new 
budget is discussed,29 even at times when the Parties commit themselves in other fo ra  - as, for 
example, in U N EP’s Governing Council - to substantial increases in relevant budgets.30
Despite the problematic operation o f the Trust Fund, some still view its existence as the 
main reason why MAP has maintained its impetus towards goals still unattained.31 Professor 
Raftopoulos, for instance, believes that the Trust Fund creates a noteworthy incentive for 
constructive compliance among the donors who, through the control they exercise over the budget, 
co-operate and ‘compete’ with each other as to the implementation o f M AP, at least to the degree 
that they expect to draw some important technical and political benefits from this.32 Indeed, MAP 
has always been conceived both by the Parties and by UNEP officials, as a pure ‘co-operation’ 
regime, in which states are not expected to concede too many powers and/or money to the 
international organisation.33 Be that as it may, the significance o f a robust financial mechanism goes 
beyond what has been already discussed to direct compliance control. In the words o f the same 
official, “states will accept compliance control only if they expect some financial gain”, as best
27 The Genoa M eeting also approved the Programme Calendar for 1986-1995, whereby alternative assessment 
methods o f  apportionment to the Trust Fund should be developed by 1987, the Trust Fund should be changed to a capital 
fund by 1990, and direct appeal for funds to the public for selected projects o f  regional significance should be effected 
by 1995, see UNEP, Report o f  the Fourth Ordinary M eeting o f  the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the 
Protection o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and related Protocols, UNEP/1G.56/5, 30  September 1985, p .3 1.
28 See B, Vucas, ‘The Protection o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution’, in U.Leanza (ed.), The International 
L egal Regime o f  the M editerranean Sea, 1987, pp.432-3.
29 With the exception o f  the 1992-93 budget, which saw contributions increasing by 10% for each o f  the two years, 
see UNEP, op.cit. n.4, p. 11. At the 1996 M eeting a proposal for a 7% increase in view  o f  the expanded needs created 
by the introduction o f  MAP II, was extensively discussed and watered down to a 3.5% increase in ordinary contributions 
with an additional 3.5%  as extraordinary contributions, see UNEP, Report o f  the Extraordinary Meeting o f the 
Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and related 
Protocols, UNEP(OCA)/M ED IG.8/7, 1996, pp.4-7.
30 See UNEP, op.cit. n.16, Annex IV, p.4.
31 See, for instance, D.Edwards, ‘Review o f  the Status o f  Implementation and Development o f  Regional Arrangements 
on Co-operation in Combating Marine Pollution’, in J.E.Carroll (ed.), International Environm ental D iplom acy, 1988, 
p.272.
32 See E.Raftopoulos, ‘The Barcelona Convention System for the Protection o f  the Mediterranean Sea against 
Pollution: An International Trust at Work’, 7(1) I.J.E.C.L., 1992, p.40.
33 According to Ibrahim Dharat, MAP Programme Coordinator, from interview with the author.
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illustrated in the case o f the Montreal Protocol regime.34
All said, one can justifiably conclude that the MAP budget has been and still is 
characteristically humble,35 suitable only for support and co-ordination actions, and does not address 
the issue o f the great cost o f substantive anti-pollution measures. The main sources o f international 
funding for such activities are provided by the EU and the E1B, and by the W orld Bank and GEF, 
as will be shown in subsequent sections.36 It must be noted, in this connection, that, UNEP, 
operating in the framework o f MAP, has always facilitated interested states in identifying 
environmental projects and negotiate aid for their implementation with various other donors.37 What 
is more, the Secretariat lately seems ready to formally assume a more rigorous advisory and 
supportive role in helping individual countries acquire additional, and presumably more substantive, 
funding.38
6.1.2. Compliance Assistance under the Barcelona Convention and Protocols.
Apart from the Trust Fund, scientific and technological co-operation obligations, which 
work towards facilitating compliance, are also present under the Barcelona Convention: Article 13 
lays down this general duty o f  co-operation without further qualifications or specifications. As far 
as developing states o f the region are concerned, however, it creates an additional duty for the 
Parties, namely to co-operate in the provision o f technical and other possible assistance in fields 
relating to marine pollution.
This provision is not directly relevant to the costs o f implementation of substantive 
measures to reduce marine pollution, but is nevertheless important in that it identifies lack of 
appropriate expertise and infrastructure in developing countries as a main impediment to designing 
and putting into practice effective environmental programmes. As Professor Raftopoulos puts it, if 
a Party has failed to cany out some duty laid upon it by virtue o f its status, traditional remedies may 
be either inadequate or futile for securing compliance. The reason is that non-compliance cannot 
really be abstracted from the level o f  the economic development o f each Party which fundamentally
34 See sitpra , Chapter 5, pp .219-20.
35 Note, e.g., that the small island states o f  the Caribbean Action Plan contribute annually more to their fund than a 
number o f  Mediterranean states to theirs, see UNEP, op.cit. n.16, Annex IV, p.5.
36 While other innovative ideas such as the establishment o f  a voluntary regional fund to finance environmental 
activities, with money derived from alternative sources, like, for instance, the charging o f  a nominal fee on airline tickets 
purchased by tourists visiting the region, have not been seriously considered as yet, sec UNEP, op.cit, n.16, p,6; and 
UNEP, op.cit. n.4, Annex III, p.5.
37 See UNEP, op.cit. n.22, p .52. It is surprising, therefore, that the Deputy Coordinator o f  MAP, in response to an 
inquiry regarding the various sources o f  funding and the results achieved, replied that the Unit has “no relevant 
information since this topic is not in our programme”, letter o f  22 April 1996 with the author.
38 See UNEP, op.cit. n.29, p.24; and UNEP, Report o f  the Tenth Ordinary M eeting o f  the Contracting Parties to the 
Convention for the Protection o f  the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and its Protocols, UNEP(OCA)/M ED  
IG.l 1/10, 3 December 1997, Annex IV, Appendix II, pp.49 et seq., for a GEF-funded study by the Secretariat concerning 
proposed investments in the area o f  land-based pollution control from 1998 to 2008 at an estimated cost o f  around $10 
billion; and see infra, p.278.
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affects policy decisions on environmental issues, nor can it be dissociated from the differentiated 
responsibility o f each State in the contribution to the pollution problems.39
Acknowledging this reality, the Athens Protocol is more detailed with regard to compliance 
facilitation and assistance to developing countries:
“Article 10. Technical Assistance.
1. The Parties shall, directly or with the assistance o f competent regional or other 
international organizations, bilaterally or multi laterally, co-operate with a view to 
formulating and, as far as possible, implementing programmes o f assistance to developing 
countries, particularly in the fields of science, education and technology, with a view to 
preventing, reducing or, as appropriate, phasing out inputs o f  pollutants from land-based 
sources and activities and their harmful effects in the marine environment.
2. Technical assistance would include, in particular, the training o f  scientific and technical 
personnel, as well as the acquisition, utilization and production by those countries of 
appropriate equipment and, as appropriate, clean production technologies, on advantageous 
terms to be agreed upon among the Parties concerned.”40
This is a compromise solution, criticised by both sides, i.e. developed and developing countries. The 
former disagree with the “advantageous terms” provision, while the latter deplore the qualification 
“as far as possible” which deprives implementation of assistance programmes o f its compulsory 
force.41
Com parable formulations are also found in the other instruments (Emergency Protocol,
Art. 10; Offshore Protocol, Art.24; and Hazardous Waste Protocol, Art. 10). All o f  them envisage
a primarily technical type o f  assistance, something that is being done throughout the life o f the
Barcelona regime by means o f the scientific and research component (MED POL) and the operation
o f regional centres such as REMPEC.
Direct financial assistance appears for the first time in the most recent Hazardous Waste
Protocol. The relevant Article is short but with potentially great repercussions. It reads:
“Article 10. Assistance to Developing Countries.
The Parties shall, directly or with the assistance o f competent or other international 
organizations or bilaterally, co-operate with a view to formulating and implementing 
programmes o f financial and technical assistance to developing countries for the 
implementation o f this Protocol.”
As we already noted,42 the Hazardous Waste Protocol essentially establishes broad obligations to 
develop and apply clean production processes so as to minimise generation o f hazardous wastes. In 
fact, it explicitly views transboundary movement o f such waste as exceptional (Art.6). 
Consequently, the aid envisaged in Article 10 will in effect have to be directed mainly towards 
research in and application o f clean production technologies in developing countries and therefore
39 Rallopoulos, op.cit. n.20, p.63.
40 The necessity o f  such direct assistance was reaffirmed at the Fifth M eeting, see UNEP, op.cit. n.22, p. 77.
41 On the relevant negotiations, see P .A.Bliss-Guest, ‘The Protocol against Pollution from Land-Based Sources: A  
Turning Point in the Rising Tide o f  Pollution’, 17 Stanford J. I. L., 1981, p.275.
42 See sitpra, Chapter 2, p.85.
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has a far-reaching potential, as long as it does not remain in paper.
It is true that the issue of expert technical assistance, training, and transfer o f technology 
to developing states in the Mediterranean often comes up at the Meetings o f the Parties, especially 
in connection with implementation o f the Athens Protocol,43 but there has not been any distinct 
decision setting out particular arrangements or procedures to this effect, although research into land- 
based pollution in the Mediterranean is indeed carried out and the findings shared. It is characteristic 
that the work plan for implementation o f the Athens Protocol during 1986-87 did not deal with 
Article 10;44 however, the Parties did resolve that direct assistance should be provided to facilitate 
national implementation o f the Protocol, mainly in the form o f expert visits and local training.45 As 
late as 1991, M A P’s budget comprised $85,000 under the heading ‘assistance to countries to 
implement the LBS Protocol’,46 which was reduced to $20,000 for each o f the years 1994 to 1996.47
The only areas where assistance has had some significant impact are the long-established 
programmes related to spill response through REMPEC activities, and monitoring in the context o f 
MED POL. In fact, in an effort to accelerate the development of national monitoring programmes 
in several countries which are lagging behind, the Secretariat has ‘stretched the rules’ and provided 
support, training and even equipment for programmes that did not have clear legal status;48 
nevertheless, this did not substantially improve the situation as far as fulfilment o f specific legal 
obligations in beneficiary countries is concerned.
An example o f initiatives seeking to provide such assistance is given by the 1993 
M emorandum o f  Understanding signed between MAP and the Centre for Environment and 
Development for the Arab Region and Europe (CEDARE),49 whereby CEDARE undertook to grant 
technical support for the two CAMPs in Egypt and Tunisia, and to set up a Training Centre for the 
preparation of national environmental master plans, the latter supported with the technical expertise 
o f MAP. Furthermore, MAP and CEDARE are jointly promoting capacity building in remote 
sensing; they are developing jo in t scientific projects in the field o f water quality; and are co­
operating, in the ‘Blue Plan’ context, in the development o f the ‘M editerranean Environment
43 See e.g., UNEP, op.cit. n.27, p.6; UNEP, op.cit. n.22, pp.68 at h, and 77 at a; UNEP, op.cit. n. 16, pp.7-8.
44 Sec UNEP, op.cit. n.22, p.71-76.
45 Ibid, p.77.
46 See UNEP, op.cit. n.4, Annex IV, p.35,
47 See UNEP, op.cit. n,19, Annex VI, p.6; and UNEP, Report o f  the Ninth Ordinary M eeting o f  the Contracting 
Parlies to the Barcelona Convention and related Protocols , UNEP(OCA)/MED 1G.5/16, 8 June 1995, Annex XIII, p. 17,
48 See UNEP, op.cit. n,16, Annex IV, pp.2-3.
49 See MedWcives, N o .27, Spring 1993, p.9. CEDARE aims at building the capabilities o f  Arab slates o f  the 
Mediterranean with a view to sustainable development, and interestingly allows for participation o f  non-Mediterranean 
states, see A.E.Chircop, ‘The Mediterranean Sea and the Quest for Sustainable Development’, 23 O.D.I.L., 1992, pp.25- 
6 .
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Observatory’ and in establishing closer relations with Arab countries.50
At a more recent development, the well-established form o f technical, capacity-building 
assistance already existing in the framework o f MAP is taken forward in MED POL 111.51 The 
objective o f the relevant programme element is to facilitate full participation o f all Parties, not only 
to MED POL activities in the narrow sense, but also to promote implementation o f action plans, 
programmes and measures for the control o f marine pollution in the region, according to the 
Barcelona legal framework.52 To this effect, apart from advice and technical assistance for 
improving national monitoring programmes, support will be forthcoming with regard to legal, 
technical and fiscal policies, strategies and practices that will contribute towards implementation 
o f effective measures to control marine pollution. This task will be co-ordinated by the Secretariat, 
and the cost will be primarily met by the Trust Fund.
6.2. Environm ental Funding in the European Union.
There is a large array o f financial instruments in the Community framework,53 some of 
which are directed specifically to environmental research and investments, while others become 
relevant, despite their developmental or primarily economic objectives because o f the explicit 
requirement therein to take into account environmental impacts when designing and implementing 
all Community policies. If  this is properly effected, then the quality o f  the environment in Member 
States indirectly benefits from environmentally sound development and overall economic activities. 
This Section focuses exclusively on relevant mechanisms, and does not address some other 
interesting issues that have become very topical within the Community during the past few years, 
such as promotion o f economic measures and fiscal instruments to bring about enhanced
5U In particular in the initiation o f ‘observatories’ at national level in order to foster observation and evaluation o f  
the environment in the Arab Mediterranean countries. On the Blue Plan, see supra, Chapter 1, fn.25.lt should be noted 
in this connection that, in 1987, the International Ocean Institute instigated the establishment o f  a Mediterranean Centre 
for Research and Development in Marine Industrial Technology to facilitate developing countries’ acquisition o f  skills 
necessary for the maximisation o f  benefits from resource rights accruing to them under the new law o f  the sea, and in 
particular Articles 276 and 277 o f  the LOSC calling for the establishment o f  regional marine scientific and technological 
centres, especially in developing countries. The most notable feature o f  this initiative, as envisaged, is that it would 
promote ‘co-developm ent’, as opposed to ‘transferal’ o f  technology, so as to allow states in the South and East o f  the 
basin to build their own capabilities. A  feasibility study was commissioned by the UNIDO - in co-operation with UNEP  
- and was completed in 1989, see UNIDO, Report o f  the Meeting o f  Experts on the establishment o f  a Mediterranean 
Regional Centre for Research and Developm ent in Marine Industrial Technology, UNIDO/1PCT.85 (SPEC.), 1989. 
1-Iowever, lack o f  political and economic support from the European Community, and especially France and Spain, who 
do not seem willing to bear the costs for such a project, together with competition between potential host countries, such 
as Malta, Egypt, and M orocco, have led to setting back o f  the actual establishment o f  the Centre to date.
51 See UNEP, op.cit. n.29, Annex IV, Appendix.
52 See ibid , p.23 at 7.3; and supra, Chapter 5, p. 197
53 For a succinct historical account and critical analysis o f  Community environmental funding, since its emergence
in 1982, see EC Commission, Progress Report on implementation o f  the LIFE Regulation and evaluation o f  the action 
by the Community relating to the environment ACE, M EDSPA, NORSPA and ACNAT, COM (95) 135 final - 95/0093  
(SY N ), 12.04.1995.
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environmental protection, for example ‘green taxes’, subsidies and state aids,54 as these still relate 
rather to domestic policy and Community competition rules than to any type o f international 
environmental funding.
When approaching the issue, one must always bear in mind that Community financial 
assistance towards implementation o f the Member States’ legal obligations is in theory restricted 
by two central tenets that guide EC environmental policy, namely the ‘polluter pays’ principle, and 
that o f ‘subsidiarity’.55 The former implies that those responsible for pollution must bear the costs 
o f compliance with the standards or quality objectives in force. Nevertheless, the Community 
accepts that deviation from the principle, and thus Community funding, is allowed where the 
immediate application o f very stringent standards is likely to cause serious economic disruption. 
This can be the case when extensive public investments become mandatory, for example to put in 
place urban and industrial waste treatment facilities, what is termed under Article 175(5) o f the EC 
Treaty “costs deemed disproportionate for the public authorities o f a M ember State” . Deviations 
from the principle are also tolerated where, in the context o f  other policies, environmental 
investment is designed to resolve certain structural problems o f a regional or sectoral nature, as long 
as the aid granted complies with the provisions o f the EC Treaty, and in particular with those 
seeking to ensure that it is not used in such a way as to distort competition (Arts.92 and 93).56
In addition to these general exceptions, there are other activities not regarded by the 
Community as contrary to the ‘polluter pays’ principle, for example, financial contributions to local 
authorities to build or manage public environmental protection facilities, where the expenditure 
cannot at the time be totally covered by the charge levied on the polluters using such facilities; other 
types of public investment such as site restoration, where the pollution at hand is the result of past 
activities or the party responsible cannot be identified; or expenditures complementing the 
application of the principle by, for instance, granting resources for the development o f public 
transport; or initiatives at the international level where financial support is justified on the grounds 
o f interest, effectiveness or solidarity; funds to offset particularly large burdens imposed on certain 
polluters to achieve an exceptional level o f environmental quality; and contributions granted to
54 See, among others, Sands, op.cit, n . l l ,  pp. 131-2 and 718-22; A.Hughcs, ‘Econom ic Measures to Protect the 
Environment’, 16(1) M a r.P o l, 1992, pp.36-42; I.Gispert, ‘Fiscal Instruments in the EU: Are we M oving towards 
Ecological Tax Rel'orm?’, 4(11) Eur.Env I L.Rev., 1995, pp.305-11; S.C.Budlong, ‘Article 130r(2) and the Permissibility 
o f  State Aids for Environmental Compliance in the EC’, 30 Colum bia J .o f  T ra n s'l.L . , 1992, pp.431-69; and J.H.Jans, 
‘State Aid and Articles 92 and 93 o f  the EC Treaty: Does the Polluter Really Pay?’, 4(4) Eur.Env'I L.Rev., 1995, pp.108- 
13.
55 See Fifth Environmental Action Programme, in EC, Towards Sustainability: A  European Community Programme 
o f  P olicy  and Action in Relation to the Environment and Sustainable Developm ent, 1993 O.J. (C 138) 1; and EC 
Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a Financial Instrument for the Environment (LIFE), 
COM (91) 28 final, 31 January 1991, pp.7-10.
55 See EC Com mission, op.cit, n.55, p.8.
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promote research and development o f clean technologies and production.57
In principle, the Community can take action with regard to environmental protection only 
to the extent that the objectives sought can be better attained at Community level than at the level 
o f the individual Member States (Art.5). This ‘principle o f subsidiarity’ - what is usually referred 
to as ‘action at the most suitable level’ - runs through the totality o f Community policies and 
activities, and consequently guides the commitment o f its budgetary resources. Although 
Community activities to respond to transfrontier or global pollution problems are readily justified - 
and even become imperative in order to ensure economic and social cohesion or prevent distortion 
o f competition or trade barriers -, direct Community funding to assist the application o f Community 
law seems basically incompatible with the principle.58 In theory, financial aid from the Community 
is legitimate only when it promotes speedier implementation o f relevant provisions or 
implementation o f more stringent rules, but in practice this distinction loses much o f its meaning 
in view o f  the fact that facilitation o f application o f the minimum standards themselves is, in the 
Commission’s view, an effective way o f encouraging the adoption o f tougher ones, especially in 
countries facing serious implementation problems in a certain area.59
The principle that Member States themselves have to finance and implement their 
environmental policy is reiterated in the EC Treaty (Art. 175(4)). However, at the same time, poorer 
countries are explicitly allowed to invoke their inability to meet expenses that are “deemed 
disproportionate” for their budgets and obtain temporary derogations from mandatory Community 
provisions and/or assistance from the Cohesion Fund (Art. 175(5)), which, as will be explained later, 
is one o f  the main sources o f environmental funding for the Mediterranean M ember States.
The financial mechanisms that are deemed more relevant for present purposes and will be 
examined in the following sections are the Cohesion and Structural Funds; and the ENVIREG, 
MEDSPA, and LIFE programmes; as well as funding from the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
outside these instruments. This does not imply that the above are the only financial instruments 
applying to Mediterranean countries, however. The Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMP),60 
in particular, specifically address the developmental needs o f the region, but have been severely 
criticised as ineffective and even damaging, particularly as far as environmental protection is 
concerned.61 In fact, funding under the IMP is generally not conditioned upon compliance with 
Community environmental policy, except from some specific rules explicitly mentioned in contracts
57 Id.
58 See ibid, pp.9-10.
59 See ibid, p. 10.
60 See Council Regulation 2088/85 concerning the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes.
61 It is characteristic that there is no reference whatsoever to environmental protection in the Regulation governing 
the IMP, see ibid. See also D.Baldock &T.Long, ‘Bad N ew s for the Environment: The E C ’s Integrated Mediterranean 
Programmes’, European Environmental Report, Dec. 1987, p. 15; and G.KUtting, ‘Mediterranean Pollution - International 
Co-operation and the Control o f  Pollution from Land-based Source’, 18(3) Mar. Pol., 1994, p.244.
254
on a case-by-case basis.62
Importantly, the MEDSPA and LIFE programmes and the EIB have provided resources to 
third Mediterranean countries as well. This aspect o f Community funding is particularly important 
as it has the potential to be linked with environmental conditions and thus act as a compliance 
incentive, especially in the context o f aid under the various stages o f the Community Mediterranean 
Policy and the recent MEDA programme, which are also examined below.
6.2.1. The Cohesion Fund.
Article 130d o f the Maastricht Treaty (new Art. 161) provided for the creation o f a 
Cohesion Fund, to benefit Member States on the ‘periphery’ of the Union, namely Spain, Portugal, 
Greece, and Ireland.63 The Fund, set up in its current form in 199464 seeks to reduce excessive 
economic and social disparities, by reinforcing the structure and improve the prospects o f balanced 
growth o f the economies concerned, and thus help achieve the aim of economic and monetary union 
by the end o f the century.65
This instrument is devoted to the development o f trans-European transport networks and 
to environmental investments contributing to the achievement o f the Article 174 objectives and, in 
particular, projects in line with the priorities laid down in the Fifth Action Programme for the 
Environment (Art.3(l)). The Cohesion Fund is, therefore, designed to fund projects involving costs 
that are deemed disproportionate to the public finances of the country concerned, in areas where any 
reduction in public investment because o f strict budgetary discipline would be extremely damaging; 
in fact, the countries receiving assistance have had to undertake that they will not reduce their own 
investments in the two sectors. The granting o f assistance by the Fund is, accordingly, conditional 
on the Member State making a real effort not to run up an “excessive government deficit” (Art.6 
and Annex II, Art.H), and in general on satisfactory progress towards fulfilment o f the conditions 
o f economic convergence.
Apart from substantive environmental measures, the Fund also finances preliminary studies 
related to eligible projects and their implementation, as well as technical support measures, in
62 See e.g. Commission Decision 88/317 approving an Integrated Mediterranean Programme for Central and Eastern 
Greece, where a general reference to the Community policy on the environment is absent from the Articles under Title 
VI (Compliance with Community Policies), save a specific requirement for prior environmental impact assessment under 
Directive 85/337 for a large project involving the diversion o f  a substantial part o f  the How o f  a major river,
63 That is, Member States with a p e r  capita  GNP o f  less than 90% o f  the Community average, which are undergoing 
a programme o f  econom ic convergence, pursuant to Article 104c o f  the Maastricht Treaty [new art. 104] (A rt.2(l)).
64 A Cohesion Financial Instrument was established under Council Regulation 792/93, and was substituted by a 
Cohesion Fund under Council Regulation 1164/94. The latter has recently been amended by Council Regulations 1264 
and 1265/1999.
65 Hence, although distinct from the Structural Funds, the Cohesion Fund is also structural in nature, as is evidenced 
both by the fact that its establishment is provided for in Article 161 which governs the Structural Funds, and by the 
fields it covers, see EC Commission, Communication on the Cohesion Fund, CO M (92) 339 final, 31 July 1992, p.2.
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particular ‘horizontal’ ones such as comparative studies to assess the impact o f  Community 
assistance, measures and studies contributing to the appraisal, monitoring, supervision or evaluation 
o f projects and to strengthening and ensuring their co-ordination and consistency, and measures and 
studies helping to make the necessary adjustments to the implementation o f  projects (Art.3(2)).
The level o f assistance varies between 80 and 85% o f the public expenditure on the project 
(Art.7), which is much higher than that provided, for instance, by the Structural Funds.66 Preparatory 
studies and technical support for the preparation o f a project can receive 100% financing, 
particularly if they are undertaken at the Commission’s initiative. Under the Cohesion Fund, 
ECU 15.15 billion were provided for a period o f seven years - i.e. until the end o f 1999 rising from 
ECU1.5 billion in 1993 to more than ECU2.6 billion in 1999 (Art.4); while for the years 2000 to 
2003 appropriations are set at EUR2.615 billion p er annum. The indicative allocation of these 
resources among the four countries concerned (Annex 1) shows that the larger part is channelled to 
Mediterranean states.67
Unlike the Structural Funds, for Cohesion Fund’s operations the Community’s partners are 
national rather than local or regional authorities (Art. 10(1) and (3)). Moreover, action here is based 
on specific projects and not on comprehensive programmes. However, projects assisted by the 
Cohesion Fund may contribute to the implementation o f programmes financed by the Structural 
Funds,68 but the same stage o f a single project cannot receive aid from both sources (A rt.9(l)/.9 
Another eligibility criterion is compliance o f the proposed project with all Community policies, 
including that concerning environmental protection (Art.8(l)). For a project to quality for assistance 
under the Cohesion Fund, it must be “o f a sufficient scale to have a significant impact in the field 
o f  environmental protection or in the improvement o f trans-European transport infrastructure 
networks” (Art. 10(3)); the total cost o f a project or group of projects may not, therefore, normally 
be less than ECU 10 million.70
The yardsticks used to assess the quality of a project are its medium-term economic and
66 See infra, p.259.
67 Spain receives 52 to 58% o f  the total, Greeee and Portugal 16 to 20%, and Ireland 7 to 10%. For the main points 
o f  decisions to grant Cohesion Fund assistance for projects undertaken, see 1996 O.J. (C 244) 1; and 1996 O.J. (C 270) 
1. For the period 2000 to 2006 the respective percentages will be 61 to 63.5%, 16 to 18%, and 2 to 6%.
68 Provided that total Community assistance does not exceed 90% o f  total expenditure.
69 See also EC Com mission, op.cit. n.65, p.6.
70 This has been criticised on the grounds that it effectively rules out small labour-intensive environmental projects 
in favour o f  big infrastructure schemes usually related to transport, see D. W ilkinson, ‘U sing the European Union’s 
Structural and Cohesion Funds for the Protection o f  the Environment’, 3(2/3) R.E.C.I.E.L., 1994, pp .124-5; and 
C.Coffey & M .Fergusson, ‘European Community Funding for Sustainable Development: The Role o f  the Cohesion  
Fund’, 6(1) R.E.C.I.E.L., 1997, p.80.
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social benefits,71 which have to be commensurate with the resources deployed (Art. 13(2) and (3));72 
the priorities established by the recipient Member-State; the contribution the project can make to 
the implementation o f Community policies on the environment and transport;73 its compatibility 
with Community policies and consistency with other structural measures;74 and the establishment 
o f an appropriate balance between the fields o f environment and transport (Art. 10(5)).75 In practice, 
the application for assistance under the Fund has to state (i) to which environmental objectives the 
project relates; (ii) how it is linked to the implementation o f Community environmental legislation; 
and (iii) whether the project is consistent with a plan and programme associated with the 
implementation o f Community policy or legislation.76 If it is deemed necessary, relevant conditions 
are attached to the final decision.77
Additionally, before approving a decision to fund a project, DG XI is always consulted in 
order to ensure that the proposal under consideration will effectively implement Community rules 
on the environment, and the Commission always examines whether Directive 85/337 on 
environmental impact assessment has been complied with.78 It must be noted in this context that for 
transport actions submitted for funding a prior environmental impact assessment is mandatory 
(Art. 13(4)). Be that as it may, one o f the most official sources, i.e. the European Court o f Auditors, 
has pointed out that the Commission has approved at least two such projects in Spain, for which the 
environmental impact had not been assessed.79 Moreover, assessments actually undertaken are 
sometimes found to be lacking.80 The Court o f Auditors also points out that “the contribution of the 
financial instrument to projects that are concerned with the practical application o f the directives 
based on Article 175 o f the Treaty, and in particular those relating to the treatment o f urban
71 See EC Commission, Cohesion Financial Instrument - Cohesion Fund - Com bined Report 1993-1994, 1995, p.69.
72 But, according to the European Court o f  Auditors, analyses o f  this kind are som etim es missing. Where they exist, 
they have generally been carried out by the Member States, possibly after work has started, or even after it has been 
completed, see European Court o f  Auditors, Special Report N o. 1/95 on the Cohesion Financial Instrument together with 
the C om m ission’ s replies, 1995 O.J. (C 59) 1, at para.4.20.
73 EC Com mission, op.cit. n.71, pp.70-7.
74 Ibid, pp.85-8.
75 There is no a p r io r i breakdown between environment and transport actions; the relevant decisions are left to be 
considered by the Member Stales concerned and the Commission, which should ensure “ a reasonable balance” between 
the two fields, see also Art. 10(2); and EC Commission, op.cit. n.65, p.3. In 1993, about 40%  o f  the funds distributed 
went to environment projects and 60% to transport, see EC Commission, op.cit. n.71, p.78; while by 1995 the ratio was 
48.2%  for the environment and 51.8%  for transport, see EC Commission, Annual Report o f  the Cohesion Fund 1995, 
COM (96) 388 final, 4 .09 .1996, p.62.
76 See EC Commission, op.cit. n.71, p.79.
77 Most o f  the cases where this has been done concern compliance with the Directives on urban waste water treatment, 
environmental impact assessment, or water quality, see id.
78 See EC Commission, op.cit. n.75, p.6I.
79 See European Court o f  Auditors, op.cit. n.72, at para.2.10.
80 See ibid, at para.3.7, where two water projects in Spain and Greece are given as examples; and Coffey & Fergusson, 
op.cit. n.70, p.82.
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wastewater and waste, is somewhat limited. A number o f small-scale projects concerning sewerage 
systems do not include the purification o f the effluent” .81
As far as implementation of supported projects is concerned, the Commission and the 
beneficiary country must ensure that it is closely monitored in order to guarantee adherence to the 
objectives o f the Fund, and that the projects are carried out efficiently (Arts. 12 and 13).82 To this 
effect, particular Decisions approving projects lay down detailed rules for monitoring and 
assessment (Art. 13(6) and Annex II, Art.F), typically providing for national Monitoring 
Committees, reports, and sample checks.83 This arrangement is complemented by a Regulation 
concerning irregularities and the recovery o f sums wrongly paid,84 aiming to combat fraud and 
provide the resources with a view at establishing an information system on irregularities.
After Cohesion Fund assistance has been granted, compatibility with environmental 
legislation continues to be checked by the Monitoring Committees during execution o f the activities, 
and, when conditions imposed are not respected,85 assistance can be reduced or cancelled.86 In fact, 
payments have in the past been suspended on the grounds of non-compliance with Community 
environmental policy in specific cases involving projects in Greece.87 A last notable feature of the 
follow-up process is the possibility for inspection missions undertaken by the Commission, under 
Article 12 o f the Cohesion Fund Regulation, to monitor the management and sound implementation
81 European Court o f  Auditors, op.cit. n.72, para.3.8. But it seems that in Spain and Greece the situation is rather 
different with regard to wastewater infrastructure funded by the Cohesion Fund, see infra , p.258.
82 See EC Commission, op.cit. n.71, pp.95-100, N ote also in this context Com mission Decision 96/455 concerning 
information and publicity measures to be carried out by the Member Slates and the Commission concerning the activities 
o f  the Cohesion Fund, which aims at increasing public awareness and transparency o f  relevant Community action in 
Member States.
33 See e.g. Commission Decision 94/422 concerning the grant o f  assistance from the C ohesion Financial Instrument 
to the project concerning the water supply in Seville in Spain, at Annex IV. On the 1993-94 and 1995 work o f  the 
M onitoring Committees in Greece and Spain, see EC Commission, op.cit. n.71, pp.95-7; and op.cit. n.75, pp.81-5 
respectively. Sec also European Court o f  Auditors, op.cit. n.72, at para.6, for a discussion o f  the difficulties experienced 
in the monitoring procedure.
84 Council Regulation 1831/94 concerning irregularities and the recovery o f  sums wrongly paid in connection with 
the financing o f  the Cohesion Fund and the organisation o f  an information system in this field.
35 However, this procedure does not always work effectively, For instance, “in the case o f  the Adra bypass (Spain), 
the Commission D ecision makes the second payment conditional upon the Spanish authorities’ undertaking to apply 
corrective measures so as to minimise the adverse effects on the environment. This undertaking, just like the 
environmental impact study, was nevertheless made after the date o f  completion o f  the work, and therefore took place 
at a time when it was no longer possible to consider alternative solutions or other changes. The corrective measures are
thus likely to have no more than a marginal effect on the project, apart from their additional cost”, see European Court 
o f  Auditors, op.cit. n.72, at para.4.24.
36 This is explicitly provided for in the relevant Decisions, see e.g. Commission Decision 94/718 concerning the grant 
o f  assistance from the Cohesion financial instrument to the stage o f  project concerning the drainage and biological 
clean-up o f  the region o f  Loutrakion in Greece, at Annex VI; and Commission Decision 94/712 concerning the grant 
o f  assistance from the Cohesion financial instrument to the project concerning the recovery o f  water from the washing 
o f  tanks, cleaning o f  bilges and deballasting o f  ships in Spain, at Annex VI.
87 See EC Commission, op.cit. n.75, p.85.
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of the projects approved.88
According to the mandatory annual report (Art. 14(1), and Annex to Annex II) o f the 
Commission to the EP concerning the activities o f the Fund for the period 1993-1994, during the 
financial year 1994 Spain used 32.4% o f the assistance it received (or ECU358.421 million) for 
environmental projects, while for Greece the relevant percentage was 85% (or ECU76.977 
million).89 A large part o f this aid to both countries went to projects involving water quality control, 
sewage collection and treatment,90 and control o f  industrial pollution, especially o f the marine 
environment.91 It is characteristic o f the increasing importance the Cohesion Fund acquires as a 
source o f environmental funding that in 1993 approximately three hundred environmental projects, 
covering waste disposal facilities, sewage treatment plants, water supply and nature conservation 
measures,92 were submitted for approval by all countries eligible for assistance,93 as compared with 
1995, when Spain alone submitted applications covering almost eight hundred such projects, half 
o f which related to drainage and wastewater treatment in implementation o f Directive 91/271.94 
During the same year, Greece channelled 75% o f the environmental assistance it received to an 
extended development o f wastewater treatment infrastructure, a sector which, together with water 
supply and overall waste management, is distinctly lagging behind in this country.95
All said, the European Parliament has been exerting its pressure to correct the malfunctions 
noted in Cohesion Fund spending during its years o f operation, and has paid particular attention to 
compliance with Community environmental legislation and proper environmental impact 
assessments o f projects proposed; in 1995, it has gone as far as threatening to withhold some o f the 
1996 budget if its terms were not met.96 In response, the Commission adopted a Communication 
containing proposals for improved assessment o f measures that have an indirect impact on the 
environment; for reviewing selection criteria towards more sustainable activities; for a more
88 In fact, during 1995 there have been four inspections o f  projects related to the protection o f  the marine environment 
in Spain, and one inspection o f  a water supply and sewerage project in Greece, see ibid, pp.86-8.
89 See ibid, p. 15.
90 See, e.g., Commission Decision 94/716 concerning the grant o f  assistance from the cohesion financial instrument 
to the stage o f  project concerning the water supply and sewerage for Mytilene in Greece.
91 The percentage o f  funds absorbed by different categories o f  environmental projects in Spain is as follows: water 
supply 35.9%; water quality control 11.9%; sewage collection and treatment 3.5%; erosion control and reafforestation 
33.2% ; nature conservation 8.1%; and control o f  industrial pollution 7%, ibid, p.22. The breakdown o f  assistance o f  
Greece is: water supply 59%; waste water treatment 13%; waste management 1%; nature protection 7%; and protection 
o f  historic sites 2%, EC Com mission, op.cit. n.75, p.40.
92 In this connection the Fund has been severely criticised as favouring projects applying 'end-of-pipe’ technologies 
as opposed to preventative ones, see W ilkinson, op.cit. n.70, p. 124..
93 See EC Commission, Eleventh Annual Report to the European Parliament on monitoring the application o f  
Community law, 1994 O.J. (C 154) 44.
94 See EC Com mission, op.cit. n.75, p. 16.
95 See ibid, pp.31-3.
96 See Coffey & Fergusson, op.cit. n.70, p .84.
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stringent attitude towards breaches o f environmental legislation in the context o f projects assisted 
by the Cohesion Fund; and for greater involvement o f NGOs and the public in order to increase 
transparency and consistency with environmental objectives.97 However, the opportunity for an in- 
depth evaluation and discussion in the light o f past experience and for a re-orientation, so as to avoid 
giving Community support to environmentally destructive activities in the future, that was presented 
at the Fund’s full review in 1999 was missed and the reform effort concentrated on bringing the 
Cohesion Fund up-to-date with the Economic and Monetary Union.
6.2.2. The Structural Funds.
The Structural Funds98 have aims similar to those o f the Cohesion Fund, but are also 
different in some important aspects; They seek to reduce regional disparities and cover apart from 
Spain and Greece, some southern areas o f France and Italy, i.e. practically all Community regions 
bordering the Mediterranean; they attach no conditions to funding; in principle, no sector of activity 
is excluded; and, significantly, resources available are much larger - ECU 172.5 billion from 1993 
to 1999. As has been noted, projects receiving assistance from the Cohesion Fund are not eligible 
for funding from the Structural Funds; that also suggests, however, that an environmental project 
which does not meet the stringent conditions imposed under the former can turn to the latter.
The Regional Development Fund (ERDF),99 is the principal Structural Fund for present 
purposes.100 The Regional Policy was initiated in 1975 to reduce disparities between various regions 
o f the Community and, especially, the backwardness o f the least-favoured among them, which are 
overwhelmingly found in the Mediterranean South. After the accession o f Greece, Spain and 
Portugal the funds devoted to this target multiplied and by 1986 reached ECU3 billion per annum  
as compared to ECU250 million in 1975. The cohesion objective o f the European Single Act, and 
even more o f the M aastricht Treaty, gave new impetus to the ERDF.
To receive funding from the ERDF, Member States submit development plans for a multi­
annual period to the Commission, setting out development strategy and priorities at the national and 
regional level. On this basis the Commission and national and regional authorities negotiate the 
priority lines that will be co-financed by the Community - usually up to 50-70% o f their cost - and 
the overall budget for that period. The agreement takes the conventional form o f a Community 
Support Framework. This is followed by operational programmes submitted by the M ember State 
for each o f the priority lines to be adopted by the Commission.
97 See id\ and EC Commission, Cohesion Policy and the Environment, COM (95) 509.
98 That is, the European Regional Developm ent Fund (ERDF), the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund (EAGGF Guidance Section), and the European Social Fund (ESF).
99 As reformed in 1988 and 1993 by Council Regulations 2052/88 and 4253-4256/88; and Council Regulations 2081 - 
2085/93.
100 See G.Durand, ‘Environmental Protection in EC Less-Developed Regions - Role o f  Regional Development 
Policy’, 18(2) M ar.Pol., 1994, pp.148-52.
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Hence, choice o f  the projects that will eventually receive funding depends on the priorities 
set by the States themselves. After the reform, “productive investments and infrastructure to protect 
the environment, if  related to economic activities” are included in the list o f interventions eligible 
for co-financing. In fact, the Commission encouraged greater inclusion o f environmental priorities 
in national plans, during negotiations for the 1989-93 programmes, as environment-related spending 
up to then accounted for only 5% o f regional spending - or about ECU3 billion.101 In any case, the 
ultimate responsibility to integrate environmental protection in the development strategy for each 
region, especially in view o f the fact that environmental actions not directly related to development 
do not qualify for funding from the Structural Funds, rests with local and national authorities and 
depends on their respective awareness.
As has been repeatedly noted, environmental legislation must be complied with in relation 
to all measures financed by the Community. In particular, environmental considerations must be 
integrated in the planning, application, control and evaluation stages o f projects financed by the 
Structural Funds.102 However, as Fehr and van der Stelt-Scheele point oi’ff, before the afore­
mentioned reform there was no legal obligation on applicants to provide a full environmental impact 
assessment for proposed projects. After the reform, every Regional Development Plan submitted 
has to include an ‘environmental profile’ detailing, among others, the state o f  the environment and 
the foreseen environmental impact o f the proposed development. In addition, every Community 
Support Framework specifies that all actions undertaken thereunder must observe Community 
environmental legislation, which importantly has to be transposed as a matter o f priority. In addition, 
monitoring o f adverse environmental effects o f funded projects has to be carried out by the 
M onitoring Committees.
There are, nonetheless, serious doubts regarding the extent to which such obligations are 
properly fulfilled, as the administration responsible for implementing the Community Support 
Framework, is usually different from the one responsible for legal and/or environmental matters.104 
As suggested by the Special Report on the environment o f the European Court o f Auditors,105 in 
practice Community environmental legislation is hardly taken into account when ERDF programmes 
are being carried out, the M onitoring Committees do not regularly perform such a function, nor is 
there any kind o f  consultation between the DGs managing the funds with DG XI. in other than
101 Ib id , p. 149. It has also offered to assist Member States with any planning or operational matters through a 
programme o f  technical assistance, ibid, p. 152.
102 See Council Regulation 2052/88, Art.7; EC Treaty, Art.6; EP, Resolution on the incorporation o f  environmental 
considerations in the Structural Funds, EP D oc.A 3-326/92, 1993 O.J. (C 42) 236; and especially Council Regulation 
2081/93, A rts,7(l), 8(4), 9(8) and lla (2 ) .
1031-1.Fehr & D.D.van der Stelt-Scheele, T h e  EC Environmental Policy in relation to the EC Structural Funds: A  
Critical Analysis o f  its Application’ (Part 1), 1(4) Eur.E nv'1 L.Rev., 1992, pp. 122-3,
104 See ibid, p. 123.
105 European Court o f  Auditors, Special R eport N o.3/92 - Environment, 1992.
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explicitly ‘environmental’ projects, environmental aspects are taken into account only in the sense 
o f a license that needs to be obtained.106 Consequently, the environmental impact o f projects 
financed by the ERDF would often be negative. The Report also attests that the greater part o f 
Community funding goes towards investments that are little more than cleaning operations, as 
opposed to preventative measures aimed at the source of pollution and in accordance with ‘polluter 
pays’ principle.107
That is why, financing by the Commission o f various projects in M ember States without 
taking into account their potential environmental effects is increasingly coming under scrutiny;108 
it is characteristic that the number o f relevant complaints has risen from ten in 1982 to four hundred 
and eighty in 1990, and the legal proceedings from sixteen in 1982 to two hundred and twenty in 
1990.109 The European Parliament has, in particular, stressed this unacceptable use o f certain 
structural funds, notwithstanding the positive set o f rules that has been established as part o f the 
reform thereof, with a view to ensuring that structural support is consistent with environmental 
policy and to allowing systematic monitoring, assessment and checks on structural operations, 
among others, in terms of environmental objectives.110 However, up to now there have been several 
cases of contradictory policy choices by the Community; for instance, the Commission has approved 
funding o f projects with adverse environmental effects, while at the same time it has initiated Article 
226 procedures against the recipient state for incorrect application o f a relevant Directive.111
The Commission is publicly admitting that the environment is one o f  the two areas where 
most infringements o f Community law involving operations co-financed by the Structural or 
Cohesion Funds happen; the most common offence is failure to comply with the EEA Directive.112 
Despite difficulties in assessing the scope o f relevant infringements, the Commission has also 
suspended or withdrawn funds in some occasions. It is currently considering a new revision o f the 
Structural Funds, in order, among others, to increase their contribution to the objectives of
106 See H.Fehr & D.D.van der Stelt-Scheele, T h e  EC Environmental Policy in relation to the EC Structural Funds: 
A  Critical Analysis o f  its Application’ (Pail 2), 1(5) Eur.Env’I L.Rev., 1992, p. 144; and W ilkinson, op.cit. n.70, pp. 119- 
20 .
107 See Fehr & van der Stelt-Scheele, op.cit. n.106, p. 145.
I0S For example, Greenpeace has challenged the disbursement o f  around ECU 12 million in structural funds to Spain 
for the construction o f  two power plants in the Canary Islands, see Case T-585/93, 1995 E.C .R., p .11-2205.
109 See Fehr & van der Stelt-Scheele, op.cit. n.103, p. 125.
110 See EP, Resolution on the Impact o f  the Community’s Financial Instruments on the Environment, EP doc.A3-
312/91 , 1992 O.J. (C 13) 486, at p.488; and EP, Opinion on the establishment o f  LIFE, 1991 O.J. (C 267) 211, at
Am end.No.8.
111 For such instances concerning projects in Greece, see 'N.FlakaioA.Oyou, ‘©Spcna flpocrracrtac; tou EAkriviKou 
FIspi|3dAkovto<; Evdmiov xtov Koivouxcbv Opy&viov’, oxo F.riaJta5ripr|iptou (sn;.), H  Aieiaduat] xov K o i v o x i k o v  AiKaioo 
FlepifaXXovxog axijv EXXada (N.Paleologou, ‘Issues o f  Protection o f  the Greek Environment before Community Organs’, 
in G.Papadimitriou (ed.), The Infusion o f  Community Environm ental Law in G reece), 1994, p. 188.
112 See EC Commission, Sixteenth Report on monitoring the application o f  Community law, CO M (1999) 301 final, 
9.07.1999, pp.44-5.
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sustainable development and environmental protection, with special emphasis on the urban 
environment and economic and social measures o f a preventive nature, such as renewable sources 
o f energy. Additional changes envisage a strengthening of the ex ante evaluation requirements, the 
information required in relation to large projects and an enhanced role for the competent 
environmental authorities in the preparation and implementation o f  program m es."3
6.2.3. ENVIREG.
If  Community action on environmental protection is to take into account “the environmental 
conditions in the regions o f the Community” and “the balanced development o f  its regions” (EC 
Treaty, Art. 174(3)), general legislative measures applying to all M ember States are not sufficient 
to provide assistance to the least developed marine areas in addressing their environmental problems 
without compromising their environmental needs. In recognition o f that reality, coupled with the 
severe scale of environmental problems threatening coastal areas, and the fact that Member States 
had not had environmental projects high in their list o f priorities in their 1989-93 development 
plans, the Community launched in 1990 a Programme for the Protection o f  the Environment and 
Promoting Economic Development (ENVIREG).114
Its general aim is to help the least-favoured regions tackle some o f their environmental 
problems and thereby “put their economic and social development on a firmer footing”, as well as 
to facilitate application o f the Community’s environmental policies at the regional level.115 Its 
specific objectives consist in abating pollution in coastal regions, especially in the Mediterranean, 
and principally around medium-sized towns whose economy depends significantly on tourism; 
promoting the planning o f land use in coastal areas in such a way as to preserve natural beauty and 
enhance biotopes; contributing to a better control and management o f toxic and hazardous waste; 
and strengthening know-how relating to the design and management o f  facilities for reducing 
pollution.
Projects to mitigate pollution o f coastal areas that are eligible for ENVIREG funding - in 
the form o f  loans and grants towards covering a percentage o f the total costs - include, among 
others, the construction or modernisation o f  sewage treatment plants, and infrastructures for 
collection and treatment o f  solid waste, in urban areas with fewer than 100,000 residents, in view 
of the fact that only a small part o f wastewater in the Community’s underdeveloped coastal regions 
is treated in a satisfactory way; studies, technical assistance and other services relating to the
113 See EC Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds, 
COM (1998) 131 final.
114 See EC Commission, N otice to the Member States laying down guidelines for operational programmes, which 
Member States are invited to establish within the framework o f  a Community initiative concerning the environment, 1990 
O.J. (C 115) 3; and H.Somsen, 'The Regionalization o f  EC Marine Pollution Law: The Example o f  the Mediterranean 
Sea’, 6(3) l.J.E .C .L . , 1991, pp.234-5.
115 See EC Com mission, op.cit. n .l 14, p.3.
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agricultural use o f compost and sludge from urban sewage; and port installations for storage and 
treatment o f ballast and bilge washing water, containing oil and other chemical substances, as well 
as small-scale equipment to minimise the effects o f accidental discharges thereof."6 ENVIREG 
grants assistance for a broad range o f actions addressing relevant needs in ways that are determined 
as most appropriate and efficient by the local communities. That does not necessarily mean building 
plants in every case; for example, it may finance the establishment o f maintenance crews assigned 
in a given region to help operators o f small stations improve their expertise."7 It must be noted in 
this respect that although priority is given to jo in t projects undertaken by more than one local 
authority, ENVIREG is an exclusively EC and strictly coastal scheme; accordingly, where local 
authorities located outside coastal areas participate in such a project, only the part relating to the 
needs o f coastal areas is eligible for a id ."8
Criteria on which the Commission decides on the specific allocations include the 
seriousness o f the problem and the quality of the programmes submitted. The former is assessed by 
taking account o f the resident population, o f the importance o f tourism in a given area, and of the 
scale o f  industries producing toxic and dangerous waste. The main parameters for assessing the 
quality o f the programmes are the organisation o f services for selecting, setting up and running new 
installations and overhauling existing facilities; the existence of an overall plan for reducing coastal 
pollution into which ENVIREG is properly integrated; the state o f progress in implementing 
Community policies for the environment in various sectors, for example, an indication o f how the 
operational programmes reflect national toxic waste plans; and the additionality of financial 
resources available to ENVIREG programmes compared to those already foreseen in the 
Community support frameworks for the environment, and other national spending in relevant 
areas."9 The European Parliament and the Economic and Social Commission had stressed that 
another criterion to be examined when deciding which projects are to be given priority should be 
respect for Community environmental legislation, but this explicit reference has -surprisingly - not 
found its way into the actual terms for assistance.120
The main weakness o f the programme, however, is the rather low amount o f money 
available, which, during the first three years, was a mere ECU500 million from the Structural
116 Id.
117 See Durand, op.cit. n.100, p. 150.
118 See EC Commission, op.cit. n. 115, p.3.
119 See ibid, p .4.
120 See EP, Resolution on a regional action programme on the initiative o f  the Com mission concerning the 
environment (ENVIREG), EP D oc.A 3-46/90, 1990 O.J. (C 96) 345, at para.23; and ESC Opinion, 1990 O.J. (C 112) 
10, at para,3.3, whereby “total compliance with the Community’s environmental directives should be a pre-condition 
for eligibility for assistance under the ENVIREG programme”.
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Funds.121 From these, the larger part went towards building new purification stations, providing 
additional equipment for ensuring secondary-level processing, and putting deficient stations back 
to operation;122 the second largest to measures to collect and treat municipal solid waste, with 
ECU 150 million for the coastal areas o f France, Italy and Greece; while infrastructures for waste 
reception in ports, and for the collection, storage and processing o f hazardous industrial waste 
attracted smaller amounts.
6.2,4. M EDSPA.
MEDSPA refers both to the general Community action plan for the Mediterranean and to 
the specific financial instrument under the said Regulation. In fact, Commission communications 
on the issue o f a general action plan for the Mediterranean date as far back as 1984.123 A preparatory 
phase, mainly for collection o f data and study at a cost o f ECU3.4 million, lasted from 1986 to 
1988. Through the work carried out during this period, the particular European reverberations o f 
environmental pollution in the Mediterranean area became clearer, and the need for specific 
Community action in close co-operation with other international bodies operating in the 
Mediterranean and covering the whole o f the region, and with particular emphasis on integrating 
the environmental dimension in other Community policies in the region, was established.
In 1988, after a long period o f gestation - which lasted another three years before a legally 
binding instrument was produced -, the Commission presented its medium and long-term strategy 
and priority measures.124 It was envisaged that to put this plan into effect existing financial resources 
at the Community level should be utilised - and co-ordinated appropriately by the Commission -, 
namely the Structural Funds, the EIB, and other instruments such as the Integrated Mediterranean 
Programmes, the financial instruments set up under the co-operation agreements with non- 
Community Mediterranean countries etc.125
Additional ad hoc resources were designed to complement the above, directed towards 
management and cost o f operations fitting into planned measures but ineligible for support from 
existing instruments. This aid from own resources would be channelled, according to the initial 
planning, principally to stimulation and public awareness campaigns, and provision o f technical 
assistance and expertise in the preparation o f plans and operational programmes at national and local
121 See EP, op.cit. n .120, at paras.4 and 38-40
122 See Durand, op.cit. n .100, pp. 150-1.
123 See EC Commission, Communication to the Council on the protection o f  the environment in the Mediterranean 
basin, COM (84) 206 final, 24 April 1984. This comprised an elaborate Com mission proposal on a comprehensive 
strategy and plan o f  action for the protection o f  the Mediterranean environment which nevertheless was not vested with 
a binding legal form.
124 See EC Commission, Communication to the Council, the EP and the ESC on the protection o f  the environment 
in the Mediterranean basin, COM (88) 392 final, 21 November 1988; and Art.4 and Annex o f  Regulation 563/91.
125 See ibid, at para.4.4.
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level.126 The Commission intended to spread resources for the first three years o f the scheme as 
follows: 85% to finance substantive measures, 10% to provide technical assistance, and 5% to 
collect the information required to implement the scheme and to improve dissemination of 
information within the Community and between the EU and non-member states.127
According to the main action plan (1989-1998), priority measures for the first five years 
were decided on the basis o f the specifically Mediterranean nature o f the relevant problem and the 
degree of urgency, and followed these laid down in the MAP Genoa Declaration, i.e. improved 
water availability, through recycling, exploitation o f new sources, prevention o f wastage etc.; and 
improved water quality, through treatment o f raw water; installation o f sewerage systems; treatment 
o f  ballast waters from ships; as well as sound management o f solid, toxic, and other dangerous 
wastes; biotope management; soil and coastal erosion; and desertification and forest fires 
program m es.128 Priorities outside the Community were helping with the establishment o f 
environmental administrative structures; and technical assistance regarding environmental policies 
and action programmes.
Regulation 563/91 established a legally binding MEDSPA, i.e. a programme o f action for 
the protection o f the environment in the Mediterranean region. This ten-year scheme importantly 
applies to the whole o f the region, non-Community areas included, and to the whole o f the Iberian 
Peninsula (Art. 1(2)), and covers projects that are primarily directed to environmental protection 
(Art. 5 (2)).
MEDSPA was explicitly committed to the mutually agreed targets set under the auspices 
o f MAP. These are set out as follows (Art.2):
• To intensify efforts to protect and improve the quality o f the environment and increase the 
effectiveness o f Community environmental policy and measures in the region concerned;
• To help make the environmental dimension a more integral part o f  action taken by the 
Community pursuant to other Community policies;
• To increase co-operation and co-ordination on protection o f the environment in the region
concerned by integrating Community action and the operations carried out at the regional, 
national and international level;
To encourage the transfer o f the appropriate technologies to protect the Mediterranean 
environment.
126 But eventually the M EDSPA, as laid down in the relevant Regulation, is more directed to actual infrastructure, 
see infra.
127 Sec EC Commission, Communication on the proposal for a M EDSPA Regulation, CO M (89) 598 final; 1990 O.J. 
(C 80) 9, at p. 15.
128 Cf. EP proposal to include a number o f  additional priorities in EP Opinion, 1991 O.J. (C 19) 611. For instance, 
the Parliament considered that special importance should be given to “the improvement o f  the quality o f  rivers flowing 
into the Mediterranean” (Amend. N o43), and, significantly, to “monitoring the implementation o f  international 
conventions and standards concerning large-scale industrial installations in order to encourage the transfer o f  appropriate 
technologies for the protection o f  the Mediterranean environment” (Am end.No.49).
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Non-Community countries were to be given assistance in technical matters and in 
establishing environmental administrative structures, whereas EU countries needed to propose much 
more concrete projects, and did not qualify for funding if they had already received aid from the 
Structural Funds or other Community financial instruments, notably ENVIREG (Art.5(2)). Hence, 
the ‘environmental’ MEDSPA came as a complement to the ‘developm ental’ ENVIREG.
The Commission, assisted by a management committee composed o f representatives o f the 
M em ber States (A rt.II) ,129 decided on particular allocations. Public investments and pilot or 
demonstration programmes could receive 50% o f their cost, private investments for non-commercial 
purposes 30%, whereas information campaigns and measures initiated by the Commission were 
entitled to 100% o f their cost (Art.7).
The financial allocation for the first two years o f the programme was an insignificant 
ECU25 million (Art.3(3)). This support took the form o f capital grants towards investment in 
projects other than infrastructure projects; financial contributions toward pilot or demonstration 
schemes, measures to provide the information necessary for MEDSPA action or technical assistance; 
interest rebates for infrastructure projects; and repayable advances (Art.6(2)).130
The Regulation also laid down procedures for the verification and monitoring o f relevant 
actions. These include on-the-spot checks by Commission officials on operations financed under 
M EDSPA (Art.8(2)), reduction or suspension of payments in case irregularities or significant 
changes “affecting the nature or conditions” o f the project and not approved by the Commission 
were certified (A rt.9(l)), and reporting duties of the beneficiary during and after execution of the 
project (Art. 10). The EP sought unsuccessfully to insert Article 12(3a) reading: “Any Member State 
may request an investigation into the compatibility o f actions or non-compliance o f  third countries 
with international conventions and standards and the impact thereof on the Mediterranean 
environment”.131 It also tried and failed to establish closer and even formal co-operation between 
M EDSPA and the MAP, in particular in the research and technology sector.132
Although the actual amount o f funding provided is strikingly small, the value o f MEDSPA 
rather lied in “the explication o f an overall environmental policy for the M editerranean basin and 
its integration into other policy concerns”, which “should work as a catalyst for the use o f  existing
129 C f  EP proposal to the effect that this committee is composed by independent experts, ibid, pp. 613 at Amendment 
N o8, and 618 at Amendment N o29.
130 The EP also tried to insert a provision for financial contribution for projects concerning the transfer and/or 
adaptation o f technologies to the Mediterranean countries, especially those which are less developed, with no success, 
see ibid., p .616 at Amendment N o.20. By the end o f  1992, M EDSPA had provided resources for eight waste water 
projects in the four Community countries with a Mediterranean coastline, and four technical assistance programmes in 
third countries o f  the region, see EC Commission, Communication in relation to Council Regulation (EEC) N o 563/91 
o f  4 March 1991 on action by the Community for the protection o f  the environment in the Mediterranean region 
(M edspa), 1993 O.J. (C 48) 2.
131 See Opinion o fth e E P , op.cit. n.128, p.618 at Amendment N o .3 3.
132 Ibid, p .613, at Amendment N o59.
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resources in a manner which is compatible with this policy”.133 However, this scheme was 
terminated in 1993 and replaced by the LIFE instrument.
6.2.5. LIFE.
LIFE is the most modern Financial Instrument for the Environment, established in 1992 to 
assist in the development and implementation o f Community environmental policy and 
legislation.134 It is designed as an all-encompassing Environment Fund that provides the resources 
necessary to achieve the environmental objectives o f the Community, and especially the integration 
o f the environment into other policies and to sustainable development in the continent. It also aims 
at achieving cohesion between Community countries in which there are differences in terms o f level 
o f development, o f the nature and perception o f environmental problems, and o f the exploitation 
o f new technologies, and, importantly, at helping the Community in the task o f discharging its 
international obligations.135
The LIFE instrument was introduced in order to bring together and consolidate the 
non-structural programmes specific to the environment designed to provide assistance for concrete 
measures and field projects which had been adopted at different stages since 1984, aiming for both 
rationalisation and greater consistency with the development o f environmental policy; accordingly, 
earlier environmental financial instruments applying to different Community regions, and notably 
M EDSPA, are hereby repealed, with a view at integrating them into a single fund with a single 
management structure and environment committee (Art. 16).136
Already during preparatory work, it was understood that LIFE would cover only preliminary 
and demonstration measures, as opposed to structural environmental projects that fall under the 
remit o f the Structural and Cohesion Funds. More specifically, it aims to work towards alleviating 
the shortcomings in the administrative structures at the national or local level and the lack o f  direct 
experience in responding to environmental problems, which are viewed as major factors 
contributing to poor implementation o f environmental legislation. In fact, this is the only financial 
instrument that explicitly addresses this issue, and thus constitutes a turning point in the 
Community’s approach to environmental funding. Relevant measures include technical assistance 
to define coherent strategies and programmes responding to existing environmental problems; 
training o f environmental managers, advisers for public authorities, environmental officers in firms
133 Somscn, op.cit. n .l 14, p.236.
134 Council Regulation 1973/92 establishing a Financial Instrument for the Environment (LIFE). On the preparatory 
work, see Wilkinson, op.cit. n.70, pp.121-2. The programme has been renewed by Regulations 1404/96 and 1655/2000.
135 See EC Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation Establishing a Financial Instrument for the Environment 
(LIFE), COM (91) 28 final, 31 January 1991, p.3.
136 But see Opinion o f  the ESC which brings attention to the fact that “in the formulation and implementation o f  
environmental policy in general, terrestrial concerns, lend to dominate over those o f  the marine”, and urges the 
Com m ission to ensure that marine protection is accorded due priority in the allocations, 1991 O.J. (C 191) 4, at 
para.2.4.2.
268
etc.; and development, installation and modernisation o f monitoring.137
Moreover, it seeks to help involve local authorities and firms in pollution control, and thus 
promote more rapid progress in the field, going even beyond what is strictly required by legislation; 
to help the victims o f environmental accidents take emergency measures or even assert their rights 
vis-a-vis those responsible in implementation o f the ‘polluter pays’ principle; to give support to the 
adjustment efforts o f small agricultural and industrial enterprises; and to promote indirect action, 
e.g. ‘eco-labelling’.138 Examples o f possible action include promoting the use o f  clean technologies 
in various sectors, restoring contaminated sites, developing waste recycling and reuse techniques, 
promoting environmental auditing etc.139
Apart from aiming at safeguarding the biological heritage and mitigating the adverse effects 
of global climate change and desertification, LIFE seeks to encourage national and local authorities 
to search for solutions to environmental problems associated with the decline o f agriculture and the 
economic marginalisation o f certain regions, as well as the revitalisation o f  urban areas.140 Possible 
action in this respect includes, among others, safeguarding coastal areas and waters.
Lastly, the programme aspires to contribute to the search for solutions to global problems, 
and notably marine pollution, with particular attention to areas such as the Mediterranean and the 
Baltic.141 Here, possible measures extend beyond the Community territory, and may relate to 
Community contributions to multilateral financial mechanisms dealing with global issues, 
Community contribution towards implementation o f international conventions, and programmes o f 
technical assistance to non-Member countries.142
Activities explicitly eligible for funding under the first phase o f LIFE (1992-1995) were 
priority environmental actions in the Community, with special emphasis on nature conservation 
projects; technical assistance actions with third countries from the Mediterranean and Baltic regions; 
and in exceptional cases, actions concerning regional or global environmental problems provided 
for in international agreements (A rt.l). It, thus, becomes apparent that this programme is primarily 
devoted to projects o f benefit to the Community as a whole and bordering regions, mainly targeting 
transfrontier environmental problems. That is a notable regression towards a more stringent 
application o f ‘subsidiarity’, when compared to MEDSPA, which is moreover, as already noted, 
coupled with a lack o f  particular emphasis on marine pollution. The sum available for the period
137 See EC Com mission, op.cit. n.135, p .l 1.
138 Ibid, pp. 11-2.
139 But note that the ESC had recommended that the Fund be allowed to finance infrastructure which actually reduces 
pollution, as opposed to being confined to the support o f demonstration projects or technologies, see ESC, op.cit. n. 136, 
at para.2.3.3.
140 See EC Commission, op.cit. n.135, p. 12.
141 See ibid, pp. 12-3.
142 Note that the EP considers that a separate financial instrument is needed to assist third countries and to contribute 
to the implementation o f  international conventions, see EP, op.cit. n .l 10, at Am end.No.5.
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1992-1995 was ECU400 million (Art.7(2)), o f which 20% went for nature protection projects, and 
5% for projects outside the Community in the form o f co-financing or interest rebates (Art.4); by 
1993, ECU 1.4 million were given to finance projects in the Mediterranean region.143
It is remarkable that only a 10-20% o f the applications received in 1994 were approved, 
which points to an incomplete understanding o f the purpose and requirements o f the LIFE 
programme, in view o f the fact that it is the only one open to any private or corporate person, 
without restriction.144 It is characteristic o f the great need for development o f waste disposal 
techniques that the relevant sector covers around one fifth o f the projects funded by LIFE.145 In this 
context, one of the most important positive aspects o f this programme is that unlike the earlier 
financial instruments, including MEDSPA, LIFE takes a more holistic and preventative approach 
for each sector, such as the development o f new technologies and cleaner production processes.
The experience gained during the first years o f the programme’s operation raised certain 
issues that needed to be addressed. It was noted, for instance, that the wide spectrum o f activities 
covered tended to reduce the impact o f the measures taken and, significantly “required an 
administrative effort out o f all proportions to the benefits obtained” .146 In view o f  the fact that there 
are increased Community funds for the environment under other instruments, the rather modest 
financial means o f LIFE created a need for clearer priorities and definition o f selection criteria and 
monitoring procedures so as to redirect this programme to areas o f activity “which give real added 
value to Community action”, and increase its efficiency and transparency.147
In this vein, in 1995 the Commission proposed a LIFE II Regulation,148 which aimed at 
extending the field o f  application o f  LIFE to the Central and Eastern European countries, and 
refocusing at four main areas, namely implementation of the Natura 2000 European network, which 
relates to outstanding habitats o f Community interest; implementation o f Community policy, in 
areas other than protection o f nature, through the financing o f preparatory, demonstration, technical 
assistance, support and promotion projects aiming at providing the investment needed to implement 
environmental legislation - with priority to be given to coastal areas, waste and water management 
-, at helping local authorities incorporate environmental factors in regional planning, and at 
promoting sustainable development and integration o f the environment in industrial activities - such 
as clean technologies, environmental audits and eco-labels -; assistance to Mediterranean and Baltic 
third countries to set up environmental infrastructures, to establish policies and action programmes
143 UNEP, op.cit. n. 19, p. 12.
144 See EC Commission, op.cit. n.55, p. 15.
145 See ibid, p. 15 and Annex 1, Table 7.
146 See EC Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) Amending Council Regulation (EEC) N o 1973/92 
Establishing a Financial Instrument for the Environment (Life), COM (95) 135 final, pp.4 and 24-7.
147 Id.
148 See ibid.
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and take measures towards sustainable development; and, lastly, promotion o f know-how and 
experience gained.149
The resulting instrument, i.e. Regulation 1404/96, accordingly provided that ECU450 
million were to be dedicated during the period 1996-1999. It was furthermore laid down that the 
above actions “shall comply with the provisions o f the Treaty and Community legislation” and had 
to meet certain criteria (Art.9a). The general criteria for actions in the EC require that these be o f 
particular Community interest, making a significant contribution to the implementation of 
Community environmental policy and legislation; that they be carried out by technically and 
financially sound participants; that they be feasible in terms o f the technical proposals, management 
and value for money; and that they contribute to a multinational approach, should the latter be more 
effective than a national approach. Activities to be implemented in third countries should, in turn, 
present an interest for the Community, notably with regard to implementing regional and 
international guidelines and agreements; contribute to the sustainable development on the 
international, regional and national level; provide solutions to environmental problems that are 
widespread in the region and the relevant sector; increase co-operation on cross-border, 
transnational or regional level; ensure feasibility; and be carried out by technically and financially 
sound participants.
Despite modest sums allocated for third countries, there have been some significant projects 
in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean that have received LIFE II support, such as the 
organisation o f urban waste management in Albanian municipalities, an inventory o f soil resources 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, coastal management in Turkey, and the development o f oil spill 
response capabilities in the Eastern sub-region.
LIFE III (2000-2004) earmarks EUR 640 million allocated as follows (Art.8): Nature 
(wildlife, habitats, N atura 2000 (Art.3)) 54%; Environment (development o f innovative and 
integrated techniques and methods that work towards environmental protection and sustainable 
development and further development o f Community environmental policy (Art.4)) 54%; and third 
countries (establishment o f capacities and administrative structures in the environmental sector and 
development of environmental policy and action programmes in third countries (Art.5)) 6%.
With regard to LfFE -Environment, projects eligible are still demonstration and preparatory 
projects, and accompanying measures (Art.4(2)) not receiving aid under the Structural Funds or 
other Community budget instruments (Art.7). LIFE contributes up to 30% o f the cost o f actions 
involving the financing o f income-generating investments; 100% o f  the cost o f  accompanying 
measures designed to provide and disseminate information on the exchange o f  experience between 
projects, and evaluate, monitor and promote the actions taken under the programm; and 50% o f the
149 Sec ibid, pp.6-7.
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cost o f other activities (Art.4(3)). As far as LIFE - Third countries is concerned eligible projects 
include technical assistance actions that contribute to the objectives o f the programme funded at 
70%; and accompanying measures funded at 100% (Art.5(2) and (3)).
Proposals for projects to be financed are submitted to the Commission by Member States, 
or the relevant national authorities o f third countries (Art.4(5) and 5(4)). An innovative possibility 
that LIFE II offered that the Commission may ask any persons - legal or natural - established in the 
Community to submit applications for assistance in respect o f measures o f particular interest, by 
means o f a notice published in the Official Journal is carried forward in LIFE III (Art.4(8) and 5(9)). 
In this way, the Commission itself becomes a substantive actor, competent to interfere and fill the 
gaps that state action creates, while at the same time being the traditional administrator o f funds.
The Commission supervises implementation o f the projects supported under LIFE, under 
terms similar to those o f M EDSPA,150 and is assisted, as in the latter scheme, by a committee from 
representatives o f the Member States (Arts.9-11).151 It is noteworthy that both the ESC and the EP 
recommended that the EEA be given a central role in assessing progress in the achievement of 
LIFE’S objectives, and that the periodic State o f the European Environment report play an important 
part in this regard.152
6.2.6. Environm ental Funding from the European Investm ent Bank (EIB).
The European Investment Bank supports the Community’s objectives and policies by 
granting medium- and long-term loans to the public and private sector, primarily in Member States 
and secondarily in third countries. As has been already noted, the EIB also provides funds and 
expertise in the context o f  the Structural Funds and other Community financial instruments.
Notwithstanding the fact that the main priority o f the Bank has always been regional 
development, environmental protection is increasingly given centre stage in its activities. Thus, EIB 
funding o f environmental investments has gradually increased during the 90s, from ECU 1,728 
million in 1989 to ECU6,044 million in 1995.153 In all, lending for environmental protection 
projects from 1991 to 1995 amounted to an impressive ECU22 billion. Although investment in 
various areas may also contribute to environmental protection - if  one takes into account the 
requirement that the Bank’s appraisal o f all projects submitted to it has to ensure that they have no 
detrimental impact to the environment investments in areas directly concerning mitigation of water
150 See supra , p.256-8.
151 But see the relevant Opinion o f  the ESC pointing out that the commitment to conceive and implement the 
operations financed in close consultation with national and local authorities and the econom ic and social partners 
concerned, as enshrined in Arl.7, is not reflected operationally in the relevant Articles, and recommends the organisation 
o f  appropriate partnerships at national level, op.cit. n.136, at para.2.5.3. The EP took this further by inserting an 
amendment defining the composition and mandate o f  such partnership committees in Member States, which was, 
nevertheless, not incorporated in the Regulation, see EP Opinion, op.cit. n .l 10, at A m end.rtos.46 and 27.
152 See ESC, op.cit. n.136, at para.2,7.2; and EP, op.cit. n. 110, at Am end.No.40.
153 See EIB, Annual Report 1990, p.28; Annual Report, 1995, p.28.
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pollution, i.e. wastewater collection and treatment schemes and projects to improve the quality of 
drinking or bathing water each year account for a little less than half o f  the Bank’s environmental 
investment (ECU9 billion from 1991 to 1995). The projects in question mostly form part o f major 
regional programmes in several river basins and coastal areas, mainly in the Mediterranean and the 
Baltic.
In addition, the Bank is assisting an increasing number o f smaller schemes carried out by 
local authorities and financed from global loans; for example, in 1995, it funded the construction 
of around 1500 sewerage systems and wastewater treatment plants at local level.154 The EIB has also 
financed installations that combine domestic/industrial waste incineration with district heating in 
some twenty European towns and cities, while large sums have been lent for environmental 
protection equipment at industrial sites, for installations to reduce pollutant emissions from 
refineries and for desulphurisation filters at major coal or lignite-fired power stations.155
On the other hand, non-EC Mediterranean countries had in the past received only modest 
loans for environmental protection measures under the Financial Protocols,156 concluded within the 
broader bilateral co-operation agreements.157 However, from 1992 onwards, funding has been 
supplemented by non-protocol horizontal financial co-operation, in the form o f loans from EIB and 
from the Community’s own budget, under the Community’s New M editerranean Policy (1992- 
1996) that will be examined in greater detail below.158 Thus, during the period 1991-1995, the EIB 
has lent an aggregate amount close to ECU800 million for environmental protection projects in the 
M editerranean Basin, most o f them involving wastewater and sewerage treatment and thus 
addressing one o f the main land-based sources o f pollution in the region.
Until that time EIB apportionment o f funds in the region as a whole was characteristically 
unbalanced: Third states have received a small fraction o f the money available, while there are 
considerable discrepancies among Member States as well. Hence, Italy had made the most extended 
use o f EIB funding, while Spain joined in with substantial impetus since it acceded to the 
Community. France had not often turned to the Bank in order to acquire funds for its wastewater
154 Among major Mediterranean urban centres having benefited from this policy in order to acquire effluent treatment 
facilities are Valencia, Rome, Venice, Florence, Milan, Athens, Heraklion, and M arseilles.
155 See EIB, The Environment: A Central Concern, http://www.eib.org/obj/env.htm
156 See EIB, Financing F acilities under the M editerranean Agreem ents, 1987, pp.6-8.
157 See infra, pp.273-4.
1S!tThc total allocation for 1992 to 1996 comprises grants totalling around ECU500 m illion, half o f  which fall under 
the protocols, and half are outside the protocols, plus EIB loans worth a total o f  ECU 610 m illion, see EC Commission, 
op.cit. n.55, Annex II, p.14. In this connection, the EIB has an allocation o f  ECU 500 million directed solely to 
environmental measures, see EC Commission, Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy o f  the European Union: 
Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, COM (94) 427 final, 19 October 1994, p.25. N ote also that the EU 
undertook during the same period wider initiatives on Euro-Mediterranean Co-operation, which led to the ‘N icosia  
Charter’ (1990), a ‘blueprint’ for sustainable development in the region; and a Ministerial M eeting in Cairo in 1992, 
which adopted a Declaration on practical action; established a follow-up mechanism com posed o f  the EU, the World 
Bank, MAP and UNDP in charge o f  the co-ordination o f  activities; and identified four Mediterranean countries, namely 
Albania, Egypt, Tunisia and Malta, on which specific projects would be implemented during an initial period o f  two 
years.
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treatment projects; a reason for that might be the French management system, which is able to 
generate its own resources, whereas Greece seemed to be lagging behind in taking advantage of the 
EIB’s funding potential.
M ore recent data, however, show a tendency for increased symmetry. Thus, in 1996, the 
EIB disbursed ECU5.9 billion for environmental protection projects within the EU improving the 
quality o f life and focussing on water conservation and management, air pollution and the urban 
environment.159 During that year, EIB loans supporting sustainable economic development and 
trans-regional projects in non-member Mediterranean countries totalled ECU681 million;160 while 
the amount for 1997 to 1999 was 2.310 million.
Let us now take a closer look at the Community Mediterranean policies in the 90s, an area 
where promising developments are envisaged to take place in the future and where EIB is bound 
to play a central role.
6.2.7. The New M editerranean Policy and the ‘Euro-M editerranean Partnership’.
A radical review o f the Community Mediterranean policy - which has passed through 
various stages since it was initiated in 1972 -161 began in 1990 and continued during 1991 when the 
majority o f the new financial protocols with Mediterranean countries entered into force.162 This re­
direction heralded a new stage o f co-operation spanning from 1992 to 1996 and governed by 
Regulation 1763/92.163 This instrument sought to ensure a balanced apportionment o f the ECU230 
million earmarked to the various regions and countries concerned for projects supplementing those 
financed under the financial protocols with third Mediterranean countries (A rt.l). The types o f 
measures concerning environmental protection,164 as envisaged by the Regulation, comprised the 
financing o f 3% interest-rate subsidies on loans granted by the Bank for investment purposes, 
outside the framework o f the financial protocols, which would have a catalytic effect, such as pilot 
or demonstration projects - including those relating to the protection o f  the waters o f the
159 See EIB, Press Release SP 03/97, 6 February 1997.
160 O f which ECU 562 million was made available outside the separate national financial protocol arrangements. 
One o f  the most significant projects finalised in 1996 involves a loan o f  ECU30 million towards works to modify the 
production process in a petrochemical plant at Skikda in North-Eastern Algeria, so as to eliminate a major source o f  
pollution in the Mediterranean.The project is being carried out in line with the recommendations o f  a METAP study 
financed by the EIB and dealing with ways o f  reducing pollution at ports and along the coastline o f  Algeria. The new  
process to be introduced for manufacturing chlorine will eliminate all mercury contamination, a major source o f pollution 
in the port o f  Skikda, see EIB, Press Release EXT 37/96, 20 Novem ber 1996.
161 See, among others, A.Tovias, ‘The E U ’s Mediterranean Policies under Pressure’, in R,Gillespie (ed.), 
M editerranean P olitics, V ol.2, 1996, pp.9-25.
162 See EC, European Community and The M editerranean, 1991, esp. at p.6.
163 Council Regulation 1763/92 concerning financial co-operation in respect o f  all Mediterranean non-Member 
countries. See also Council Regulation 1762/92 on the implementation o f  the protocols on financial and technical co­
operation concluded by the Community with Mediterranean non-member countries.
164 Such measures were allocated, according to an indicative breakdown laid down in the Annex to the Regulation, 
E C U 115-120 million
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Mediterranean and training measures (Art.3(3)). However, this re-orientation did not address all 
problems identified in the different phases of the Community’s Mediterranean policy. In fact, results 
thereof are generally thought to be mixed: Financial and technical support for structural adjustment 
has not had any major overall impact, while the respective instruments are thought to have been 
rather narrow, and the resources provided inadequate to meet the increasing needs o f the region.165
As far as environmental objectives are concerned, recent agreements o f financial and 
technical co-operation with Mediterranean countries tend to devote more attention to relevant 
considerations; the most wide-spread clause to this effect stipulates that environmental projects, in 
particular training and technical assistance ones, are a priority area o f  Community funding.166 Still, 
in the more general and weighty sector o f economic reforms and restructuring, agriculture and 
industry, there has been a conspicuous lack o f environmental considerations.167 What is more, even 
when the Community was expected to fund environmental projects in the developing states o f the 
region, there were no conditions attached that would commit the latter to comply with international 
standards, let alone EU rules on environmental protection.168
Having said that, since 1994, the European Union has been discussing a new more 
wholesome approach towards its southern neighbours, which has been characteristically termed 
“Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”.169 This notion is premised on the many areas o f interdependence 
between Europe and the Mediterranean region, notably environment, energy, migration, trade and 
investment, and on an appreciation o f the fact that helping M editerranean countries meet the 
challenges they face is vital for Community interests. These challenges mainly relate to peace and 
stability in the region, as well as free trade and economic modernisation and restructuring. The 
Community’s long-term aspiration regarding such a close and extended co-operation is to establish 
“the largest free trade area in the world, covering the enlarged Community, any Central and Eastern
165 See EC Commission, op.cit. n.158, pp.20-3. In this context note that the ‘Avicennc initiative* (on science and 
technology co-operation with the Maghreb and the countries o f  the Mediterranean Basin), despite the wide range o f  
actions it covered, had a total budget o f  ECU15.6 million for 1992-1994, see EC Com mission, op.cit. n.55, Annex 11, 
p. 15.
166 See, e.g., Council Regulation 1763/92, at Arts.l and 3(1); 1991 Protocol on financial and technical co-operation 
between the European Community and the Syrian Arab Republic; and identical wording in the 1991 Protocol with 
Morocco; and in the 1991 Protocol with Tunisia. See also 1993 Protocol on financial co-operation between the EC and 
Slovenia, Article 9; 1990 Agreement between the European Economic Community and the People’s Republic o f  Bulgaria 
on trade and commercial and Economic Co-operation, Article 2; and 1980 Agreement with Yugoslavia, Article 10. 
Surprisingly, no such stipulation appears in the 1989 Protocol with Malta.
167 Id.
168 Cf. the 1992 Agreement on the European Economic Area with the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries, 
purporting to ‘export’ a considerable body o f  Community environmental principles and legislation to non-member states 
and integrate the environmental dimension in a trade regime; in fact, i f  EFTA countries are to abide by the terms o f  this 
agreement, no less than thirty two environmental Directives will have to become part o f  their domestic law. For a brief 
discussion o f  the environmental provisions o f  this instrument, see D.Baldock & E.Keene, ‘Incorporating Environmental 
Considerations in Common Market Arrangements’, 23 Env'l L., 1993, pp.601-2; and Sands, op.cit. n, 11, pp.549-50.
169 See Commission Communications: EC Commission, op.cit. n.158; and Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy  
o f  the European Union: Proposals for implementing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, COM (95) 72 final, 8 March 
1995. See also the most favourable opinion o f  the ESC, Opinion on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 1995 O.J. (C 
301) 45.
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European countries not by then Members, and all Mediterranean 11011-Member countries” by 2010.170
For this aspiration to be achieved, there is a need for a multi-dimensional policy, a long­
term strategy, seeking to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Zone o f Political Stability and Security; 
and a legally framed Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area involving promotion o f free trade, 
increased financial assistance, and wider co-operation. This strategy was solemnly adopted by the 
Foreign Ministers o f all states bordering the Mediterranean (i.e. except Libya, Albania and 
Yugoslavia), at the 1995 Barcelona Conference, and it is envisaged that there will be a series of 
‘Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements’ concluded with all partners.171
Environmental protection is one o f the priority areas o f co-operation; more specifically, the 
Community intended to promote a short- and medium term priority action programme, and provide 
financial support focussed on these priorities, especially in the form o f long-term subsidised EIB 
loans.172 Significantly, in this context the EU intended to promote the adoption o f uniform 
legislation, at least for some environmental sectors, increase its contribution in the areas o f training, 
education, networking and environmental data, and, last but not least, enhance co-operation within 
existing international structures, such as M AP.173
A Short and Medium-term Priority Environmental Action Programme (SMAP), designed 
to provide the common framework that will guide both policy and funding for environmental 
purposes within the ‘Euro-Mediterranean partnership’ context, was indeed adopted by the Euro- 
Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on the Environment (Helsinki, November 1997).174 Pursuant 
to it, five priority fields require immediate attention: integrated water management, integrated waste 
management, ‘hot spots’ (concerning both polluted areas and threatened ecosystems), integrated 
coastal zone management, and combatting desertification. The SMAP also provides for a follow-up 
mechanism consisting o f an network o f correspondents; a reporting system; a review mechanism 
after two years; and consultation practices, also involving the civil society. Furthermore, it explicitly 
acknowledges that, among a series o f supportive measures that are necessary to achieve the 
objective o f enhanced environmental protection in the region, support for the implementation of 
obligations contained in applicable international instruments, as well as adoption and 
implementation o f legislation and regulatory measures, especially preventive ones, is o f particular 
importance. In the framework o f SMAP, the partners discuss and evaluate regional environmental 
projects and present them for funding under the MEDA Regulation.
170 See EC Com mission, op.cit. n.158 pp.2-3.
171 To date such agreements have been concluded between the Community and Tunisia, sec Council Decision 98/238, 
1998 O.J. (L 97) 1; M orocco, Council Decision 00/204, 2000 O .J  (L 70) 1; Israel, see EUROM ED Special Feature, 
No. 15, 18 July 2000, at www.eurom ed.net.
172 Note that the Economic and Social Committee emphasises that special attention should be given to the development 
o f  new and efficient water treatment policies, see ESC, op.cit. n. 169, Appendix II, at (b).
173 Sec EC Com mission, op.cit. n .169, p .l I.
174 On SM AP, see the EU website at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgl 1/smap.
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More generally, Council Regulation 1488/96 on financial and technical measures to 
accompany the reform o f economic and social structures in the framework o f the 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership (MEDA Regulation) is the instrument governing this ambitious 
new stage.175 According to the MEDA Regulation, the Community shall implement measures in the 
framework o f the principles and priorities o f the Euro-Mediterranean partnership to support the 
efforts that Mediterranean non-Member countries will undertake to reform their economic and social 
structures and mitigate any social or environmental consequences which may result from economic 
development (Art. 1(1)).176
Importantly, the beneficiaries of such measures may include not only states and regions but 
also local authorities, regional organizations, public agencies, local or traditional communities, 
organisations supporting business, private operators, co-operatives, mutual societies, associations, 
foundations and non-governmental organisations (Art. 1(2)). Activities financed shall mainly take 
the form o f technical assistance, training, institution-building, information, seminars, studies, 
projects for investment in micro-enterprises, small and medium-sized undertakings and 
infrastructures and action designed to highlight the Community nature o f the assistance (Annex 
il(vi)). Measures to be financed under this Regulation shall be selected taking account, inter alia, 
of the beneficiaries’ priorities, evolving needs, absorption capacity and progress towards structural 
reform. Selection shall also be based on an assessment of the effectiveness o f those measures in 
achieving the objectives aimed at by Community support (A rt.5(l)). Indicative programmes 
covering three-year periods shall be established at national and regional level (Art.5(2)), and shall 
be updated annually and amended, as necessary. These have to define the main objectives, 
guidelines, and priority sectors o f Community support, together with factors for the evaluation o f 
the programmes. In this context, due regard shall be taken o f environmental considerations in the 
preparation and implementation o f all activities financed (Annex Il(vii)).
It is equally important that the Commission has included in its proposed guidelines for 
MEDA programmes an explicit reference to assistance to be given as a matter o f priority in the field 
o f “harmonization o f legislation and standards in the field o f the environment” , so that 
Mediterranean countries can prepare for free trade with the EU and raise their standard o f living.177 
This is actually the first sign o f a trend towards harmonisation o f environmental standards 
throughout the region outside the Barcelona Convention system. But even before this objective is
175 It replaces Regulations 1762/92 and 1763/92 as from 1 January 1997, the former remaining in force for the 
management o f  financial protocols still applicable at that dale and for the commitment o f  funds remaining under the 
expired protocols (Art. 17).
176 N ote, however, that not all third Mediterranean countries are to benefit from the new arrangements, According 
to Annex 1 o f  the Regulation, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, M orocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Occupied Territories o f  Gaza and the West Bank are elevated to the rank o f ‘Mediterranean partner’ for the EU. That 
leaves outside the old ‘pariahs’, Libya and all Balkan countries.
177 See EC Commission, Proposal for a Council decision concerning the adoption o f  the guidelines for MEDA  
indicative programmes, COM (96) 441 final, 12.09.1996, p.8,
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actually reached, the Community may impose appropriate conditions on the projects it is going to 
fund, with the understanding that should these be disregarded further funding would be suspended 
or terminated.
Community financing shall notably be in the form o f grants or risk capital. Concerning co­
operation measures in the field o f the environment it may also take the form o f  interest rate 
subsidies, at a rate o f 3%, for loans granted by the Bank from its own resources (A rt6 .(l)).178 
Financing decisions and any financing agreements and contracts resulting therefrom shall provide, 
inter alia, for supervision and financial control by the Commission and audits by the Court o f 
Auditors, where appropriate, to be carried out on the spot (Art.6(3)). The amount dedicated to 
implementing this programme for the period 1995 to 1999 is set at ECU3.424 billion (Art. 1(3)).179
The Commission shall be assisted in formulating relevant proposals by the MED Committee 
composed o f representatives o f the Member States (Art. 11(1)). Should there be a divergence of 
opinion between the MED Committee and the Commission, proposals are referred to the Council 
for final decision (Art.l 1(3)). Regarding projects to be financed by subsidised loans in the field of 
the environment, the EIB may act on any proposal only after it receives Commission approval 
(Art. 12). The Commission is further instructed to examine, together with the Bank, progress 
achieved in implementing the MEDA Regulation and has to submit to the European Parliament 
and the Council an annual report containing information on the measures financed during the year, 
albeit with due regard for confidentiality, and provide an assessment o f the results obtained 
(Art. 15(1)). The Commission has in fact proceeded with this evaluation and has come up with a 
proposal to amend Regulation 1488/96 in order to streamline and simplify the decision-making and 
follow-up procedures.’80
All said, meeting the objectives o f the ‘Euro-Mediterranean partnership’ may prove a more 
difficult task than it already is by its nature. It is characteristic o f the sensitive political character o f 
the extended co-operation streamlined by the MEDA Regulation that the Council o f Foreign 
M inisters held on 23 April 1996 - exactly three months before its adoption - was fraught with 
disagreements over the relevant proposal.181 This last point is further illustrated by the more recent 
M alta Conference o f Foreign Ministers o f  Mediterranean countries (15-16 April 1997), which
178 Loans signed by the EIB in 1996 include projects to improve waste water treatment and management o f  water 
resources in M orocco, Egypt, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories.
179 Notwithstanding the Commission proposal for a sum o f  ECU5.5 billion, o f  which ECU0.3 billion for 
environmental projects, see EC Commission, op.cit. n.169, p.14. N ote that 90% o f  the resources are channelled 
bilaterally, and the other 10% is devoted to regional activities in the benefit o f  all. Eventually, the sum increased to 
3.474 billion, see EC Commission, Annual Report of the MEDA Programme 1998.
180 See EC Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation 1488/96,.., CO M (1999) 494 final, 
99/0214 (CNS), 20.10 .1999.
181 Greece, for instance, continued to oppose any financial aid to Turkey, whilst the UK was unhappy at the 
decision-making procedure with regard to cutting o ff aid in the event o f  human rights violations, see European Report, 
2126/V /9 , 24 April 1996.
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produced very little results, mainly because o f increasing tension in the Arab-lsraeli relations. 
However, the participants took time to note that there are considerable delays in the absorption o f 
financial allocations and that new impetus is required, if the agreed targets are to be met.182 1997 
was, nevertheless, the first year o f effective implementation o f the MEDA programme, when almost 
one billion ECUs were absorbed by the Mediterranean partners (approximately 110 million of which 
devoted to environmental projects), while Framework Financing Conventions were being concluded 
with the latter.183
6.3. The W orld Bank/European Investment Bank (EIB) Environm ental Program for the 
Mediterranean (EPM).
In the context o f enhanced commitment o f  international banks to environmentally sound 
investments during the 80s and their strategic support o f regional environmental actions,184 the 
World Bank and the EIB, with the support o f the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the 
European Community, initiated in 1988 the Environmental Program for the Mediterranean (EPM). 
This is a programme o f assistance seeking to address environmental policy, and institutional and 
investment-related needs in Mediterranean countries, and mobilise the financial resources required 
to implement the broad range o f actions needed to rectify the environmental problems o f the 
region.185 Importantly, the EPM is not confined only to certain aspects o f environmental degradation, 
but has the very broad scope o f managing the natural resources o f the basin consistently with the 
principles o f sustainable development.
The EPM has developed in a preparatory and three implementing phases: The preparatory 
phase - completed by 1990 - involved a study o f environmental degradation in the Mediterranean, 
and identification o f priority areas, as well as definition o f the broad instruments o f intervention for 
mounting a responsive programme o f assistance. A very significant contribution o f this study is that 
it exposes the causes o f environmental degradation in the region in rather bold terms.186 It highlights 
three main reasons for it, setting aside population growth, namely inappropriate economic 
policies;187 weak regulatory and administrative systems;188 and insufficient public awareness.189 It
182 See Conclusions o f  the Second Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Malta, 15 and 16 April 1997, at 
http://www.noel.diplom acy.edu/euromed; and F.S.Hakura, 'The Euro-Mediterranean Policy: The Implications o f the 
Barcelona Declaration’, 34 C.M .L.Rev., 1997, pp.337-66.
183 See Communication by Vice-President Marin to the Commission, at http://www.curomed.nel/M EDA/REPORTS/.
184 See supra , Chapter 3, p .l 13.
185 See World Bank/EIB, The Environm ental Program  fo r  the M editerranean - P reserving a Shared Heritage and  
M anaging a  Common R esource, 1990.
^  [bid, pp.35-48.
1117 Involving pricing distortions, such as low prices, usually by means o f  subsidies, for energy and for industrial inputs 
which encourage excessive use and do not provide incentive for enterprises lo invest in resource recovery and reuse. Low  
output prices also reduce the incentive lo recover waste, while the pricing o f  water below  econom ic cost throughout the
(continued...)
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further found that many o f the countries in question have been developing environmental 
programmes to address immediate priorities, but these are rarely preventive in character, due to 
these adverse factors. It is explicitly stated, in this context, that MAP has so far advanced 
understanding o f  the threats to the Mediterranean environment, but has not had any considerable 
effect on projects or on policy formulation.190
The study finally stresses the suitability o f economic measures, such as pricing resources 
so as to reflect true costs and other incentives and/or disincentives, such as pollution charges, 
balanced with better regulatory interventions, improved resource management, and specific 
environment-related investments, in order to improve the quality o f the environment in the region. 
To assist in such an effort, the World Bank and the EIB are summoned to contribute their expertise 
in policy analysis and formulation; project design and preparation; institution building; and 
mobilisation o f financial resources.191 The EPM was, thus, seen as an opportunity for a more 
systematic regional analysis through exchanges o f experience among interested states and the 
translation o f this into effective projects and policies.
Proposed action was envisaged to span three closely linked levels: A rolling three-year 
Mediterranean Environment Technical Assistance Program (METAP), subject to annual review of 
financing requirements, and launched in January 1990; increased emphasis by the two Banks on the 
identification and financing o f environmental projects and components thereof; and initiatives to 
attract resources from other multilateral and bilateral donors in support o f  METAP and EPM 
investment activities. The last two levels primarily address external borrowing on concessional 
terms that the developing countries o f the region are in need of.
Accordingly, the range o f activities o f the EPM, for the biennium 1990-1992, involved 
policy studies, institution building, and monitoring, including elaboration o f oil spill contingency
l87(... continued)
region discourages the treatment and reuse o f  wastewater, leading to rapid depletion o f  freshwater resources
188 See infra, Chapter 7, p.305. Importantly, inadequate management presents an impediment to improving municipal 
and industrial wastewater treatment. This mostly takes the form o f  low-tariff revenues o f  wastewater agencies - due 
mainly to political constraints - seldom covering the cost o f  operation and maintenance; hence, these agencies are 
dependent on government budgets, cannot attract qualified personnel, and sometimes facilities simply break down and 
are bypassed altogether.
189 Hence, in much o f  the region, the - rather misguided - perception is that untapped resources are still available for 
development and that new technologies will solve the problems o f  resource depletion. At the same time many sectoral 
issues are not fully understood, and the same can be said with regard to external costs, including transboundary issues, 
such as air pollution and groundwater aquifers. By the same token, the long-term importance o f  ecologically fragile 
coastal areas and ecosystems is not sufficiently appreciated and consequently their continuing degradation is tolerated; 
this is helped by the fact that environmental education in most Mediterranean countries is still lagging behind.
190 See World Bank/EIB, op.cit. n.185, p. 16.
191 In fact, from 1980 to 1990, the E lB ’s environment-related loans in the Mediterranean had totalled almost $3.3 
billion - about half o f  its total environmental lending -, whereas the World Bank’s loans for environmental protection 
in the region had amounted to around $2.3 billion - only 8% o f  all its lending to Mediterranean countries. The 
environmental priorities o f  the two Banks have differed, however, with the EIB being more active in water management; 
at the same time, the World Bank activities mainly involve the Southern and Eastern coast, whereas the EIB, as already 
discussed, focusses on the Northern rim.
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plans and disaster preparedness, the goal being a full operational capability in the region; support 
for the implementation o f the Athens Protocol; compilation and assessment o f  the environment- 
related legislative, regulatory, and institutional frameworks in M editerranean countries, especially 
these applicable in coastal areas; regional studies on linkages between environment and 
development with the Blue Plan team; development and implementation o f an institution- 
strengthening programme, involving training, twinning o f laboratories, and provision o f equipment, 
for marine pollution monitoring in the context o f MED POL; as well as project identification and 
preparation, including updating of feasibility studies for port reception facilities, and preparation 
o f representative pilot projects for coastal zone management.
The second phase o f the programme identified and prepared investment projects and 
institution-strengthening activities and defined specific policy measures based on the priority areas 
established during the first phase; whereas the third is due to implement these measures, projects 
and activities. The priorities for the second and third phases envisaged both curative and preventive 
measures in the areas of:
Integrated Water Resource Management, which includes integrated, long-term planning for 
surface and groundwater resources adopting the least-cost solutions for their development; 
conservation and protection o f identified water resources, through pricing and other measures, such 
as information, regulations, and incentives for water-saving technologies, recycling and reuse; 
institutional and legal changes to consolidate responsibility for water resource planning and 
management; improvement of responsible organisations’ capabilities in data collection, monitoring, 
and analysis o f management alternatives; and the adoption of coherent pollution reduction strategies 
for coastal and watershed areas, which should comprise investments in least-cost systems, provision 
o f  incentives for adoption o f water-saving technologies and for conservation and reuse, and 
improvement in the economic and regulatory aspects o f control policies; and watershed management 
programmes having a significant effect on water availability, e.g. soil conservation, fertiliser and 
pesticide management, and siting o f industry and o f solid waste disposal sites;
• M anagement o f  Solid and Hazardous Wastes;
Prevention and Control o f Marine Pollution from Oil and Chemicals, which includes 
preparation o f operational oil spill contingency plans for all countries, encompassing the 
development o f sub-regional and inter-country arrangements to maximise the efficiency o f control 
and co-ordinate actions against spills o f hazardous materials; expansion and rehabilitation of port 
oil reception facilities, including floating facilities; adoption o f incentives for improved deballasting; 
monitoring and enforcement o f the MARPOL and Barcelona Convention provisions on reducing 
marine pollution from ships and land-based sources; preparation o f  complementary disaster 
preparedness plans for shipping accidents involving hazardous materials; and training o f personnel 
and provision o f adequate equipment in case o f  oil or hazardous material emergencies; and
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• Coastal Zone Management.
Turning now specifically to METAP, it must be made clear that this scheme is the main 
operational instrument o f the EPM, and is designed to act as a catalyst for environmental 
investment. This means that the main responsibility for such investment rests with the countries 
themselves, which have to mobilise primarily their domestic resources. It also means that, however 
ambitious and comprehensive the scope o f EPM as a whole might seem, it is really up to the Banks 
to choose which projects to fund, without any structured arrangement, but METAP, restricting them.
METAP has three basic objectives, namely to develop a sound pipeline o f  environmental 
projects; to formulate and improve environmental policies and regulations; and to strengthen the 
required institutional framework in the countries o f the region. Technical assistance in this 
framework consists in: prefeasibility studies o f  projects to be financed in the third phase o f the 
EPM; policy studies addressing key policy factors affecting the Mediterranean environment and 
making specific recommendations for implementation; and a coherent institutional development 
programme, including specific recommendations for improving the environmental legislative and 
regulatory frameworks at the country, sub-regional, and regional levels; studies on strengthening 
institutions and organisations; training; seminars on topics o f  regional interest to disseminate the 
findings o f the policy studies and information on other METAP activities; support for increased 
public awareness; and activities o f regional relevance aimed at strengthening scientific and regional 
databases.
METAP activities were due to be closely integrated with the regional activities o f the two 
Banks, whereas collaboration with UNEP/MAP was envisaged with a view to developing actions 
that would contribute to the overall effectiveness o f the EPM. But the principal integration 
envisaged involves Community activities for the protection o f the Mediterranean region, and notably 
M EDSPA.192
The three-year cycle of METAP I ended in 1992, and the projects then completed involved 
twelve Mediterranean countries, with special attention given to the Southern shore.193 In practice, 
during the first cycle, capacity-building efforts were geared towards policy studies to create 
incentive structures promoting environmentally sustainable development and to guide institutional 
developm ent by creating capacity at national and local levels for strategic environmental action 
planning and priority setting, since having appropriate institutions, incentives and information in 
place is thought to be essential for the success o f critical investments in environm ent.194
On the basis o f experience gained during that period, subsequent efforts concentrated on
192 See EIB, Annual R eport 1989, p. 16,
193 Namely, Albania, Algeria, Cyprus, Croatia, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Italy, Malta, M orocco, Tunisia, and Turkey, see 
Europe Environment, N o .4 1 1, June 8, 1993, p.5.
194 See A.Kudat, S.Peabody & N .O zm en, ‘METAP: A  Concept Paper on Capacity B uild ing’, cited in World Bank’s 
web site at http://www-esd.worldbank.org/htm l/esd/env/publicat/bulletin/nltnv7nl/news4.htm .
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supporting institutional and policy development, and integrating information and communications 
into the process o f environmentally sustainable development. During the second cycle (METAP II), 
launched in 1993, METAP concentrated on sponsoring follow-up studies o f incentive systems that 
are more broadly focussed, and have applicability in many countries o f the region. The linkages 
between policy and investment were thus emphasised with a clearer objective to identify coastal 
zone investments. It was envisaged that during this phase M ETAP would be oriented towards 
practical measures, primarily in the sectors o f water quality, the urban environment and the 
development o f infrastructure - with ECU30 million earmarked for the period 1993-1995 to be 
exclusively used for the studies needed to prepare the projects, while funding for the actual 
implementation o f the latter was estimated to be several times higher.195
M ost o f the project studies financed during these three years were aimed at solid waste
management, industrial pollution control, wastewater treatment and oil pollution control; among 
them some o f important magnitude, such as the Algeria Industrial Pollution Control and Egypt’s 
Pollution Abatement Projects. Regional capacity-building initiatives focussed on training in 
environmental communications, conflict mediation and negotiation and environmental economics. 
M ETAP interventions towards institutional strengthening included a M EDGEOBASE land 
information system in Morocco, advanced phases o f environmental impact assessment units in
Algeria and Egypt and an Environmental Strategy for Lebanon.196
Effort was to also to be made to find additional financial backers to support the programme, 
notwithstanding the World Bank Vice-President’s satisfaction with the stepping-up o f levels o f 
investment during M ETAP 1. It is notable in this respect that, according to the said official, the 
difficulties had more to do with shortage o f worthwhile projects than lack o f funding.197 In fact, 
during its first years o f  operation, apart from developing training programmes,198 and direct 
organisational support in some countries o f the region, METAP managed to secure financing from 
different sources for several activities.199
The program m e’s third and final phase (METAP III, 1996-2000), is a $100 million 
programme which will implement concrete projects in three integrated priority areas: capacity
195 See Europe Environment, op.cit. n.193.
195 In 1994, preparation began on the Albania Integrated Coastal Zone Management Project; on an oil spill 
contingency plan in the Occupied Territories; and on a solid waste management project in Turkey, see World Bank, 
Making Developm ent Sustainable - The World Bank Group and the Environment - Fiscal 1994, 1994, p. 127. In addition, 
during the same year the Mediterranean Coastal Cities Network (MEDCIT1ES), with M ETAP support, conducted 
environmental audits in several cities, i.e. Limassol (Cyprus), Oran (Algeria), Sousse (Tunisia), Tangiers (Morocco), 
Tripoli/El-M ina (Lebanon), and Tirana (Albania), and began follow-up action.
197 Europe Environment, op.cit. n.193.
198 Three main training programmes were under way in 1994 relating to environmental communication, environmental 
mediation and negotiation, and environmental impact assessment.
199 For example GEF Financing for Tunisia’s programme to combat marine pollution; EU financing for the A1 Hoceima 
Conservation Management Plan in Morocco; EIB financing for the Limassol Municipal Environmental Audit in Cyprus; 
and World Bank financing for the Hazardous Waste Management Options programme in Algeria, see World Bank, op.cit. 
n.196, pp. 126-7.
283
building, participation and partnerships; arresting and prevention o f pollution at ‘hot spots’; and 
integrated water and coastal areas resource management. It is envisaged that, by shifting the 
programme’s management to the region, through such initiatives as a M ETAP Regional Facility at 
Cairo consisting of a UNDP-managed Capacity Building Unit; a World Bank/EIB-managed Project 
Preparation Unit; a Private Public Partnership which will expand partnerships and collaborations 
between government, business, and community groups; and a Special Grants Fund for local 
environmental NGOs in beneficiary countries, M ETAP III will result in several billion dollars in 
environmentally related investments. In the current phase, the programme is taking a demand-driven 
approach, and focusses on proceeding to sustained action on a series o f specific environmental 
investments; increasing environmental management capacity, concentrating on monitoring, 
enforcement and participation; and establishing and strengthening partnerships with the private 
sector and NGOs.
Aspiring as it may seem, the EPM as a whole is surrounded by serious scepticism. In the 
core of it lies - as could be expected - the World Bank’s general attitude towards developmental and 
environmental issues.200 It is specifically pointed out that the policy tools promoted by the Bank, 
such as taxes, prices, subsidies etc., are traditional instruments and may have proved effective in 
industrialised, free- market economies. But in the developing M editerranean countries, which do 
not conform with such a model, it is feared that, for instance, high water prices would deprive poor 
consumers from a basic good, and would expose local industries to overwhelming competition with 
transnational corporations. Moreover, the EPM ’s priority programme is criticised as “not [being] 
very concrete” and not substantially different from “a ‘business as usual’ policy-based lending 
approach with environmental impact assessment tagged on” ;201 to put it differently, it is feared that 
the W orld Bank would never give precedence to environmental concerns over economic 
development. In this context, its power to dictate, to a certain extent, internal restructuring and to 
interfere with policy-making is not viewed as a necessarily beneficial reality, as its adherence to a 
market-based system and its drive to implement such schemes in developing countries does not help 
the latter develop their own capacities, but rather prolongs a dependency situation, which in turn 
favours exploitation and degradation o f the environment.202
On the other hand, and notwithstanding the non-binding nature o f  EPM, even these 
suspicious o f the World Bank’s approach concede that developing countries and their companies 
have no incentive to introduce higher environmental standards without outside pressure, so that 
policy-based lending with environmental conditions attached might have a positive impact in this
200 See KutUng, op.cit. n.61, pp,240-2.
201 Ibid, p.241.
202 Ibid, p.242.
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respect.203 What is most important, co-operation with MAP is deemed as very critical in giving more 
substance to both initiatives, and helping put in practice recommendations adopted at the Barcelona 
Convention Meetings o f the Parties.
6.4. Global Environm ent Facility (GEF) Funding in the M editerranean.
Protection o f the Mediterranean marine environment from pollution falls under the 
4International W aters’ heading in the Global Environment Facility’s agenda.204 Protection of 
international waters in the Mediterranean seems, prim a fa c ie , to refer to measures for abating 
pollution from ships, as this is the main type o f pollution encountered on the high seas. However, 
GEF activity in the region, notwithstanding its modest start, has expanded to give new meaning to 
the term; thus, ‘international waters’ in the Mediterranean now signify ‘waters o f international 
concern’ potentially covering sea areas under exclusive national jurisdiction, and consequently also 
addressing vital problems o f land-based pollution. In this context GEF co-fmanced, in 1997, the 
preparation o f a Mediterranean- wide Strategic Action Programme to address pollution from land- 
based activities, with the possibility of extending its support to follow-up activities envisaged therein 
at a sum o f between $4-6 million.205
Having said that, the only GEF endeavour concerning protection o f  the Mediterranean 
against pollution in full fledge today is the Oil Pollution Management Project for the Southwest 
Mediterranean Sea,206 while a much more significant plan for abating marine pollution, including 
that from land-based sources, in the whole o f the Southern Mediterranean region is still in its early 
stages. The former is a pilot activity involving three developing countries, Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia, and was scheduled for completion by December 1998 at a total cost o f  $20 million,207 an 
amount that the countries concerned would be unable to raise from their own national budgets. Its 
main objectives are:
• To reduce the input o f  petroleum hydrocarbons into the international waters o f the region 
by complying with MARPOL requirements;
To ensure commonality o f approach, regulatory policies, and methodologies;
• To promote exchange o f information and co-ordination of implementation;
To utilise national data sets to assess regional trends in marine pollution, both for national
203 Id.
204 On GEF in general, see supra, Chapter 3, pp.l 19-20.
205 See UNEP, op.cit. n.38, pp.80-1.
206 See GEF, Algeria, M orocco and Tunisia - Oil Pollution M anagement P roject fo r  the Southw est M editerranean  
Sea , Project Document, April 1994. Note, however, that the World Bank has been financing several port projects in the 
region, see ibid, p. 19.
207 More specifically, $18.3 m illion com es as concessional funding from the GET core funds, while the remaining 
amount is raised by individual countries, see ibid, p. 16.
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coastal waters and for adjacent international waters;
* To enhance national monitoring capabilities; and more generally
• To “ improve marine pollution management through development o f a common region-wide 
approach and mechanisms, as well as providing a future linkage to the Malta Centre o f 
REM PEC”.208
Significantly, promotion o f national regulations and regulatory mechanisms, as well as 
development of appropriate infrastructure for monitoring compliance with international conventions 
related to marine pollution by oil, and especially more effective detection o f ships not abiding by 
national laws and international conventions, are also among the stated aims o f  the scheme.209
The project comprises both national and regional elements, including enhancement o f oil 
spill response capabilities in the three countries involved, and elaboration o f  national and regional 
contingency plans; provision o f  equipment for combatting oil spills; rehabilitation and expansion 
o f reception facilities at key ports, as well as a series o f supporting measures, such as provision of 
pollution monitoring mechanisms; training; and technical and marketing studies to evaluate re­
refining or alternative uses o f recovered oily materials.210 By July 1996, implementation was 
proceeding satisfactorily, with national contingency plans enacted for all three countries; training 
activities continuing; co-operative agreement to combat oil spills signed by the port authorities in 
the three countries; and the draft Regional Contingency Plan being finalised. Rehabilitation of 
deballasting facilities was the only sector where implementation had not yet began by that date;211 
this type o f activity, together with construction o f  Vessel Traffic Services (VTS), and monitoring 
o f sea water pollution levels need to be pursued more actively in the future.
Although the pilot project was a major step toward establishing sub-regional co-operation, 
and a catalyst in identifying the oil pollution issues and moving forward jo in t training and 
standardisation o f equipment, its components had to be scaled down to fit the limited funds 
available at that time. This led to a proposed second scheme, intended to complement the former 
and extend its benefits to Egypt and Libya.212
To this effect, GEF provided $46,700 to the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency to 
organise a high-level conference in Cairo in December 1995, attended by representatives o f the five 
countries, REMPEC, and MAP. Its primary objective was to facilitate a sub-regional discussion of 
the policy issues concerning a jo in t effort to reduce pollution in the South Mediterranean.
208 Ibid, p.4; see also pp. 10 and 21. A  legal framework for such co-operation is already in place by means o f  a 1991 
Agreement on Maritime Co-operation among Member Slates o f  the Arab Maghreb Union, providing, inter alia , for co­
ordination o f  legislation and national capabilities with the aim o f  preventing and controlling marine pollution (Art.3), 
see ibid, Annex 1.
209 See ibid, pp.4-5, 10 and 21.
210 Ibid, pp.3 and.
2,1 See GEF, Q uarterly O perational Report, July 1996, p.93.
212 See GEF web site at http://www.worldbank.org/html/gef/.
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Consequently, the participants addressed broad issues o f biodiversity conservation and coastal zone 
management, with special emphasis on regional collaboration on a broad strategy and framework 
for reducing the effects o f land-based pollution on the marine environment. They laid the foundation 
for long-term co-operation in the sub-region and articulation o f an action plan that will have national 
as well as regional benefits by reducing the threat o f an accidental oil pollution disaster, which could 
conceivably devastate the already fragile coastal ecosystem. They, finally, decided to create a 
Regional Project Steering Committee (RPSC) to co-ordinate and implement future activities in this 
area, since experience from the pilot project showed that such an organ with a clear and 
well-defined role and objectives, as well as adequate project preparation, are essential to ensure 
success.
As a result, the proposed project focusses on further enhancing national and regional 
institutional capability to deal with marine pollution caused by land-based discharges and oil and 
ship wastes, as well as to improve the quality o f coastal waters and ecosystems, protect biodiversity, 
and strengthen the ability o f the five countries to intervene in case o f oil spills. It specifically aims 
at:
• Enhancing marine pollution abatement and control in critical areas that are subject to ship 
wastes and industrial and land-based pollution;
Strengthening the regional capacity to respond to oil spills;
• Adoption o f a Regional Contingency Plan, which would ensure that the five countries have 
consistent regulatory policies, methodologies, and equipment, and that they allocate 
resources and operate efficiently;
Provision o f  a comprehensive monitoring system to control maritime traffic and monitor 
compliance with international regulations;
• Implementation o f appropriate and sound alternatives for processing collected oily 
materials, including possible marketing o f by-products and other options for final disposal;
• Adoption o f  an action plan and implementation o f its recommendations to ensure good 
coastal zone management and tackle general marine pollution; and
Adoption o f a comprehensive cost recovery principle to ensure the availability o f adequate 
funds to finance project implementation, operation, and maintenance.
In order to meet the above objectives, the project will cover provisions for defining an 
action plan and Regional Contingency Plan and implementation o f agreed actions; enforcement of 
a cost recovery system; provisions for private sector involvement through appropriate contracts 
between the recipient countries and specialised companies; construction and equipping of several 
control centres to provide national and regional pollution monitoring mechanisms; construction o f 
Vessel Traffic Schemes at selected locations; jo in t training o f personnel; rehabilitation of existing 
deballasting stations, and provision o f additional multipurpose reception facilities to treat ship
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wastes and ballast and bilge waters; identification and implementation o f  alternative uses for 
recovered oily materials and lubricants; construction o f  treatment plants for waste water and 
industrial discharges at key ports; and acquisition o f mobile and floating equipment to collect oily 
materials and used lubricants, as well as floating and mobile equipment and material to strengthen 
oil spill response capabilities.
GEF will initially provide $600,000 to finance comprehensive consultant studies, which 
will focus in detail on the objectives mentioned above and tackle the following activities: (a) 
consolidation o f recommendations o f completed and ongoing studies as well as updating them 
regarding threat to marine environment; (b) development and enforcement o f legal and institutional 
framework for a Regional Project Steering Committee to co-ordinate and implement the project; c) 
preparation o f a Regional Contingency Plan for the collective co-operation among the five countries; 
(d) assessment and recommendations for linking the above Contingency Plan with the existing ones 
among other countries in the region; (e) definition o f investment priorities responsive to individual 
and joint needs and the related planning o f actions and investments based on realistic constraints; 
(f) quantifying pollution caused by land-based activities as well as those caused by navigating ships 
and oil tankers; (g) definition o f baseline costs o f the project and incremental costs; (h) development 
o f scheme to recover investment, operation and maintenance costs; (i) recommendation of an 
appropriate cost-effective means o f treating collected oily materials in an environmentally safe 
manner; and (j) preparation o f the institutional set up referred to above. The total project cost is 
currently estimated at $160 million, o f which $40 million will be financed through grants from the 
GET core funds; the balance will be financed by co-financing and the recipient governments.
One cannot help noticing a considerable progress from the pilot to the proposed project. 
Although some very positive elements are already present in the former, such as its explicit target 
o f implementing international regulation, and especially MARPOL standards, as well as developing 
appropriate national and sub-regional infrastructure for monitoring compliance with international 
conventions related to marine pollution by oil, this project suffers from the same defect noted in the 
context o f EPM, namely abundant rhetoric and fewer practical results. The new project, on the other 
hand, seems - at least at this early phase - to be framed in much more concrete and up-to date terms, 
adopting some still quite innovative approaches to pollution abatement, as, for instance, 
implementation o f  environmentally sound and processing and re-use o f  pollutants. However, it is 
still rather weak when it comes to spelling out specific measures to mitigate land-based pollution 
in the Southern Mediterranean. In this connection, it is rather unlikely that its medium-sized budget 
would suffice to implement any effective comprehensive plan.
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6.5. Concluding Remarks.
It is now time to draw some overall conclusions from the preceding discussion, and evaluate 
the trends likely to mature in following years. The premises on which this evaluation rests is that, 
regardless o f their long-term cost-effectiveness, environmental measures are not easily chosen as 
a first priority when countries concerned decide to allocate their finite resources. It follows that 
international assistance can act as a direct or indirect incentive to comply with respective 
international obligations, and even induce treaty parties to accept some form o f effective compliance 
control.
In this sense, the Mediterranean Trust Fund is suitable only for support and co-ordination 
actions, and does not address the issue o f the great cost o f  substantive anti-pollution measures. It 
would not be unjustified to say that it has exercised only indirect influence towards increased 
national awareness, capacity-building, and consequent observance o f  international standards, if 
viewed in the wider framework o f co-operation in the provision o f technical and other assistance 
to developing countries in the region. It is in this setting that the Secretariat’s new-found readiness 
to formally assume an advisory and supportive role in helping individual countries acquire 
additional, and presumably more substantive, funding through other financial institutions and 
mechanisms, as well as the recent inclusion o f capacity-building assistance for the implementation 
of international standards in MED POL activities, acquire increasing significance. In fact, these 
developments pave the way for gradual introduction o f an articulated financial mechanism, 
somewhere along the lines o f the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund, the absence o f which is 
strongly felt in the Barcelona system, since it arguably leads to any efforts at effectively controlling 
compliance by the Parties proving futile.
Most o f the other programmes o f financial assistance examined in this Chapter are rather 
recent, and cannot be fully evaluated, as there is usually a time lag for data to become accessible in 
any meaningful quantities. However, one cannot help noticing that relevant activity is multiplying 
in the 90s. Hence, EPM provides a non-binding, but comprehensive, ‘blueprint’ for World 
Bank/EIB investment in the region. Its more substantial contribution so far is a considerable volume 
o f preparatory work for specific projects, which, if they materialised, would have a very significant 
impact in the protection and enhancement of the Mediterranean marine environment in harmony 
with applicable international standards. At the same time, the GEF project for the South-Western 
M editerranean, notwithstanding its explicit target o f implementing international regulation, and 
especially MARPOL standards, as well as developing appropriate national and sub-regional 
infrastructure for monitoring compliance with international conventions related to marine pollution 
by oil is a modest start which could, nonetheless, be geared towards more tangible results in the 
future; hopeful signs o f improvement in this connection are noted in G EF’s proposed project 
concerning the whole o f the Southern Mediterranean area.
289
Turning now to the EU, the importance its environmental funding mechanisms bear for 
Mediterranean Member States can be easily appreciated; in fact, by 1995, these countries figured 
as leading recipients with regard to resources provided by relevant instruments,213 while the 
Cohesion Fund and the EIB provide even larger funds for environmental investments.
Be that as it may, any meaningful conclusions on the scope and utility o f Community 
financial instruments for environmental protection can be inferred only when they are viewed as a 
coherent whole, in the sense that they aim at implementing relevant policies that are - in principle - 
consistent with each other. In this respect, despite efforts towards co-ordination, there has, in the 
past, been some considerable overlapping. Progress in this area is, however, being noted by means 
o f a clearer distinction between structural and non-structural funds, through introduction o f the 
Cohesion Fund and LIFE in the early 90s.
A nother significant finding is that, at least before 1992, there was in general no explicit 
conditioning o f Community assistance on compliance with environmental legislation.214 In other 
words, there was incomplete connection o f Community financing with the fulfilment o f specific 
environmental obligations, and even inconsistency o f various types o f  funding with stated 
environmental objectives; what is more, suggestions to this effect were straightforwardly rejected. 
This situation is being reversed in later instruments, despite weaknesses - especially with regard to 
translating the general idea into practice - that can still be traced even in the context o f more 
advanced settings, such as that o f the Cohesion Fund.
M ore specifically, the Cohesion Fund, although covering specific projects as opposed to 
comprehensive programmes, is the main source o f waste water infrastructure funding for the region. 
However, its procedures o f follow-up to ensure compliance with environmental legislation is not 
always effective, which results in some environmental damaging projects passing through. The 
Structural Funds have had an even more negative record, at least until their reform, but provide 
much larger funds and can, significantly, finance comprehensive programmes.
As far as ENVIREG and MEDSPA are concerned, these initiatives had very limited 
allocations and, consequently, have not had any great impact. LIFE, on the other hand, 
notwithstanding its limited resources and the fact that it is directed only to capacity-building as 
opposed to substantive environmental projects, incorporates the most current thinking on the issue 
o f  international assistance for environmental protection; its strict orientation towards enhanced 
implementation o f environmental legislation is in this context unique. LIFE has an additional value 
as far as third Mediterranean states are concerned, in view o f the fact that this is the only 
Community programme accessible to them, and as in the case o f action at Community level, it is 
largely devoted to the much needed development o f national capabilities in order to effectively
213 See EC Commission, op.cit. n.55, Annex 1, Table 6.
214 See EP Resolution op.cit. n.120, at para.7, where it is stressed that this should be changed.
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implement international and regional environmental standards. LIFE II can thus become a 
significant - albeit not large - source o f funding for the implementation o f the Barcelona Convention 
and Protocols in the South and Eastern Mediterranean. It must, nevertheless, be noted that provision 
of resources in this context is again not explicitly linked with and conditioned on attainment of at 
least some o f the MAP objectives.
All said, infringement procedures under Article 226 and financial programmes remain 
discinnected. Thus, if a project with Community funding leads to an infringement and a case 
brought before the ECJ, the Commission does not recover the sums paid automatically.215 However, 
increased attention by the EIB and the Commission on compliance with environmental legislation 
and suspension o f funding when this is not achieved is sometimes thought to have “greater impact 
on national and regional decision-making procedures than any procedure under Article 226... could 
have hoped to achieve”.216
Finally, the adoption o f the MEDA Regulation in the broad framework o f  the ‘Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership’, together with increased resources available from the EIB since 1992, 
point to a radical change o f direction o f the Community policy vis-a-vis non-member states. In 
particular, it is increasingly appreciated that the EU has an obligation to assist developing states in 
the region in their effort to address the environmental impacts o f development. In this promising 
setting, however, the progress achieved in explicitly and strictly conditioning Community assistance 
on compliance with environmental legislation by Member States, cannot be easily duplicated, as the 
countries involved are not in any way bound by EU law. Having said that, the ‘Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership’ emphasises co-operation with international structures, such as MAP, and includes 
promotion o f uniform legislation, at least for some environmental sectors, in its agreed targets; 
hence, it could be possible to envisage a future development involving conditioning of financial aid 
on adherence to international and regional environmental standards. This is likely to have a great 
impact on the region, as multiple relationships and interaction between the EU and third 
M editerranean states will deepen in the context o f the wide economic and political integration 
process that has already began.
215 See L.Kramer, E.C. Environm ental Law, 4th ed., 2000, pp.292-3.
216 L.Kramer, E.C. Treaty and Environm ental Law , 3rd ed., 1998, p. 172.
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CHAPTER 7.
Co m p l ia n c e  Co n t r o l  a n d  E n f o r c e m e n t  o f  
In t e r n a  tio n a l  E n v ir o n m e n t a l  Ob l ig a  t io n s  i n  th e  
M e d it e r r a n e a n  u n d e r  N a t io n a l  L a  w.
The preceding discussion focussed exclusively on international mechanisms to promote and 
ensure compliance with environmental treaty undertakings. From a different standpoint, this Chapter 
looks at national legal systems and their mechanisms to accommodate, implement and enforce 
international environmental law. This perspective becomes totally relevant in view o f the nature and 
extent o f international rules for the protection o f the Mediterranean Sea against pollution.1 The fact 
that these rules call for implementation principally at the domestic level imports some very 
significant parameters in our discussion: First, it potentially turns national implementation into an 
international concern and thus legitimises a certain intervention o f international law; secondly, it 
brings into play the comparatively well-developed and authoritative domestic legal systems with 
their full arsenal o f enforcement procedures, as well as the natural custodians o f the protected 
environmental assets, namely sensitive individuals citizens and non-governmental organisations. 
It is, therefore, submitted that the national-legal-system route bypasses, at least in principle, some 
o f the barriers inherent in a purely international system o f  compliance control exposed in previous 
Chapters.
As was demonstrated in Chapter 2, so far states have accepted that the world community 
has an interest in controlling activities carried out within their exclusive jurisdiction and in 
maintaining the quality o f their own marine environment,2 but there is, as yet, no concomitant 
recognition o f the need to devise new enforcement mechanisms that would accommodate that 
community interest, as well as a notable unwillingness to transfer enforcement powers to 
international organs.3 In order to minimise the effect o f this obstacle international law may be 
viewed as part o f  national law and international obligations as having little or no difference from
1 See supra, Chapter 2.
2 On the trend towards internationalisation o f  the domestic environment o f  slates and consequent erosion o f  domestic 
jurisdiction, a developm ent similar to that in the area o f  human rights, see A .Boyle, ‘The R ole o f  Human Rights Law 
in the Protection o f  the Environment’, in A .E .B oyle & M .R.Anderson (eds.), Human R ights A pproaches to 
Environmental Protection, 1996, pp.43-69, at pp.54-5. According to the author, primary exam ples o f  this trend are the 
Biodiversity Convention and ‘sustainable developm ent’, the latter representing “an entirely different view  o f  what is 
‘international’ about the environment than we have seen before”, ibid, pp.55-6. See also A .E.Boyle (ed.), Environmental 
R egulation an d  Econom ic G rowth, 1994, pp. 174-9; and M.A.Schreurs & E.Economy, The Internationalization o f  
Environm ental P rotection , 1997, for a political science perspective.
3 See also P.Sands, Principles o f  International Environm ental Law, Vol.I, 1995, p. 154 e tse q ..
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domestic ones,1 so as to explore the ready-made possibilities that the highly developed - when 
compared to the international - national legal orders provide. Then, anyone citizen or NGO having 
appropriate standing and wishing to enforce an international environmental regulation could resort 
to a domestic court or administrative agency to challenge both private and governmental actions or 
inactions, and thus bring pressure on the executive to comply with their international commitments;5 
in fact, national courts and administration are in most cases the only fo ra  available to these actors.6
This is by no means an original notion; it basically forms an age-old part o f mainstream 
international law doctrine. However, the idea has been regularly underrated in the environmental 
context. The reasons for that phenomenon are basically the overwhelming obstacles o f diverse legal 
systems and policies affording few public rights o f a substantive or procedural nature, a notable 
reluctance to interpret international law in a way that could impose considerable burdens on the 
executive, as well as a great variety in the degree o f priority awarded to environmental protection.7
Despite this reality, there are today promising signs o f change and innovation, both at the 
state and the international level: Increasing environmental awareness leading to more democratic 
accountability for state authorities, widening procedural rights serving to challenge environmentally 
destructive actions, and a changing attitude of the judiciary are developments taking place within 
national borders, stimulated by international legal arrangements incrementally establishing 
procedural public rights and concomitant duties, mainly in Europe and the West, following the flux 
o f substantive environmental law-making o f the last two decades.
Accordingly, this Chapter will consider the issue o f compliance control and enforcement 
o f international environmental obligations from the perspective o f national legal orders in the 
M editerranean region. More specifically, it will examine the relevant provisions o f applicable 
conventions, and how these have influenced national legislation. Then, it will address the question 
o f enforceability o f applicable international norms in individual states, should the latter fail to adapt 
their legislation to the said rules; in other words, it will examine the place o f conventional 
obligations in the domestic legal hierarchy in Mediterranean states. The same questions will 
subsequently be asked in the context o f Community environmental law, which presents many 
distinct and advanced features, with special emphasis on Mediterranean M ember States.
See R.Fisher, Improving Com pliance with International Law, 1981, at Chapter IX; and J.Ebbesson, C om patibility  
o f  International and National Environm ental Law , 1996, p.xix..
5 See Sands, op.cit. n.3, pp .158-60; and Boyle, op.cit. n.2, pp.64-5.
6 See E.Hey, ‘The European Community’s Courts and International Environmental Agreem ents’, 7(1) R.E.C.I.E.L., 
1998, pp.4-10.
7 See Boyle, op.cit. n.2, p.64. Note that researchers adopting the ‘transnational’ approach to international 
environmental law had already suggested the inclusion o f  domestic courts and administration in a global environmental 
protection system from the early 70s, see, e.g., C.A.Fleisher, Draft Convention on Environm ental Co-operation Among  
Nations, 1972.
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7.1. Implementation o f International Environmental Obligations in Mediterranean 
Countries.
As has been succinctly put, “the truly legal function of international law essentially is found 
in the internal legal systems of states. Only through what we could term ‘domestic legal operators’ 
can we describe the binding character o f international law or, better still, its ability to be 
implemented in a concrete and stable fashion.”8 Be that as it may, it is equally true that the precise 
steps a state has to take in order to implement its international obligations - including environmental 
ones - largely depends on the nature o f the respective rule.9 If it involves an omission, i.e. it is a duty 
to refrain from a certain activity, no positive action has to be undertaken. That is, o f course, so to 
the extent that the state itself is the only actor who can carry out the prohibited act; otherwise, it has 
to see that the prescribed behaviour is made illegal within its jurisdiction. Where positive action is 
prescribed, a state has to adopt implementing legislation, policies and programmes and to ensure 
that these are complied with by those subject to its jurisdiction and control.10 Effective 
implementation, thus, comprises, apart from a legal framework,11 structures to ensure follow-up and 
deal with non-compliance.
It follows that formal legislative action, as well as a series o f practical measures and 
sometimes institutional changes, are usually required to give effect to international environmental 
rules.12 The institutional mechanisms that have to be put in place in each country in order to achieve 
environmental objectives and to verify that all persons and corporations comply with them have to 
be consistent with the cultural, social and economic fabric o f  the country; hence, there is no recipe 
for establishing a best system that will develop and adapt as actual practice generates feedback.13
As far as the means a state will employ to address violations o f prescribed standards are 
concerned, specific sanctions, i.e. whether it will be criminal penalties, civil remedies, 
administrative or fiscal measures, and voluntary restraints, are commonly left to its discretion,
8 B.Conforti, International Law and the Role o f  D om estic Legal Systems, 1993, p.8.
9 See YB.I.L.C., 1977, Vol.II, Pari 2, pp.l 1-30; supra, Chapter 4, pp.142-3, on the distinction between obligations 
o f  conduct and o f  result; and Ebbesson, op.cit. n,4, Chapter 3, on the discretion o f  states in the implementation o f  
international standards.
10 See, for example, Basel Convention, Arts.4(4) and 9(5); Bamako Convention, Art.9.
11 As Judge Pescatore puts it, “many o f  the treaties have no use and no substance if  they are not duly pul into operation 
in the sphere o f  domestic law”, P.Pescatore, ‘Conclusions’, in F.G.Jacobs & S.Roberts (eds.), The Effect o f  Treaties in 
D om estic Law, 1987, p.274.
12 For thorough research into the relevant practice o f  several states, at different levels o f  developm ent, in relation to 
five environmental treaties, see E.Brown Weiss &  H.K.Jacobson (eds.), Engaging Countries - Strengthening Compliance 
with International Environmental Accords, 1998, Chapters 6-14; and D.Vogel & T.Kessler, ‘How Compliance Happens 
and D oesn’t Happen D om estically’, in ibid, pp. 19-37. See also D.G.Victor, K.Rausliala & E .B .Skolnikoff (eds.), The 
Implementation and Effectiveness o f  International Environm ental Commitments: Theory an d  P ractice, 1998, Chapters 
8-15.
13 See UNEP IE/PAC (Industry and Environment Programme Activity Centre), From Regulations to Industry 
Compliance: Building Institutional Capabilities, Technical R e p o r tY \o .\\ ,  1992, p.7.
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although some international instruments impose 011 states an explicit duty to institute criminal 
penalties.14
Let us illustrate these points using the MARPOL Convention: This instrument provides a 
good example o f how complex a task implementation o f an international convention can be, 
especially when it lays down requirements o f a technical nature.15 The actors involved in 
M ARPOL’s effective implementation include the government of the State-Party and its legal and 
marine administration, the shipowners, and the port authorities. Ideally, when ratification or 
accession is being considered, all these sectors should consult in order to be properly prepared to 
implement all standards and processes prescribed. Generally speaking, MARPOL obligations relate 
to preparation o f legislation, including regulations; surveys and inspections; constructional, 
equipment and operational requirements; documentation; and relevant procedures.
At the legal level, it is necessary to consider whether existing legislation gives the power 
through which the Convention may be integrated into the national legal system, or it needs 
amending, or whether new enabling legislation is required. In the specific context o f MARPOL, it 
is important that implementation o f amendments and associated resolutions and recommendations 
be permitted, which is moreover typical o f most o f the instruments that have been examined so far. 
The Regulations laid down in MARPOL’s Annexes can to a large extent be reproduced as national 
regulations with only minor changes, in order, for instance, to include definitions given in the 
instrument’s main body. These Regulations sometimes refer to other IMO instruments, like the 
International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code; hence, national laws must dictate 
observance o f these as well. This legislation should also provide for inspection, detention and 
penalties suitable for each case.
At the organisational level, MARPOL imposes duties that make the existence o f an effective 
marine administration, staffed with at least a  minimum o f qualified personnel, imperative. Its duties, 
apart from drafting the above-mentioned legal instruments, include issuance o f certificates and 
maintenance and updating of records of ship certification; design and equipment approval; issuance 
o f instructions to surveyors; delegation o f surveys and issue o f certificates to appropriate 
organisations; gathering o f survey reports and violation reports; prosecution o f  offenders; 
monitoring reception facilities; and contribution to the functioning o f IMO, and especially its 
MEPC, in the form o f proposals, information on how the above duties are being discharged, reports, 
and participation in the meetings.
14 See, for example, Basel Convention, Art.9(5); LOSC, Art. 217(8).
15 See generally, MARPOL - H ow to D o it. M anual on the P ractical Im plications o f  Ratifying and Implementing 
MARPOL 73/78, 1993; see also S.Kuwabara, The Legal Regime fo r  the Protection o f  the M editerranean Sea against 
Pollution from  Land-Based Sources, 1984, pp.107-8, which recommends a similar manual or guidelines or even model 
legislation to be developed in the context o f  MAP to address the lack o f  expertise and experience in drafting or 
implementing environmental legislation in a number o f  Mediterranean countries.
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Shipowners or operators have to ensure that every ship has been equipped to the relevant 
Annex 1 requirements; has been surveyed; has an appropriate certificate; an Oil Record Book; and 
a crew instructed and trained to comply with the discharge criteria. If  a liquid substance in bulk, 
other than oil, is involved, producers and shippers have to ensure that its characteristics are known 
and that it has been assessed and is listed in one o f the Annex II appendices, or, if it is not listed, 
that it has been provisionally assessed by IMO; if it is not listed nor assessed, they must confirm that 
the guidelines for provisional assessment are followed and conditions for its carriage are established 
with the relevant marine administration. They also have to make sure that the ship to be used has 
been surveyed and found suitable, and is appropriately certified and manned with a trained crew. 
When it comes to packaged harmful substances, producers and shippers have to ensure that the 
cargo is properly identified, packed, marked, labelled, documented, stowed and secured in 
accordance with the IMDG Code. Shipowners also have to make sure that their ships are equipped 
with a suitable sewage treatment plant or an accepted alternative system, and have adequate 
arrangements for dealing with garbage; that they are surveyed and provided with the relevant 
certificates, and have an appropriately trained crew.
Port authorities have generally to ensure that adequate reception facilities are available not 
just for oil, but also for different kinds of liquid noxious substances, sewage and garbage. MARPOL 
addresses this obligation to the governments o f the Parties, which, in practice, means that the 
government will require a port authority or terminal operator to provide the facilities, either through 
legislation placing a duty on ports, followed by investigation o f reports on inadequacies and serving 
o f enforcement orders, or through legislation and a regime of inspection and licensing. For a harbour 
or terminal to satisfy the relevant requirements, it is not enough simply to have some facilities; these 
must be o f sufficient capacity and appropriate design to accommodate all ships that will need to use 
them without suffering any undue delay. Therefore, the port authority has to assess the quantity and 
quality o f residues, mixtures and material to be dealt with, and decide on the type o f facility to be 
employed.
The master o f a ship faced with non-existent or inadequate reception facilities should, when 
the problem cannot be solved by the port authorities at the time, submit details o f the inadequacy 
on a report form and send it to the port state, which has to take up action with the port concerned 
and inform the flag state and IMO. The ship master is also under a duty to report the particulars of 
any incident entailing the discharge or loss into the sea o f oil, noxious liquid substances, and 
harmful substances in packaged form, to the nearest coastal state, and the shipowner must issue 
appropriate instructions and assume the reporting obligation should the ship be unable to provide 
the required information. The marine administration, on its part, should establish a ship reporting 
system and notify mariners o f full details o f the requirements to be met and procedures to be 
followed, including nominating the shore establishment responsible for the operation; issuing
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instructions for the relay o f information; instructing those nominated to receive reports on what 
action they should subsequently take; prosecuting those who fail to report such incidents; and 
notifying IMO o f the relevant arrangements.
All these day-to-day activities are to be supervised by the national administration and any 
infringements dealt with, which goes to show how demanding and unrelenting the task o f effective 
implementation o f an international convention can be.
That said, one must always bear in mind that there is a distinct category o f international 
obligations - a very important category in the context o f M AP and the LOSC - that cannot be 
discharged at the domestic level. These are typically obligations o f co-operation which require an 
international forum , or several for that matter, to be implemented.16 Be that as it may, it is interesting 
to look at what the applicable instruments provide with regard to their implementation within state 
borders.
7.1,1. Treaty Provisions on National Implementation.
Although international political science teaches that implementation o f specific 
environmental policies in a state is rather “a combination o f binding international law and public 
exposure o f non-compliance (often by less inhibited non-governmental organisations), normative 
persuasion, scientific argument, technical assistance, and investment”,17 than merely a matter o f 
compliance with legally binding standards imposed on governments by international institutions, 
from their own perspective, treaties usually commit states “to take all appropriate measures, in 
conformity with international law” .
7 .I .I .I . The LOSC and Other Instruments.
Practically all instruments examined in Chapter 2 contain some explicit or implicit 
indication o f what the parties undertake to do within their own jurisdictional domain. The LOSC, 
for instance, reaffirms the duty o f its Parties to ‘adopt laws and regulations... to implement 
applicable international rules and standards’ or ‘to enforce their laws and regulations’ (Arts.213, 
214, 222), already imposed under general international law and/or specific conventions (Art.216). 
These provisions do not, therefore, add anything new, but rather put special emphasis on actual 
implementation and enforcement o f the respective international rules - especially if read together 
with the obligation to set standards ‘no less effective’ than the international ones when regulating 
various sources o f pollution (e.g. Ait.210(6) with regard to dumping).18
16 And see, supra, Chapter 2, pp.86-90.
17 R.O.Keohane, P.M.Haas & M.A.Levy, ‘The Effectiveness o f  International Environmental Institutions’, in P.M.Haas, 
R.O.Keohane & M .A.Levy (eds.), Institutions fo r  the Earth - Sources o f  Effective International Environmental 
Protection, 1993, p. 17.
I# But c f  A rt.212(l), which requires national regulations regarding pollution through or from the atmosphere merely 
to “lake into account” internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures.
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Only when it addresses pollution caused by ships, does the LOSC become more restrictive 
and clearly channels enforcement o f  international standards through various national legal systems. 
Hence, flag states have to ensure compliance by vessels flying their flag, and to this end they must 
provide for the effective enforcement o f relevant rules, irrespective o f where a violation occurs 
(Art.217(l)). What is more, penalties provided for by flag laws and regulations must be adequate 
in severity to discourage future violations (Art.217(8)). From an opposite angle, the Convention 
does not allow for penalties other than monetary, when a coastal or port state takes action against 
a foreign vessel (A rt.230(l)), save in cases involving a serious and wilful act o f pollution in that 
state’s territorial sea (Art.230(2)), i.e. when the passage o f the vessel has lost its innocence 
(Art. 19(h)).
An interesting question that arises in this context is who has the duty or right to ensure 
implementation o f international rules in relation to a shared resource or the commons. Usually, it 
is the states under whose jurisdiction the polluting activity falls. The LOSC provides a useful 
illustration o f that rule by, for example, addressing the provisions that deal with ship pollution o f 
the high seas primarily to flag states and those dealing with land-based sources to coastal states. 
However, the LOSC has also introduced a very significant innovation, namely the port state power 
to enforce against foreign ships for pollution offences wherever committed (A rt.218), including the 
high seas.19 It has, thus, assigned individual states with an additional new duty, to enforce 
international law with regard to violations committed not only within their jurisdiction, but also 
beyond that in common areas.
M oving away form the LOSC, the London Convention requires its Parties to ensure that 
all vessels and aircraft included in their registers, or loading in their territory or territorial sea matter 
do be dumped, or engaged in dumping in areas under their jurisdiction, comply with the 
conventional stipulations (Art.VII(l)). In the same vein, Parties have to take measures to prevent 
and punish infringements o f the Convention, and develop procedures for effective application 
thereof on the high seas (Art. VII).
Finally, as far as seaborne movement o f hazardous wastes is concerned, the Basel 
Convention instructs its Parties to take appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to 
implement and enforce its provisions, including measures to prevent and punish conduct in 
contravention thereof (Art.4(4)), especially illegal traffic o f hazardous waste (Art.9(5)). The Bamako 
Convention goes even further and requires its Parties to prohibit import from non-parties and to treat 
it as a criminal offence (A rt.4(l)). More generally, any illegal act o f  import must be penalised in 
national law in a way that such conduct will be both punished and deterred (Art,9(2)).
19 See, am ong others, B.Kwiatkowska, The 220-M ile EEZ in the New Law o f  the Sea, 1989, pp. 180 et seq.\ 
G.Kasoulides, P ort S tate C ontrol and Jurisdiction: Evolution o f  P ort State R egim e , 1993, pp. 117-22; and 
J.P.A,Bernhardt, lA Schematic Analysis o f Vessel Source Pollution: Prescriptive and Enforcement Regimes in the Law 
o f  the Sea Conference’, 20(2) Virginia J. o f ln t' lL .,  1980, pp.284-6.
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7.1.1.2. The Barcelona Convention and Protocols.
Turning to regional law, it is noteworthy that, until the 1995 revision, in the Barcelona 
Convention and its Protocols there was no direct reference either to domestic legislative measures 
or to sanctions imposable on persons in breach o f the treaty rules.20 Only the Dumping Protocol 
contained a pertinent reference in Article 11(1), whereby each Party had to apply the measures 
required to implement the Protocol to all ships and aircraft registered in its territory, or loading there 
matter to be dumped, or engaged in dumping in areas under its jurisdiction. The absence o f such 
provisions in earlier instruments did not imply a lesser duty to comply with the commitments laid 
down therein and to implement them domestically, however. As Professor Raftopoulos notes, the 
obligation to proceed to both formal and effective implementation was clearly there and it was, 
notably, a continuous one.21
The new Article 14 now lays down a duty o f formal implementation in explicit terms: 
“Environmental Legislation.
1. The Contracting Parties shall adopt legislation implementing the Convention and the 
Protocols.
2. The Secretariat may upon request from a Contracting Party, assist that Party in the 
drafting of environmental legislation in compliance with the Convention and the Protocols.”
This is a clear improvement compared to the previous absence o f any relevant stipulation. It might 
seem self-evident that the Parties have to adapt their national legal system so as to fulfill norms 
agreed at the international plane, but in reality they rarely do s o 22 The rejection o f an initial proposal 
submitted by the Secretariat, whereby the latter would be authorised to “review the compliance of 
national legislation with the Convention and the Protocols and... report... to the Meetings o f the 
Contracting Parties”, and even assist in the enforcement o f this legislation - although it is not clear 
what such assistance would entail -23, is characteristic o f the tendency to retain as much discretion 
as possible in the implementation o f international commitments at home. Thus Article 14 is still 
formulated in very general terms whose main value is likely to be the possibility o f involving the 
Secretariat in the drafting o f implementing legislation, when and if  a Party decides so.
Having said that, the more recent Protocols admittedly devote more attention to these issues: 
The Offshore Protocol contains a rather extensive provision in this respect; in Article 7, each Party 
is instructed to prescribe sanctions to be imposed for breach o f obligations arising out o f the 
Protocol, or for non-observance o f the implementing national laws and regulations, or non­
20 C f  1983 Quito Land-Based Sources Protocol, Art.XIIl.
21 E.Raftopoulos, The B arcelona Convention and P rotocols - The M editerranean A ction P lan R egim e , 1993, p.62.
22 See infra, pp.300-6.
23 See UNEP, M eeting o f  Legal and Technical Experts to examine amendments to the Barcelona Convention and its 
related Protocols and the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP), Proposed Amendments to the Convention fo r  the Protection  
o f  the M editerranean Sea against Pollution and its Related Protocols, UNEP(OCA)/M ED W G .82/3, 20 October 1994, 
p .15.
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fulfilment o f specific conditions attached to the authorisation granted to the operator o f an offshore 
installation. Moreover, sanctions must be imposed in relation to illegal discharges o f wastes and 
harmful substances from offshore installations (Ait. 13(c)). Similarly, the W aste Protocol speaks of 
appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to prohibit the export and transit o f  hazardous 
waste to developing countries (Art.5(4)), but also directly commits parties to “introduce appropriate 
national legislation to prevent and punish illegal traffic, including criminal penalties on all persons 
involved in such illegal activities” (Art.9(2)).
But more important in view o f its subject-matter affecting a very wide range o f production 
and consumption activities in each country is the amended Land-Based Protocol, which contains 
a provision that might have been implied in the previous version, but is nevertheless significant to 
be clearly spelled out. Pursuant to new Article 6, discharges and releases into water or air that reach 
and may affect the Mediterranean area are to be “strictly subject to authorisation or regulation by 
the competent authorities o f the Parties”, taking due account o f the provisions o f the Protocol and 
Annex II - which defines certain elements that have to be considered when issuing permits -, as well 
as the decisions and recommendations o f the Meeting o f Parties. Moreover, it is specifically required 
that the Parties set up “systems o f inspection” to assess compliance with authorisations and 
regulations, for which they can request the Secretariat’s assistance, and that they establish 
“appropriate sanctions in case o f non-compliance” and "ensure their application”. Those are fairly 
concrete and precise undertakings regarding the conduct o f administrations in the region in order 
to control land-based pollution and as such represent a considerable improvement in the notoriously 
vague formulation o f MAP obligations.
Despite recent progress, however, it is generally conceded that, in the context o f MAP, co­
ordination at the level o f technical and scientific information has been much more successful than 
integration o f technical and scientific standards “ into a normative language and a standardized 
methodology”; the latter “has been proved immeasurably more demanding”.2'1 In fact, there has not 
even been adequate information regarding legislative implementation o f the Barcelona Convention 
and Protocols at the domestic level, and only a minimum systematic review o f the legal and policy 
responses to the Mediterranean pollution and conservation problems.25 The most official source, 
the Deputy Co-ordinator o f MAP admits that the Secretariat knows nothing about implementation 
by individual Parties o f the Barcelona Convention and Protocols20 which leaves much to be desired
24 See E.G.Raftopoulos, The Mediterranean Action Plan in a Functional Perspective: A Quest for Law and Policy, 
MAP Technical R eports  N o .25, 1988, p.45.
25 Id.
26 In letter o f  L.Jeftic with the author. It is especially characteristic o f  the very limited preoccupation o f  MAI3 
institutions with the issue that in an official document, namely UNEP, The State o f  the Marine and Coastal Environment 
in the Mediterranean Region, MAP Technical R eports Series, No. 100, 1996, p.95, it is asserted: “For the most part, 
international legislation does not apply to coastal terrestrial development and the question o f  implementation and 
compliance does not arise. This also holds essentially true for territorial sea.” And this is despite the express application
(continued...)
300
in terms o f follow-up, if the new provisions are to exert any substantial influence. Notwithstanding 
lack o f  official data, it is, nevertheless, worthwhile to attempt an assessment o f how the legal 
framework o f MAP has influenced pertinent legislation in M editerranean countries.
7.1.2. Environmental Legislation in M editerranean Countries.
Since the first studies in preparation for MAP were carried out over twenty-five years ago, 
the situation regarding control o f polluting activities around the Mediterranean coast has, o f course, 
greatly changed. In the 1972 FAO report on legislative controls o f  marine pollution in the region,27 
there was an apparent lack of data, both on the actual pollution loads and on relevant national 
policies and laws, especially as far as the African coast was concerned.28 But even in the most 
industrialised and affluent Northern sub-region an overwhelming percentage o f domestic waste was 
being discharged at sea completely untreated, as purification plants were scarce, while intensive 
industrial and agricultural production was increasingly becoming a major threat, with control 
policies only at nascent state.29
Indeed the limited amount o f relevant legislation was described as ‘abstruse and 
insufficient’, and at the same time traditional both in terms o f substance, since it dealt with only 
sectoral issues such as the discharge of specific toxic substances and did not cover pollution other 
than oil in areas beyond national jurisdiction, and in terms of method typically using prohibition and 
threat o f punishment and generally lacking a preventive approach or incentives to compliance.30 
Most importantly, the reality o f non-enforcement of these rules was already emerging.31
In 1984, Kuwabara surveyed the national legislation in place to deal with land-based 
sources o f pollution o f the Mediterranean Sea,32 and concluded that only few states had laws directly 
controlling the discharge of wastes from the coast into the sea.33 This was, not surprisingly, coupled 
with a lack o f treatment systems for such wastes.34 Specific polluting substances, such as heavy 
metals and detergents were found to be regulated in very few cases, while legislation protecting 
amenities, except for litter, and marine ecosystems as such was also scarce. The situation was 
somewhat better only as far as protection o f freshwater and regulation o f pesticides was concerned.
“ (...continued)
o f  - at least - the Barcelona instruments to both territorial seas, and often internal waters, and to land activities causing 
marine pollution, as has been clearly shown in Chapter 2.
27 GFCM, The Slate o f  Marine Pollution in the Mediterranean and Legislative Controls, Studies an d  Reviews N o.51, 
1972.
28 Ibid, p .5 and 13.
M Ibid, pp.5-11 and 13-32.
30 Ibid, pp.52-53 and 36 respectively.
31 Ibid, p.41.
32 See Kuwabara, op.cit., n.15, Chapter 4.
33 Ibid, p. 104.
34 Ibid, p. 105.
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With regard to the quality of relevant legislation, Kuwabara found that it usually contained 
mere prohibitions with regard to ‘harmful* substances without quantitative or qualitative definitions 
o f what ‘harmful* means, and that it was mainly sectoral in character, although he discerned a trend 
towards a more comprehensive approach,35 as well as towards greater integration o f environmental 
considerations into the planning o f industry in coastal areas, through increasing establishment of 
prior authorisation systems for new installations. Moreover, a tendency to install an ‘environmental 
focal point*, either in the form o f an ad hoc ministry or a committee, to co-ordinate the work o f the 
various branches o f the government in the field o f marine protection was identified; while, on the 
other hand, the actual power to grant licences or authorise discharges remained decentralised, 
usually in the hands o f local authorities.36 However, this account was based on secondary sources 
seriously outdated, even by 1984 standards, and thus has some value only in so far as it helps trace 
the historical evolution o f marine protection legislation in M editerranean countries.37
In an effort to work more intensely towards identifying gaps in the various legal systems 
o f marine protection, the Barcelona Convention Parties decided in 1987 to authorise the compilation 
o f Greek legislation pertaining to the Barcelona Convention,38 as a model for similar compilations 
o f legislative provisions in other countries.39 Such a task was understandably fraught with 
difficulties, in view o f the fact that there is rarely a systematic distinction o f environmental 
legislation from other more comprehensive sources of national law, or a compilation or codification 
for domestic purposes for that matter.40 This is why this effort progressed at a rather slow rate and 
only in 1992 has it been possible to produce a first comparative analysis o f three Mediterranean 
states’ marine pollution legislation, namely Greece, Israel and Egypt.41
This study furnishes valuable information from which some interesting - albeit tentative - 
lessons can be learned. The main and most striking finding is that relevant pieces o f legislation have 
almost entirely been promulgated prior to the entry into force for each Party o f the Convention or 
the Protocol to which they functionally correspond; hence, one cannot talk o f ‘implementing laws* 
stricto sem u, It is worth mentioning only exceptions to this pattern: Greek legislation on issues 
covered by the Emergency Protocol has mostly been issued after the latter’s ratification; the same
35 Ibid, pp. 105-6, especially in the legislation o f  France, Algeria, Italy, Syria, and Turkey.
3f’ Ibid, pp. 106-7.
37 See ibid, Chapter 4, ln .l , where the secondary sources on national legislation are listed, the latest being a 1976 
edition.
38 By E.G.Raflopoulos, presented in 1988 in op.cit. n.24.
3S See UNEP, Report o f  the Fifth Ordinary M eeting o f  the Contracting Parties to the Convention on the protection 
o f the Mediterranean Sea against pollution and related Protocols, UNEP/ 1G.74/5, 28 September 1987, p. 51. The Sixth 
Meeting o f the Parties in 1989 further approved such studies to be carried out for four more countries, see Report o f  the 
Sixth Ordinary M eeting o f  the Contracting Parties, UNEP(OCA)/M ED 1G. 1/5,1 N ovem ber 1989, Annex VI, p.7.
40 See Raftopoulos, op.cit. n.21, p.47.
41 UNEP, Compilation o f  Environmental Legislation Relative to the B arcelona Convention - Com parative Analysis, 
U N E P/BU R /40/lnf.3, 15 January 1992.
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is true for Egyptian laws dealing with agriculture, that have been promulgated or amended after 
ratification o f the Athens Protocol. The study suggests that, in essence, the relational links between 
the Barcelona Convention and Protocols and relevant national legislation can be traced not only 
prior to the introduction o f the former into each national legal order, but also prior to the very 
establishm ent o f the Barcelona Convention system.42 On condition that the compilation is fairly 
complete, this clearly implies that the Parties - at least those examined - do not take legislative action 
once they become bound by an international instrument. If  there is a degree o f  compliance with 
conventional stipulations, it is ‘accidental’. O f course, one can reverse this line o f reasoning and 
consider the possibility that, in effect, states enter into an international agreement only so far as they 
have secured that no major legislative reform is going to be needed as a result o f their being bound 
by international law.
A closer look at the content o f the legislation examined may shed some light on these 
thoughts. According to the study, the legislation o f Egypt covering the subject-matter o f the 
Dumping and Emergency Protocols is sectoral and risk-oriented;43 both Protocols are only partially 
covered (Dumping Protocol, Arts.4, 11, and 12; Emergency Protocol, Arts.3 and 8). As far as the 
subject-matters o f  the Athens Protocol are concerned, Egyptian regulations seem inadequate; 
relevant laws are sectoral and risk- and use-oriented and cover only some o f  its provisions, usually 
with “weak implementing combinations” .44
The legislation o f Israel relating to the Dumping Protocol is characterised by a trend from 
a sectoral to a more comprehensive approach, with the more recent all-inclusive environmental laws 
on the prevention o f  marine pollution cover almost all substantive and procedural duties laid down 
therein.45 The regulations relating to the issues covered by the Emergency Protocol are sectoral risk- 
and use-oriented, but together with the comprehensive instruments and the ratification o f MARPOL 
address almost all aspects o f the Protocol, despite a degree o f  weak implementation o f Articles 4 
to 7. The trend towards comprehensive laws is also discernible in relation to the Athens Protocol; 
these recent instruments cover adequately all substantive duties, but only one procedural (Art.8).
Greek legislation on dumping is characterised by a trend towards a combination of 
comprehensive and specific sectoral legislation, covering almost all substantive and procedural 
duties o f the relevant Protocol, except those o f Articles 8,9 and 12,46 and the same is true for 
legislation pertaining to the Emergency Protocol. The situation with regard to the Athens Protocol 
is more complex: The system-oriented law 1650/1986 on the Protection o f the Environment covers 
the inadequacies o f risk-oriented legislation with regard to control o f industrial activities, while a
42 Ibid, p.91.
43 Ibid, p.92.
44 Ibid, pp.92-3.
45 Id.
40 Ibid, pp.93-4.
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combination o f different types o f instruments addresses the issue o f  pollution transported through 
watercourses, especially the relevant substantive obligations; the same holds for management of 
municipal and industrial waste issues. With regard to other sectors, however, which are regulated 
by the comprehensive law in more abstract terms, implementation is poorer, as, for instance, with 
regard to the management o f solid, toxic and hazardous wastes, and to control o f agricultural 
activities. This is even worse in relation to urban planning, where the applicable sectoral body of 
legislation does not cover Articles 5 and 6 o f the Athens Protocol, nor any administrative duties, 
whereas two relevant comprehensive laws deal only with issues arising from Articles 4, 6 and 7.
The study suggests that a crucial factor that determines the level o f progress are problems 
associated with the country’s economic development. Indeed, the major part o f relevant legislation 
was issued before 1980, and only 9%  was later amended, while post-1980 legislation deals mainly 
with these aspects o f the Barcelona Convention system that are more germane to the types of 
environmental problems faced by developing countries and to the level o f development o f their 
administrative infrastructure.
All said, it must be borne in mind that all the above refer only to formal compliance with 
international undertakings. It is a completely different question - and one much more difficult to 
answer - whether this legislation is observed by state and private persons alike. The comparative 
analysis provides some insight on another aspect o f internal legal orders that is very relevant to this 
last issue, namely on the institutional structure that exists in the three countries, which is a crucial 
actor both in terms o f law-making and o f follow up and enforcement o f the rules once they are 
established.47
More specifically, since the early 80s, Greece has developed an institutional system which 
is a combination o f authority for environmental matters lying with different traditional ministries still 
retaining certain related competences and an ad hoc institution, the M inistry o f the Environment, 
Physical Planning and Public Works.48 Although co-ordination problems have by no means been 
eliminated, the latter organ plays a catalytic and central role in that it has promoted the promulgation 
o f comprehensive, system-oriented environmental legislation, it has initiated and guaranteed the 
harmonisation of Greek environmental rules with those o f  the EU and promoted the ratification o f 
environmental treaties. The study also suggests that the Ministry has additionally played a central 
role in integrating environmental considerations into developmental legislation.
The evolution in Israel is broadly similar, although here it happened without any instigation 
from realities such as participation in the EU. Since the establishment o f the Ministry o f the
47 N ote that the structure o f  administration with the ultimate authority in environmental matters varies greatly in 
Mediterranean countries: for instance, Albania, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Slovenia, 
Spain, Tunisia, and Turkey have an environmental ministry; others have a special agency (Croatia, Egypt, Libya), 
sometimes under the Ministry o f  Public Works (M onaco), or o f  the Interior (Algeria).
48 UNEP, op.cit. n.41, p.95.
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Environment in 1987, there is a distinct tendency in Israeli environmental legislation towards more 
comprehensive laws, better environmental management and enhanced integration o f relevant 
considerations in economic activities and land-planning.49 In Egypt, on the other hand, the 
institutional system is still sectoral, despite establishment o f the Environment Affairs Agency in
1982.50
It must have become clear by now that measuring the effectiveness o f  a regime such as MAP 
is an extremely complex and arguably unattainable task. Skjterseth attempted such an evaluation in
1992.51 despite his explicit recognition o f the difficulties involved.52 His main conclusion was that 
although Mediterranean co-operation was a political success, the main goal o f the Barcelona 
Convention, i.e. to enhance the marine environment, has not been successfully met. “Compared to 
a situation without any environmental co-operation,” he says, “ it seems clear that the Mediterranean 
would have suffered from more severe pollution than today”; however, this achievement is viewed 
as a result o f natural market variations, technological improvement and other co-operative efforts, 
like those within the EU, than MAP. His most useful finding for present purposes, though, is that 
“there is a widespread tendency that the Parties fail to comply with their legal obligations”.53 From 
a legal standpoint, that basically means that they do not enact implementing legislation, let alone 
make sure that such norms are respected.
On the other hand, in 1990 Peter Haas was assessing national implementation in a 
remarkably positive way. In particular, he thought that governments in the region had increasingly 
adopted more comprehensive pollution control legislation, which moreover was enforced “with 
greater vigor”. He concluded that “states actually comply with their Med Plan obligations” 54 Unlike 
Skjaerseth, Haas considers water quality an inappropriate indicator o f compliance, in view of the 
flaws in relevant data; he rather thinks that development o f pollution control measures should be 
looked at to assess the measure of compliance with MAP.55 In this context, he considers the creation 
o f central national institutions responsible for environmental issues a major factor contributing to 
the adoption of coherent marine pollution control policies, despite the fact that only in Egypt, Libya 
and Turkey were such institutions created after the respective countries became involved in MAP.56 
The most adequate and comprehensive legislation, according to this study, was found in France -
49 Id. C f  A.Bin-Nun, The Law o f  the Slate o f  Israel: An Introduction, 1992 (2nd ed.), pp.91-6, whereby there are still 
colliding competences and jurisdictions, as well as lack o f  widespread awareness o f  the significance o f  environmental 
protection.
so UNEP, op.cit. n.41, pp.95-6.
5! J.B.Skjaerseth, The M editerranean Action Plan - M ore P olitica l Rhetoric than Effective P roblem -Solving?, 1992.
52 Ibid, pp.2-3.
53 Ibid, pp. 3 2-3.
5,1 See P.Haas, Saving the M editerranean - The Politics o f  International Environm ental C o-operation , 1990, p. 129; 
see also pp. 131-154, for an overview o f  the progress o f  national activities in this context.
^ Ibid, p. 130.
Ibid, pp. 131-40.
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where it has been accumulating since the 60s and is by far the most sophisticated system of 
legislative control in the region - Greece, Israel, and Egypt, with the rest o f the countries lagging 
behind, but making substantial progress with time; national expenditures for marine pollution 
measures in the Mediterranean countries were also examined and resulted in a similar estimate as 
far as leading countries and progress are concerned.57
However, Haas is the only one taking a favourable stance with regard to the Mediterranean 
states’ record o f compliance. The EIB/World Bank preliminary study for the Environmental Program 
for the Mediterranean, examined in the previous Chapter, found that whatever legislation is in place, 
it is not generally complied with. An important factor behind this phenomenon is the delay, once a 
general framework law is adopted, in issuing the necessary supplementary decrees.58 What is more, 
subsidiary legislation is often unenforceable because it is “inappropriate or unaffordable” or because 
o f lack o f the necessary capacity and equipment, particularly - although not exclusively - in Southern 
countries;59 enforcement agencies often do not have the capacity to enforce standards, especially in 
countries where the environment is not a political priority; and many countries have ineffective rules 
in place, such as fines that have not been adjusted to inflation. These problems appear to be 
particularly acute where the industry is primarily publicly owned.
The study also pointed to the fact that it has sometimes proved difficult to balance 
responsibilities among central, regional and local authorities.60 In the former Yugoslavia, for 
instance, almost all functions were delegated to the republics and communes; in Italy, to regional 
and local agencies; and in France, to regional river basin authorities, the agences financiered du 
bassin, having the power both to allocate the resources and to fund pollution control measures, and 
thus presenting an interesting model for other countries;61 while in the developing Mediterranean 
countries decentralisation o f environmental responsibilities and assignment o f  relevant powers to 
local governments was gaining momentum.
Is there an overall conclusion that can be drawn from all these studies with regard to the 
initial question asked in this Section? As we already noted, it is by no means evident that a certain 
piece o f legislation is passed as an implementing law, except when the law ratifying a convention 
also includes further rules that give substance to general or ‘non-self-executing’ provisions.62 It 
follows that how and to what extent the operation of, for instance, MAP has contributed to
57 Ibid, pp. 140-54.
58 See World Bank/EIB, The Environm ental Program  fo r  the M editerranean - P reserving a Shared H eritage and  
M anaging a Common Resource, 1990, pp.42-4.
59 ll is characteristic that many secondary waste water treatment facilities in the region, although designed to remove 
90% o f  BOD, actually remove less than 70%, due to the lack o f  skilled technicians.
60 World Bank/EIB, op.cit. n.58, p.43.
61 See, T.Lanoux, France: Water and Waste: A Study o f  the Im plem entation o f  the EE C Directives, European 
Environm ental P olicy in Practice, V o l.3, 1986, pp.8-9.
62 On the meaning o f  this term, see follow ing Section.
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improving marine pollution controls in the Mediterranean can only be a matter o f speculation, as the 
possible factors that influence and determine the attitude and actions o f governments and the public 
vary greatly from country to country and understandably evolve with time as awareness increases. 
In other words, a regional system o f protection which imposes, among others, legal obligations 
interacts with a great range o f variables and other regional or global legal regimes and finally 
contributes to enhanced legal measures and policies at the national level, directly and indirectly, as 
it helps raise awareness. To try and assert the level o f compliance with international obligations in 
the region appears, thus, a rather futile exercise if it is done in such an all-encompassing way.
On the other hand, it seems more constructive to examine whether in cases o f non- 
compliance, as they specifically arise in particular countries, there exist mechanisms to ensure proper 
implementation o f the international standards breached. The issue examined in the following Section 
is, accordingly, whether, should a state not implement international rules that it has duly committed 
itself to, the latter can still be applicable to legal relations within that state; or in other words, what 
is the effect o f treaty provisions in national legal orders in the Mediterranean.
7.1.3. The Position o f  Treaties in the National Legal Order o f M editerranean States.
International law binds states to implement it in accordance with the fundamental principle 
pacta  sunt servanda ,63 but it is constitutional law that allows it to have a specific effect within a 
certain legal system. Let us, then, examine how Mediterranean Constitutions import international 
rules into the domestic legal system, and where they place them in the hierarchy o f legal norms.
Any student o f international law is bound to have come across the extensive debate 
generated by the two main approaches to incorporation o f international law in domestic legal orders, 
i.e. the ‘monist’ and the ‘dualist’ approach.64 According to the former, a treaty approved by the state 
and in force at the international plane automatically becomes part o f the law o f the land, without any 
separate act o f ‘incorporation’ or ‘transformation’, while the latter results in a treaty having no effect 
per se and requiring transformation by a legislative act.
France is a typical example o f the ‘monist’ system. However, according to Article 53 o f the 
French Constitution, among others, treaties or agreements concerning international organisations; 
those that imply a financial commitment for the state; and those that modify provisions o f a 
legislative character may only be ratified or approved by way o f legislation. This, o f course, 
diminishes the practical importance o f the above distinction, in view o f the fact that a specific 
legislative act is similarly needed in countries, such as Italy, which adopt a predominantly ‘dualist’ 
approach. This is usually a statute (‘implementing order’) providing that “full implementation is to 
be given to the treaty from the date it enters into force for Italy”, while the actual text o f  the
63 See Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties, Art.27.
64 See generally, F.G. Jacobs & S.Roberts (eds.), The Effect o f  Treaties in D om estic L aw , 1987.
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international agreement is reproduced in a schedule. In practice, an implementing order is always 
enacted whenever Parliament authorises ratification o f a treaty. This is also required under Article 
80 o f the Constitution every time legislation needs to be modified for implementing the treaty.65 The 
only real difference remaining, therefore, is that, in theory, Italian courts do not apply the treaty 
directly but rather the order; however, in practical terms the national judge is usually not concerned 
with that kind o f rather legalistic distinction.
As ratification, usually by the national legislature, is the rule among Mediterranean states,66 
it is interesting to briefly consider the problem o f non-ratification - or delays in this respect -. It has 
been suggested that “the real problem o f national ratification is not opposition but indifference”, 
although political factors or fears concerning possible repercussions o f certain rules might also 
account for some cases o f delay or failure to ratify.67 Thus, it is often observed that ratification is 
expedient only when there is a motivation to endorse a particular international agreement; this 
phenomenon is more common in developing countries with poor administrative infrastructure, 
although Western Europe is by no means immune to it. In this context, clauses whereby some rules 
apply even before the legal entry into force o f a convention, such as those found in MARPOL with 
regard to construction requirements, reduce the cost involved in ratification, or rather disconnect 
these costs from the latter. Another incentive to ratification is a provision that a convention is to be 
applied to all activities and persons that fall under the control or jurisdiction o f a Party irrespective 
o f the status o f the instrument in the national jurisdiction o f the actor.68 Such a clause is again found 
in MARPOL, and implies that a state will not have any benefit if it stays out o f the regime; its ships 
will be subject to it, while the state itself will not be able to use the rules laid down in the 
Convention to its own benefit.
N ow , once a treaty is imported into the national legal system it is significant to know the 
position o f the rules it establishes in relation to the rest o f national legislation. A survey o f modern 
constitutions by Professor Cassesse revealed four broad categories: those which do not say anything 
about the implementation o f treaties; those that recognise the binding effect o f treaties in the 
domestic legal order, but do not grant them higher status than ordinary legislation; those which
65 See G.Gaja, ‘Italy’, in Jacobs & Roberts, op.cit. n.64, p. 108.
66 Most constitutions o f  the region require parliamentary ratification for at least certain categories o f  treaties, see, e.g., 
the Spanish Constitution, Article 94(1), establishing such a requirement for, among others, treaties that “ imply important 
financial obligations, or involve modification or repeal o f  some law or require legislative measures for their execution”; 
similarly in Croatia, Article 133; Greece, Article 36(2); Israel, Article 11(4) o f  the 1964 Basic law; Tunisia, Article 33; 
Turkey, Article 90; Yugoslavia, Article 78(4); Slovenia, Article 86; Syria, Article 71(5); Albania, Article 67. Note that 
early Constitutions, such as the Lebanese (1947), contain rather outdated clauses, whereby the President o f  the Republic 
can negotiate and ratify treaties and even keep them secret from the Parliament (Arl.52); in M onaco (1962), the Prince 
is entitled to issue the necessary ordinances for application o f  international agreements (Art.68); while in Morocco, the 
King is similarly empowered to sign and ratify treaties (Art.31(2)); but cf. the very recent (1996) Algerian Constitution, 
whereby the President o f  the Republic alone concludes and ratifies international treaties (Art. 77(9)).
67 See R .M .M ’G onigle & M.W.Zacher, Pollution, P olitics and International Law - Tankers at Sea, 1979, p .3 2 1.
Ibid, p .3 \8 .
308
establish the principle that treaties prevail over ordinary legislation, and consequently the legislature
may not alter or supersede their provisions by enacting new law; and, finally, those exceptional cases
like the Dutch Constitution which allow treaties to modify or revise constitutional provisions.69
The Italian, Albanian, and Israeli Constitutions fall into the first group.70 In these countries,
any international instrument is usually incorporated in the form o f  an ordinary legislative act and
ranks equal with the rest o f such acts. The main shortcoming o f this system, according to Professor
Cassesse, is that “national authorities may easily thwart the impact o f international treaties on
domestic legislation by resorting to interpretative devices over which no constitutional control is
available”.71 However, despite the fact that when there is no express hierarchy o f  legal rules under
the constitutional law o f a country, the courts should normally apply the lex posterior rule to resolve
conflicts,72 it is often the case that national courts - conversely - try to maintain the primacy of
international rules through certain interpretative techniques. Most common among them are the
presumption that domestic law conforms to international law unless the intention o f  the legislator
to the contrary is manifest, and that the treaty rule is lex specialis, widely used in Italy in an effort
to save international norms that have been overridden by subsequent statutes.73
The Egyptian, Syrian, Turkish, and Yugoslavian Constitutions belong to the second
category,74 and present characteristics similar to the first group; whereas the Algerian, Croatian,
Cypriot, French, Greek, Slovenian, Spanish and Tunisian Constitutions place treaties in higher
ranking than ordinary legislation.75 The Spanish and the Croatian Constitutions are the most
advanced in this respect, as they do not impose any restrictions to the full operation o f treaty rules,
such as those found in the French and Greek Constitutions containing a reciprocity clause.76 The
Spanish Constitution reads:
“Article 96(1). Validly concluded international treaties once officially published in Spain 
shall constitute part o f the internal legal order. Their provisions may only be abrogated, 
modified or suspended in the manner provided for in the treaties themselves or in 
accordance with general norms o f international law.”
m See A.Cassesse, ‘Modern Constitutions and International Law’, 192 Receuil des Coitrs, 1985(111), pp .331 -475, at 
Chapter III. On the application o f  international environmental law by Dutch courts, see A.Nollkaemper, ‘Judicial 
Application o f  International Environmental Law in the Netherlands’, 7(1) R.E.C.I.E.L., 1998, pp.40-6.
70 See, e.g., Article 8(1) o fth e  1991 Albanian Constitution providing for observance o f  “the principles and norms o f  
the international law generally accepted”, but remaining silent with regard to treaty rules. On the particular jurisprudence 
developed by the judiciary in Israel, which is in principle a monist country but does not treat conventional rules as 
binding law, see E.Benvenisti, ‘Judicial M isgivings Regarding the Application o f  International Law: An Analysis o f  
Attitudes ofN ational Courts’, 4 Eur.J. o f  Ini 'I L., 1993, pp.176-83.
71 Cassesse, op.cit. n.69, p.397.
72 See, e.g., T.Scovazzi, ‘Two Italian Judgments Relating to the Implementation o f  Environmental Conventions’, 
E ur.Env'l L.Rev., Novem ber 1996, p.316, for a presentation o f  an Italian case where MARPOL was applied as lex 
posterior.
73 Gaja, op.cit. n.65, pp.96-101; Conforti, op.cit n.8, p.42-3 et seq; and Cassesse, op.cit. n .69, pp.398-401.
1A Articles 151, 71, 90, and 16 respectively.
75 Articles 123, 134, 169(3), 55, 28(1), 8, 96(1), and 32 respectively.
76 See Cassesse, op.cit. n.69, pp.403 and 404-8.
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Significantly, the last sentence in essence implies that not even constitutional amendments can alter 
international rules, once these have been incorporated into the Spanish legal order.77
Broadly speaking, constitutional law tends to ensure municipal compliance with 
international norms, but, as professor Cassesse points out, it “does not tie the hands o f domestic 
authorities...[but rather] leaves them considerable leeway in case national interests should run on a 
collision course with international obligations.”78 Hence, a variety o f barriers to the full and adequate 
implementation o f international law at the national level have been devised,79 including the ‘acte de 
gouvernement ’ doctrine, whereby actions o f the state executive in breach o f international law are 
non-justiciable, extensively used by French courts;80 the related jurisdiction o f the executive over 
the interpretation o f treaties, a practice discontinued by the French Conseil d ’ Etat only in 1990;81 
the relevant anglo-saxon ‘act o f state’ doctrine, barring judicial review o f the behaviour o f a foreign 
state;82 but, most significantly, the concept o f ‘non-self-executing’ international law.83
To the extent an international instrument is formally valid under municipal law, the question 
whether it can be directly applied by ‘domestic legal operators’, depends exclusively on its content.84 
One manifestation o f the ‘self-executing’ character o f an international provision is that it confers 
upon individuals enforceable rights and obligations; however, that is not a pre-condition for the said 
character to exist, as not all ‘self-executing treaties’ create individual rights. The decisive question 
is whether the agreement or some o f its provisions can be relied upon by any interested person and 
directly applied by the executive or the judiciary, or “an intervening act o f  integration by a public 
authority is required before the agreement is applied” .85
As Professor Conforti rightly argues, in principle, ‘non-self-executing’ rules strictly must 
consist o f  those not creating any obligations for the state, but merely allowing for discretionary 
pow er,86 and those which, although creating obligations, cannot be implemented due to lack of
77 See ib id , p.404.
n Ibid, p.412.
79 See, among others, Conforti, op.cit. n.8, pp. 13-47; and, J.H.Jackson, ‘Status o f  Treaties in Dom estic Legal Systems; 
A  Policy A nalysis’, 86 A.J.I.L., 1992, pp.310-40,.
80 Sec Conforti, op.cit. n.8, pp. 14-7.
81 Ibid, pp. 17-20,
82 See ibid, pp.20-4, esp. at fn.38.
83 Ibid, pp.25-34.
84 See Ebbesson, op.cit. n.4, p.59.
85 Conforti, op.cit. n.8, pp.25-6.
86 Ibid, p.27. Cf. E.Somers, ‘The Role o f  the Courts in the Enforcement o f  Environmental R ules’, 5 I.J.E.C.L., 1990, 
p. 194, suggesting that “the bulk o f  international law is not self-executing”; and Ebbesson, op.cit. n.4, Chapter 10, who 
argues that although most treaties cannot be complied with solely by reliance on direct effect, and incorporation by 
legislation better ensures implementation, an integrative approach is desirable so that dom estic courts and institutions 
would consider treaties as one o f various legal sources in their decision-making.
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necessary organs or mechanisms in the national legal system.87 He further argues that evasion o f 
direct application o f international norms because o f their ‘vagueness’ or ‘indeterminateness’, 
especially when they contain declarations o f principles rather than specific rules, is highly 
questionable, as “an interpreter can draw concrete applications from any declaration o f principle, 
however general, if only by virtue o f its abrogative effect” .88 The invocation o f particular dispute 
resolution mechanisms as grounds for not applying an international instrument, as was done by the 
ECJ in relation to GATT,89 also seems unjustified. Most importantly, even a treaty’s inclusion of 
implementation clauses, by which the parties undertake to take all necessary legislative and other 
measures to give effect to its provisions, cannot be a barrier to its ‘self-executing’ character.90 
Professor Conforti argues that such clauses only direct parties to secure the treaty’s validity within 
their legal systems and take the necessary steps to implement it, and, at most, remain meaningful, 
after the instrument has taken full effect in the state, in relation to treaty norms which remain ‘non­
self-executing ’ until the organs or mechanisms necessary for their implementation are developed.
The most widely held view, however, is that, for treaty provisions to be ‘self-executing’ or 
‘directly applicable’, they must be complete and precise and impose duties or confer rights to 
individuals.91 It has been suggested in this connection that sometimes ‘the legislature desires to 
preserve the option to breach the treaty in its method o f application’,92 and hence does not endorse 
direct application when it lays down the relevant constitutional rules.
A nother related issue is the trend to deny that binding resolutions o f international 
organisations are ‘self-executing’. Most countries take the position that they must be incorporated 
by an ad hoc legislative or administrative act before they can have any domestic effect. Most often, 
such acts are adopted by the executive upon delegation by the legislature. Still, if a treaty has 
acquired domestic formal validity and confers upon specific bodies the power to make binding 
decisions, then the binding force o f those decisions flows directly from the former’s own obligatory 
character.92
All these questions, as they arise in each country, are ultimately decided by the national 
judiciary. The age-old debate between ‘monists’ and ‘dualists’ has lost much o f its significance in
87 See, e.g., T .Scovazzi, op.cit.n .12, p .3 15, whereby the Italian authorities adopted the necessary implementing law 
thirteen years after the entry into force o f  CITES for Italy.
88 Conforti, op.cit. n.8, pp.28-9.
89 In Cases 21 to 24/72, 1972 E.C.R., p.1219; Case 9/73, 1973 E.C.R., p .l 135; and Cases 267 to 269 and 281/1983, 
1983 E.C.R., p .801.
90 See Conforti, op.cit. n.8, pp.30-4. In fact, in Italian jurisprudence there are instances o f  direct application o f  certain 
provisions o f  a treaty featuring an implementation clause, see ibid, fn.69.
91 See Jurisdiction o f  the Courts o f  Danzig Advisory Opinion. 1928, P.C.I.J., Series B, N o.15, p p .17-8,
92 See Jackson, op.cit. n.79, p.325.
93 Conforti, op.cit. n,8, p.35-6.
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this context too;94 in fact, in countries o f dualist tradition, such as Italy, the courts have adopted an 
‘internationalist stance’ and are ready to directly apply treaties that are not considered ‘self- 
executing’ in other states, such as the GATT,95 while in ‘m onist’ countries, such as France, the 
judiciary has a reputation for being unwilling to enforce international law against the wishes of the 
legislature or the executive.96
It follows that the role o f the judiciary emerges as very critical should binding treaty norms 
be made operative in any given jurisdiction. In fact, national courts as enforcers o f international law 
is an idea broadly favoured by international lawyers,97 despite the fact that “ [j]udges firmly refuse 
to live up to the vision...”,98 in view o f sensitive issues o f political and economic nature leading to 
judicial deference to the political branches o f state. In this connection, it would be fair to say that 
the authority o f the judiciary is not as strong in other parts o f the world as in Western Europe and 
North America;99 in many countries it may even be considered unacceptable to leave the resolution 
o f general legal questions and especially decisions to fill gaps in the existing legal system to 
courts.100 The above discussion, therefore, will be o f only theoretical value, if  it is not accompanied 
by an examination o f how the judiciary o f  a particular M editerranean country puts constitutional 
provisions into effect in real life. Indeed, it is particularly instructive to look at the practice o f courts 
in a ‘monist5 system, where, moreover, international law ranks higher than domestic legislation, such 
as Greece. It should be noted, however, that the following case study is only an example, an 
illustration o f the previous points, and does not allow for general conclusions to be drawn, as it is 
not claimed that it is representative o f all or some o f the Mediterranean states.
7,1,4. Judicial Application o f International Environm ental Law in Greece - A
Case Study.
On a close look, it immediately becomes evident that Greek courts are overwhelmingly 
concerned with the application of exclusively national laws, even in cases where international treaty 
rules are prim a facie  applicable. The former may well be said to implement the latter, but the fact
94 Ibid, pp. 13 and 26; and F.G.Jacobs, ‘Introduction’, in Jacobs & Roberts (eds.), op.cit. n .64, pp.xxiv-xxvi.
95 See Conforti, op.cit. n.8, fn.54 and 62; and Gaja, op.cit. n.65, p. 104.
96 See J.D.de la Roch6re, ‘France’, in Jacobs & Roberts (eds.), op.cit. n.64, pp.39-61. In practice, the French 
administrative judge - as opposed to the judicial courts which demonstrate a more open attitude - sets treaty and 
legislation on the same level, despite the constitutional provision; when a conflict arises, he gives precedence to the most 
recent rule, However, he does admit applications to annul administrative acts for violation o f  treaties.
91 See, among others, Benvenisti, op.cit. n.70, pp. 159-183, esp. at fn.3 for a review o f  relevant literature,
n  Ibid, p. 161.
99 On the problem o f  non-independent judiciary in developing countries see, among others, M.G.Faure, Enforcement 
Issues for Environm ental Legislation in D eveloping C ountries, Maastricht: UNU/INTECl-I, Working Paper No. 19, 
March 1995, p. 16.
100 Somers, op.cit. n.86, p. 193.
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remains that the Greek judge, despite an explicit constitutional mandate to enforce international 
treaty law applicable in the country, regularly fails to embark into any relevant consideration.
Accordingly, decisions o f Greek courts regarding imposition o f administrative fines for 
marine pollution from land-based, and more specifically industrial, activities are commonly based 
on Law 743/1977 regarding protection o f the marine environment and regulation o f related issues 
(as amended by Law 1147/1981),101 while most recent ones additionally apply the ‘framework’ Law 
1560/1986 concerning protection o f the environment.102 This is to a certain extent justified both by 
the understandable familiarity o f the national judge to his domestic legislation, and by the fact that 
the said laws partially implement international prescriptions on their subject-matter.
However, in the context o f marine pollution from ships, one comes across some notable 
exceptions to this pattern o f evading direct application o f international norms in preference for 
domestic legislation. Hence, although cases concerning marine pollution from ships are also 
regularly decided under Law 743/1977,103 there are some instances where international treaties have 
been found to lay down the applicable law, even in the face o f conflicting national standards. One 
such judgm ent was awarded by the Three-Member Administrative Court o f Appeal o f Thessaloniki 
in 1990,104 upholding the fine imposed on a non-Party ship, upon its entering into a Greek port, for 
pollution committed outside the territorial sea o f Greece, in accordance with M ARPOL (Art.5(4)). 
In this case, the Court o f Appeal embarked into a constructive reading o f the Convention, together 
with the ratifying statute, and importantly considered the said Article ‘self-executing’ rejecting an 
argument to the effect that it required further implementing legislation in order to acquire full effect 
in the country. The second example is equally significant: Pursuant to Decision 1759/1991 o f the 
M ulti-M ember Court o f First Instance o f Pireas,105 the standard o f strict liability for oil pollution
101 See, e.g., civil cases: Multi-Member Court o f  First Instance o f  Alliens, D ecision N o.14598/1982 , EXXtjvm) 
AiKaioffvvt] [Greek Justice], V o l.25, 1984, p.388; One-Member Court o f  First Instance o f  Nauplion, No. 163/1991, 
EmOechp^ai; EpmpiKou Aucaiov [Review o f Commercial Law], Vol.p(3,1991, p.628. From the case law o f  administrative 
courts, see Three-Member Administrative Court o f  Appeal o f  Athens, N o ,36/1987, Emdscbptjap NavxiXiaKov Airniou  
[R eview  o f  Maritime Law], Vol. 16, 1988, p.30; Council o f  State decisions N o. 1029/1987, AioiKt}xm) A ikij 
[Administrative Trial], V o l.l, 1989, p.473; No. 1124/1988, Aiomjmct] Aim) [Administrative Trial], V o l.l, 1989, p.474; 
N o .62/1992, AioiKf'jxm/ Aiicr] [Administrative Trial], V ol.II, 1992, p .1208; N o .865/1993, <PopoXoyiKo Bijpa  [Tax 
Tribune], V ol.8, 1994, p .175; and N o .1177/1994, unreported. On marine pollution from urban wastewater, see Council 
o f  State, D ecision N o .3 154/1993, unreported. For penal proceedings for land-based marine pollution under Law 
743/1977, see Council o fth e  Supreme Court, Decision N o.807/1989, Ilom K a Xpovuca [Penal Chronicles], Vol.M, 1990, 
p. 174.
102 See, e.g., Three-Member Administrative Court o f  First Instance o f  Thessaloniki, Decision N o.323/1992, AioiKijxuoj 
Aiicij [Administrative Trial], V o l.6, 1994, p.204.
103 See, e.g., Council o f  State, Decision N o .220/1987, EmQecbprimj NavxiXiaxov A i k c A o v  [Review o f  Maritime Law], 
V ol.16, 1988, p.29; and N os.2952/1990 and 3720/1990, Em0sd>pijar] Arjpoaiov AioiKipiKoo A im io u  [Review ofPublic  
Administrative Law], V o l.35, 1991, p.298; Three-Member Administrative Court o f  First Instance o f  Pireas, Decision  
N o.2/1993, AioiKpTiKij A m \  [Administrative Trial], V ol.6, 1994, p.396; Three-Member Administrative Court o f  Appeal 
ofPireas, D ecision No. 138/1993, EmOscbptio)} Na.vxiXia.Kov A im io v  [Review ofM aritim e Law], V ol.21, 1993, p.343; 
and Council o f  State, D ecision N o.674/1994, unreported.
104 Decision N o.616/90, Em&Fxbpijm} Aijpoaiuu A i o i k i j x i k o u  Aumiou [Review o fP u b lic  Administrative Law], V ol.35, 
1991, p.611.
105 EmOscbpijmj EpxopiKov Aucaiov [ Review o f  Commercial Law], Vol.pp, 1991, p .686.
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enshrined in the 1969 Civil Liability Convention overrides ordinary national law requiring 
responsibility on the basis o f fault.
Moreover, during the 80s, the Greek Council o f  State started producing a very significant 
body o f jurisprudence,106 which matured in the 90s when increased environmental awareness 
brought many citizens and NGOs before the courts in challenge o f acts allowing further degradation 
o f the environment and their quality o f life. This phenomenon acquires additional significance in 
view o f the fact that other state organs in the country do not show the same awareness and 
willingness to apply and enforce environmental legislation.107
The Council o f State has, in this context, endorsed several principles central to international 
environmental law-making and turned them into fundamental tenets o f the Greek legal order without 
waiting for their formal endorsement by the legislature. What it has actually done is to constructively 
interpret national legislation and the Constitution in the light o f international legal developments, 
including soft law. in this context, the Court has upheld, among others, the principle o f sustainable 
development; the principle o f prevention; and a truly radical doctrine, whereby legislative changes 
introducing provisions less favourable to environmental protection as compared with pre-existing 
legislation are prohibited.108
The Council has also recently had the opportunity to produce a considerable body o f  case- 
law in which specific treaties, such as the 1979 Berne Convention on the Conservation o f European 
Wildlife and Natural Habitats - usually concurrently with Directive 79/409 on conservation o f wild 
birds -, are meticulously applied. The first chance to do so was presented in 1993, when the Court 
found that a Ministerial Decision on permitted hunting o f certain wild species did not fulfill the 
requirements o f the Berne Convention, as it was not premised on a comprehensive scientific study 
pertaining to the population o f each species concerned and the impact o f  the envisaged hunting 
activity on them .109 In the same vein, the Berne Convention has been relied upon in order to uphold 
a Presidential Decree imposing restrictions on property rights in and around the breeding grounds
106 And especially its Fifth Division which is assigned with environmental cases, and has, during the last fifteen years, 
built a strong reputation for being a staunch supporter o f  environmental causes.
107 See K.MevouSdicoc;, Tlpoorucna t o d  nepif3d?Tovxo<; oro EX7,qvuc6 Aqpbmo A Ik cu o . H EDp[3oA,f| tt|< ; NopoA.oyla<; 
t o d  EopJ3ouHou xq<; E ju K p a T e la t;’ [K.Menoudakos, ‘Protection o f  the Environment in Greek Public Law. The 
Contribution o f  the Jurisprudence o f  the Council o f State’], NopoqKai (Pvai/ [Law and Nature]. V o l.4(1), 1997, pp.20- 
1 ,
108 See D ecisions N o .5267/1995, unreported; 53/1993, and 1520/1993, N opog kcu <P6at] [Law and Nature], Vol. 1, 
1994, pp.290 and 209 respectively; 10/1988, unreported; 185/1995, unreporled; and 2242/1994  concerning urban 
planning, N dpoq Kai 06a tj [Law and Nature], V o l.2(1), 1995, p .121. In Decision N o .253/1996 , To X vvm ypa  [The 
Constitution], V ol.22, 1996, p .1066, it notably went as far as interpeting the Constitution in the light o f  Agenda 21 with 
regard to principles that should govern coastal development.
109 Council o f  State, Decision N o,366/1993, ToXbvxaypa [The Constitution], Vol.20, 1004, p. 157. Note that the Court 
subsequently had a chance to review the quality o f  the scientific study ordered in the above D ecision, and still found it 
inadequate, see Decision N o .l 174/1994, unreported.
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o f the sea turtle (caretta caretta);uo and o f  the Mediterranean monk seal (monachus monachus).111 
Moreover, in Decisions 2343/87 and 1342/92, the Council o f State applied the Ramsar Convention 
on Wetlands of International Importance in concrete cases overcoming the lack of precise 
delimitation o f  the protected areas involved, setting aside national provisions allowing for exceptions 
to the system o f  protection established by the international instrument, and finding at least the 
prohibitive content o f relevant international law - i.e. the prohibition o f any act degrading or 
destroying protected wetlands - directly applicable.
Finally, special reference should be made to Decision 2301/1995, which is an outstanding 
piece o f commendable judicial application o f international law for an additional reason:112 In this 
instance, the Council o f State considered the applicability o f  the 1979 Bonn Convention on the 
Conservation of Migratory Species o f Wild Animals, an instrument not ratified by Greece. It 
eventually found that it is in fact binding and applicable by virtue o f Council Decision 82/461, 
whereby the Community as such acceded to the Convention. The Council invoked relevant case law 
of the ECJ in support o f the conclusion that an international agreement duly entered into by the EC 
forms an integral part o f the Community legal order,113 and may, in principle, be ‘directly applicable’ 
in Greece in view o f its wording, nature and subject-matter entailing clear and precise obligations 
not being conditional on any implementing act.114
7.2. Implementation o f Community Environmental Law in M editerranean M ember States.
Let us now consider the distinct concepts o f the Community legal order that relate to
application o f  rules o f  international origin in domestic jurisdictions, and see how they differ from
what we have seen so far.
As early as 1963, the ECJ described the Community as “a new legal order o f international
law”, 115 and formulated the doctrine of ‘supremacy o f Community law’ declaring that
“ ... by creating a Community o f unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own 
personality... and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty 
or a transfer o f powers from the states to the Community, the M ember States have limited
110 See Council o f  State, D ecisions N os. 1821/1995, Nditog m i  <Pwij [Law and Nature], V o l.3 (l) , 1996, p. 149; and 
4950 to 4953/1995, unreported.
111 Council o f  State, D ecision N o.2304/1995, N o/uogm i 06m j [Law and Nature], V o l.3(1), 1996, p. 176.
112 Council o f  State, D ecision N o.2301/1995, No/uog m i  06afj [Law and Nature], V o l.3(1), 1996, p. 162.
113 See Cases 12/86, Demirel. 1987 E.C.R., p .3719; and 181/73, Haegeman. 1974 E.C .R., p.449,
114 Although, eventually, the said convention was found not directly applicable in the specific circumstances, as the 
sea turtle is listed under Annex 11, thus requiring further governmental action for its effective protection. On the ‘direct 
applicability’ o f  international instruments in Community law, see also infra, p .322.
115 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Netherlands Fiscal Administration. 1963 E.C.R., p .l.
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their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body o f law 
which binds their nationals and themselves.”116
This provides the underlying rationale for the idea that, once a Community legislative act is issued, 
M ember States need not - in fact, they are not allowed to - ‘incorporate’ it in the domestic legal 
domain, unless such legislative action is required by the act itself. This is the first fundamental 
characteristic distinguishing the Community legal order from the international one, and is 
importantly coupled with the principle that all national law - including constitutional rules - is 
inapplicable if  in conflict with the EEC Treaty or ‘directly applicable’ secondary provisions.
More specifically, Regulations which are the principal legislative texts o f the Community 
order are binding and directly applicable in all Member States (Art.249); implementing national 
legislation is not normally required nor permitted.117 As a Regulation is a lexperfec la ,m  it creates 
rights and obligations for both States (‘vertical effect’) and their nationals ( ‘horizontal effect’). All 
domestic laws contrary to it or even “encroaching upon the field within which the Community 
exercises its legislative power” are inapplicable,119 and furthermore, there seems to exist a positive 
obligation to repeal conflicting national provisions.120
A Directive, on the other hand, which is the type of instrument overwhelmingly used in the 
environmental context, is binding as to the result to be achieved upon each M ember State to which 
it is addressed, but leaves to the national authorities the choice o f forms and methods (Art.249). 
Member States have to modify national legislation accordingly and to guarantee that the Directive 
is enforced. More specifically, the instrument has to be formally implemented within a specified time 
limit, i.e. to be transposed into national law and be given full effect (effet utile) ,121 either through 
adoption o f a new parliamentary act, if existing legislation is inadequate, or through introduction of 
new administrative regulations based on existing statutory authority, or even new administrative
116 Case 6 /64, Costa v. ENEL. 1964 E.C.R., p.585.
117 See Generally, T.C. Hartley, The Foundations o f  European Community Law, 4th ed., 1998, p. 198.
118 It should be noted, however, that the sometimes poor quality and often com plex and technical character o f  
Community legislation, in general, have caused concern which led to the adoption o f  a number o f  criteria that should 
be checked during drafting, namely that the wording o f  the act is clear, simple, concise and unambiguous; that the 
various provisions are consistent with each other and, to the extent possible, with existing legislation; that the rights and 
obligations o f  those to whom the act is to apply are clearly defined; that provisions without legislative character are 
avoided etc., see Council Resolution o f  8 June 1993, 1993 O J , (C 166) 1.
119 Case 106/77, Simmenthal. 1978 E.C.R., p.629.
120 Case 167/73, Com mission v. France. 1974 E.C.R., p .359. This doctrine might seem  fairly straightforward but it 
has met with some resistance in certain Member States; in Italy, for instance, Regulations were not considered directly 
applicable for a long time - i.e. at least until 1984 - and required an ad  hoc incorporation act, see A.la Pergola & P.del 
Duca, ‘Community Law, International Law and the Italian Constitution’, 79 1985, pp.598-621; Conforti, op.cit. 
n.8, pp.38-9; and Gaja, op.cit. n.65, pp.91-2.
121 Case 48/75, Jean N oel Rover. 1976 E.C.R., p.516; and see generally, S.Prechal, D irectives in European Community 
Law, 1995, Part 1; and J.H.Jans, European Environm ental Law, 1995, pp.l 19-41.
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practices through circulars, should the existing framework permit it.122 The last point needs a further 
qualification: “ [M]ere administrative practices, which by their nature can be changed as and when 
the authorities please and which are not publicized widely enough” do not constitute proper 
transposition.123
Respecting the deadline for implementation is not, according to the ECJ, a mere formality, 
but rather an essential element o f the Community legal order;124 when it lacks, there is an undesirable 
discrepancy in M ember States’ laws after the deadline expires. That is why arguments in defence 
of non-timely transposition o f Community law, such as that the time allowed for implementation is 
insufficient;125 that other Member States had failed to implement a Directive within the fixed time­
lim it;126 and that internal difficulties', including constitutional pro v i s i t s ,  the premature 
dissolution o f the national legislature,129 governmental crises,130 or other circumstances, have 
prevented timely implementation,131 have all been rejected.
Generally speaking, the crucial issue is not one o f form, but rather o f  whether the specific 
transposition vests the Community rule with binding force; it has to happen in a way that “fully 
meets the requirements o f clarity and certainty in legal situations”,132 and “ ...must consequently 
transpose their terms into national law as binding provisions”.133 Therefore, the legislative instrument 
that implements a Directive has to be o f the same legal status as previous regulation o f the subject- 
matter so as to ensure that the former will substitute the latter as lex posterior.™  Under the same 
rationale, a State may not simply attribute ‘direct effect’ to the provisions o f a D irective,135 and thus 
avoid normal transposition, nor can it invoke the fact that current practice within the State conforms 
with the Directive.136 The ECJ has additionally held that partial application o f a Directive does not
122 Similarly, “general principles o f  constitutional or administrative law” may render specific legislation on a certain 
subject superfluous, see, among others, Case 29/84, Commission v. Germany. 1985 E.C.R., p. 1661.
123 Case 102/79, Com mission v. Belgium . 1980 E.C.R., p.1486.
124 See Case 52/75, Com mission v. Italy. 1976 E.C.R., p.284.
125 See ib id , p.277.
126 Case C -38/89, Blaneueron. 1990 E.C.R.., p.I-2567.
127 Case 77/69, Commission v. Belgium. 1970 E.C.R., p. 1237.
128 Case 102/79, loc.cit. n.123, p. 1487.
129 Case 79/72, Commission v. Italy. 1973 E.C.R., p .671.
130 Case C -38/89, loc.cit. n.126.
131 See, among others, Case 52/75, loc.cit. n.124, p.285.
132 Case 96/81, Commission v. Netherlands. 1982 E.C .R., p .1804.
133 Case 239/85, Commission v. Belgium . 1986 E.C.R., p.3645.
134 Case 102/79, loc.cit. n.123, p. 1473.
135 See infra , pp.322 et seq.
136 See Case 102/79, loc.cit, n.123, at p. 1484.
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relieve a state from its duty; not even the fact that a specific problem on which the Directive has 
bearing is not intense in the country is a good defense for not fully applying the instrument.137
Practical and effective implementation is also required and usually involves designating 
‘competent authorities’;138 establishing procedures and setting standards; monitoring and gathering 
information; establishing sanctions for non compliance; or even making investments to ensure that 
the desired results will be achieved. A note must be made at this point in relation to administrative 
regulations, most commonly taking the form o f circulars. Although, as already observed, these 
instruments are not, in principle, appropriate to give formal effect to Community Directives, they, 
nevertheless, often constitute an indispensable step in the process o f application o f Community rules 
in real terms, as they contain instructions to and arrangements for various branches o f the national 
Administration, necessary if the latter’s behaviour is to conform with these rules and if actions that 
will give practical effect to them are to be initiated. Hence, in some instances, these instruments 
become the single more important factor for the effective application o f Community law in a 
Member State.139 At the same time, exactly because o f their importance, they have the potential o f 
bringing new elements or imposing supplementary conditions, and thus altering the substance o f  a 
Community rule in a way that cannot be readily controlled by the competent Community organs.140
It is important to realise in this context that even the verbatim  incorporation o f the text o f 
a Directive into national legislation may still constitute improper transposition if  not in form at least 
in substance, as, in the Commission’s words, “this practice may fail to respect the context o f the host 
legal system and the capacity o f the existing administrative structure to implement and apply the 
resultant obligations”, which leads to domestic provisions being turned into a pure formality.141 It 
follows that the Commission examines, to the extent possible, all the relevant factors with a view 
to ascertaining that all the objectives o f  Community law are achieved.
All said, and despite this well-developed body o f authoritative jurisprudence that is 
supposed to inform the actions o f M ember States, it is a widely acknowledged reality in the 
Community, that this type o f instrument is not likely to be implemented accurately and in time; this 
phenomenon is particularly pronounced with regard to environmental Directives.142 The Commission 
has even gone as far as asserting that the mandatory character o f the latter is not always recognised,
137 Joint Cases C -361/88, Commission v. Germany. 1991 E.C.R., p.2567; and C -59/89, 1991 E.C.R., p.2607.
138 In fact, the power to implement a Directive can be delegated to regional or local authorities, in accordance with 
the Member State’s legal system, see Case 97/81, Commission v. Netherlands. 1982 E.C.R., p. 1819.
139 See V .Constantinesco, ‘France: Sunth&se N ationale’, in G.C.Azzi & J.de Bry (eds.), L'Application du D roit 
Com m nnautaire p a r  les E tats-M em bres, 1985, p .51 .
140 See supra, Chapter 5, pp.231-5.
141 See EC Commission, Tenth Annual Report on Monitoring the Application o f  Community Law, COM(93) 320 final, 
28 April 1993, p.98.
142 See, e.g ., the Dublin C ouncil’s call for full implementation and enforcement o f  environmental Directives in 
Member States in order to increase the effectiveness o f  Community environmental legislation, EC Council, European 
Declaration on the Environmental Imperative, E C  Bull., N o .6, 1990, p.7.
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and that “ in practice directives are commonly regarded as mere recommendations” .143 The overall 
relevant record o f Mediterranean states is indeed one o f the worst in the Community, as will be 
shown in the next Section.
7.2.1. Implementation of Environmental Directives in M editerranean M ember States.
Broadly speaking, although Member States do not as a rule refrain from eventually 
transposing most o f the obligations contained in environmental Directives, it is quite common not 
to do so in the prescribed time-frame. Delays in transposition in Mediterranean countries are equally 
common place.144 In the environmental section o f the annual Commission reports 011 the 
implementation o f Community law, Greece and Italy have been typically urged to “do better” .145 In 
fact, transposition o f environmental Directives in Italy has been the slowest in the Community; thus, 
by the end o f 1994, Italy had notified implementing measures for 76% o f the instruments falling due 
by that date, while France had a record o f 94%, Greece 85%, and Spain 86% Gust below the overall 
average o f 89% ).146
Having said that, since 1992, Italy has introduced a new procedure, known as the 
‘Community Law ’, which has allowed a large number o f Directives to be implemented, some of 
which were more than a decade behind time.147 One should bear in mind that the Italian legal system 
presents a feature that complicates the situation: The regions in this country enjoy legislative powers 
in relation to the transposal o f environmental Directives,148 but the Commission is not notified o f 
regional legislation.149 Consequently, it cannot be clear to what extent the central government ensure 
that this type o f transposition is carried out as it should.
But also in France, problems leading to late transposition o f the water Directives, at least 
as exposed in a 1986 study, related either to prolonged consultations with veiy many national bodies 
in view o f the great number o f competent authorities in related matters, or with a sense on the part 
o f the French Administration that there was no pressing necessity to comply with the timetable set
143 See EC Commission, op.cit. n. 141, p.96.
144 See EC Commission, Eleventh Annual Report on M onitoring the Application o f  Com m unity Law , COM (94) 500 
final, 29 March 1994, p.77. Notably, by the end o f  1993, no Member State had com plied with the obligation to adopt 
and notify programmes to reduce pollution o f  the aquatic environment by discharges o f  dangerous substances 
(D ir.76/464, Art.7), see ibid, p.78.
145 See EC Com mission, Eleventh..., op.cit.n. 144, p.83.
146 See EC Commission, Twelfth Annual Report on Monitoring the Application o f  Com m unity Law (1994), COM(95) 
500 final, p.72. By the end o f  this year, from the four Mediterranean Member States only France was in the process o f  
transposing the urban waste waters Directive, see ibid, p.66. However, by the end o f  1997 the overall situation had 
visibly improved with France having transposed 96% o f  the Directives applicable on that date, Greece 97%, Italy 97%, 
and Spain 99%, see EC Commission, First Annual Survey on the implementation and enforcement o f  Community 
environmental law, October 1996 to December 1997, SEC 1999/592, 27 .4.1999, p.66.
147 See EC Commission, op.cit. n.141, p.97.
148 See P.Cologgi, ‘Italic’, in Azzi & de Bry, op.cit. n. 139, pp. 165-70.
149 See EC Commission, op.cit. n. 141, p, 123.
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by the Community instrument,150 the latter being a demonstration o f a conception o f sovereignty and 
resistance to change characteristic o f the French Administration.151
In Greece, as well, the fragmentation o f competence between various public bodies leads 
to mechanisms o f  environmental protection being ineffective,152 although this phenomenon is not 
strictly related to Community environmental rules but runs through the whole body o f national 
environmental legislation. It is characteristic o f the overall situation that pollution o f marine waters 
falls under the jurisdiction o f the Ministry o f Merchant Marine, the control o f polluting installations 
under that o f  the Ministry o f Industry, issues o f urban sewage and waste are dealt with by the 
Ministry o f the Interior, and fishing is supervised by the Ministry o f Agriculture, while all these 
competences operate alongside the comprehensive responsibilities o f the Ministry o f the 
Environment, and the decentralised powers o f local and regional authorities. If that is a rather 
widespread phenomenon in Europe and beyond, in Greece it is aggravated by the unstable status o f 
the administrative structures and the respective division o f functions, which often leads to open 
competition among various departments and efforts at undermining each other’s authority.153
But the main malfunction of the Greek system o f transposition o f environmental Directives 
consists in the practice o f ministerial decisions performing this function, in circumvention o f the 
proper procedure which requires presidential decrees, i.e. normative acts o f higher ranking. This 
phenomenon, which has lately acquired alarming dimensions, has the important repercussion that 
the instruments implementing Community environmental rules escape proper prior elaboration by 
the Council o f State and control o f legality by the President o f the Republic, which in turn lead to 
an often poor quality.154 Other problems observed so far include what is commonly called in Greek 
legal jargon ‘spurious’ transposition, i.e. incorporation o f a Community environmental rule in an 
instrument using a purely domestic legal basis, and thus obscuring the former’s origin with potential 
implications when it comes to enforcement thereof; incorrect transposition; as well as transposition 
in a fragmentary or non-systematic way.155
In fact, the quality o f transposition and the application o f the norms contained therein 
present an even bigger cause for concern in all Mediterranean countries than respecting the deadlines
150 See Lanoux, op.cit. n.61, pp. 100-1.
151 See Conslantinesco, op.cit. n.139, pp.55-7.
152 See N . - K . X X s t t u c ; ,  ‘H E<pappoyq xou KotvoxiKou A i k u I o u  icepipdLXovxot; cwi6 xqv EXXr|vucii Aiohaicrri Kai rj 
A a o 7iotr|ar| xcov Kavbvcov xou crrn BouX.f|’ [N.-K.Hlcpas, ‘The Application o f  Community Environmental Law by the 
Greek Administration and the Invocation o f  its Rules at the Parliament’], in r.riaxabiipqxpion ( c j c , ) ,  H  Aieiodvaij rov 
Koivoxucou Aucaiov IlepifaXAovvog cm/v EXXaba, AOi'iva: A.E6KK0uA,a<; [G.Papadimitriou (ed.), The Infusion o f  
Community Environmental Law in Greece, Athens: Sakkoulas], 1994, pp. 164-7.
153 See ibid, p. 166.
154 See r .n a 7ra5r|p.r|xp(or), H AiabiKaata npoaapj-ioyi'iq xou E A a t i v u c o u  npog xo K o i v o x i k 6  A k a io  nepifidAAovxoc;’ 
[G.Papadimitriou, ‘The Process o f  Adaptation o f  the Greek to the Community Environmental Law ’], in Papadimitriou, 
op.cit. n.150, pp.73-9.
155 See EC Com mission, op.cit. n.141, p.71, whereby the Commission was in 1993 pursuing bilateral talks with the 
Greek authorities with a view  to resolving the difficulties responsible for improper transposition.
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for implementation.156 The example o f Greece again illustrates the severe weaknesses that emerge 
when one examines actual implementation o f Community environmental rules once incorporated 
into the national legal order. There are instances, for example with regard to the management o f 
solid wastes regulated in Directives 75/442 and 78/319,157 where, despite formal adoption of 
legislation, which sets even more stringent standards than the Community minimum requirements, 
the actual day-to-day business is conducted without this legislation exerting any visible influence.158 
The main reasons that have been positively identified as accounting for this phenomenon are lack 
o f resources and infrastructure, inability o f the Administration to put into effective use the 
considerable human resources o f the country, and last but not least the power that rests in the hands 
o f local lobbies which typically react when the ‘development’ o f their region is jeopardised by the 
application of environmental protection measures, what could be described in more subtle terms as 
low environmental awareness.159 This ‘real-life’ aspect o f the law is unfortunately the most difficult 
to follow up and evaluate in a comprehensive way, not only in Greece but in all Member States.160
One could rightly conclude, then, that the everyday practical application o f environmental 
Directives is not and cannot be monitored by the central mechanism o f compliance control under 
Article 226. This mechanism operates only against central governments, whereas implementation 
involves a large number o f people throughout the Member States, which can be effectively 
monitored only by national authorities,161 and, in any case, the Commission is both geographically 
remote and ill-equipped to conduct investigations on legal and factual aspects o f individual cases 
o f non-compliance that come to its notice.162 Moreover, the Community central judicial enforcement 
system cannot take into account the legal and administrative structures at various levels within 
Member States where environmental rules are applied.163 The Commission shares those beliefs and 
has proposed that the Council recommends some minimum criteria regarding the organisation, 
execution, monitoring and publications o f environmental inspections in order to assist Member
150 At the end o f  1994, for instance, Italy had several infringement procedures pending against it with regard to waters
Directives, while such proceedings were under way against Spain and Greece for failure to notify programmes for the
reduction o f  water pollution under Directive 76/446, see EC Commission, Twelfth..,, op.cit. n ,146, p.67; and supra
Chapter 5, pp.233-4,
157 On this issue, see M.AoripoucojroijAoo, T-I npoaappoyfi xq<; EAAvucr|<; N opoO scta; orov T opsa tcov A7iopArpcov’
(M.Asimakopoulou, ‘The Adaptation o f  Greek Legislation in the Waste Sector’), in Papadimitriou, op.cit. n.152, pp.81-
90. The dumping o f  such waste in a gully in Crete has led to an ECJ judgment against Greece, see Case C-45/1991, 1992
E.C.R., p.1-2509.
158 Waste management is actually one o f  the weakest sectors o f  environmental protection in Greece which - directly 
or indirectly - results in the accumulation with time o f  massive quantities o f  pollutants in the marine environment, see 
EC Commission, op.cit. n.141, p. 114.
159 See Hlepas, op.cit. n.152, pp.169-70.
169 See EC Commission, op.cit. n .I41, p.96, where various reports and declarations by Community institutions, such 
as the EP, the Council and the Court o f  Auditors, as well as institutions o f  the M ember States, calling for “a substantial 
boost to the practical effect given to Community legislation”, are cited.
161 But cf. European Parliament proposals for a Community coastguard in 1978 O.J. (C 63) 28 and (C 108) 59.
162 Sec EC Com mission, First..., op.cit. n.146, p.43.
163 See EC Com mission, Im plem enting Community Environmental Law, CO M (96) 500 final, 22 .10 .1996, p.5.
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States in carrying on relevant tasks, and thereby reduce the wide disparity in the quality and form 
o f inspections.164 The proposal was based on a paper on Minimum Criteria for Environmental 
Inspections produced in 1997 by the informal Network for the Implementation and Enforcement 
of Environmental Law (IMPEL) ,165
IMPEL was established in 1992 as the ‘Chester network’ of national environmental agencies 
and was later modified according to the Fifth Environmental Action Programme in its present form. 
Its mandate is to promote the exchange of information and experience and the development o f a 
greater consistency o f approach in the implementation o f environmental legislation, and consider 
relevant questions, including ways to ensure better enforcement by national, regional, and local 
bodies, and thus improve co-operation and co-ordination between various enforcement agencies.166 
IMPEL is currently working, among others, on two studies on access to justice and access to 
environmental information, and on a project on environmental enforcement practices in Member 
States.167
These last points highlight the significance of decentralised enforcement at the level o f each 
Member State providing a crucial complement to the enforcement at Community level.168 To quote 
Professor Macrory,
“Full implementation o f Community law... is unlikely ever to be achieved solely by the 
“top-down” mechanism implicit in the Article 169 [226] procedure. In the long run, it 
requires a genuine internal political will by Member States..., and this in turn demands both 
the dynamic participation o f citizens and amenity groups, and an active recognition by 
national courts and authorities o f their own role in giving effect to Community 
obligations.”169
7.2.2. Enforcement o f Community Environmental Law at the M ember-State Level.
In fact, in the context o f the Community legal order, certain domestic actors, namely 
concerned individuals and the judiciary, have much more scope and real power to take
164 See EU Council, Resolution o f  7 October 1997 on the drafting, implementation and enforcement o f  Community 
environmental law, 1997 O.J. (C 321) 1, at para.17; and EC Commission, Proposal for a Council Recommendation 
providing for minimum criteria applicable to environmental inspections in the Member States, COM (98) 772 final; 
amended in COM (99) 652 final. The Commission is even considering the need for a limited Community body with 
auditing competencies, and is also concerned with the development o f  horizontal measures such as telematic networks 
or training related to the application and enforcement o f  environmental legislation in the framework o f  LIFE 11, EC 
Commission, op.cit. n.163, p.22.
165 See IMPEL, Minimum Criteria for Environmental Inspections, BU5 4/48; and IMPEL Network, IMPEL Reference 
Book fo r  Environm ental Inspections, Nijmegen, 1999.
166 See EC Commission, op.cit. n.163, pp. 18-20. It is likely that in the future the scope o f  its mandate will be 
broadened, see EU Council, op.cit. n .164, at para.21.
167 See IMPEL Network, Com plaint Procedures and Access to Justice fo r  Citizens an d  N G O s in the F ield o f  the 
Environment within the European Union, Final Report, May 2000,
168 See Prechal, op.cit. n.121, p.8.
169 R.Macrory, ‘The Enforcement o f  Community Environmental Laws: Some Critical Issues’, 29 C.M .L.Rev., 1992, 
pp.368-9.
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implementation o f the law in their hands, especially when compared to the situation in general 
international law as described above.
The first substantive improvement lies in a notion analogous to that o f ‘self-executing’ 
provisions, namely that Community rules may be ‘directly effective’. More specifically, the ECJ has 
developed the doctrine o f ‘direct effect’ pursuant to which, after the prescribed time limit for 
transposition has expired, Directives imposing sufficiently precise, clear and unconditional 
obligations, not requiring further state action, may give rise to rights and obligations that individuals 
can rely upon when resorting to their national courts, while a M ember State may not rely on its 
failure to perform obligations which a Directive entails.170 Accordingly, individuals and NGOs may 
enforce ‘directly effective’ provisions o f  Directives after the deadline for implementation has passed 
- at that stage Directives have no differences from Regulations in the effects they produce, except 
in relation to the so called ‘horizontal direct effect’ discussed below - by bringing actions against 
Member States, and emanations thereof,171 including the judiciary,172 before national courts,173 and 
even awarded damages.174
An international agreement binding on the Community may also have ‘direct effect’,175 and 
may be the subject o f  an Article 234 reference for a preliminary ruling.176 However, the doctrine 
does not apply unqualified in such cases: In its early jurisprudence, the Court has insisted on the 
existence o f ‘direct effect’ o f treaty provisions in the sense o f conferring rights on individuals in 
order to review the validity o f a Community act allegedly in contravention to an international 
undertaking.177 However, this line was later abandoned and the Court reviewed the validity o f
170 Case 26/62, loc.cit.n .l 15; Case 41/74, Van Duvn v. Home O ffice. 1974 E.C.R., p.1337; Case 148/78, Pubblico 
Ministero v. Tullio Ralli. 1979 E.C.R., p. 1629. Judge Pescatore has summed up the relevant criteria suggesting that the 
ultimate test for direct effect o f  a rule laid down in a Directive is the ‘justiciability’ o f  the issues involved, see 
P.Pescatore, ‘ The Doctrine o f  “Direct Effect”: An Infant D isease o f  Community Law’, 8 Eur.L.Rev., pp. 174-7. See 
generally Hartley, op.cit. n .l 17, Chapter 7; and on the com plex practical and theoretical problems that arise when 
applying the doctrine to Directives, among others, Prechal, op.cit. n.121, Chapter 11; N.Green, ‘Directives, Equity and 
the Protection o f  Individual R ights’, 9 Eur.L.Rev., 1984, pp.295-325. On the ‘direct effect’ o f  EC environmental law, 
see J.H.Jans, ‘Legal Protection in European Environmental Law’, in H.Somsen (ed.), P rotecting the European  
Environment - Enforcing EC  Environmental Law, 1996, pp.49-98; L.Krtimer, ‘Direct Effect o f  EC Environmental Law’, 
in ibid, pp.99-150; and J.H.Jans, European Environm ental Law, 1995, C h.IV (l).
171 Case 188/89, Foster v. British Gas. 1990 E .C .R ., p.I-3313.
172 Case 14/83. Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-W estfalen. 1984 E.C.R., p. 1891.
173 Case. 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton Health Authority. 1986 E.C.R., p .723.
174 See infra, p.326-7.
175 See Case 104/81. Kupferberg. 1982 E.C.R., p .3641; Case 87/75. Bresciani. 1976 E.C.R., p .129, at paras. 16-18; 
Case 12/86, loc.cit. n .l 11, p.3 719; and Case C-18/90, Kziber. 1991 E.C.R., p.1-199. The interpretation and effect o f  such 
an agreement is a matter ultimately falling under the jurisdiction o f  the ECJ to decide, see Kupferberg. para.17.
176 See Case 181/73, loc.cit. n .l 13, p.449. However, agreements with third countries are not to be interpreted in the 
sam e broad, policy-oriented manner as Community treaties, See Kupferberg. loc.cit. n . l74, at paras.28-31; and Case 
270/80, Polvdor. 1982 E.C .R., p.329.
177 See G.Bebr, ‘Agreements Concluded by the Community and their Possible Direct Effect: From International Fruit 
Company to Kupferberg’, 20 C.M .L.Rev., 1983, p.46.
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international commitments without first examining whether rights to individuals are conferred.178 
In this context, it is increasingly being realised that “the proliferation, increasing complexity and 
greater domestic impact o f environmental agreements suggest that new agreements are likely to 
create rights more appropriate to direct enforcement or more likely to prejudice individuals”,179 and, 
consequently, more likely to be enforceable as an integral part o f the Community legal order, [public 
interest litigation in Mediterranean M ember States can involve implementation o f the Barcelona 
Convention and Protocols as a matter o f Community law to the extent they contain directly 
applicable provisions]
Indeed, the concept o f ‘direct effect’ is particularly significant when the Member State has 
not acted as it should in order to give a Directive full force. However, one must always bear in mind 
the restrictions inherent in it, namely that a Directive is not directly applicable in its entirety, i.e. the 
parts that give States a margin o f discretion are not, and only the core o f the legal rules therein can 
have such effects;180 nor can it impose in itself obligations on individuals, as it is addressed only to 
States,181 and, thus, it cannot be relied upon, after expiry o f the time limit, against such persons;182 
and last but not least, that environmental Directives usually instruct authorities to take certain 
measures and are not drafted with the specific objective o f creating rights for individuals.183
This last point presents the greatest difficulty for present purposes, in view o f the fact that 
there is very little litigation in both European and national courts to give any more guidance on this 
issue. In this context, it has been suggested that it would be very helpful if  Directives were drafted 
more closely in the style o f Regulations, so as to grant rights to individuals even in the absence o f 
proper application by the respective state.184 On the other hand, the notion o f ‘rights’ in the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence is rather wider than in most national legal systems.185 Although a general interest is 
not sufficient, the group o f individuals concerned is rather extended according to the Court’s 
reasoning; in the environmental context, for example, it has found that Directives establishing limit 
values for substances in water or air confer rights on the persons whose health might be endangered
178 See, e.g., Case 40/72 , Schroeder v. Fed. Rep, o f  Germany. 1973 E.C.R., p .125; and Case 181/73, loc.cit. n .l 13.
179 See M .Hession, ‘The Role o f  the EC in Implementation o f  International Environmental Law’, 2(4) R.E.C.I.E.L., 
1993, p.345.
180 Case 88/79, Grunert. 1980 E.C.R., p. 1827.; cf. Case 286/85, McDermott and Cotter v. The Minister for Social 
Welfare. 1987 E.C.R., p.1453. See L.Kr&mer, Focus on European Environm ental L aw , 2nd ed., 1997, pp.93-103, for 
a discussion o f  the directly applicable provisions o f  certain environmental Directives.
181 Case 152/84, loc.cit. n . l72, p.723,
182 But Kramer submits that public authorities must apply a Directive, after its time limit has elapsed, even if  it imposes 
additional burdens to individuals, op.cit. n . l80, p .l 10.
183 See S .D ouglas-Scott, ‘Environmental Rights in the European Union - Participatory Democracy or Democratic 
D eficit?’, in Boyle & Anderson (eds.), op.cit. n.2, pp.122-3.
184 See R.Wdgenbaur, ‘The European Community’s Policy on Implementation o f  Environmental Directives’, 14 
Fordham L.Rev., 1990-91, p.469.
185 See J.G.J.Lefcvere, ‘State Liability for Breaches o f  Community Law’, 5(8/9) E u r.E n v’l L.Rev., 1996, pp.241-2; 
and Prechal, op.cit. n . l 21, pp. 129-44.
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by not reaching these values.186 That o f  course does not necessarily mean that there should be a 
national remedy available to protect such rights or that standing should be given contrary to national 
rules, as will be made clear later.
Be that as it may, all ‘directly effective5 Community law, either primary or secondary, as 
well as international agreements binding on the Community, prevail over national law of any 
nature,187 even if adopted subsequently?8 In fact, it is more accurate to say that, in the latter 
instance, adoption o f such legislation is not valid to the extent it is incompatible with Community 
provisions. Member States have a positive obligation to repeal conflicting legislation,189 but the 
judiciary cannot wait for that; it has to give full effect to the Community rule and not apply any 
inconsistent statute whenever such an issue arises.
More precisely, the national judge must examine o f his own motion - ex officio - whether 
a piece o f  legislation he intends to implement conforms to any relevant Community set o f rules and, 
moreover, must apply the pertinent ‘directly effective5 provisions even absent invocation by a party 
to the case before him .190 It is further established that national courts have an interpretative 
obligation to construe national law in the light o f the wording and purpose o f  relevant Directives,191 
both in cases o f implementing legislation and when the respective Community rules have not been 
transposed;192 the same obligation applies for the administration.193 However, the national judge is 
not unaided in this task; he can request the ECJ to deliver a preliminary ruling under Article 234 of 
the EC Treaty, which will be binding on his final decision,194 on questions on the interpretation of 
primary and secondary Community law,193 o f the statutes o f organs established by an act o f the 
Council, or on the validity of Community acts. This interaction o f  the national judiciary with the
186 See, among others, Case C-58/89, Commission v. Germany. 1991 E.C.R., p.1-4983; and Case 361/88, loc.cit. n. 137. 
See also L.Krhmer, European Environm ental Law Casebook, 1993, pp.368-9.lt is, nevertheless, true that this line o f  
jurisprudence is not consistent. For instance, the Court on another occasion held that Directive 75/442 on waste defines 
the framework for the action to be taken by the Member States regarding the treatment o f  waste and does not require, 
in itself, the adoption o f  specific measures or a particular method o f  waste disposal; it is therefore neither unconditional 
nor sufficiently precise, and thus is not capable o f  conferring rights on which individuals may rely as against the state, 
i.e, it cannot be construed as ‘directly effective’, see Case C -236/92, 1994 E.C.R., p.I-483; cf. L.Kramer, 
E.C.Environm ental Law, 4th ed,, 2000, p.289.
187 See Hartley, op.cit. n .l 17, p p ,218-20; and Prechal, op.cit. n.121, pp. 119-22.
188 See, e.g., Case 106/77, loc.cit. n .l 19, at paras. 17-18.
189 See Case 167/73, loc.cit. n . l20.
190 See Joined Cases 87 to 89/1990, A.Veholen and Others v. Sociale Vcrzekeringsbank. 1991 E .C .R , p .1-3757; and 
Case C -3 12/93, Peterbroeck. 1995 E.C.R., p.4599.
191 See Case 14/83, loc.cit. n.171; G.de Btirca, ‘Giving Effect to European Community D irectives’, 55 The Modern 
Law Rev., 1992, pp.217-9; and Prechal, op.cit. n .121, Chapter 10.
192 According to Prechal, in the in the latter case there is an obligation o f ‘remedial’ interpretation, see op.cit n.121, 
p.215.
193 Case 103/88, C oslanzo. 1989 E .C .R , p. 1839, at para.33; but sec Prechal, op.cit. n.121, pp.73-6.
m  See Hartley, op.cit. n .l 17, Chapter 9.
195 One o f  the earliest and most notable environmental cases brought before the Court for a preliminary judgment was 
Case 21/76, Handelskwekerii GJ Bier v. Mines de Potasses d'Alsace. 1976 E.C.R., p. 1735, where the ECJ interpreted 
the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement o f  Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters so as to 
give victims o f  transboundary pollution a free choice o f  venue.
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European Court and the resulting jo in t legal interpretations provide the best illustration o f how 
closely intertwined the Community and the Member States legal orders are. In fact, the ECJ has the 
opportunity to clarify a series o f issues when asked for preliminary rulings with regard to 
environmental Directives, and has already delivered authoritative interpretations for several such 
instruments.196
Beyond that well-settled process, a 1990 ECJ ruling seems to have opened the way for what 
has been called the ‘indirect effect’ o f Directives. Pursuant to the M arleasing case,197 when a 
Directive has not been transposed by a Member State - or has been partially or wrongly transposed, 
national courts have to interpret national law, whether it concerns legislation adopted prior to or 
subsequent to the Directive, as far as possible, within the light o f the wording and the purpose o f the 
Directive in order to achieve the result envisaged by it. It has been repeatedly suggested that the 
C ourt’s findings go beyond a mere interpretative obligation and in substance require the national 
judge to give effect to the provisions o f Directives regardless o f the terms o f  national legislation 
being interpreted.198 This raises questions o f legitimacy o f the courts’ task as it has the potential to 
frustrate legitimate expectations o f the parties.199 However, according to the EC J’s own words, this 
function should be performed by a national court “so far as it is given discretion under national 
law”,200 so that the division o f powers within a certain jurisdiction is not unacceptably altered.
This doctrine - also classified as ‘horizontal direct effect’,201 in view o f the fact that it 
imports a Directive otherwise inapplicable even in litigation between private parties -,202 if further 
developed and clarified by the Court,203 could have significant repercussions for direct litigation 
against individuals or corporations acting in contravention o f the objectives laid down in 
environmental Directives, without having to go through administrative proceedings challenging 
related administrative acts first.
1% See, P.Sands, ‘European Community Environmental Law: Legislation, the European Court o f  Justice and Common- 
Intcresl Groups’, 53(5) The M odem  Law  Rev, 1990, at fn.82; and Case C -l 18/94, 1996 E.C.R., p .1-1223, on the Wild 
Birds Directive; Case 359/88, 1990 E.C.R., p.I-1509, on the Waste Directives; Case 295/82 , 1984 E.C.R., p.575, on the 
Used Oils Directive; and Case C-236/92, loc.cit. n.186, on the non-existence o f  directly effective provisions in Directive 
75/442.
197 Case C - l06/89, Marleasing v. Comercial Internacional de Alimentacibn. 1990 E.C.R., p.I-4135.
198 For French jurisprudence accepting this notion, see D.Curtin, ‘Directives: The Effectiveness o f  Judicial Protection 
o f  Individual Rights’, 27  C.M .L.Rev., 1990, pp.725-6.
199 See, am ong others, de Bdrca, op.cit. n. 191, pp.223 and 227-33; N.M altby, ‘M arleasing : What is All the Fuss 
About?’, 109 The Law Q uarterly Review, pp.301-11, and relevant literature at fn. 1
209 See Prechal, op.cit. n.121, pp.240-5.
201 See, e.g., ibid, pp.295-305.
202 See discussion o f  that effect in J.Stuyck & P.Wytinck, ‘Case C - l06/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial 
Internacional de Aliinentacion SA, Judgment o f  13 Novem ber 1990', 28 C.M .L.Rev,, pp.205-23.
21)3 In fact, in case C -316/93, Vaneetveld v. Le Fover. 1994 E.C.R., p.1-763, Advocate General Jacobs proposed that 
the distinction be abandoned in favour o f  the principle that directives may im pose directly effective obligations on 
individuals; however, the Court did not find it necessary to decide on this point. For a staunch advocation o f  such a 
‘horizontal effect’, see Conforti, op.cit. n.8, pp.37-8.
326
In the last few years, the Court also developed the notion o f ‘non-contractual strict liability’ 
incurred by M ember States for loss or damage caused to individuals as a result o f breaches of 
Community obligations - irrespectively o f their being ‘directly effective’ or not - for which the state 
- i.e. its legislative or executive branch - can be held responsible.204 In these cases - none o f which 
related to environmental obligations, however, - the ECJ repeatedly said that certain conditions must 
be met for a right to reparation to exist: the rule o f law infringed must be intended to confer rights 
on individuals, and in case o f a Directive being breached, the content o f  these rights must be 
possible to ascertain on the basis o f the latter’s provisions; the breach must be sufficiently serious; 
and there must be a causal link between the violation resting on the State and the damage suffered 
by the injured parties. This is arguably an even more legitimate construction than the principle of 
‘direct’ - let alone ‘indirect’ - effect.205
Accordingly, incorrect transposition o f a Directive into national law can give rise to the 
appropriate circumstances for state liability.206 However, in such a case the ‘seriousness’-of-the- 
breach criterion will depend on whether the Member State ‘manifestly and gravely’ disregarded the 
limits on its rule-making powers, which in turn hinges on the clarity and precision o f the rule 
infringed, and the measure o f discretion left to Member States.207 The ECJ has, indeed, left it to 
national legal systems to elaborate further substantive and procedural rules o f liability and 
compensation, with the minimum requirements that these must not be less favourable than those 
relating to similar domestic claims, and must not be so framed as to make it virtually impossible or 
excessively difficult to obtain reparation. Should such claims be upheld in national courts they may 
provide an even better guarantee o f Member State compliance, “since it will in practice be much 
more difficult... to disregard a decision o f their own courts... than it is to disregard the decision o f 
the more remote Court o f Justice”.208 However, only few cases o f application o f  the so-called 
‘Francovich principle’ by national courts are known to d a te 209
204 See Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and Others v. Italy. 1991 E.C.R., p.I- 
5357; Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Bracherie du Pecheur and Factorame. 1996 E.C.R., p.I-1029, at para,31; Case 
C-5/94, Hedlev Lomas. 1996 E.C.R., p.I-2553; Joined Cases C -178/94, C -179/94, C -188/94, C -189/94, and C-190/94, 
Erich Dillenkofer and Others v. Germany. 1996 E.C.R ,, p .1-4845, at para.20; Joined Cases C -283/94, C-291/94 and C- 
292/94, Denkavit International BV and Others v. Bundesant filr Finanzen. 1996 E .C .R ., p .1-5063, at paras.47-50; and 
Case C-66/95, Judgment o f2 2  April 1977. See, generally, Prechal, op.cit. n.121, Chapter 12. On Francovich. see C.Plaza 
Martin, ‘Furthering the Effectiveness o f  EC Directives and the Judicial Protection o f  Individual Rights Thereunder’, 43 
I.C .L.Q ., 1994, pp.35-50; and J.H.Jans, European Environm ental Law, 1995, Ch.IV (2).
205 See J.Steiner, ‘From Direct Effects to Francovich: Shifting Means o f  Enforcement o f  Community Law’, 18 
Eur.L.Rev., 1993, pp.9-10.
206 See Case C -392/93, British Telecommunications. 1996 E.C.R., p.1-1631, at para.40.
2U7 See Joined Cases C -283/94, C -291/94 and C -292/94, loc.cit. n.204, at para.50. Other factors to be taken into 
account are whether the infringement and the damage caused was intentional or involuntary, whether an error o f  law was 
excusable or inexcusable, whether a position taken by a Community institution contributed towards the breach, and the 
adoption or retention o f  national measures contrary to Community law.
208 Curtin, op.cit. n .193, p.712. In the same vein, see Plaza Martin, op.cit. n.204, p.45.
2ro For the relevant case-law, including French and Spanish, see Lefevere, op.cit.n .\& 5, p.238 at fn.3. An example o f  
Greek jurisprudence applying the Francovich doctrine is the High Court’s (Areios Pagos) Decision N o .13/1992,
(continued...)
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Having said that, there now exists at least the possible alternative o f invoking the doctrine 
o f state liability as an effective remedy,210 to the extent a right cannot be enforced before national 
courts on the grounds that the underlying provision has no ‘direct effect’, for instance because it 
imposes obligations on others than the state.211 It is equally true that the Francovich ruling 
establishes at least in principle a basis according to which Member States could be liable for 
damages resulting from their failure to implement environmental Directives which create ‘individual 
rights’, e.g. setting water or air quality standards, or giving the right to participate in environmental 
impact assessments or o f access to information.212 That is despite fears that a rather constrictive 
interpretation is likely to result from the Court’s wording unless the state involved has failed to 
transpose an environmental directive altogether. It has even been suggested that an individual’s 
claim to reparation in such a situation is more likely to succeed when there exists a previous ruling 
on the same case or subject matter, and especially one based on the Article 226 procedure; in all 
other cases, the outcome would be at least uncertain.213
More generally, Community law does not provide for special remedies that should exist in 
national jurisdictions to safeguard individual rights;214 it basically protects national procedural 
autonomy, and only requires a minimum o f equal availability o f recourse for breaches of 
Community law on terms no less favourable than for similar infringements o f national law.215 More 
specifically, Member States are required to penalise infringements o f  Community law with 
appropriate penalties; the choice o f  the latter is left to the form er’s discretion, but they must be at 
least effective, proportionate and dissuasive, and analogous to penalties for similar infringements 
o f national law.216 It has been rightly pointed out, however, that this ‘equal treatment’ leads to 
‘unequal’ remedies and procedures in the Community as a whole, in view o f the very divergent 
procedural systems that operate in the various countries.217
209(... continued) 
unreported.
210 See ibid, p.241.
211 See re-affirmation o f  the principle in Case C -91/92, Paola Faccini Pori v. Rccreb Sri. 1994 E.C.R., p .1-3325.
212 See Sands, op.cit. n.3, p.671. But cf. Case 236/92 Difesa della Cava. 1994 E.C .R., 1-483; and W.Abboud, ‘EC 
Environmental Law and Member State Liability - Towards a Fourth generation o f  Community Rem edies’, 7(1) 
R.E.C.J.E.L., 1998, pp.88-91.
213 See Lefevere, op.cit. n. 185, pp.240-1.
214 See Case 158/80, Rewe v.Hauptzollamt Kiel. 1981 E.C.R., p. 1805.
215 See, e.g., Case 45/76, Comet v.Produktschap voor Siergewassen. 1976 E.C.R., p.2043; and Prechal, op.cit. n. 121, 
pp. 148-87.
216 See Case 8/88, Commission v. Greece. 1989 E.C.R., p.2965. Note also that the Council has urged the Commission  
to consider including in its future proposals for environmental instruments a provision requiring national measures to 
comprise appropriate dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance with the requirements o f  the relevant Community acts, 
see EC Council, op.cit. n,164, at para.12; and EC Commission, First..., op.cit. n .146, pp .10-1.
217 See J.Bridge, ‘Procedural Aspects o f  the Enforcement o f  European Community Law through the Legal Systems 
o f  the Member Slates’, 10 E w .L .R ev., 1985, p.40.
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Only when national provisions are not adequate to effectively enforce Community law, or, 
in the Court’s words, the exercise of Community rights is rendered “virtually impossible or 
excessively difficult”,218 are Member States under a duty to provide for special remedies.219 In this 
connection, all legal systems should respect, inter alia, the principle that a decision by a national 
authority rejecting a claim under Community law must be reasoned and subject to judicial review;220 
that in cases involving Community law where the sole obstacle to the granting o f an interim 
injunction is a rule o f national law, that rule should be set aside;221 and that a M ember state cannot 
rely on national time limits for bringing proceedings to claims arising under a Directive, until the 
latter has been properly implemented.222
Still, the core issue for individuals challenging state behaviour before the courts, especially 
when environmental Directives protecting collective interests are in question, is that o f standing. 
This is a matter also left to national law to define,223 to the extent the right to effective judicial 
protection is not undermined.224 Consequently, the great divergence o f relevant rules in Member 
States is maintained, still placing an additional barrier to the effective enforcement o f Community 
environmental law.225 Long experience has shown, however, that complaints by concerned citizens 
can be best handled at the local level where they arise. As a general rule, the public do not have 
sufficient access to the national courts for environmental matters, although these fo ra  are better 
placed to take into account the particular context o f the environmental measures as it applies in each 
M ember State, and especially to grant appropriate interim  measures. Such access would make it 
more likely that individual cases concerning problems o f implementation o f  Community law are 
resolved in accordance with the latter’s requirements, and could even deter potentially liable actors 
from breaching environmental regulations.226 Hence, calls for the development o f more considered 
principles and procedures taking into account the various private and collective interests that may 
be affected by a flawed implementation o f Community rules are increasingly heard.227
218 See Case C -3 12/93, loc.cit. n. 190.
219 See, e.g., Von Colson, loc.cit. n. 172, at para.23.
220 Case 222/86, UNECTEF v. H evlens. 1987 E.C.R., p.4097.
221 Case C -213/89, R. v. Secretary o f  State for Transport ex parte  Factorame (N o .2). 1990 E.C.R., p .1-2433.
222 Case C -208/90, Emmott. 1991 E.C.R., p. 1-4269.
223 See Prechal, op.cit. n.121, pp. 166-8; and infra, Chapter 8, p.354.
224 See Joined Cases C-87 to C -89/90, 1991 E.C.R., p.I-3757, at para.23.
225 See Douglas-Scott, op.cit. n. 183, pp. 124-5.
226 EC Com mission, op.cit. n.163, p.12.
227 See, e.g., Macrory, op.cit. n.169, pp.367-8; and E.Rehbinder, 1 Locus Standi, Community Law and the Case for 
Harmonization, in H .Somsen (ed.), op.cit. n.170, pp. 151-66..
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7.3. Concluding Remarks.
Summing up the main findings o f this Chapter, one must start from the realisation that the 
task o f implementing environmental standards laid down in international treaties within each party’s 
jurisdiction is usually very complex and demanding, requiring legislative action, as well as practical 
measures and investments and/or institutional changes for its effective completion. The applicable 
instruments, adopted both at the Community and regional or global levels, do not, as a rule, describe 
the necessary actions in great detail, thus leaving a great measure o f  discretion as to the choice of 
means. Still, this does not imply a lesser duty to comply and effectively execute international 
undertakings. Even when international instruments lay down in rather precise terms the necessary 
implementing measures, however, it is often observed that the states liable to adopt them remain 
inactive, especially outside the Community system where at least formal transposition is sooner or 
later achieved. Hence, the set o f rules adopted in the MAP context have not directly resulted in a 
respective transformation o f  the legal framework in Mediterranean countries.
A scertaining the degree o f formal compliance is difficult enough as far as international 
rules, and rather easier as far as environmental Directives, are concerned, but when one turns to 
practical and effective compliance both systems present a notable weakness both to closely follow 
what is actually happening and to enforce unfulfilled norms. This is where national legal orders with 
their full arsenal o f compliance-control and enforcement mechanisms emerge as a crucial 
complement to centralised enforcement.
If  this is made possible at all in relation to general international law, it is through the 
incorporation o f treaty rules, according to the constitutional law of each country, and the critical role 
o f the judiciaiy, which, with varied effectiveness - as well as willingness, for that matter -, translates 
the former and ensures compliance in concrete cases. The jurisprudence o f  the Greek Council o f 
State shows what a great impact an environmentally-conscious national judge can have in a 
relatively short period o f time. However, it is submitted that the absence o f any internationally 
harmonised procedural guarantees that will empower the citizens to bring appropriate cases before 
the courts, thus allowing the latter to better enforce international environmental standards in 
individual countries is strongly felt.
Accurate, timely and effective implementation o f Community law, on the other hand, may 
be pursued by much more concise and powerful means o f  decentralised enforcement, since the 
national judge is much more closely associated, in fact subordinated, to the Community legal order, 
and under precise duties that relate to the rectification o f both public and private non-compliance 
with Community norms. Concerned individuals are additionally given an array o f possible ways to 
challenge such practices, using the doctrines o f ‘direct’ and ‘indirect effect’, and o f ‘state liability’, 
albeit after a series o f stringent conditions have been satisfied. Despite this advanced setting, the 
Community system is not adequate in its results and is similarly still lacking in uniform minimum
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remedies and procedural standards, prominent among which are rules 011 standing, so as to better 
enable concerned citizens and their associations to take up the task o f enforcing environmental 
norms at the municipal level.
The idea that national courts are appropriate fo ra  to enforce intenational and Community 
environmental law is in fact increasingly acknowledged among international lawyers.228 It follows 
that international law in general needs to find concrete legal ways to intervene in the sphere of 
national procedural mechanisms, until recently viewed as the reserved domain of domestic 
jurisdiction, and gradually turn them into effective vehicles for control over compliance with 
international environmental obligations. The next Chapter will look into some tentative efforts 
towards that direction.
2211 See D.Bodansky & J.Brunncd, ‘The Role o f  National Courts in the Field o f  International Environmental Law’, 7(1) 
R.E.C.J.E.L., 1998, pp .11-20; M .Holley, ‘Sustainable Developm ent in Central America: Translating regional 
Environmental Accords into Dom estic Enforcement A ction’, 25 E cology L.Q., 1998, pp.89-119; D.S.Ardia, ‘Does the 
Emperor have no Clothes? Enforcement o f  International Laws Protecting the Marine Environment’, 19 Michigan 
1998, pp.555-63; D.Noble, ‘Enforcing EC Environmental Law: The National Dim ension’, in Somsen (ed.), op.cit. n. 170, 
p.46; and H.G.Schermers, ‘The Role o f Domestic Courts in Effectuating International Law’, in M.Brus et al. (eds.), The 
U nited N ations D ecade o f  International Law  - Reflections on International D ispute Settlem ent, 1991, pp.77-85.
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CHAPTER 8.
P r o c e d u r a l  R ig h t s : To o l s  f o r  I m p l e m e n t a t io n  a n d  
C o m p l ia n c e  C o n tr o l  o f  In t e r n a t io n a l  E n v ir o n m e n t a l  
Ob l ig a t io n s  i n  th e  M e d it e r r a n e a n .
This Chapter continues the line o f  reasoning developed in Chapter 7 and considers the 
extent to which international and Community law has introduced and established a series o f 
procedural rights with a view at improving the law-making and law-enforcement machinery for 
environmental protection within individual states.
Prompted by the development o f very advanced enforcement systems in the framework of 
the European and American human rights regimes, there has recently been considerable discussion 
on the need to establish a right to/on the environment as a human right, so as to expand the coverage 
o f  the relevant compliance-control mechanisms in the environmental sphere.1 From a substantive 
point o f view, if  one examines the constitutional orders o f Mediterranean states, it is actually 
possible to find some o f them, mostly on the European coast, establishing a right to live in a healthy, 
balanced environment, 2 and additionally defining that it is the duty o f the state and the local 
government - but often o f the citizens as well - to preserve and enhance the natural environment - 
sometimes with particular reference to special protection o f the sea -3 and to prevent environmental 
pollution.4 Furthermore, in some countries such as Greece, conservation and protection of the 
quality o f  the environment in general is deemed to contribute towards enhanced quality o f life, and 
thus positive development o f  individuals, and consequently enjoys the full protection o f  goods 
linked to the personality.5
1 See, among others, A .E ,B oyle & M.R.Anderson (eds.), Human Rights A pproaches to Environm ental Protection, 
1996.
2 See 1990 Croatian Constitution, Article 69(2); Turkish Constitution, Article 56; 1991 Slovenian Constitution, 
Article 72; and Spanish Constitution, Article 45(1).
3 See 1990 Croatian Constitution, Article 52.
4 See 1990 Croatian Constitution, Article 69(3); Greek Constitution, Article 24(1); M altese Constitution, Section 9; 
Turkish Constitution, Article 56; 1991 Slovenian Constitution, Article 73; and Spanish Constitution, Article 45(1) and 
(2), which, moreover in para.3 provides that the violators o f  the said duties will face penal or administrative sanctions, 
and shall be obliged to repair the damage caused.
5 See Court o f  First Instance ofN auplion , No. 163/1991, EmBediptjcTij Epnopixov Ancaiou (R eview  o f  Commercial 
Law), VoI.pP, 1991, p.628, whereby hampering the use o f  the sea and coast by way o f  pollution caused by industrial 
discharges may provide the grounds for an actionable claim on the mere basis o f  Article 57 o f  the Civil Code concerning 
protection o f  the human personality; and in the same vein, Court o f  First Instance o f  V olos, D ecision N o. 1097/1989, 
Nopuco Bt}pa [Legal Tribune], V ol.38, p.308; and One-Member Court o f  First Instance o f  Serrcs, Decision No. 12/1994, 
Nopo^Kai <Puai] [Law and Nature], V ol.2(1), 1995, p.203.
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However, constitutional provisions on environmental protection are usually treated as mere
guidelines to the legislature to enact proper legislation as far as it is possible; thus, the Spanish
provision is not enforceable through a constitutional complaint brought by an individual,6 while the
Maltese Constitution explicitly adds that these guiding principles are not “rights enforceable in any
court” (Section 2 1).7 In general, it would be fair to say that different attitudes o f courts in different
countries make the constitutional provision enforceable or not, and, in this connection, there is an
on-going debate over the appropriate role o f the judiciary.8
At the international level, it has been convincingly argued that a substantive and generic
right to a decent environment “would add little to what already exists in international law” and may
be largely redundant,9 and that it would be much more constructive to focus on certain procedural
aspects that should be harmonised worldwide.10 In fact, the Rio Declaration reaffirms the desirability
o f  such a development in Principle 10, which reads:
“Environmental issues are best handled with the participation o f all concerned citizens, at 
the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to 
information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including 
information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity 
to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public 
awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to 
judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.”11
As Principle 10 indicates, such rights may include, for instance, civic participation in 
planning and decision-making, including participation in environmental impact assessment 
procedures; rights to information; rights o f legal redress, including broad locus standi to facilitate 
public interest litigation, and the right to effective remedies in case of environmental damage. These 
prerogatives are complementary in the sense that together they form the backdrop on which 
concerned citizens and their associations can rely in order to follow up and enforce international 
environmental norms at the domestic level.
6 See S.Douglas-Scott, ‘Environmental Rights in the European Union - Participatory Democracy or Democratic 
Deficit?’, in Boyle & Anderson (eds.), op.cit. n .l , pp. 110-1.
7 N ote that in the United States as well courts almost uniformly hold that general environmental provisions in the 
Constitution are ineffective absent additional legislation, see Pollard 111, ‘A  Promise Unfulfilled: Environmental 
Provisions in State Constitutions and the Self-Execution Question”, 5 Vanderbilt J. o f  N at.Res.L ., 1986, p.351.
K See F.du Bois, ‘Social Justice and the Judicial Enforcement o f  Environmental Rights and D uties’, in Boyle & 
Anderson (eds.), op.cit. n .l , pp. 153-75.
lJ See, e.g., A .Boyle, ‘The R ole o f  Human Rights Law in the Protection o f  the Environment’, in A .E.Boyle & 
M.R.Anderson (eds.), op.cit. n .l ,  pp.48-57.
10 See ibid, pp.59-63; M.R.Anderson, ‘Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: An Overview’, in 
Boyle & Anderson (eds.), op.cit. n .l , pp.1-23, at p.9; and Douglas-Scott, op.cit. n.6, pp.l 12-22. See also the Final Report 
on Environmental Rights by the Special Rapporteur Ksentini o f  the UN Sub-Com m ission on Prevention o f  
Discrimination and Protection o f  Minorities, UN Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9, csp.at paras 67-70, 220 and 221, discussed  
in J.Cameron & R.M ackenzie, ‘A ccess to Environmental Justice and Procedural Rights in International Institutions’, 
in Boyle & Anderson (eds.), op.cit. n .l ,  pp. 129-52.
11 See also Agenda 21, Ch.23, esp .at23.2 . But cf. Climate Change Convention, Article.6.
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Accordingly, the following Sections will examine in more detail the requirement of prior 
environmental impact assessment, public access to environmental information, and public access 
to administrative and judicial proceedings. The last Section o f this Chapter is devoted to the 1993 
North American Agreement on Environmental Co-operation which represents the most advanced 
instance o f international law intruding in the reserved sphere o f national enforcement of 
environmental laws outside the EU to date.
8.1. Environm ental Im pact Assessment with Public Participation.
The procedural requirement to carry out environmental impact assessments (EIAs) prior to 
any major project with possible environmental consequences is gaining widespread acceptance as 
a standard legitimately imposed by international law. This is thought to provide the necessary data 
that will inform, on one hand, the relevant decision-making process, and, on the other, any 
subsequent action the public may want to pursue in order to mitigate any adverse effects o f  the 
activities once these are authorised. Provisions to that effect are now quite common in most 
environmental treaties. Additionally, there exists an ad hoc instrument for the ECE region, the 1991 
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention). 
However, the most detailed and influential international regulation o f the matter is still found in the 
context o f Community law.
8,1.1. Global and Regional Instruments on Environmental Im pact Assessment.
More specifically, the LOSC introduces the requirement o f prior environmental assessment 
o f the potential effects o f activities under the jurisdiction or control o f  Parties, which may cause 
substantial pollution o f or significant harmful changes to the marine environment, and o f 
communication o f relevant reports (Art.206). Although this proviso does not impose an absolute or 
strict duty o f environmental impact assessment - which still arguably flows directly from the 
obligation not to cause environmental harm - since such an assessment is compulsory only ‘as far 
as practicable’, it is significant in that it stresses the importance o f anticipating harm and not dealing 
with it ex post facto. In that sense, it has certainly influenced the decision o f  Mediterranean states 
to incorporate a general requirement to that effect in the revised Barcelona Convention. In view o f 
the impressive number o f conventional stipulations that reiterate this rule,12 it is quite clear that
12 See, e.g. 1986 Noum ea Convention, Art. 16; 1978 Kuwait Regional Convention, Art.XI; 1982 Jeddah Regional 
Convention, Art.XI; 1981 West and Central Africa Regional Convention, Art. 13; 1983 Wider Caribbean Regional 
Convention, Art. 12; 1985 East Africa regional Convention, Art. 13; 1989 South- East Pacific Protected Areas Protocol, 
Art.VIII; 1990 Wider Caribbean Specially Protected Areas Protocol, Art.13; while Art.7 o f  the 1992 Helsinki 
Convention, despite its title, is in reality a notification and consultation article, which still implicitly recognises the 
existence o f  EIA obligations.
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studies to assess the impact o f proposed activities to the marine environment are today a mandatory 
requirement.
That makes the inclusion o f E1A provisions in the 1995 revision o f the Barcelona 
Convention and Protocols a rather late, albeit necessary, progressive step. Under the revised 
Convention, EIA is a prerequisite for authorising any proposed activity “ likely to cause a significant 
adverse impact on the marine environment” (Art.4(3)(c)), Despite the value o f  this provision as 
such, one cannot help noticing that it is rather hortatory - or else a guiding principle as opposed to 
a minimum standard - allowing too much discretion to the Parties as far as the actual procedure is 
concerned, with no guidelines, let alone projects for which prior EIA would be compulsory, to limit 
this discretion in any way.
Oil the other hand, the revised Dumping Protocol introduces a rather more streamlined EIA 
procedure, without even explicitly stating so: The dumping of some specified categories of wastes 
that may still be legitimately carried out requires a prior special permit that may only be issued after 
“careful consideration o f the factors set forth in the Annex”, which comprise all possible effects o f 
the proposed activity on amenities, marine life, and any other use o f  the sea, as well as possible 
alternatives (A rt.6 (l) and Annex, at C).
It is regrettable that there is no such prerequisite in the revised Land-Based Sources 
Protocol, despite the stated requirement for an authorisation and regulation system to be set up in 
each country. An EIA prerequisite in this context would likely lead to a radical reversal o f the 
burden o f  proof as discharges o f dangerous substances into the aquatic environment would not only 
be regulated and carried out under specified conditions, but the entrepreneur would have to produce 
scientific evidence that a particular activity in a precise area would not have excessive malevolent 
effects in order to be given consent in the first place.
That is exactly what is foreseen in the Offshore Protocol, in which legal prescriptions 
become much more concrete. A “survey concerning the effects o f the proposed activity on the 
environment” always forms part o f the application to commence operations addressed to the 
competent authority (Art.5(l)(a) and 6(1))). The latter may also request a full EIA to be carried out, 
depending on the character o f the proposed activity, which must contain all elements listed in Annex 
IV. The notion o f post-project analysis is also discernible in the operator’s obligation to monitor the 
effects o f activities on the environment, under the supervision o f the competent authority 
(Art. 19(1)).
The importance o f the inadequate formulation o f the revised Barcelona Convention 
previously noted is somewhat minimised in the event another state is likely to suffer an adverse 
impact (Art.4(3)(d)). Then the state concerned to protect its interests is probably going to make an 
appropriate claim, and thus initiate the assessment procedure. In this context, the Espoo Convention 
is very relevant - albeit applicable only to European Mediterranean states - to the extent it elaborates
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on the EIA procedure that is required for projects with an impact felt across borders. Although the 
Convention has only recently entered into force,13 it has influenced other international instruments, 
and certainly the amendments to the EIA Directive discussed below.14
The purpose o f this Convention is, more broadly, to ‘prevent, reduce and control significant 
adverse transboundary environmental impact from proposed activities’ (A rt.2(l)). For that, Parties 
have to take all necessary measures (Art.2(2)), including the establishment o f procedures for 
carrying out ElAs with a specified minimum content; and notification to and consultation with other 
Parties likely to be affected by the planned activity (Arts.2(4) and (5), 3 and 5). Its material scope 
is wider than the EC D irective’s,15 as it applies also to large pipelines, large dams, major mining, 
offshore hydrocarbon production, major oil and chemical storage facilities, and deforestation o f 
large areas (Appendix I). As the EIA requirement applies to activities likely to have ‘a significant 
adverse environmental impact’ (Art.2(3)), criteria to assist in that determination are set out in 
Appendix III. A noteworthy procedure is that established under Appendix IV, whereby the ultimate 
decision on whether the potential impact is significant, and consequently on whether to carry out 
an EIA or not, is considerably limited by the authoritative opinion o f an inquiry commission. EIAs 
are transmitted to Parties likely to be affected, and, importantly, the public in areas likely to be 
affected has the right - a right that has to be equivalent to that enjoyed by the citizens o f the country 
o f origin (Art.2(6)) - to be informed on the content o f EIAs and formulate comments that are 
transferred to the country o f origin before the decision is taken (Art.4(2)).
Post-project analysis is also called for, with ensuing duties to notify and consult with states 
found to be affected at that stage (Art.7). This is a very essential new element in the EIA concept, 
because it imports the idea that the process prescribed should be taken seriously into account when 
deciding a project, and the soundness o f  any decision should be tested by monitoring and further 
analyses after the activity in question has gone under way. In fact, as early as 1987, the ECE Task 
Force on EIA had pointed that “a successful EIA is one which ensures that all relevant impacts 
associated with the proposed project are adequately and fully taken into account in the decision­
making process”.16 It follows that EIA must not be viewed as a mere formality, but rather guide 
action - or inaction - in a substantive way. As studies o f  future impact are rarely straightforward or 
produce a completely guaranteed prognosis, the ‘precautionary principle’ comes into play in the 
relevant decision-making.
13 In September 1997. From the Mediterranean states only Albania, Croatia and the EU Members have ratified it to 
date.
1,1 See also ECE, Current Policies, Strategies and A spects o f  Environm ental Im pact A ssessm ent in a Transboundary 
Context, 1996, p.vii.
15 See infra, p.336.
IG ECE, ‘Application o f  Environmental impact Assessment, Highways and D am s’, Environm ental Series 1, 1987, 
ECE/ENV/50, pp.33 and 60.
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Environmental assessment procedures are being currently introduced in Mediterranean 
states at an increasing pace; although, by 1992, apart from EU members, the only Mediterranean 
countries that had enacted EIA legislation were Cyprus, Israel and Turkey,17 some form o f relevant 
legislation - albeit not fully implementing the Espoo Convention -18 is today in place also in Albania, 
Croatia, Malta and Slovenia.19 What is more, it seems there is considerable scope for rapid 
expansion o f  the standard in the Southern coast which is manifestly lagging behind. In 1995, for 
instance, the African Ministers responsible for the environment solemnly declared their commitment 
to adopt national EIA instruments, with special attention to coastal areas, and recognised that 
although financial and technical resources still sparse in Africa would be needed, they would 
exhaust all internal and external sources to achieve this objective. In this context, they agreed on a 
number o f co-operative measures to enhance capacity in implementing EIA procedures in the 
continent, importantly including the future adoption o f a relevant regional Convention.20
8.1.2. Council Directive 85/337 on Environmental Impact Assessment.
Let us now turn to this very important piece of Community legislation, the first ‘horizontal’ 
instrument having broad repercussions in all environmental sectors and indeed many areas of 
economic and social activity. Hence, it is not surprising that it took five years to negotiate, and that 
its wording is often vague and unclear.
The Directive lays down a procedure, whereby, according to a ‘preventive’ rationale, before 
permission is granted for certain development projects, likely to have significant effect on the 
environment, because of their nature, size, location and other factors, a prior assessment o f possible 
environmental impacts must be executed (Art.2 (1) and (2)). EIA is mandatory for projects listed 
in Annex I (A rt.4(l)),21 whereas EIA on Annex II projects, deemed to have less intrinsic 
characteristics adversely affecting the environment, is left to the discretion o f Member State 
(Art.4(2)).22 The relevant determination involves specification o f certain categories o f projects or 
establishment o f criteria and/or thresholds (Art.4(3)).
The EIA must cover certain types o f environmental impacts and at the same time take 
account o f individual circumstances (Art.3), and is carried out by experts appointed by the developer
17 See N.A.Robinson, ‘International Trends in Environmental Impact A ssessm ent’, 19 Boston Coll.Env'l Aff.L.Rev., 
1992, p.597.
18 ECE, op.cit. n . l6, p.46.
19 See ibid, pp. 1-25.
20 See Communiqud o f  the African High-level Ministerial Meeting on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), 
Durban, South Africa, June 24-25, 1995, reprinted in World Bank, Environmental Assessm ent (EA) in Africa  - A World 
Bank Commitment (Proceedings o f  the Durban (South Africa) Workshop, June 25, 1995), 1996.
21 Nam ely oil refineries; large thermal power stations; nuclear power stations and radioactive storage and disposal 
installations; iron and steel works; asbestos and integrated chemical installations; motorways, railways and airports; ports 
and inland waterways; and hazardous waste landfill, incineration or treatment installations.
22 Annex II covers agriculture and food processing; extractive industry and metal processing; energy industry; glass 
manufacture; chemicals; textile, leather, wood, rubber and paper industry; infrastructure projects etc.
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(Art.5(l)), i.e. not independent. It must include detailed data meeting some minimum requirements 
(A rt.5(l) and (2) and Annex III), but also a non-technical summary, so as to make it accessible to 
the public. The latter, together with designated environmental authorities, is entitled to active 
participation before consent is given (Art.6); in particular, it has the right to be fully informed and 
submit comments on the proposed project. If a project is likely to have transfrontier reach, interested 
states must also be informed and consulted (Art.7), along the lines o f  the Espoo Convention. 
Finally, the parties consulted have the right to be informed about the decision and any conditions 
attached (Art.9).
The application o f this Directive has turned out to be very problematic.23 The transitional 
period 1985-1988 was apparently not sufficient for most Member States to adopt the necessary 
legislative instruments;24 thus, the process o f formulation o f  appropriate legislation continued 
through the early 90s in several countries, including Greece, France and Italy.25 This delay gave the 
ECJ the chance to proclaim the ‘direct effect’ o f certain provisions, especially o f Articles 2, 3 and 
8,26 which “ [rjegardless o f their details, ... unequivocally impose on the national authorities 
responsible for granting consent an obligation to carry out an assessment o f  the effects o f certain 
projects on the environment”.27 The Court had in this context a chance to clarify the doctrine: It held 
that the opportunity o f individuals to rely on provisions o f a Directive found to have ‘direct effect’ 
is not a condition for recognising ‘direct effect’, but conversely a consequence o f  that effect. 
Consequently, national authorities are under an obligation to abide by these provisions, irrespective 
o f whether individuals may invoke them as against the state.28
But even when they eventually proceeded to transposition, many European governments 
proved reluctant to make EIA mandatory for Annex II projects, some o f  which have a considerable 
impact on the environment; in fact, some countries have gone as far as excluding generally and 
definitely from possible assessment one or more classes o f projects included in Annex II, a practice 
recently reproved by the ECJ,29 Among Mediterranean Member States one can clearly distinguish 
two very different approaches: in France and Greece all categories o f Annex II projects are subject
23 In 1994, e.g., the lion’s share o f  infringements o f  environmental directives related to Dir.85/337; failure to assess 
the impact o f  specific Annex II projects was the commonest grounds o f  complaint, see EC Com mission, Twelfth Annual 
R eport on M onitoring the A pplication  o f  Community Law (1994), COM (95) 500 final, pp.63-4.
24 For a succinct summary o f  difficulties encountered in transposing the Directive, see EC Commission, Report from 
the Commission o f  the Implementation o f  Directive 85/337/EEC on the Assessment o f  the Effects o f  Certain Public and 
Private Projects on the Environment and Annex for the United Kingdom, COM (93) 28 final - Vol. 12, 2 April 1993, 
pp.64-5, Luxembourg was the only Member State against which an ECJ judgm ent has been issued for failure to abide 
by the deadline, see Case C -3I3/93, Commission v. Luxembourg. 1994 E.C.R., p.I-1279. Belgium has subsequently been 
condemned for incorrect transposition, see Case C -133/94, Commission v. Belgium . 1996 E.C.R., p.1-2323.
25 See EC Commission, op.cit. n.24, pp. 13-5.
26 See Case C -431/92, Commission v. Germany. 1995 E.C.R., p.1-2192.
27 Ibid, at para.40.
2B Ibid, p .1-2220. See also A.G.Ureta, ‘The E.C. Environmental Impact A ssessm ent D irective Before the European 
Court o f  Justice’, 5(1) Env 7 Liability, 1997, pp.9-10.
2y See Case C -133/94, loc.cit. n.24, at para.42.
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to a mandatory EIA, while in Italy and Spain a considerable number o f  broad groups o f such 
projects remain uncovered.30 However, in Greece, which, moreover, is the only Mediterranean 
M ember state where environmental information is submitted after the initial approval o f siting,31 
there are frequent complaints about failure to implement the relevant legislation.32
It has also become apparent that some o f the substantial value o f assessing the impact before 
an activity is carried out is lost en route, as the Directive lays down only the procedure and not any 
substantial requirement, for instance, it does not define when a specific project has to be rejected 
following a negative EIA, or even what consists an acceptable and valid EIA; in this vein, it is 
characteristic that Commission proposals for a Directive making EIA mandatory for governmental 
projects and policies have been abortive due to stiff opposition by some Member States.33 Moreover, 
in France and Spain, there is no provision for the formal review o f information submitted by the 
developer, while in Greece and Italy this task has been assigned to specific environmental 
authorities, in the latter a special EIA Commission.34
This absence o f standardised arrangements concerning the substance o f the assessment has 
led to large variations in the quality o f environmental impact studies (EISs) between Member States, 
but also within each country. In this connection, the Commission’s report found that in France 
studies prepared for large, national, and public projects were broadly o f better quality than those 
concerning small and private projects, which, however, accounted for 70% o f  the total.35 In Greece, 
industrial projects attract the best EISs, while in general the time and money devoted to the 
preparation o f EISs, as well as the consideration o f alternatives, are inadequate. In Italy, the quality 
o f these studies is improving since the EIA Commission came in full operation; while in Spain, only 
a 20% o f EISs are estimated to be o f a satisfactory quality.
That is, o f course, different from actually taking into account the environmental impact o f 
a proposed project in the final decision. In fact, it is rather difficult to ascertain the extent to which 
the EIA process decisively influences decision-making by the administration. It would be, 
nevertheless, fair to say that public reaction and pressure does often lead to environmental impacts 
being taken into account and relevant conditions imposed in Mediterranean M ember States.36 It must 
be noted that in Italy and Spain, some guarantees to that effect seem to exist; in the former, the 
M inisters concerned are under a duty to issue a decision on environmental compatibility, on the 
basis o f advice from the EIA Commission, while in the latter, there is provision for the preparation
30 EC Com mission, op.cit. n.24, pp. 17-8.
31 Ibid, p.24.
32 See EC Commission, Eleventh Annual Report on M onitoring the A pplication  o f  Com m unity Law , COM (94) 500  
final, 29 March 1994, p.64.
33 P.Sands, Principles o f  International Environm ental L aw , Vol.I, 1995, p.588,
34 EC Com mission, op.cit. n,24, pp,24-5.
35 Ibid, Table 4.4. at p.43.
30 Ibid, Table 4.9. at p.53
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o f a Declaration o f Environmental Impact containing the written decision or judgm ent o f the 
competent environmental authority, which is furthermore publicised.37 In Spain in particular, there 
are also formal arrangements for monitoring the project and its environmental impacts, through the 
mandatory Programme o f Environmental Surveillance,38 although no such requirement appears in 
the Directive.
Availability o f EISs to the public before consultation was also found to remain an empty 
principle, with considerable practical difficulties arising in most M editerranean states.39 In fact, the 
consultation process itself presents great variations in these countries, and has been satisfactory only 
when it concerns high-profile and controversial projects; in most other cases, the public is either not 
aware o f their procedural rights or is not adequately informed so as to participate in the debate in 
any meaningful way.40 However, the importance o f public participation in the EIA process cannot 
be overstressed,41 since it can in principle result in meeting public needs and making the 
administration accountable for relevant choices, in better access to information, and better 
development decisions, and in increased credibility o f the entire EIA process.
The EIA Directive has, in fact, one o f the highest records o f  complaints (one in four in 
1998) relating to its implementation among environmental instruments, whereas infringement 
proceedings are currently under way against, among others, Italy, Spain and Greece.42 During the 
first two years o f application, the number of complaints received by the Commission for all Member 
States was three hundred and thirty four,43 and has since steadily risen. Complaints received tend 
mostly to be about the quality of impact assessment studies, the examination o f alternatives, and the 
failure to take into account opinions validly expressed at public enquiries, i.e. matters for which the 
Directive being o f a procedural nature does not give the Commission enforcement o f follow-up 
powers, and in any case are very difficult for the latter to substantiate and contest.44 That has 
prompted the Commission to urge concerned individuals to make full use o f the internal means of
37 Ibid, p.31. However, up to late 1991, only one negative Declaration o f  Environmental Impact had been issued at 
national level, see Table 4.9. at p.53.
3ii Ibid, p .32, and Table 4.10  at p.55. In Italy and France, such a procedure applies only to certain projects either 
because o f  their nature or because conditions to that effect have been attached, while in Greece relevant checks are 
occasional and selective.
m Ibid, Table 4.7. at p.48.
AU b id , Table 4.8. at p.51.
41 See, among others, W.A.Tilleman, ‘Public Participation in the Environmental assessm ent Process: A  Comparative 
Study o f  Impact Assessment in Canada, the United States and the European Community’, 33 C olum bia J. o f  Trans 'I L., 
1995, pp.343-8.
42 See EC Commission, First Annual Survey on the implementation and enforcement o f  Community environmental 
law, October 1996 to December 1997, SEC 1999/592, 27 .4.1999, p.46.
43 EC Com mission, op.cit. n.24, Table A .2.1. at p.71. Spain was the most complained-against country with 72 
complaints, follow ed by the UK (48), Italy (42), Germany (37), Greece (34), and France (33).
44 See EC Com mission, Implementing Community Environm ental Law, COM (96) 500 final, 22 .10.1996, pp.27-8; 
and op.cit. n.42, p.47.
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redress in each state,45 which underlines the particular importance o f uniform rules on standing 
discussed below.
That said, in 1993, i.e. three years after its due date, the Commission published a report on 
the implementation o f the Directive during the first six years o f application, i.e. until July 1991.46 
This early report focuses on both formal and practical compliance with the requirements o f  the 
Directive, on the criteria and/or thresholds adopted for the selection o f  Annex II projects to be 
subject to assessment, on key aspects o f EIA practice, and on an overall assessment o f the 
effectiveness o f implementation and relevant difficulties. This report was followed by consecutive 
proposals for amending the Directive, which were informed by the following objectives:47
• To ensure that the Directive’s provisions are applied to the full range of projects which may
have significant impacts on the environment;
• To ensure that the EIA process starts sufficiently early in the planning and design o f
projects and that alternatives and mitigatory measures receive adequate consideration;48
• To strengthen quality control o f  the assessment and review o f EIS;
• To ensure that arrangements relating to the availability o f EISs and consultations based
upon it are made more effective;
To ensure that satisfactory arrangements are made for taking the EIS and consultation 
findings into account in project authorisation decisions; and
To strengthen arrangements for monitoring post-implementation environmental impacts. 
To what extent these objectives are served by the proposals produced from 1994 to 1997 
by the Commission is debatable. The 1994 proposal included new provisions on the compulsory 
assessment ( ‘screening’) o f Annex II projects,49 on the basis o f limit values applicable in the 
M ember State and the selection criteria defined in new Annex Ila; and on the content o f the 
assessment ( ‘scoping’, i.e. a requirement that the competent authority specifies the scope o f the 
information to be supplied in consultation with the authorities concerned and the project manager 
and before application is made; compulsory assessment o f alternatives etc.). The range o f projects 
listed in the two Annexes was also rearranged and expanded.50 In addition, the requirements o f the 
Espoo Convention were more fully accommodated in relation to projects with transboundary impact.
45 See EC Com mission, op.cit. n.42, pp.47-8,
46 See EC Com mission, op.cit. n.24.
47 See ibid, pp.61-2.
4il Cf. the long history o f  the ‘alternatives’ component o f  the EIA process in the US, see Tilleman, op.cit. n.41, pp.384- 
93.
49 See EC Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 85/337/EE C  on the assessment o f  the 
effects o f  certain public and private projects on the environment, COM (93) 575 final - 94/0078  (SY N ), 1994 O.J. (C 
130) 8.
50 Importantly, Annex II is envisaged to include all waste water treatment plants.
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The comments received on that initial draft ranged from those considering the suggested 
definitions and criteria as general and vague, and thus bound to cause further disparity and 
confusion, and putting forward the idea o f an exclusive list o f  projects subject to EIA depending on 
their size and character,51 to very extensive amendments submitted by the European Parliament.52
The latter focus on expanding the scope of EIA obligations to cover entire “national 
programmes”, i.e. all projects serving a single objective;53 a series o f new categories of projects, 
more precisely defined than in the Commission proposal, including projects posing a threat to the 
marine environment, such as, crude-oil refineries, installations for the production o f hydrocarbons 
at sea, and waste water treatment plants with a capacity exceeding 300,000 population equivalents;54 
as well as Community-funded projects in third countries, thereby importantly extending the area of 
application o f the Directive outside European borders.55 The European Parliament also proposed a 
clarification o f the fact that projects requiring an EIA have to be made subject to a requirement for 
development consent, as well as establishment o f follow-up and monitoring obligations on the part 
o f national authorities during and after execution o f  an authorised project through continuous 
assessment o f  impacts.56 Furthermore, it addressed the issue o f quality o f EISs by defining the 
factors that have to be assessed therein, as well as the qualifications and official approval o f experts 
preparing them .57 Finally, it attributed much importance to strengthening the role of the public in 
the EIA process, by proposing that an Advisory Council consisting o f NGOs, citizens and 
consum ers’ associations, carries out, together with the competent authority, the ‘screening’ for 
Annex II projects; that the public is consulted on ‘scoping’; and that it is informed on the effects 
and impact o f the execution o f  projects.58
The Commission incorporated some o f the above, but importantly rejected, as excessively 
‘far-reaching’ or not improving the existing formulas, public involvement in the ‘scoping’ and 
‘screening’ processes, as well as the inclusion or the lowering o f thresholds for certain types of 
activities in the Annexes.59 Post-consent monitoring, as well as extension o f the EIA procedure to
51 See Committee o f  the Regions, Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 85/337/EEC  
on the assessment o f  effects o f  certain public and private projects on the environment, 1995 O.J. (C 210) 78.
52 See EP, Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 85/337/EE C  on the assessment o f  
effects o f  certain public and private projects on the environment, 1995 O.J. (C 287) 83.
53 See ibid, Amend. 19 and 21.
54 Ibid, Am end.42-56.
55 Ibid, Am end.84 and 39.
50 Ibid, Am end.32 and 36-37 respectively.
57 Ibid, Amend.25 and 30-31 respectively.
58 Ibid, Am end.26, 27 and 37 respectively.
39 See EC Com mission, Amended Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 85/337/EEC on the 
assessm ent o f  certain public and private projects on the environment, CO M (95) 720 final, 94/0078 (SY N). The 
Commission maintained the same attitude after the European Parliament insisted on its main suggestions after the second 
reading, see EC Commission, Re-examined Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 85/337/EEC on the 
assessment o f  certain public and private projects on the environment, COM (96) 723 final, 94/0078 (SY N). On public
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projects in third countries was not outright rejected, but rather delegated to other, in the 
Commission’s view more relevant, Community instruments.
More specifically, the amended Directive, adopted in early 1997,60 does extend the range 
o f projects requiring an obligatory impact assessment; sets out clearer criteria to be applied when 
deciding whether Annex II projects should be submitted to impact assessment ( ‘screening’);61 and 
tightens the procedures to be applied, among others, by requiring public consultation before consent 
is given rather than before building works start, and by laying down a public right to be informed 
o f the criteria for Annex II projects requiring an EIA, any requests for development consent and 
decisions thereon. It also provides that, if the developer so requests, the authority responsible must 
give an opinion as to the content and exact scope o f the information to be supplied on the basis o f 
specifications in Annex IV (‘scoping’). Most importantly, the new Directive tries to be consistent 
with the requirements o f Directive 96/61 on integrated pollution prevention and control, introducing 
the possibility o f a single procedure being applied to projects covered by both instruments (Art.2). 
Hence, prior impact assessment finds its proper place in an integrated process aiming at full 
consideration o f environmental impacts and proper decision-making in M ember States with far- 
reaching implications if properly implemented. The amended Directive also incorporates the 
obligations arising from the Espoo Convention (Art.7), and thus makes it binding to all Community 
states, despite its not having entered into force as yet. It remains to be seen whether the new 
instrument will affect in any substantial way the way the EIA procedure is being implemented in 
Member States, after March 1999 when the deadline for transposition expired.62
8.2. Public Access to Environmental Information.
After environmental information has been produced, either by means o f an EIA or in any 
other form, the next logical step is to make it accessible to the public. This serves both to increase
continued)
participation not only in the ‘screening’ and ‘scoping’ but also in the decision-making process, cf. Article 6 o f the Aarhus 
C onvention. For a discussion o f  the shortcomings o f  the final proposal and the instrument adopted, see W.M.Tabb, 
‘Environmental Impact Assessment in the European Community: Shaping International Norm s’, 73 Tulane Law Review, 
1999, pp.923-60.
60 As Council Directive 97/11.
61 It provides, e.g., for compulsory EIA for Annex II projects likely to have significant effect on special nature 
protection zones, on the conservation o f wild birds, and o f natural habitats o f  wild flora and fauna under the relevant 
Directives. Whether Annex II projects will require an EIA now depends on each project’s characteristics (such as size, 
use o f  natural resources, production o f  waste, impact on natural and historical heritage) and the sensitivity o f  areas likely 
to be affected.
62 Note also that the Commission insists in its effort to move from individual projects to a more general strategic level
and impose an EIA requirement government activities such as town and countiy planning, see EC Commission, Proposal 
for a Council Directive on the assessment o f  the effects o f  certain plans and programmes on the environment, COM (96) 
511 final, 1997 O.J. (C 129) 14; and amended Proposal, COM (1999) 73 final. For a commentary see H.von Seht & 
C.Wood, ‘The Proposed European Directive on Environmental Assessment: Evolution and Evaluation’, 28(5) Env'l Pol. 
& L., 1998, pp.242-9.
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environmental awareness and democratic control in general, and to document arguments before the 
administration or the courts in particular. However, unlike the EIA requirement, the notion o f public 
access to environmental information has a much shorter and more modest history. In fact, it is only 
in the Western world that this concept has found its way into positive international law. The 
subsequent sections will accordingly discuss rights o f access to environmental information endorsed 
in the Barcelona and other regional conventions and in the relevant Community instrument.
8.2.1. Regional Instruments on Public Access to Environm ental Information.
The revised Barcelona Convention is indeed one o f the few international instruments 
containing a relevant obligation.63 Pursuant to it, the Mediterranean Parties have to ensure public 
access to information on the state o f  the environment in the field o f  application o f  the Convention 
and Protocols, on activities or measures adversely affecting it or likely to do so - which points to 
public involvement in EIA procedures and on activities carried out or measures taken in 
accordance with the Convention and Protocols (Art. 15(1)); they also have to ensure that the 
opportunity is given for public participation in decision-making processes related to the field o f 
application o f the Convention (Art. 15(2)). The right o f access to environmental information is, 
nevertheless, qualified by the power o f the Parties to refuse disclosure o f  such data on the grounds 
of confidentiality, public security or investigation proceedings, to the extent they justify their refusal 
and observe applicable international regulations (Art. 15(3)).64
It is notable that there is a conspicuous lack of reference to any form o f ‘active’ information 
in the Convention, i.e. the requirement imposed on governmental organs to regularly produce 
environmental reports for the public, without the latter having to ask for it. Only in the revised Land- 
Based Sources Protocol, one comes across an obligation to make available to the public the findings 
o f monitoring activities relating to levels o f pollution, as well as to the effectiveness o f measures 
undertaken (Art.8).65
The inclusion o f the said provisions in the Barcelona revision process reflects recent 
developments pointing towards wide-spread endorsement o f the right o f access to environmental 
information throughout the industrialised world, notably in the framework o f  the Council o f Europe 
and the ECE. The first relates to the 1993 Council o f Europe Convention on Civil Liability for
03 See, e.g., also the 1992 ECE Transboundary Watercourses Convention, Art. 16.
M Cf. 1992 Paris Convention on the Protection o f  the Marine Environment o f  the North-East Atlantic, Article 9, 
whereby national authorities should make available any information in written, visual, aural or data-base form, on all 
their activities and measures that are likely to have an impact on the state o f  their maritime areas to “any natural and legal 
person” .
65 See also Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable Development - Recommendations and Proposals for action 
on the theme of: Information, Public Awareness, Environmental Education and Participation, UNEP, Report o f  the 
Eleventh Ordinary M eeting o f  the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection o f  the Mediterranean Sea 
against Pollution and its Protocols, UNEP(OCA)/M ED IG. 12/9, 6 December 1999, Annex IV, Appendix 1; and MAP 
Information Strategy, Appendix IV.
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Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment (Dangerous Activities 
Convention).66
This instrument provides for access to information on the lines o f the EC Directive 
discussed in the next section (Chapter III). Pursuant to it, anybody may request public authorities 
or other bodies with public environmental responsibilities and under the control o f a public authority 
to provide information relating to an activity that has caused or is threatening to cause damage. 
Moreover a person suffering damage may request the court to order the operator to provide specific 
information - a provision not to be found in the EC Directive including particulars o f  equipment 
and machinery used, the kind and composition o f  the dangerous substances or waste in question, 
and the nature of genetically modified organisms; however, such information might be denied if the 
request imposes a disproportionate burden on the operator in the light o f  the various interests 
involved. The latter may also refuse to provide material able to incriminate him, which seems to 
minimise the practical utility o f this provision.
The second development is even more significant as it involves adoption o f an international 
instrument dedicated specifically to the procedural rights considered in this Chapter. Building on 
the ECE Charter on Environmental Rights and Obligations which provides for individual access to 
administrative and judicial proceedings and participation in decision-making, and the ECE 
Guidelines on Access to Environmental Information and Public Participation in Environmental 
Decision M aking,67 the Fourth Ministerial Conference “Environment for Europe” (Aarhus, 
Denmark, 23-25 June 1998) finalised the text o f  the Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus 
Convention).68
The Aarhus Convention is the product o f two years o f intense negotiations.69 It aims at 
establishing minimum procedural standards in ECE countries guaranteeing the public rights o f 
access to information, participation in decision-making and access to justice, and, importantly, is 
the first international treaty endorsing in its operative part the right to the quality o f  the environment 
as a basic human right (A rt.I).70 Each Party to this instrument undertakes to adopt the necessary 
regulatory and other measures, as well as enforcement arrangements, to establish and maintain a 
“clear, transparent and consistent framework” in order to implement its provisions (Art.3(l)).
66 For the civil liability arrangements under the Dangerous Activities Convention, see supra, Chapter 4, pp. 163-5.
67 ECE, G uidelines on A ccess to Environm ental Information and Public P artic ipation  in Environm ental D ecision- 
Making, 1996.
68 For an account o f  what took place during the Conference, see lCBrady, ‘Aarhus Convention Signed’, 28(3/4) Env 7 
P o l &L. ,  1998, pp. 171-90.
b<) See J.Wates, ‘The UN ECE Guidelines and Draft Convention on A ccess to Environmental Information and Public 
Participation in Environmental Decision making’, in R,E.Hallo (ed.), A ccess to E nvironm ental Information in Europe - 
The Im plementation an d  Im plications o f  D irective 90/313/EE C, 1996, pp.423-36.
70 For a concise presentation o f  the main points o f  the Convention, see K.Brady, ‘N ew  Convention on A ccess to 
Information and Public Participation in Environmental Matters’, 28(2) Env 7 Pol. & L., 1998, pp.69-75.
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As far as access to environmental information is concerned, the Convention enacts the most 
detailed and advanced international regulation on the subject to date. The main points o f the scheme 
envisaged are as follows: Public authorities in general - not confined to those that exercise 
environmental management slriclo sensu (Art.2(2) - have to make such information available to the 
public no later than two months after the relevant request, without an interest having to be stated, 
in principle in the form requested, and at a reasonable charge (A rt.4(l), (2) and (8)).
Exceptions to this rule are allowed - in writing and adequately justified - for reasons of 
national defence and public security, protection o f intellectual property, confidentiality o f 
proceedings etc. that, nevertheless have to be interpreted restrictively (Art.4(4). The most 
controversial exception relates to the confidentiality o f commercial and industrial data (Art.4(4)(d). 
After extensive discussion, the provision was watered down by adding “where this confidentiality 
is protected by law in order to protect a legitimate economic interest” and by defining an instance 
when confidentiality cannot be invoked, namely when the relevant information concerns emissions 
relevant to environmental protection.
This system is complemented by several detailed arrangements and principles that have to 
be respected by national administrations, and by an express undertaking to the effect that officials 
are required to support, i.e. guide and assist, the public in seeking access to information (Arts. 3(2) 
and 5(2)(b)(ii)),71 and that persons exercising their rights “shall not be penalized, persecuted or 
harassed in any way for their involvement” (Art.3(8)). Moreover, any person considering that his/her 
request for information has been ignored, wrongfully refused, inadequately answered, or otherwise 
not dealt with in accordance with the preceding provisions must be given access to an expeditious, 
inexpensive and binding review procedure before a court or another independent and impartial body 
established by law (Art.9(l)).
Public authorities have an additional independent duty to collect and disseminate 
environmental information, especially in case o f threat to public health or the environment 
(Art.5(l)(a) and (c)). Mandatory systems for an adequate flow o f information to public authorities 
about proposed and existing activities which may significantly affect the environment are in this 
context also called for (A rt.5(l)(b)). In the long run, a comprehensive mechanism that will cover 
the whole territory o f the state and will record environmental information in data bases easily 
accessible through public telecommunication networks, including reports on the state o f the 
environment, texts o f relevant legislation, policies, plans and environmental agreements, should be 
established (Art.5(3)). In any case, each Party undertakes to publish and disseminate a national 
report on the state o f the environment at regular intervals (Art.5(4)). The only notable Guideline that 
did not find its way into the actual treaty is that requiring governments to “ inform the public o f the
71 Hence, for instance, when a public authority does not hold the information requested it is, nevertheless, required, 
as promptly as possible, to inform the applicant o f  the authority to which it believes the latter should apply or transfer 
the request to that authority and inform the applicant accordingly (Art.4(5)).
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possibilities o f submitting information to international bodies concerning non-compliance with 
international rules” (Guideline 13).72
It must, finally, be noted that NGO participation in the preparatory stages for this 
Convention was unprecedented, while several powerful states, including Germany and the US, 
persistently tried to do away with the most radical elements o f the draft, and still did not sign the 
final text. That might seem strange for an agreement on procedures and not on the substance o f 
environmental problems, but it is ju st an indication o f the increased significance o f empowering 
citizens and NGOs to demand full adherence to the multiplicity o f national and international 
norms.73
This type o f tension created by public rights is certainly innovative for the Mediterranean 
region,74 with the exception o f the European Union area, where Council Directive 90/313 on public 
access to environmental information has broadly acknowledged and institutionalised relevant 
obligations.
8.2.2. Council Directive 90/313 on Public Access to Environm ental Information.75
Under this instrument, Member States have to ensure through appropriate regulations that 
environmental information, broadly defined as encompassing data on the state o f water, air, soil, 
flora and fauna, land and natural sites, and on activities or measures adversely affecting or designed 
to protect these (Art.2(a)), is “effectively” made available to any natural or legal person - aliens 
included - upon request and without justification (A rt.3(l)), albeit at a reasonable charge (Art.5).76 
The public authorities o f each state are responsible to provide the information requested,77 even if 
they do not actually hold it but could obtain it on demand from other, even private, sources; Article 
6 further tries to cover environmental information held by privatised or private bodies exercising
72 See Brady, op.cit. n.70, p.71.
73 It is illustrative o f  the very difficult negotiations that the provision on “review o f  com pliance” with the Aarhus 
Convention (Art. 15) is thought to be one o f  the weakest ever. It reads: “The M eeting o f  the Parties shall establish, on 
a consensual basis, optional arrangements o f  a non-confrontational, non-judicial an d  consultative nature for reviewing 
compliance with the provisions o f  this Convention. These arrangements shall allow for appropriate public involvement 
and may include the option o f  considering communications from members o f  the public on matters related to this 
Convention.” See Brady, op.cit. n.70, p.73.
74 See, e.g., El-Hadi Chalabi, L ’Algerie, I ’E tat et le D roit (1979-1988), 1989, pp.235-54, for a discussion o f  
restrictions on the press and consequently on access to information in Algeria. Cf. A .Bin-N un, The Law o f  the State o f  
Israel; An introduction, 1992 (2nd ed.), pp.65-8, on the right to information and to form associations as set out in Israeli 
High Court D ecisions, despite restrictions on the press.
75 See, generally, L.Kramer, Focus on European Environm ental Law, 2nd ed., 1997, Chapter 12; and Hallo (ed.), 
op.cit. n.69, esp.at Chapter 1.
70 But see F.Sanchis Moreno, ‘Spain’, in Hallo (ed.), op.cit n.69 p.244, for som e exam ples o f  blatantly excessive 
charges for acquiring environmental information in Spain.
77 A ‘public authority’ is “any public administration at national, regional, or local level with responsibilities, and 
possessing information, relating to the environment” with the exception o f  administrative bodies acting in a legislative 
or judicial capacity (Art.2(b)).
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public functions,78 and in some countries, for instance France, this is taken to include a whole range 
o f bodies such as the Association o f Architects, the General Company o f  Waters, or Hunting 
Federations.79
If  they fail to do so, they have to justify their denial (Art,3(4)), and individuals are 
guaranteed the right o f appeal under the domestic legal system (Art.4). In fact, in some countries, 
for instance France, there is a separate administrative tribunal to deal exclusively with appeals in 
cases concerning access to information,80 thus providing an ad hoc procedure that can overcome any 
possible deficiencies encountered in the general administrative system established in the country, 
such as the long tradition o f bureaucratic secrecy, slowness, great costs etc.81 However, a study o f 
the practice o f French administrative courts to which an interested person can appeal in case the 
authority insists on denying certain information reveals that such recourse has seldom been 
successful.82
These rights are also restricted by certain exceptions protecting legitimate interests in the 
confidentiality o f public authorities proceedings, international relations, and national defence; public 
security; matters which are, or have been, sub judice, or under enquiry, or which are the subject o f 
preliminary investigations; commercial and industrial confidentiality; confidentiality o f personal 
data and/or files; material supplied by a third party without a legal obligation; and material, the 
disclosure o f which would make it more likely that the environment to which it related would be 
damaged (Art.3(2)), Moreover, a request may be refused where it would involve the supply o f an 
unfinished document or data or internal communications, or where the request is manifestly 
unreasonable 01* formulated in too general a manner (Art.3(3)). Some commentators deem that these 
exceptions are so broad as “to threaten to swallow the general rule in favour o f access to 
environmental information” .83 It has indeed been proven that the relevant provisions are stretched 
and used to cover, for instance, information on emissions or discharges which is obviously the kind 
o f data the Directive intended to be made available to the public,84
The Directive additionally includes a watered-down version o f  ‘active information’;85 it 
specifically provides that reports on the state o f the environment be periodically published (Art.7),
78 See R.E.Hallo, ‘Directive 90/313/EEC on the Freedom o f  A ccess to Information on the Environment: Its 
Implementation and Implications’, in Hallo (ed.), op.cit. n.69, p.10, and see pp.10-4, for a discussion o f  the various types 
o f  exceptions.
79 See F .Pelisson & M.Prieur, ‘France’, in Hallo (ed.), op.cit. n.69, p .8I.
80 See ibid, pp.79-80. The French Com mission for A ccess to Administrative Docum ents (CADA), which acts as a 
special tribunal o f  first instance, has during its first fifteen years (1978-1994) issued opinions on an impressive 25,000  
cases, o f  which roughly 7% relate to the environment.
81 See Hallo, op.cit. n.78, p. 17.
82 See Pelisson & Prieur, op.cit. n.79, p.84.
83 Hallo, op.cit. n.78, p .II .
M See ib id , p. 13.
85 See ib id , p. 18.
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without further clarifications or restrictions, an obligation largely depending on the quality o f the 
information gathered, and consequently on the sampling, monitoring and reporting systems in 
Member States.86
Notwithstanding the extensive restrictions on special information, and the fact that the 
discretion each state has to adopt the practical arrangements needed to put the abstract right into 
effective use (A rt.3(l)) has led to diverse degrees o f changes in administrative practices and of 
resultant ease or difficulty in the actual exercise o f the right in different M ember States,87 the 
material scope o f the right is broad and far-reaching, as it covers all possible data, scientific, legal 
and political, and in any form. Hence, Member States were slow to transpose the Directive; almost 
half o f the then twelve states failed to meet the thirty-month deadline, among them Greece and 
Spain were significantly late, while Italy adopted legislation in conformity with the minimum 
requirements o f the Directive only in 1997.88 In fact, from the four M editerranean countries only 
France had already for many years in place legislation on public access to information formulated 
in even wider terms in some respects than those o f the Directive, as well as a considerable body o f 
relevant case law.89
In some o f the laggard countries, notably Greece and Spain, individuals tried to invoke the 
‘direct effect’ doctrine, in view o f the fact that this is one o f the most obvious examples of 
environmental Directives attributing rights to individuals, but with limited success.90 These two 
countries also figure among those having attracted the majority o f  complaints to the Commission 
for failing to properly implement the Directive.91 It is characteristic that in Spain, from a total o f one 
hundred and fifty documented cases, only in 5% access to information was provided, while in an 
impressive 80% there was no reply by the administration to the relevant request.92 That is not to say
8S See ib id , pp.21-2. In fact, from the four Mediterranean countries, only Spain seem s to conform with this
requirement, see Sanchis Moreno, op.cit. n.76, p.231.
87 See ibid, p. 15.
88 See ibid, pp.5-7; and EC Commission, op.cit. n.42, p.45. In fact, Greece waited until the Commission began legal 
proceedings before adopting implementing legislation, while Spain had to review its legislation after the Commission 
began proceedings on the grounds that the said legislation did not properly implement the Directive. It must be noted 
that none o f  the proceedings opened have been pursued, sec 1995 O.J. (C 254) 122. However, in 1998, the Commission 
opened new proceedings against Spain for incorrect transposal o f  the Directive (Case C -l 89/99, see EC Commission, 
Sixteenth Report on monitoring the application o f  Community law, COM (1999) 301 final, 9 .07 .1999, p.64; and EC 
Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the experience gained in the 
application o f  Council Directive 90/313/EEC o f  7 June 1990, on freedom o f  access to information on the environment, 
COM (2000) 400 final, 29.06.2000, p.7. On the Spanish experience, see Sanchis Moreno, op.cit n.76, pp.225-48. On the 
situation with regard to access to environmental information in Italy, see M .Albrizio & P.Fantilli, ‘Italy’, in Hallo (ed.), 
op.cit. n.69, pp. 175-82.
89 In its present form since 1978, see Pelisson & Prieur, op.cit. n.79, pp.71-93. In other respects, however, pre-existing 
legislation was insufficient, as, for instance, it did not grant non-French citizens rights o f  access nor the right o f  appeal, 
see M .W heeler, ‘The Right to Know in the European U nion’, 3(1) R.E.C.I.E.L., 1994, p.2.
90 See Hallo, op.cit. n.78, p.7. On the activities o f  Spanish NGOs unsuccessfully invoking ‘direct effect’, see Sanchis 
Moreno, op.cit. n.76, pp.226 and 234-5. On the Greek experience, see infra, pp.355-8,
91 See Hallo, op.cit. n .78, p.20.
92 See Sanchis M oreno, op.cit. n.76, pp.242-3.
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that in countries more advanced, as far as access to information held by the administration is 
concerned, citizens and NGOs do not continue to encounter obstacles, especially in view of 
extensive invocation o f  allowed grounds for denial practised in practically all EU states,93 In fact, 
this notable tendency by government departments to adopt a very broad interpretation when 
allowing exceptions to the principle o f disclosure is among the most common subjects o f complaint, 
together with the refusal by national authorities to respond to requests for information, the time 
taken to reply, and demands for payment o f unreasonably high fees.94
Lastly, it must be noted that the Directive is subject to review after the Member States 
submit reports on their experience with its implementation (A rt.8)95 The Commission has recently 
issued the relevant report and intends to come up with a revision proposal which will deal with these 
provisions that have led to flawed implementation, by clarifying the definitions o f information to 
be disclosed and o f the public authorities required to disclose it, drawing exceptions more narrowly, 
shortening the time-limit for responding, clarifying the duty to give reasons for refusal, and 
strengthen the rpovision on active supply o f information.96 It is thus expected that the more 
progressive - in some respects - Aarhus Convention will exert some positive influence in the review 
process,97
All said, it would be fair to conclude that, despite the existing legal framework, there are 
still considerable obstacles to free access to environmental information in Europe, and remarkably 
in the European Union as such.98 It is characteristic that information held by the Commission itself 
or the Council o f Ministers is only accessible through general rules o f  access to documents adopted 
pursuant to a relevant Declaration annexed to the Maastricht Treaty99 The Community organs, with 
the distinguished exception o f the European Parliament (EC Treaty, A rt.225),100 do not seem to be 
any different than national bureaucracies in that confidentiality and secrecy also ranks high in their 
priorities.101 In fact, the Court o f First Instance has already had the chance to rule on a case o f refusal
93 See, e.g., Pelisson & Prieur, op.cit. n.79, p.74, on the practice o f  Ihe French administration.
94 See EC Commission, op.cit. n.42, p.45
95 These were due by 31 December 1996; however, only one was submitted within the deadline and the rest arrived 
only after the Com mission started relevant infringement procedures, see EC Com m ission, 2000, op.cit. n.88, p.3.
95 See EC Commission, 2000, op.cit. n.88, esp. at pp .102; and Hallo, op.cit. n .78, pp.20-1.
97 See EC Commission, 2000, op.cit. n.88, pp. 12 and 8-9; and R.E.Hallo, ‘A  Look Ahead’, in Hallo (ed.), op.cit n.69, 
pp.439-40; and Brady, op.cit. n.70, p.74.
98 See generally R.E.Hallo, ‘The EU Institutions’, in Hallo (ed.), op.cit. n.69, pp,409-22.
99 Declaration No. 17 on the right o f  access to information annexed to the Final Act o f  the Treaty on European Union, 
1992 O.J. (C 191) 101; and Declaration 93/730/EC  on a Code o f  Conduct concerning public access to Council and 
Commission documents; Council Decision 93/731/EC  on public access to Council documents, 1993 O.J. (L 340) 43; 
and Commission Decision 94/90/ECSC, EC, Euratom on public access to Commission documents, 1994 O.J. (L 46) 58.
100 See Hallo, op.cit. n .98, pp.419-20.
101 N ote that, at the Amsterdam Conference, the NGOs proposed a new Article 21 giving European citizens access 
to information, decision-making and justice as part o f  a general right to human developm ent, and to amend Art.226 so 
that an individual bringing a complaint against a Member State would have access to all the files exchanged between 
the Commission and the Member State, see R.Hallo, Greening the Treaty U: Sustainable Developm ent fo r  a D em ocratic
(continued...)
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o f information by the Commission in WWF UK v. Commission.102 Should the EU accede to the 
Aaarhus Convention, the possibility is presented to drastically alter this picture, however, in view 
o f the fact that the latter’s definition o f  “public authorities” that are under the afore-mentioned 
obligations covers “the institutions o f any regional economic integration organization... which is a 
Party to this Convention” (Art.2(2)(d)). In other words, the Community organs would eventually 
have to rearrange their procedures in order to bring them in line with what is required by the Aarhus 
instrument.
8.3. Public Access to Judicial and Administrative Remedies.
International law has been concerned with public access to national legal recourse in order 
to ensure compliance with international environmental law even less than with access to 
environmental information. In fact, it is more correct to say that it has since long established rights 
o f  equal access to the victims o f  various forms o f transboundary pollution, but it has not touched 
upon the issue o f public standing for environmental claims absent any transnational element. 
However, the rights o f  standing flow directly and complement the previously examined 
prerogatives, and as was argued in the previous Chapter represent the single most important missing 
element in order to make the national law model a truly effective tool for the enforcement o f 
international environmental obligations. Therefore, this issue cannot be overlooked for much longer.
The gap has been, indeed, identified and appreciated by the international community,103 as 
indicated in Agenda 21, Chapter 27.13, which reads: “Governments will need to promulgate or 
strengthen, subject to country specific conditions, any legislative measures necessary to enable the 
establishment o f NGOs o f consultative groups, and ensure the right o f NG O s to protect the public 
interest through legal action.” Still, not much has happened since 1992 in this respect either in the 
context o f the general international or the Community legal order.
I0,(...continued)
Union: P roposals f o r  the 1996 Intergovernm ental Conference, 1995.
102 C aseT-105/95, 1997 E.C.R., p.11-313. The Court found that the Commission was entitled to refuse public access 
to documents related to infringement proceedings against a Member State but the relevant decision should adequately 
explain the reasons for the refusal, see S.Schikhof, ‘A ccess to Environmental Information’, 4(4) M aastricht J. o f  Eur, 
& Com p.L., 1997, pp.386-94.
103 On the desirability o f  promoting the access o f  individuals and NGOs to administrative and judicial procedures 
related to environmental matters, see UNEP, Meeting o f  Senior Government O fficials Expert in Environmental Law for 
the Mid-term review o f  the Programme for the development and periodic review o f  environmental law in the 1990s, 
Observations and Recommendations regarding the Programme for the development and periodic review o f  environmental 
law in the 1990s, UNEP/ENV .LAW /3/3, 1996, at E.22; and, among others, M .Bothe, ‘Com pliance Control beyond 
Diplomacy - The Role o f  Non-Governmental Actors’, 27(4) Env'l Pol. & L., 1997, pp.293-7.
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8.3.1. Public Access to Judicial and Administrative Remedies under Regional
Instruments.
Rights o f access to national courts to claim compensation for damage caused by 
transboundary pollution are thought to be established at least in the OECD region, and an emerging 
rule o f global customary law.104 The relevant regimes - reviewed in Chapter 5 - apply to accidental 
pollution incidents and relate to civil liability and compensation procedures, including redress for 
land-based pollution damage under the Montreal Guidelines and the ensuing Global Programme o f 
Action, as well as some regional instruments, such as the Quito Protocol and the Paris Convention, 
but not the Mediterranean Land-Based Sources Protocol. However, when it comes to operational 
pollution, or more generally, to private or governmental failure to observe international obligations, 
international law remains silent.
In Europe, however, the Dangerous Activities Convention building on the civil liability 
regimes goes some way towards a  more wholesome right o f access. Article 18 allows any 
association or foundation which is dedicated to environmental protection and satisfies relevant 
domestic legal requirements to make certain requests to the courts or administrative authorities of 
a Party, for instance that a dangerous activity is prohibited, or that the operator be ordered to take 
measures to prevent an incident or damage, or to effect reinstatement. Nonetheless, reservations 
regarding non-acceptance of claims by environmental groups are explicitly permitted, which 
invalidates the binding force o f that provision; in other words, the Parties may well retain their 
restrictive national rules on standing without being in breach o f any international undertaking.
That instrument aside, the only move to improve the situation with regard to public access 
to justice only recently took place in the framework o f the ECE with its Guidelines on Access to 
Environmental Information and Public Participation in Environmental Decision Making and 
culminated in the Aarhus Convention. In fact, access to justice, including a broad definition of 
standing, and support to NGOs, the media etc. so as to enable them to play an enhanced role in the 
enforcement o f environmental laws were major sticking points in the negotiations that produced this 
instrument.105 As we saw, Article 9 o f the Aarhus Convention provides for the review o f  decisions 
related to requests for environmental information. What is more, each Party has to ensure that the 
public has access to a review procedure before a court or an equivalent organ to challenge the 
substantive and procedural legality o f any decision, act or omission concerning public participation
ltM See, supra, Chapler 4, pp. 156-66; and among others, A.-Ch. Nygilrd, Transboundary Pollution - International 
Legal Standards on the Right to Take Action in National Courts, 1993; Sands, op.cit. n ,33, pp .158-60; and P.W .Birnie 
& A.E.Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 1992, p. 198.Such rights may also be derived from existing human 
rights law through the principles o f  equal protection and non-discrimination found in the Universal Declaration o f  
Human Rights (Art.7) and in the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art.26), see B oyle, op.cit. n.9, p.62.
105 See Wates, op.cit. n.69, pp .431-6; and ECE Committee on Environmental Policy - Working Group for the 
preparation o f  a draft convention on access to environmental information and public participation in environmental 
decision-making, Draft Elements fo r  the Convention on Access to Environmental Information and Public Participation  
in Environm ental D ecision-M aking, CEP/AC.3/R. 1, Geneva, 11 April 1996.
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in decision-making, as laid down in Article 6 (Art.9(2)). However, any person wishing to resort to 
this procedure has to prove either a “sufficient interest” or maintain “ impairment o f a right”, when 
the law o f  the Party requires this as a precondition.106
Moving beyond review procedures for the protection of the rights it establishes, the Aarhus 
Convention also requires each Party to ensure that the public has access to administrative and 
judicial procedures to challenge acts or omissions by both private persons and public authorities 
contravening provisions o f its national environmental laws (Art.9(3)), However, it does not set any 
minimum standards with regard to the criteria that have to be met for a person to be given standing 
in such procedures; these are left exclusively to national law to define. Having said that, all the 
above arrangements have to result to adequate and effective remedies, including injunctif relief, and 
be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive (Art.9(4)). Moreover, the Parties undertake 
to provide information to the public on access to administrative and judicial review procedures and 
even consider the establishment o f appropriate assistance mechanisms to remove financial and other 
barriers to access to justice (Art.9(5)). Finally, these provisions are complemented by the duty to 
afford appropriate recognition and support to environmental NGOs under the national legal systems, 
and the general prohibition o f persecution, penalisation or harassment against persons exercising 
rights attributed under the Convention.
Despite criticism expressed by environmentalists maintaining that it does not go far 
enough,107 this is obviously a ground-breaking instrument, unique in its subject-matter in 
international environmental regulation so far. However, it is not in force nor likely to be soon and 
thus not permitting any conclusions on whether and to what degree it will affect procedural rules 
and principles in the countries o f the region. Therefore, it would be an accurate description o f the 
current situation to assert that today the issue o f standing is exclusively defined by national legal 
rules,108 and depends on political and social circumstances in each country and the resulting level 
o f environmental awareness. To better illustrate how much any positive development at the 
international level was overdue, we will now turn to an examination o f  this issue in the context of 
the Community legal order.
106 It is further defined that environmental NGOs that meet the requirements o f  national law shall be deemed to have 
a sufficient interest and rights capable o f  being impaired for the purposes o f  Article 9(2).
107 Brady, op.cit. n,68, p. 177 and 184.
io« por a brief presentation o f  participation and information rights o f  environmental NG O s in France, see B.Dyssli, 
‘Information and Participation in French Environmental Law’, in M.FUhr & G.RoIler (eds.), Participation and Litigation 
Rights o f  Environmental A ssociations in Europe - Current Legal Situation an d  P ractica l Experience, 1991, pp. 19-24; 
in Spain, see Ch.AlvarezBaquarizo, ‘Civic Participation in the Implementation o f  Environmental Legislation’, in ibid, 
pp,35-8; in Italy, see C.Carruba, ‘Participation Experience in Italy’, in ibid, pp. 127-8; and in Greece, see A.Kallia, 
‘Participation Rights o f  Environmental Associations in Greece’, in ibid, pp.61-76.
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8.3.2. Public Access to Justice under Community Law.
To start with, it is well-known that a complainant to the Commission is not given the 
procedural leeway to dispute a decision under Article 226, nor to initiate infringement 
proceedings.109 According to Article 230, any natural or legal person may institute proceedings 
before the ECJ only against a Decision addressed to that person, or against an act in the form of 
Regulation or Decision addressed to somebody else,110 to the extent it is o f “direct and individual 
concern” to the person challenging it. ‘Individual concern5 requires that the Community act affects 
the legal position o f the latter due to a factual situation that singles it out in a way similar to the 
recipient o f the Decision.111 ‘Direct concern’ refers to the independence o f the challenged act from 
any national implementing measure or, if  such a measure is required, the lack o f  any discretion by 
the M ember State in its adoption.112 Accordingly, the ECJ has allowed recourse to persons 
challenging provisions o f Directives that affect them ‘directly and individually’.113
Absent these conditions, anyone establishing an interest in the result o f a case before the 
ECJ has a right o f intervention.114 Additionally, if the national legal system gives standing in courts 
to NGOs, then the latter can intervene before the ECJ when a preliminary ruling has been requested 
by the national judge. Thus, for example, the German environmental group ‘Bund Naturschutz’ had 
the chance to present its submissions to the ECJ in relation to the application o f the E1A Directive;115 
the same can be envisaged with regard to Directive 90/313 which provides for recourse in case o f 
rejection or insufficient response to a request for information. In view of the restrictive interpretation 
o f Article 230, this is in practice the only possibility to date for an association aiming at protecting
109 See the relevant case-law o f  the ECJ refusing standing to a third party to challenge the legality o f  the Commission’s 
use o f  discretion on whether to commence infringement proceedings, Case 246/81, Bethell v. Commission. 1982 E.C.R., 
p.2277; Case 87/89, Socfefe Nationale Interprofessionelle de la Tomate {'SQNITQ') v. C om m ission. 1990 E.C.R., p.l- 
1981. It should be noted that the European Parliament has a right to intervene in proceedings before the ECJ, as well 
as to institute an action against the Council for failure to act, or an action for annulment, but only to the extent it is 
protecting its own prerogatives, see G.Bebr, ‘The Standing o f  the European Parliament in the Community System o f  
Legal Remedies: A  Thorny Jurisprudential Developm ent’, 10 YB ofE ur.L ., 1990, pp. 171-207. Consequently, it cannot 
interfere with the enforcement o f  applicable rules in Member States in any substantial way.
110 In these instances, the Regulation is in reality a Decision, see Joined Cases 16 to 17/62, Confederation Nationale 
des Producteurs de Fruits et L6gumes v. Council. 1962 E.C.R., p.981; or contains measures addressed to specific persons, 
see case 30/67, Industria Molitora Imolese. 1968 E.C .R., p .171; or is akin to a wad o f  individual D ecisions, see Joined 
Cases 103-109/78, Usines de Beauport. 1979 E.C.R., p. 17.
111 See, among others, Case 25/62, Plaumann, 1963 E.C.R., p. 197; Case 169/84, Companie Francaise de 1’Azote. 1986 
E .C .R ., p.391; Case 206/87, Lefebre v. Com m ission. 1989 E.C.R., p .275; and Joined Cases C -429/92 and C-25/93, 
Assobacam . 1993 E.C.R., p .1-3991. For a more liberal view, see Case C-358/89, Extramet. 1991 E.C.R., p,I-2501.
1,2 See Joined Cases 21 to 24/72, International Fruit Company. 1972 E.C.R., p. 1219.
113 See Case C-298/89, Gibraltar v. Council. 1993 E.C.R., p .1-3605; and B.Xpumav6<;, T1 EufifSoLf] t o d  AEK orqv 
E(pappoyf| Tpt; FloA,vnKT|<; riepi[3&M,ovTO<;- II n e p t T r a u a r i  t w v  Opa5tKd)v Flpootpoytbv' [V .llristianos, ‘The Contribution 
o f  the ECJ to the Application o f  the Environmental Policy - The Case o f  Class A ctions’], No/uog xai <Pv<r>i [Law and 
Nature], V o l.2 (l) , 1995, p.33.
114 A ccording to Article 37 o f  the Protocol on the Statute o f  the Court o f  Justice o f  the European Economic 
Community; see also Joined Cases 16-17/62, loc.cit. n .l 10, p.937.
115 See Case C -396/92, Bund Naturschutz in Bavern N Y . 1994 E.C.R., p.I-3717.
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the collective interest o f its members, and a fortiori the general public interest, to be given some 
type of standing before the EC J.116
In fact, the Court does not seem to be willing to change this attitude: In the recent 
Greenpeace case,117 the Court o f First Instance reaffirmed that a third party can contest a Decision, 
only if he is able to prove that he is affected by it in a manner which differentiates him from all other 
persons. In this connection, where interests linked to environmental protection are involved, the 
mere existence o f harm suffered or to be suffered cannot confer locus standi on an applicant if it is 
such as to affect, generally and in the abstract, a large number o f persons who cannot be determined 
in advance in a way that distinguishes them individually in the same way as the addressee o f a 
Decision; moreover, that conclusion cannot be affected by the fact that in the practice o f national 
courts in matters relating to environmental protection locus standi may depend merely on the 
applicants’ having a ‘sufficient’ interest.
However, the Court further held that ‘special circumstances’ such as the role played by an 
association in a procedure which led to the adoption o f an act within the meaning o f  Article 230 may 
justify holding admissible an action brought by an association whose members are not directly and 
individually concerned by the contested measure. This leaves at least some scope for a future 
relaxation o f the rules on standing; it remains to be seen whether the ECJ will proceed in that 
direction in its forthcoming decision on the appeal filed by Greenpeace or on some other occasion.
National legal orders are even more reluctant to alter their traditional principles on standing, 
and the ECJ has not proved willing to interfere with them to the extent the principle o f effective 
judicial protection is not frustrated.118 It is illustrative in this connection that it often happens that 
citizens are denied access to national courts to challenge infringements o f  the EIA Directive on the 
grounds that they cannot prove special interest in the matter.119 The Council has indeed expressed 
its awareness that this is an area where Community initiatives must be undertaken. To this effect it 
has called on Member States to consider appropriate mechanisms to deal with complaints o f citizens 
and NG O s regarding non-compliance with environmental legislation and on the Commission to 
submit a report on the existing administrative and judicial mechanisms, including access to justice, 
and to assess whether there is a need for the development o f minimum criteria or guidelines 
regarding the handling of complaints both at national and at Community level and improved access 
to courts and administrative tribunals by non-governmental organisations and/or citizens with a view 
to encouraging the application and enforcement o f Community environmental legislation, in the
116 See, e.g., Joined Cases 16 to 17/62, loc.cit. n .l 10, p.901.
117 Case T-585/93 (Court o f  First Instance), Stichting Greenpeace Council and others v. Com mission. 1995 E.C.R., 
p.Il-2205; upheld on appeal, Case C -321/95, Judgment o f  2 April 1998.
118 See Joined Cases C-87 to 89/90, A .Veholen and others v. Sociale Verzekeringsbank. 1991 E.C.R., p.I-3757, at 
para.23.
119 See EC Com mission, op.cit. n.42, p.48.
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light o f the subsidiarity principle and taking into account the different legal systems o f the Member 
States.120 The Commission is actually working on relevant proposals.121
Having examined the three most important types o f  procedural rights and corresponding 
duties from the perspective o f international law, it is interesting to see how the courts in a particular 
jurisdiction have accommodated these rather innovative ideas. The example taken is again from the 
Greek jurisprudence.
8.4. Procedural Rights in Greek Jurisprudence - A  Case Study,
The Greek Council o f State, faithful to its ‘green’ tradition, has developed a consistently 
progressive case-law with regard to environmental impact assessment requirements, which goes a 
long way in rectifying deficient application o f the EIA Directive in G reece.122 In this context, it has 
in principle accepted the ‘direct effect’ o f certain provisions o f the Directive after the deadline for 
implementation had passed without transposition,123 and it has annulled administrative acts 
regarding projects for which no EIA had been undertaken prior to their commencement,124 meaning 
not only material work but also the issuing o f any preparatory administrative act, including choice 
of site,125 even if the project commenced before the EIA Directive and/or the implementing national 
legislation came into effect.126
The relevant case law also examines the legality o f prior EIA actually undertaken, adopting 
an exacting attitude towards the administration, be it in relation to formalities, such as the 
participation o f certain Ministries in the approval o f environmental conditions,127 or, more
120 See EU Council, Resolution o f  7 October 1997 on the drafting, implementation and enforcement o f  Community 
environmental law, 1997 O.J. (C 321) 1, at para.24-26. See also E.Rehbinder, 4Locus S tan di, Community Law and the 
Case for Harmonization, in H.Somscn (ed.), Protecting the European Environment - Enforcing E C  Environm ental Law, 
1996, pp. 151-66.
121 And it is even considering financial and technical assistance for increasing awareness in Community environmental 
law by judges, lawyers and officials o f  the Member States, see EC Commission, op.cit. n.44, pp. 10-3 and 22.
122 In fact, it only once departed from this route, when it ruled that the EIS submitted with the application for 
authorisation o f  extending the installations o f  a refinery also covered consent for com mencement o f  operation, Decision  
53/1993, N opoqK ai 0 6 a ij  [Law and Nature], V o l.l , 1994, p.290.
123 See Decision N o.2586/I992, EU.pv.Emd.Evp.Aucaiov [Greek Review o f  European Law], 1994, p.438. In this case, 
the Council eventually found that the project in question fell under Annex II, and hence the state had the scope to define 
whether it was covered by an EIA requirement.
12,1 See, e.g., Council o f  State, Decision N o.1035/1993, AppsvoKovXoq [Armenopoulos], V ol.5, 1993, p.473, regarding 
construction o f  a major circular highway near Athens; and N os. 1675 and 1676/1993, unreported, concerning a water 
supply project in Kefalonia.
125 See Council o f  State, D ecision No. 1520/1993, N opoqK ai <P6op [Law and Nature], V o l.l ,  1994, p.209; and 
2829 /1993 , N opoq icai 06a tj [Law and Nature], V ol.2, 1994, p.471-8, both concerning the siting o f  waste water 
treatment plants.
116 See, e.g., Council o f  State, D ecision N o .37/1993, N opoqK ai 0 6 m j [ Law and Nature], V o l.l , 1994, p.219, 
regarding extension o f  the Chios airport.
127 See Council o f  State, D ecision N o.1872/1994, N opoqKai 0u<rri [ Law and Nature], V ol.2(2), 1995, p.508.
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importantly, to the substance o f the assessment. The Council has, importantly, held that the aim of 
the EIA process is to inform the competent authorities on the specific impact o f the proposed project 
so as to enable them - in the spirit o f the preventive approach - to decide whether the activity is 
permissible, and possibly impose appropriate conditions.128 What is more, the Council has held that 
EISs have to consider the alternatives to the proposed works and be satisfied that the latter are 
indeed the most environmentally friendly solutions.129
One o f  the cornerstones o f the Council o f State’s jurisprudence is its decision on the 
diversion o f the Acheloos river.130 This was a major composite project involving several dams and 
interventions on the biggest watercourse in the country with multiple repercussions on the natural 
and man-made environment. The Council significantly found that this overall impact does not equal 
the aggregate o f the impact o f each separate work, but is rather multiplied due to the dynamic, non­
linear character o f the interdependent ecosystems that will be affected. Consequently, it ruled on the 
desirability o f  a composite and comprehensive study o f the highest scientific standard, requiring a 
great amount o f expertise, that would reveal the overall consequences o f the project in order to 
satisfy the quality requirements o f a meaningful assessment and an informed subsequent decision.
As far as public access to environmental information is concerned, Greece was 
characteristically late in transposing Directive 90/313, notwithstanding existing constitutional and 
legislative provisions establishing some relevant rights.131 In response, a group o f Greek 
environmental NGOs invoked the doctrine of ‘direct effect’ in support o f their claim that they had 
a right to obtain data in relation to the diversion o f Acheloos river, without awaiting for 
transposition. In a ground-breaking judgm ent, in 1995, the Fifth Division o f  the Greek Council o f 
State indicated its willingness to come in defence o f public rights o f access to environmental 
information.132 The case at hand concerned a petition o f three NGOs, namely the WWF Greece, the 
Greek Ornithological Society, and the Greek Society for the Protection o f the Environment and 
Cultural Heritage, against the Minister o f Industry, Energy and Technology. The petitioners sought 
to annul an act o f the Director o f Water Potential and Natural Resources, issued under instructions 
o f the said Minister in response to a request for statistical hydrological data on certain watercourses. 
In this act it was claimed that the Ministry was not in possession o f the relevant information, and 
it was suggested that certain research bodies be approached.
The Court considered Directive 90/313, together with a relevant piece o f national legislation 
predating the former, and found that:
l2K See D ecision N o .1520/1993, loc.cit. n.125.
l2y See Council o f  State, Decision N o.1035/1993, loc.cit. n.124.
i3U Council o f  State, Decision N os.2759 and 2760/1994, N opoqK ai [ Law and Nature], V o l.2 (l), 1995, p. 162.
131 Sec V.Dorovinis, ‘Greece’, in Hallo (ed.), op.cit n.69, pp. 111-4.
132 Council o f  State, Decision N o .3943/1995, unreported.
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“ ...With the above-mentioned Directive, Member States are obliged to introduce in their 
internal law provisions establishing an obligation o f the administrative services, central and 
peripheral, as well as o f the local authorities, to provide any natural or legal person 
submitting a relevant request with information... contained in documents, or other elements 
in visual, audio or computer form, irrespectively of whether these documents or elements 
have been issued, compiled or produced by the afore-mentioned services or are merely filed 
with them... It follows that the result pursued by the Directive is only partially guaranteed 
by the provisions o f the Greek Law, and specifically to the extent it concerns provision o f 
information derived from public documents. Therefore, it is not necessary to introduce 
special new provisions o f internal law so as to comply with the Directive to that extent. On 
the contrary, the Directive’s mandate is not covered to the extent it refers to an obligation 
o f provision o f information on the basis o f documents not issued or compiled in the above 
services, but merely filed with them, or o f elements in visual, audio or computer form being 
at the disposal o f these services. In view o f the fact, however, that the obligation stemming 
from the Directive is not dependent on pre-conditions at the discretion o f Member States, 
which may simply provide for a possibility to refuse information in certain cases and 
regulate the means by which information will be provided to interested persons, and, 
moreover, the exact obligation o f Member States flows from the Directive itself, any 
interested person has the right to invoke the provisions o f the Directive in order to base 
directly on them his claim o f access to data... The refusal o f the [said] Directorate is not 
legitimate, because... it was itself under a duty to provide the requested data to the 
petitioners [inasmuch as it is responsible for co-ordinating the research activities o f a 
multiplicity o f  public sector services], even if  they are not among those kept at that 
Directorate, since under such circumstances it should take steps with a view to acquiring 
the relevant data...”
This Decision, coupled with the Commission initiating infringement proceedings, prompted 
a Joint Ministerial Decision to implement the Directive, five years after the latter’s adoption and 
more than two years after the deadline had expired.133
Turning now to the issue o f standing, in Greece capacity to litigate is attributed to natural 
and legal persons as well as groups o f persons not possessing corporate legal personality, to the 
extent their lawful interests are prejudiced. Although this interest m ust be ‘personal, direct, and 
existent’, the Greek Council o f State has shown a notably early willingness - since the 70s - to 
accept environmental or other NG O s’s ‘lawful interest’ to challenge a large variety o f administrative 
decisions.13,1 Thus, the Athens Society o f Friends o f the Trees was deemed to have a lawful interest 
in the annulment o f an authorisation to build a shipyard in the Pylos Bay, hundreds o f kilometres 
away from the association’s base, on the grounds that the latter’s objectives covered protection o f 
wildlife, places o f outstanding natural beauty, plants and trees, the Greek countryside and the 
environment in general.135 In another judgm ent, the Lawyers’ Association o f  Volos was found to 
have a legal interest in the annulment o f  an authorisation to expand a factory in the vicinity o f the
133 N o .7 7 9 2 1/1440/6.9.95 on the freedom o f  citizen access to the public authorities for information relating to the 
environment, Official Gazette 795B ’, 14/9/1995. The instrument closely follow s the requirements and even the wording 
o f  the Directive, but -surprisingly - requires the person requesting information to show a legal interest! It additionally 
establishes a right o f  appeal to a Special Commission, which until 1997 had not been set up.
134 A s w ell as the rather better established interest o f  local government, see, e.g., Council o f  State, Decision  
N o.2755/1994, No/uog tcai <P6arj [ Law and Nature], V ol.2(2), 1995, p.487.
135 Council o f  State, Decision N o .8 10/1977, unreported.
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city, on the basis o f the former’s competence to discuss and pronounce on any issue with national 
or social implications, including protection o f the natural and cultural environment in order to 
prevent deterioration in the quality o f life.536 In fact, it is conceded among Greek lawyers that in 
administrative judicial proceedings related to the protection o f the environment, the Council’s 
attitude towards standing has permitted a quasi actio p o p u la r ise 7
It should be noted in this context, that this stance has exerted influence on the 
environmental awareness o f the Greek judiciary as a whole, which now treats leniently even violent 
confrontations between environmental activists and polluting corporations, as, for instance, in the 
case o f Greenpeace members acquitted in relation to the occupation o f an oil refinery; this action 
in fact led to the imposition o f heavy fines for pollution incidents that triggered the activism in the 
first place.138
8.5. New Trends in Regional Free Trade Arrangements - The NAFTA Side-Agreement on 
Environmental Co-operation.
It m ust be evident by now that harmonisation o f domestic administrative and judicial 
procedures and close supervision by the international community o f their effective application is a 
veiy ambitious task, bound to face considerable resistance on the grounds o f state sovereignty and 
independence. However, the North American Agreement on Environmental Co-operation 
(NAAEC), adopted in 1993, points to the emergence o f such a trend. This instrument was 
understandably concluded in an area where economic co-operation, or even integration, is advanced 
to a considerable degree, a factor that creates the necessary legal conditions and political trust to 
allow such developments.
NAAEC is a side-agreement of NAFTA, arguably the most environmentally sensitive trade 
agreement to date,139 as it upholds explicit environmental objectives, significantly including that of 
“strenghten[ing] the development and enforcement o f environmental laws and regulations” 
(Preamble); and committing its Parties to sustainable development and high-level environmental
136 Council o f  Slate, D ecision N o .4576/1976, unreported.
137 See, e.g., K.M gvou56ko<;, ‘n p ooraa la  xou riepi|3ci7Aovroc; aro E?At]viK6 Ar|p6cno Ahcato. H lo p p o /i]  iqc; 
NopoA,oyiac; t o d  £up(3o\Atou xiy; EmKpaxelac;’ [K.Menoudakos, ‘Protection o f  the Environment in Greek Public Law. 
The Contribution o f  the Jurisprudence o f  the Council o f  S late’], No/aogKai <P6o>j [Law and Nature], V o l.4(1), 1997, 
p. 19.
I3S Sec Greek newspaper To Vima, 13 April 1997, p.A41,
139 See, am ong others, R.Housman, ‘The N .A .F .T .A .’s Lessons for reconciling Trade and the Environment’, 30  
S tanford  J. o f  ln t'l L., 1994, pp.379-422; T.L.Anderson (ed.), NAFTA an d  the Environm ent, 1993, and especially 
P.M.Emerson & R.A.Collinge, ‘The Environmental Side o f  North American Free Trade’, pp.45-60; M.J.Spaulding, 
‘Transparency o f  Environmental Regulation and Public Participation in the Resolution o f  International Environmental 
D isputes’, 35 Santa C lara  L.Rev., 1995, pp. 1129-31; B.J.Condon, ‘NAFTA and the Environment: A Trade-Friendly 
Approach’, 14 N W  J. o f  ln t ’l  L. & Bus., 1994, pp.528-41; and F.M.Abbott, ‘The N A FTA  Environmental Dispute 
Settlement System as a Prototype for Regional Integration Arrangements’, 4 YB.I.E.L., 1993, pp.3-29, esp.at fn.3 where 
relevant literature is cited.
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protection, not only maintaining existing environmental standards (Chapter 7B), but also prohibiting 
their lowering and allowing enactment o f only more stringent ones (Arts.905 and 713). What is 
more important for present purposes is that NAFTA aspires towards future upward harmonisation 
of environmental laws (Arts.713-714 and 905-906) and adoption o f existing or emerging 
international standards (Arts.712(1) and 905(1)), and preserves the right/duty to enforce 
environmental treaty obligations listing relevant instruments that supersede NAFTA, and the 
ensuing free-trade regime, in case o f inconsistency (Art. 104).140
Building on these achievements and in order to appease the NAFTA critics,141 the 
environmental side-agreement provides for future formulation o f  commonly agreed standards by the 
trilateral North American Commission for Environmental Co-operation (NACEC),142 That aside, 
it explicitly sets procedural standards related to the domestic enforcement o f already existing 
national environmental law (Arts.5-7). This is an unprecedented - even by European Community 
standards - intrusion in the internal legal domain, which solemnly acknowledges that protection of 
the domestic environment is indeed an international concern.
More specifically, the central obligation undertaken in this agreement is that each Party 
must “effectively enforce its environmental laws”, through appropriate government action, such as 
appointing and training inspectors; monitoring compliance and investigating suspected violations; 
seeking assurances o f voluntary compliance and compliance agreements; publicly releasing non- 
compliance information; promoting environmental audits; requiring record keeping and reporting; 
providing or encouraging mediation and arbitration services; using licences, permits or 
authorisations; initiating judicial and other proceedings to seek appropriate sanctions or remedies; 
providing for search, seizure or detention; issuing administrative orders, including orders o f a 
preventative, curative or emergency nature etc. (Art.5(l)). The Parties have, thus, considerable 
freedom to choose the means that are most appropriate for their own legal system, but are in any 
case committed to ensure availability o f enforcement proceedings, and appropriate sanctions 
(Art.5(2)-(3)).
Private access to remedies is also guaranteed (Arts.6-7), and in particular rights to sue for 
damages; to seek sanctions or remedies such as monetary penalties, emergency closures or orders 
to mitigate the consequences o f violations; to request the competent authorities to take appropriate 
enforcement action; and to seek injunctions where a person suffers loss, damage or injury as a result
Hu N am ely CITES, the Montreal Protocol, the Basel Convention, and certain bilateral agreements between North 
American states, For a discussion o f  Article 104's implications, see I-lousman, op.cit. n .139, pp.398-400.
141 On the drafting history o f  the environmental provisions o f  NAFTA, see ibid, pp.3 80-394.
142 See, among others, S.C.Fulton & L.l.Sperling, ‘The Network o f  Environmental Enforcement and Compliance 
Cooperation in North America and the Western Hemisphere’, 30(1) The International L aw yer, 1996, pp.l 11-40; 
Spaulding, op.cit. n.139, pp. 1131-41; Condon, op.cit. n.139, pp.541-8; and Housman, op.cit. n.139, pp.412-9. The 
Secretariat is composed o f  independent members, as opposed to government officials sitting in the N A C E C ’s Council. 
In addition, there is a Public Advisory Committee o f  five non-governmental persons from each Party that is called upon 
to give advice.
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o f conduct contrary to environmental laws or tortious conduct (Art.6(3)). However, these rights 
pertain to persons “with a legally recognized interest under... [the Party’s] law in a particular 
matter”; in other words, the national rules o f standing are not interfered with, nor is access to legal 
proceedings given to aliens. 143 This is a crucial weakness in a system aspiring to empower the public 
so as to defend environmental goods, inasmuch as it does not affect jurisdictions that restrict access 
to legal recourse by not acknowledging relevant interests to the public at large.
Moreover, NAAEC includes ground-breaking provisions for recourse to international institutions 
to redress state failures related to enforcement operating at two levels, The first significantly 
involves the public: NGOs and individuals may present the Secretariat o f the NACEC with 
submissions with regard to a Party’s failure to enforce its environmental law . 144 The Secretariat then 
decides 011 whether the submission warrants a response, i.e. whether it alleges harm to the person 
making the submission, concerns issues whose further study would advance the purposes o f the 
regime, that private remedies under the Party’s law have been pursued, and whether the submission 
is drawn exclusively form media reports (Art. 14(2)), and may request the Party concerned to 
respond. Eventually it may prepare a factual record for submission to the Council, which may then 
make it publicly available (Arts. 14-15).145 It must be stressed, however, that this procedure does not 
automatically activate the formal dispute settlement process; in other words, the challenge to a 
government’s enforcement failure may well be exhausted after the steps described above have been 
taken unless another Party to the agreement takes up the issue and initiates the second level o f 
compliance control, to which the public - remarkably - has no access at its own initiative. 146
At this second level, any Party may request consultations with regard to another state’s 
persistent failure to enforce its environmental laws (Art.22). This important recognition of other 
countries’ legitimate interest in the observance o f domestic environmental legislation is tempered, 
however, by the caveat that the alleged enforcement failure must relate “ ...to a situation involving 
workplaces, firms, companies or sectors that produce goods or provide services: (a) traded between 
the territories of the Parties; or (b) that compete, in the territory o f the Party complained against, 
with goods or services produced or provided by persons o f another Party” (Art.24). This means that 
the international concern is limited only to economic activities, thus excluding a wide spectrum of 
other areas where environmental enforcement is desirable and largely deficient, and especially those
143 See l-lousman, op.cit. n.139, p.413.
144 This seems particularly significant for M exicans complaining that they have not adequate access to their own 
government for such matters, see Condon, op.cit. n .139, p.543.
145 On the three submissions that have reached the NACEC, see M.J.Kelly, ‘Bringing a Complaint under the NAFTA  
Environmental Side Accord: Difficult Steps under a Procedural Paper Tiger, but M ovem ent in the Right Direction’, 24 
P epp erd im  Law R eview , 1996, pp.71-97; K.Raustiala, ‘International “Enforcement o f  Enforcement” under the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation’, 36 Virginia J.I.L., 1996, pp.721-63; and P.M.Johnson, ‘The 
Commission for Environmental Co-operation and the Cozumel Case’, 6(2) R.E.C.I.E.L., 1997, pp.203-7.
146 See Abbott, op.cit. n .139, pp. 10-1, where he submits proposals with a view  to departing from these traditional 
intergovernmental practices.
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bearing on state interventions and activities affecting environmental assets. Moreover, a potentially 
powerful defence is available, namely that the challenged action or inaction has resulted “from bona 
fid e  decisions to allocate resources to enforcement in respect o f other environmental matters 
determined to have higher priorities” (Art.45(l)). It is difficult to envisage an international - or 
domestic, for that matter - organ questioning or dismissing any relevant submissions by a 
responsible government.
Bearing these restrictions in mind, if negotiations prove abortive, any Party may resort to 
the Council for resolution (Art.23). Should the matter still remain unresolved, and if it falls under 
certain categories, it may be referred to an expert Arbitral Panel, which produces a final report that 
the Parties involved are to implement by means o f an agreed action plan (Art.33 ) . 147 I f  the latter is 
in turn not properly implemented, the Panel can be reconvened and impose “a monetary 
enforcement assessment” (Art.34 ) . 148 This penalty is designed to be paid into a fund which will 
contribute at the direction o f the Council to improved environmental protection or law enforcement 
in the Party complained against (Annex 34(3)). Failure to pay that fine brings about the possibility 
o f the Panel, or subsequently the other Party concerned, deciding suspension o f NAFTA benefits 
for the culpable Party (Arts.35-36).149 In this connection, it has been suggested that a Party may well 
opt for paying the rather symbolic fine that will in any case return home through the above- 
mentioned fund , 130 or even suffer trade sanctions rather than implement Panel decisions, and that 
the whole process needs to acquire a more binding character. 131 At the same time, however, it is 
conceded that countries, such as the US and Mexico, have been traditionally suspicious o f 
international adjudication or intrusions 011 their sovereign prerogatives, which implies that any 
‘stronger’ system would be unlikely to be agreed upon or ultimately tolerated and put into effect. 132
The NACEC is not only a dispute-resolution fo rum , but also, and certainly more often, an 
organ entrusted with the day-to-day task o f promoting co-operation in environmental enforcement 
(Arts. 10(4)), through various actions and initiatives, as e.g. the compilation o f  an annual report o f 
data on each Party’s enforcement activities (Art. 12). In that context, the Commission has, since 
1995, established a standing North American Enforcement and Compliance Work Group, composed
147 The dispute settlement procedure established by the side agreement has been castigated as ‘Byzantine’, because 
o f  its elaborate and lengthy character, see ibid , p.8. In this respect, one must not forget that most international dispute 
settlements procedures present the same characteristics in order to ensure that the parties to a conflict have both the 
procedural guarantees and the time to de-escalate and resolve their differences.
148 Currently at 0.007%  o f  the total trade between the Parties during the most recent year for which data is available 
(Annex 34(1)).
I4<J More specifically, for the U SA and M exico the monetary assessment may be recouped through trade sanctions, 
whereas for Canada, it may be recouped through the Canadian courts, see Arts.22-36A.
150 See Abbott, op.cit. n .139, p. 16.
151 See ibid, pp. 11-2.
152 See ibid, p. 13; and p.28, where the author contemplates NAFTA evolving on the European Union lines towards 
greater integration with consequent concessions o f  sovereign authority.
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o f environmental enforcement officials from the three countries. 153 Hence, the primary role that the 
new structures play is one o f closer partnership in order to enhance enforcement efforts in the US, 
Canada and M exico . 154
To sum up, in the framework o f NAAEC both domestic and international public fo ra  are 
made available for the resolution o f conflicts regarding compliance with environmental regulations. 
One should not forget that this has been made possible on the basis o f  a long history o f bilateral 
efforts at co-operating with a view to environmental protection, and more specifically enforcement 
actions in the region . 155 Although it has been suggested that the terms o f  the side-agreement have 
the character o f non-binding political commitments rather than hard law , 155 which makes their 
implementation heavily dependent on the political will o f governments, and “on the priority the 
citizens o f each country assign to environmental issues” , 157 even those adopting a sceptical stance 
concede that citizens’ access to judicial and administrative proceedings for enforcement of 
environmental laws is a most significant improvement to N A FTA . 158 Despite criticism expressed 
so far that the NACEC adopts a formalistic stance and to date proved reluctant to pursue any o f the 
cases brought before it, 159 there is ample space to translate these innovative arrangements into actual 
practice. Then the way is arguably open for a new promising era o f international control over 
compliance with international - as well as national - environmental law, which will combine non- 
compliance procedures administered within the institutions set up in various international 
environmental regimes, with expanding internationally agreed determination o f  domestic 
implementation and enforcement procedures and respective rights and duties.
8.6. Concluding Remarks.
In this Chapter we saw that international environmental law - with the pioneering influence 
o f Community regulation - has already gone some way towards establishing public rights o f a 
procedural nature that operate domestically and bring the public into the law-making and law-
153 See Fulton & Sperling, op.cit. n.142, p .131.
154 Indeed, it is envisaged that this system will eventually expand to cover the whole o f  the Americas, ibid, pp. 138-40; 
and Abbott, op.cit. n .139, p. 17.
155 For a review o f  this history, see Fulton & Sperling, op.cit. n.142, pp. 116-27.
I5& And that it is “riddled with textual weaknesses and hortatory enforcement provisions” , see e.g., M.J.Kelly, 
'Overcoming Obstacles to the Effective Implementation o f  International Environmental Agreements’, 9 The Georgetown  
International Environm ental Law Review, 1997, p.480.
157 See Condon, op.cit. n.139, p.542.
ISS See, for instance, M.S.H.Cho, ‘Private Enforcement o f  NAFTA Environmental Standards through Transnational 
Mass tort Litigation: The Role o f  United States Courts in the A ge o f  Free Trade’, 27  S t.M a iy ’s  L.J., 1996, p.831; and 
Spaulding, op.cit. n.137, p. 1133-6. For critical views, see also D.D.Coughlin, ‘Comment, The North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation: A  Summary and D iscussion’, 2 M o.E n v’l L. & P o l'y  Rev., 1994, p.93.
159 See J.Coatney, ‘The Council on Environmental Cooperation; Redaction o f  “Effective Enforcement” within the 
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation’, 32 Tidsa Law Journal, 1997, pp.823-42.
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enforcement process. The right to participate in EIA procedures and that o f access to environmental 
information are the ones most widely accepted and practised, especially in the most developed 
countries, albeit with considerable obstacles. The same cannot be said for the right o f access to 
administrative and judicial proceedings, which still to date remains a matter exclusively governed 
by national law, save in the area o f transboundary pollution damage.
More specifically, environmental impact assessments prior to the issuing o f permits for any 
project likely to affect the marine environment are today a mandatory requirement, even absent 
transnational elements. Entry into force o f the Espoo Convention will probably accelerate the 
application o f the principle in other areas o f environmental protection, and will stimulate the 
proliferation o f relevant procedures not only among its Parties but also in other parts o f  the world, 
and especially Africa and the rest o f the Mediterranean region. Nevertheless, the European 
experience with implementation o f the EIA Directive shows that a legal framework is not in itself 
enough to guarantee that this procedure will have the intended impact on decision-making nor that 
the public will be involved in a meaningful way.
As far as public rights o f  access to information are concerned, these have not yet been 
sufficiently embedded in the day-to-day practice o f  national administrations even in the EU 
countries where they have been introduced since the early 90s. Nevertheless, the adoption of the 
Aarhus Convention has the potential to inform and reinforce the existing legal arrangements in 
Europe and influence the legislation o f other countries as well.
This instrument is very significant in another respect: it is the only international agreement 
to date whereby states undertake to establish at least minimum rights o f access to justice for their 
citizens and NGOs for the purpose o f enforcing environmental legislation, irrespective of damage 
suffered. Relevant developments are also expected in the context o f Community law, where as yet 
there is no recognition o f a broad definition o f standing that would accommodate collective interests 
either before the ECJ or domestic judicial and administrative fora.
The trend towards increased intrusiveness o f international law is also reflected in the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Co-operation. The central object o f regulation therein are 
state obligations to effectively enforce national environmental legislation, coupled by the 
establishment o f procedures for public recourse to both national and international institutions to 
redress relevant failures. This represents the clearer admission so far that the method and 
effectiveness o f environmental enforcement within state borders is a legitimate international 
concern, and is in fact a corollary o f international regulation o f the domestic environment.
Having said that, one must never lose sight o f the fact that the EU and NAFTA are political 
and economic integration systems, which allows them to develop mechanisms that deeply interfere 
with the reserved domain o f national procedural rules. In the Mediterranean, the envisaged 
integration process in the context o f the ‘Euro-Mediterranean partnership’ - extensively discussed
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in Chapter 6  - makes a comparable evolution possible as well as desirable. In other words, the 
‘export’ o f environmental conditions from the Community to third countries in the region, linked 
to funding and development co-operation, already taking shape is perfectly capable o f eventually 
encompassing procedural requirements as well.
However, another caveat is necessary in this connection: NGOs in developing countries are 
only ju st emerging as active participants; 160 what is more, procedural rights might be ju st a 
theoretical notion in countries where democratic institutions are lagging behind . 161 Consequently, 
there is no guarantee that prescribed freedoms and corresponding duties such as those implied above 
will be put into effect and make any difference in the management o f international environmental 
obligations in these countries. Having said that, relevant experience in other developing parts o f the 
world is encouraging, pointing to the conclusion that rights to environmental protection “can lie 
dormant until they are actively seized by environmentalists and lawyers” , 162 and also that, from an 
opposite perspective, strong environmental movements combined with an independent and 
sympathetic judiciary may create environmental remedies even when existing laws do not explicitly 
provide for them . 163 But exactly because these conditions are not always present, there is still a need 
for stronger international supervision in the Mediterranean, as detailed in Chapter 5.
160 See D.Sharfman, Living Without a  Constitution: Civil Rights in Israel, 1993, p. 179, for a presentation o f  the trend 
towards increased environmental activities in Israel, including court petitions.
161 There are, however, encouraging examples o f  judicial application o f  a series o f  procedural rights established under 
international law, especially in the context o f  human rights, in Mediterranean countries that have been long found 
themselves in the midst o f  turbulent and unstable political circumstances, both internally and externally. One notable 
exam ple is Egypt, see 'A.el-Morr, ‘The Supreme Constitutional Court o f  Egypt and the Protection o f  Human and 
Political R ights’, in Ch.Mallat (ed,), Islam an d  Public Law, 1993, pp.229-60. On the bearing o f  factors such as a 
country’s culture, stage o f  development, and political processes on compliance with international environmental law, 
see E.Brown Weiss & H.Jacobson, ‘A ssessing the Record and Designing Strategies to Engage Countries’, in E.Brown 
W eiss & H.K.Jacobson (eds.), Engaging Countries - Strengthening Com pliance with InternationaI Environmental 
Accords, pp.529-35.
162 Anderson, op.cit. n .139, p.20; see also A.Fabra, ‘Indigenous Peoples, Environmental Degradation and Human 
Rights: A  Case Study’, in Boyle & Anderson (eds.), op.cit. n .l , pp.245-63; and E.Fernandes, ‘Constitutional 
Environmental Rights in Brazil’, in ibid, pp.265-84.
163 See M.R.Anderson, ‘Individual Rights to Environmental Protection in India’, in Boyle & Anderson (eds.), op.cit. 
n .l, pp. 199-225.
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365
It is now time to pull the various strands of the preceding discussion together and formulate 
some overall conclusions. In the previous Chapters we saw how, within the wider context o f the 
evolution o f international environmental law, international regulation for the protection o f the 
Mediterranean Sea against pollution matured from a hortatory ‘framework’ to specific commitments 
in the context o f MAP, and from a piecemeal approach to integrated pollution control in the context 
o f the EU. The evolving legal framework covering to a lesser or greater extent any possible polluting 
source with often detailed and technical standards that have to be implemented domestically 
demonstrates the acceptance o f world community interests in the control o f activities carried out 
within exclusive state jurisdiction and in the preservation and enhancement o f  the quality o f the 
marine environment within state borders irrespective of any possible transboundary effect. This 
‘internationalisation5 o f the domestic environment, has, thus, restricted the absolute sovereignty and 
discretion o f governments with regard to the conduct allowed, and even required, in order to bring 
about full implementation o f  the respective commitments, along the lines o f  the developing theory 
o f ‘trust5, 1 whereby states are seen as caretakers, ‘trustees5 o f their environmental assets rather than 
sovereigns thereupon.
We also traced the parallel evolution o f  compliance control mechanisms from the state 
responsibility model that accommodates bilateral interests and the comprehensive institutional 
approach and the provision o f  financial and technical assistance catering for collective interests, all 
operating at the inter-state level, to the national law mechanism that brings to the forefront domestic 
actors representing public interests in the proper implementation o f international environmental 
standards. In this context, we questioned the efficiency o f the mechanisms in place today to follow 
up and ensure compliance in the specific case o f international regulation to control marine pollution 
in the Mediterranean.
The absence o f state practice relative to the invocation o f state responsibility for breach of 
environmental obligation and to the use o f sanctions worldwide, and especially in the Mediterranean 
region, has been repeatedly stressed in this study. There is nothing to indicate that the situation will 
change in the near future and that the fundamental tenets o f these most traditional concepts will be 
drastically altered. In fact, this approach has innate shortcomings: It relies on the wrong actors to 
control compliance with international environmental standards, i.e. the states themselves, which 
have no incentive to take action against each other, especially when no vital state interests are
1 See E.Brown Weiss, in  Fairness to Future G enerations , 1989; and supra, Chapter 2, pp,59-60.
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affected. Furthermore, even in the event that collective interests find a proper place in the law of 
state responsibility in the future, the fact remains that this is a reactive strategy, as opposed to a 
preventive one, in the sense that it only becomes relevant when a violation is alleged to have already 
been committed. It is consequently a mechanism that can serve only as a last resort, a reminder that 
pacta sunt servanda  and that this cornerstone principle may not be ignored at will.
Turning to the comprehensive institutional model, in Chapter 5 it was argued that this is the 
most influential treaty mechanism established to date that allows for the continuous interaction 
needed to follow up international standards laid down in paper so that they are put into practical 
effect and achieve their objectives. This mechanism brings to the forefront non-state actors, and 
more specifically international organs representing the common interest o f the parties and, therefore, 
having their own dynamic as somewhat independent agents, that deal with day-to-day problems and 
seek to ensure refinement, implementation and ultimately compliance with the substantive rules 
established under their constituent treaty. This interactive process, however, is still intensely 
political in nature, as it relies on the willingness o f each and every state-party in order to function 
effectively, especially when there is no well-defined arrangement for compliance control.
This is reiterated by the examination o f the two principal techniques used in the treaty 
regimes applicable to marine pollution o f the Mediterranean Sea, i.e. monitoring and reporting. 
These are meant to provide the indispensable feedback on both formal and practical implementation 
o f international obligations and as such their proper execution is vital for any subsequent follow up 
action. However, this information is almost exclusively controlled by the state itself whose 
behaviour is under scrutiny. As a result, and despite extensive reporting requirements and efforts 
within various organs to facilitate and promote submission o f reports, the required information is 
usually not forthcoming, or when it is, its quality and adequacy are found lacking. At the same time, 
the organs responsible for putting data gathered into effective use remain in most cases inactive. 
Transparency in the sense o f efficient information-gathering is achieved only in the context o f the 
Paris MOU; the intrinsic features of this arrangement, however, entailing administrative agencies 
inspecting those coming under their jurisdiction, point to the reality that in practice the major part 
o f potentially polluting activities, not involving ships, cannot be meaningfully followed up by a 
system o f international co-operation o f this kind.
Overall, the European Union has established the most advanced and wholesome 
international compliance-control mechanism by endowing the Commission with the task o f ensuring 
that Community legislation is properly implemented in Member States. This is in practice a complex 
process o f interaction with the public through the channel o f submission o f complaints, as well as 
with competent national authorities, which can gradually culminate to the judicial stage, and even 
to the imposition o f fines on persistent non-compliant states. The operation o f this mechanism does 
produce results in the sense that several problems of implementation are resolved during the
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informal stages, and some instances o f blatant violations o f  Community environmental rules are 
reversed after an ECJ judgm ent is obtained. In this context, M editerranean M ember States are 
subject to fairly stringent supervision with regard to the application o f Community law for the 
protection o f the marine environment in their territory.
Nonetheless, this process is by no means faultless. Its most important limitations relate to 
the inability o f the Commission services to monitor national implementation effectively, in view of 
the fact that monitoring and reporting requirements under environmental Directives, despite their 
much more sophisticated and mandatory character, are still not properly fulfilled, especially by 
Mediterranean countries; and to the political considerations that admittedly have a greater or lesser 
bearing on the decision to institute infringement proceedings against a state. Consequently, this 
m echanism can be only partially successful, and has to be complemented by decentralised 
enforcement at the national level. What is more, the Community model o f  compliance control 
cannot be extended to cover third Mediterranean countries before a process o f integration 
comparable to that within the EU has been achieved.
There is still the possibility o f developing an advanced international compliance-control 
arrangement outside the EU context. The operation o f the Montreal Protocol ‘non-compliance 
procedure5 shows that such a permanent, streamlined mechanism, explicitly providing for 
sanctioning or assistance measures to address non-compliant behaviour, can make a real difference 
in individual states5 performance. Nevertheless, even this procedure does not escape being 
influenced by political considerations and an excessive concern for confidentiality, which 
underscore the need for openness and transparency so that the parameter o f public exposure can 
come in, and NGOs can access information gathered and be involved in the life o f  the international 
regime. Notwithstanding its shortcomings, the Montreal Protocol model has influenced and been 
incorporated in other international environmental regimes.
N o such development is imminent in the context o f MAP, however; the Parties to the 
Barcelona Convention are simply not concerned with compliance control, notwithstanding certain 
Secretariat efforts, nor have they vested their collective organ with anything more than a standard 
and loosely-defined supervisory power in the 1995 revision. A positive indication for a possible 
change o f this attitude towards a long-overdue recognition o f the collective interest in compliance 
control is the inclusion o f compliance monitoring in the objectives o f MED POL 111. Be that as it 
may, M A P’s twenty-year operation has undoubtedly much contributed to capacity-building and 
increased awareness in Mediterranean countries, which indirectly leads to more environmental 
regulation in conformity with international undertakings. In fact, it would be fair to say that treaty 
institutions work - in a characteristically preventive fashion - towards enhanced compliance even 
absent any distinct non-compliance procedure. The follow-up work effected in the framework o f the 
IMO committees in relation to MARPOL is the best illustration o f this point.
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From another standpoint, the possibility o f requiring delinquent states to pay fines, and, 
more generally, the Commission’s authority to manage enormous funds, which can have a direct or 
indirect impact on Member States’ compliance patterns, highlights the centrality o f financial 
resources for compliance-control purposes. Experience with the Montreal Protocol mechanism also 
teaches that the acceptance and legitimisation o f substantial compliance control are closely linked 
with the availability o f a treaty mechanism for financial assistance to parties that meet their 
substantive and procedural obligations. More generally, international assistance, in the form of 
provision o f financial resources, transfer o f technology and technical information, and trade and 
other economic incentives, can also act as a direct or indirect inducement to comply with 
international obligations o f environmental protection. It can specifically facilitate implementation 
o f  relevant standards in countries with insufficient resources but willing to comply with their 
international commitments, and, at the same time, may instigate measures o f environmental 
protection by governments that are either indifferent or hesitant, but nevertheless ready to take 
advantage o f the available aid. This is, therefore, an absolutely preventive approach since it operates 
before the issue o f non-compliant behaviour has even arisen.
These considerations have obviously not informed the design o f the M editerranean Trust 
Fund, which has led to its unsuitability to support substantive measures to combat marine pollution 
in the region. In the same vein, the provisions o f the Barcelona Convention and Protocols on 
financial and technical assistance to developing countries have been translated into concrete actions 
to a very limited extent, mostly in the area o f oil spill response and monitoring capabilities. With 
regard to land-based pollution abatement, MAP has provided only modest amounts for the training 
o f experts on national implementation. In this connection the GEF-funded project for mitigating 
marine pollution from various, including land-based, sources in the Southern Mediterranean is much 
more substantial and in pace with current thinking.
In the Community context, on the other hand, Mediterranean Member States have received 
very substantial support for the execution o f environmental projects. Spain and Greece in particular 
have benefited during the last six years from the Cohesion Fund for the purpose o f controlling 
industrial pollution o f the marine environment and o f constructing wastewater treatment facilities; 
more modest amounts were also directed to such investments under the ENVIREG programme. 
However, the Cohesion Fund has, at least in the first few years o f its operation, shown some notable 
failings with regard to ensuring that the projects funded fully complied with Community 
environmental legislation and were subjected to adequate EIAs. In general, until 1992 there was no 
explicit conditioning o f Community assistance on compliance with environmental standards, and 
even inconsistency o f  various types o f funding with stated environmental objectives, notably under 
the Structural Funds and from the EIB. However, much progress has been made since in these 
respects.
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As far as third Mediterranean countries are concerned, Community support has been 
forthcoming under the MEDSPA programme, which is significantly the first one explicitly linking 
Community funding to the attainment o f the MAP objectives. However, aid in this context was very 
limited and directed exclusively to technical and administrative capacity-building. In view o f the 
discrepancy in the level o f development o f appropriate national legislation for the prevention and 
redress o f pollution between developed and developing states in the region, that kind o f assistance 
aiming at narrowing the gap is definitely not inconsequential, but it is certainly not enough. The 
same can be said with regard to the LIFE instrument, the principal Community funding programme 
for the environment currently in operation, which also directs small amounts to capacity-building 
in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, the main source o f  funding for environmental 
projects in non-member states o f the region has been the EIB and the various financial protocols 
between the Community and individual countries. However, this assistance has not been made 
conditional on compliance with international, regional or Community environmental standards.
There is every indication that the situation will change in the recently introduced stage of 
intra-regional co-operation in the framework o f the ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’. The MED A 
Regulation, which governs this phase, in particular refers to the EU obligation to assist developing 
states in addressing the environmental impacts o f development. In this context, it is envisaged that 
harmonised legislation will be promoted, and, moreover co-operation with regional institutions such 
as those o f  the MAP system will be fostered. Raising environmental standards in third 
Mediterranean countries has obvious advantages also for European compliance with the respective 
rules and for competitiveness in a free-trade environment. It is, therefore, submitted that there is 
much scope for conditioning Community financial aid to non-member states on the achievement of 
specific international and regional targets for pollution abatement. In this connection, the repeatedly 
noted interaction and constructive discourse between Community and international environmental 
law can provide the necessary basis, in view o f the fact that, although third states are certainly not 
yet bound by Community law, they are committed to regional standards o f  protection at least as far 
as the marine environment is concerned. Having said that, the progress achieved in this area within 
the EU can only be accomplished in this context to the extent the broad economic and political 
integration process materialises and deepens.
To sum up, more astute and extensive use o f the conditional funding technique is arguably 
a central challenge for the future o f compliance control with international marine pollution standards 
in the Mediterranean region; as this tool can positevely influence both the intention and the capacity 
o f concerned states to comply .2 To this effect, it is useful to consider concentrating efforts towards:
2 See E.Brown W eiss & H.Jacobson, ‘Assessing the Record and Designing Strategies to Engage Countries’, in E.Brown 
W eiss & H.K.Jacobson (eds.), Engaging Countries - Strengthening Com pliance with International Environmental 
A ccords , Cambridge, 1998, pp.53 8-42
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i) Ensuring that environmental projects in Member-States receiving Community assistance fully 
comply with relevant legislation, and stringently applying the discontinuation-of-funding clause in 
case o f non-compliance;
ii) Including explicit conditioning o f  financial aid on adherence to international and regional 
environmental standards in all future ‘Euro-Mediterranean Association A greem ents’, as a first step 
towards an eventual harmonisation o f environmental legislation; and
iii) Endowing the MAP Secretariat with ‘clearing-house’ functions with regard to all available 
assistance mechanisms, including the EU and EIB, GEF and M ETAP, talcing advantage o f its 
recently expressed readiness to formally assume an advisory and supportive role in helping 
interested countries acquire funding for environmental projects. Such a development can 
conceivably pave the way for the eventual introduction o f a substantial financial mechanism in the 
Barcelona regime, which could be either in the form o f the Montreal Multilateral Fund or o f an 
imaginative consolidation o f  the management of all the existing assistance schemes under a single 
regional institution. This could in turn be linked to some kind o f compliance-control procedure as 
was done in the ozone regime.
That said, the international compliance-control systems considered so far are not nor are 
they likely to become entirely satisfactory. Although they can go a long way towards facilitating 
compliance and, in the sphere o f Community law, towards direct enforcement action, they always 
depend on national governments and administration for ultimately bringing about full 
implementation o f  international environmental norms. Another common characteristic o f the 
techniques examined is that they bring the most ardent defenders o f the environment, namely 
concerned citizens and their associations, only marginally into play. These actors have the incentive, 
the intention; suffice it to give them the capacity, i.e. the practical ability and the legal authority to 
control compliance with environmental standards and thus take the initiative away from states and 
international organs that are ultimately as independent and effective as the parties o f a given regime 
allow them to be. Both these failings can be realistically rectified through the use o f domestic legal 
mechanisms with their array o f administrative and judicial procedures for the enforcement o f  legal 
obligations in general and environmental standards in particular.
As was explained in Chapter 8 , in principle the different branches o f the state are under a 
duty to implement and enforce international rules that have duly entered into force for that state. 
Under the Community legal order this duty stems from the doctrine o f supremacy o f Community 
law and the accompanying principles that have been embedded in the EC J’s jurisprudence over 
many years. With regard to other international obligations, especially in treaty form, national 
Constitutions provide for their incorporation in the national legal order and their placement in the 
legal hierarchy o f the state; once incorporated, international law must be accurately and effectively 
implemented or, if this not done or is done improperly, it must be enforced by the judiciary. Despite
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diverse legal traditions and practice, international standards are, thus, capable o f being held ‘directly 
effective’ or ‘self-executing’ in a national jurisdiction to the extent they are formulated in precise 
and clear terms, grant individual rights, and restrict state discretion as to the way they should be 
implemented. Thus, the national judge emerges as a crucial complement to centralised enforcement. 
The example o f the Greek Council o f State jurisprudence argues in favour o f this proposition, and 
additionally shows that the judiciary can fill the gap o f compliance control with international 
agreements not undertaken under the centralised enforcement mechanism o f the Community.
In fact, effective implementation o f Community environmental law is better guaranteed by 
the much closer association o f the Member States’ legal orders with the Community one, in view 
o f the fact that the judiciary is under precise duties that relate to the rectification o f both public and 
private non-compliance with Community rules. Citizens are given in this context additional avenues 
to challenge such practices by invoking the ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ effect o f environmental Directives, 
or even raising a claim o f ‘state liability’.
But even before a compliance issue comes before the court, the follow up needed to control 
what is actually taking place with regard to effective practical implementation o f the said rules can 
realistically be pursued in a meaningful and comprehensive way only at the local level, as is 
evidenced by both international and Community efforts in this field. In this connection, the 
environmentally-sensitive sectors o f the society acting as ‘w atchdogs’ can assist competent 
authorities and, if  need be, substitute for them. International law has a large potential for future 
intervention to this effect.
It is true that in the environmental sphere international regulation has not been as intrusive 
in the domestic procedural domain as in the area o f human rights. However, the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Co-operation introduces state obligations to effectively enforce 
national environmental legislation, and even procedures for recourse to both national and 
international institutions to redress state failures related to enforcement. This is a clear indication 
that the method and effectiveness o f environmental enforcement within state borders are a legitimate 
international concern, and, in fact, a corollary o f international regulation o f the domestic 
environment. As Professor Kiss puts it: “Clearly, the most powerful - or the least weak - tool for 
ensuring compliance with international environmental obligations is public awareness and the will 
to impose upon governments the protection o f the environmental values which are essential for the 
survival o f  humanity” .3
Be that as it may, only recently has international environmental law shifted its focus on 
establishing citizen rights that acknowledge public interests in its subject-matter. Community law 
has been in the vanguard o f relevant developments that bring the public into the law-making and
3 A-Ch.Kiss, ‘Compliance with International and European Environmental O bligations’, 9 Hague YB. o f  Int 7 L ,  1996, 
p.54.
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law-enforcement process. The right to participate in compulsory EIA procedures, especially when 
the marine environment is likely to be affected, is the most widely accepted principle in this 
connection; while the right o f access to environmental information is being slowly entrenched, 
mainly in the Western world. However, the application of these principles meets with considerable 
obstacles; the fact that the EIA Directive attracts the majority o f complaints every year is 
characteristic o f the resistance o f public authorities to be constrained by procedural requirements 
that change the usual course o f  business. Most importantly, neither international nor Community 
environmental law has yet paid enough attention to the need for uniform minimum rules on standing 
that would enable concerned individuals and their associations to take up the task o f  enforcing 
environmental standards in particular. With the notable exception o f  the Aarhus Convention which, 
however, has not yet become operative, rights o f access to administrative and judicial proceedings 
still to date remain under the exclusively control o f individual states, save in the area of 
transboundary pollution damage.
However, the harmonisation o f civil liability rules in general in relation to transboundary 
activities and especially shipping, despite its long history and ensuing legitimisation, is today only 
marginally relevant to compliance control as such. In fact, as explained in Chapter 4, the practice 
is still rather conservative when it comes to compensating damage to the environment p er se. That 
is notwithstanding the fact that the threat o f being subject to strict and uniform liability standards 
has a considerable deterrent impact on prospective violators o f environmental rules in general to the 
extent their behaviour will cause some appreciable damage. That aside, the Dangerous Activities 
Convention indicates a trend towards establishing common liability rules for environmental harm 
that occurs exclusively within national borders, which, together with the recent emergence o f a trend 
in favour of compensation for pure environmental loss and the development o f  relevant techniques 
within national legal systems, points to a potential transformation o f the civil liability mechanism 
into a tool o f enforcement against private polluters and possibly against the state itself. A relaxation 
o f the relevant requirements could strengthen the case for interest groups challenging 
environmentally destructive actions not only 011 the basis o f illegality, but, where appropriate, on 
the grounds that these activities have caused pure ecological injury. This would be a significant 
addition to the array o f procedural standards operating within national jurisdictions.
That said, in the specific context o f MAP even the more modest efforts to develop a 
regional system o f liability and to set up an Interstate Guarantee Fund have met with seemingly 
unsurm ountable reluctance for twenty years now. Similar difficulties are noted in relation to the 
Com m ission’s attempts to establish common environmental liability standards across the EU. If 
these eventually produce some results, the way is paved for an expansion o f the relevant rules in the 
rest o f  the M editerranean region, either through a legal harmonisation process under the ‘Euro-
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Mediterranean partnership’, or at least through Mediterranean participation in the regime established 
pursuant to the Dangerous Activities Convention.
More generally, one must always bear in mind that the development o f  mechanisms that 
decisively interfere with the reserved domain o f national procedural law is easier to achieve in the 
context o f political and economic integration systems, such as the EU and NAFTA, and much more 
difficult in a looser co-operative environment like the Barcelona regime. It follows that a 
comparable evolution is possible in the regional Mediterranean context only through the envisaged 
integration process. If  this setting matures, one can imagine that procedural requirements will be 
eventually encompassed in the wider ‘export’ o f environmental conditions from the Community to 
third countries in the region. Even that would not be enough, however: Procedural guarantees might 
be just a theoretical notion in countries where democratic institutions are lagging behind. Hence, 
it is not guaranteed that relevant rights and corresponding duties, even if they are formally 
introduced, would be put into effect and make any difference in the management o f international 
environmental obligations in these countries. For that to happen there are several preconditions that 
have to fulfilled, including substantial democratic accountability, existence o f active environmental 
NGOs and the ensuing enhanced public awareness.
With these caveats in mind, it is nevertheless worth considering in the development o f 
future international regulation:
i) The establishment of more detailed, technical and complete rules, with more specific instructions 
as to what is required for their implementation, which will be easier to be considered directly 
applicable;
ii) the establishment of minimum environmental liability rules at the Community level with a broad 
definition o f damage to the environment and provision for public standing in order to present 
relevant claims;
iii) the establishment o f minimum rights for public access to justice and to administrative 
proceedings for environmental matters at the Community level;
iv) the adoption o f a regional instrument, for instance in the form o f a Barcelona Convention 
Protocol, laying down environmental liability standards applicable in the whole region;
v) the endorsement o f  procedural principles in the vein of the Aaarhus Convention and the 
respective Community instruments for the whole o f the Mediterranean area, either by means of a 
separate Protocol in the MAP context or through accession o f the non-European Mediterranean 
states to the Aarhus treaty; and, finally,
vi) the establishment o f a network o f national environmental enforcement authorities in the 
M editerranean along the lines o f IMPEL for the exchange o f information and expertise and the 
production o f common approaches and guidelines in relation to enforcement problems.
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Thus reinforced, the national law model, despite its prim a fa c ie  reactive character, can 
ultimately become preventive. In other words, although this approach basically provides a response 
in case international environmental obligations are not given proper regard in domestic jurisdictions, 
if it becomes comprehensive enough and regularly practised, it can also play a significant deterrent 
role and arrest deviating behaviour before it occurs by way o f the fear o f being detected and 
sanctioned.
It should also be said that the two lines of future positive developments analysed above are 
complementary: In the short and medium term, the institutional approach is more susceptible to 
modification, because it is already well-established and can be functionally altered to accommodate 
the above-described adjustments with no excess difficulty. Development o f the national law model 
for compliance control, on the other hand, is a long-term challenge, in view o f the fact that states 
are initially required to transcend traditional perceptions o f what the limits o f international law are 
and subsequently to tolerate deep internal changes that do not depend so much on international 
regulation but rather on environmental awareness and democratic processes within each state.
All said, it must be obvious by now that the topic o f this study has never before been 
thoroughly researched. What is more, the actual thesis views compliance control issues from a 
perspective not common in international legal thinking, inasmuch as the national and international 
legal systems are perceived to have a much greater affinity than usual, so that the discussion on 
implementation o f and compliance with international environmental law addresses factors, actions 
and procedures operating under domestic legal orders. It follows that the foregoing inferences can 
only be tentative.
However, the line o f reasoning pursued in the present context is not exclusively related to 
the international law on the protection o f the Mediterranean sea against pollution. In fact, although 
the area o f marine pollution regulation is one o f the most technical and detailed, and thus susceptible 
to advanced compliance control, we noted that the mechanisms that accommodate the multilateral 
interest are even more mature in other areas o f  international law such as the ozone regime. 
Moreover, the - arguably - most advanced stages o f compliance control with international law 
intruding into the domestic legal sphere have no direct relation to marine pollution, i.e. to the sector 
regulated, but are rather procedural in nature. The study o f the M editerranean Sea case is also 
typical o f a regime involving both developed and developing nations with all the ensuing problems 
and tensions. Therefore, it is submitted that the conclusions reached can have some considerable 
relevance to other areas of international environmental law. This makes specific research and case 
studies in other environmental sectors and regimes necessary in order to trace the stage of 
development and the effectiveness o f compliance control mechanisms therein and validate, qualify 
or reject the thesis argued in this study. To this effect, other useful areas o f  future research may 
include individual state compliance with international environmental obligations, as well as the
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impact o f procedural public rights oil compliance control with international environmental 
commitments in particular jurisdictions. The list cannot be easily exhausted, since the issue o f 
compliance is both vital and very complex. Behind us may be a long line o f achievements, but in 
front there is undoubtedly an uphill road to consequential implementation o f international 
environmental standards.
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1991 O.J. (L 78) 32; Council Directive 94/3, 1994 O.J. (L 5) 15; Council Directive 94/904, 
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dangerous substances, 1980 O.J. (L 20) 43.
Council Directive 80/778 relating to the quality o f water intended for human consumption, 1980 
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(L 291) 1.
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other than the chlor-alkali electrolysis industry, 1984 O.J. (L 74) 49. .
Council Directive 84/360 on the combating o f air pollution from industrial plants, 1984 O.J. (L 
188) 20.
Council Directive 84/491 on limit values and quality objectives for discharges o f 
hexachlorocyclohexane (HCH), 1984 O.J. (L 274) 11.
Council Directive 84/63 Ion the supervision and control within the EC o f the transfrontier shipment 
o f hazardous waste, 1984 O.J. (L 326) 31; as amended by Council Directive 85/469, 1985 
O J. (L 272) 1; Council Directive 86/121, 1986 OJ. (L 100) 20; Council Ditrective 86/279, 
1986 O.J. (L 181) 13; and Council Directive 87/112, 1987 O.J. (L 48) 31.
Council Directive 85/203 on air quality standards for nitrogen dioxide, 1985 O.J. (L 87) 1; as 
amended by Council Directive 85/580, 1985 O.J. (L 372) 36.
Council Directive 85/337 on environmental impact assessment, 1985 O.J. (L 175) 40; as amended 
by Council Directive 97/11, 1997 O.J. (L 73) 5.
Council Directive 86/280 on limit values and quality objectives for carbon tetrachloride, DDT and 
pentachlorophenol discharges, 1986 O.J. (L 181) 16; as amended by Council Directive
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88/347 with regard to aldrin, dieldrin, endrin, isodrin, hexachlorobenzene, 
hexachlorobutadiene and chloroform, 1988 O.J, (L 158) 35; and Council Directive 90/415 
with regard to dichloroethane, trichloroethylene, perchloroethylene and trichlorobenzene, 
1990 O J. (L 219) 49..
Council Directive 88/609 on the limitation o f emissions o f certain pollutants into the air from large 
combustion plants, 1988 OJ. (L 336) 1; as amended by Council Directive 94/66,1994 O.J. 
(L 337) 83.
Council Directive 90/313 on public access to environmental information, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 56 .
Council Directive 91/271 concerning urban waste water treatment, 1991 O.J. (L 135) 40.
Council Directive 91/676 concerning the protection o f waters against pollution caused by nitrates 
from agricultural sources, 1991 O.J. (L 375) 1.
Council Directive 91/689 on hazardous waste, 1991 O.J. (L 377) 20; as amended by Council 
Directive 94/31, 1994 O J. (L 168) 28; and Commission Decision 96/302 establishing a 
format in which information is to be provided pursuant to Art.8(3)..., 1996 O.J. (L 116) 26.
Council Directive 91/692 standardizing and rationalizing reports on the implementation o f certain 
Directives relating to the environment, 1991 O.J. (L 377) 48.
Council Directive 93/75 concerning minimum requirements for vessels bound for or leaving 
Community ports and carrying dangerous or polluting goods, 1993 O.J. (L 247) 19; as 
amended by Council Directive 98/55, 1998 O.J. (L 215) 65.
Council Directive 95/21 concerning the enforcement, in respect o f shipping using Community ports 
and sailing in the waters under the jurisdiction o f the M ember States, o f international 
standards for ship safety, pollution prevention and shipboard living and working conditions, 
1995 O J. (L 157) 1.
Council Directive 96/61 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control, 1996 O.J. (L 257) 
26.
Commission Directive 98/15 amending Council Directive 91/271/EEC with respect to certain 
requirements established in Annex 1 thereof, 1998 O.J. (L 067) 29.
3. Decisions.
Council Decision 77/585 concluding the Convention for the protection o f  the Mediterranean Sea 
against pollution and the Protocol for the prevention of pollution o f the Mediterranean Sea 
by dumping from ships and a ircraft, 1977 O.J. (L 240) 1.
Council Decision 81/420 on the conclusion o f the Protocol concerning co-operation in combating 
pollution o f the Mediterranean Sea by oil and other harmful substances in cases of 
emergency ,1981 O.J. (L 162) 4.
Council Decision 81/971 establishing a Community information system for the control and 
reduction o f pollution caused by hydrocarbons at sea, 1981 O.J. (L 355) 54; as amended 
by Council Decision 86/85 on the establishment o f a Community information system for 
the control and reduction of pollution caused by oil spillages o f  hydrocarbons and other 
harmful substances discharged at sea or in inland waterways, 1986 O.J. (L 77) 33; and 
Council Decision 88/346, 1988 O.J. (L 158) 32.
Council Decision 81/462 on the conclusion o f  the Convention on long-range transboundary air 
pollution, 1981 O.J. (L 171) 11.
Council Decision 82/72 concerning the conclusion o f the Convention on the Conservation of 
European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, 1982 O.J. (L 38) 3.
Council Decision 83/101 concluding the Protocol for the protection o f the Mediterranean Sea 
against pollution from land-based sources, 1983 O.J. (L 67) 1.
Council Decision 84/132 on the conclusion o f the Protocol concerning Mediterranean specially 
protected areas, 1984 O.J. (L 68) 36.
Council Decision 85/338 on the adoption o f the Commission work programme concerning an 
experimental project for gathering, co-ordinating and ensuring the consistency of 
information on the state o f the environment and natural resources in the Community, 1985 
O.J. (L 176) 14; as amended by Council Decision 90/150, 1990 O.J. (L 81) 38.
Council Decision 93/98 on the conclusion on behalf o f the Community o f  the Convention on the 
control o f transboundary movements o f hazardous wastes and their disposal (Basel 
Convention), 1993 O.J. (L 14) 16 .
Council Decision 93/626 concerning the conclusion o f the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
1993 O.J. (L 309) 3.
Council Decision 93/731/EC on public access to Council documents, 1993 O.J. (L 340) 43.
Council Decision 94/69 concerning the conclusion o f the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, 1994 O.J, (L 33) 13.
Commission Decision 88/317 approving an Integrated Mediterranean Programme for Central and 
Eastern Greece, 1988 O.J. (L 143) 28.
Commission Decision 92/446 concerning questionnaires relating to Directives in the water sector, 
1992 O.J. (L 247) 10.
Commission Decision 93/481 concerning formats for the presentation o f  national programmes as 
foreseen by D ir.91/271, Art. 17, 1993 O.J. (L 226) 23.
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Commission Decision 94/90/ECSC, EC, Euratom on public access to Commission documents, 1994 
O.J. (L 46) 58.
Commission Decision 94/422 concerning the grant o f assistance from the Cohesion Financial 
Instrument to the project concerning the water supply in Seville in Spain, 1994 O.J. (L 185) 
243.
Commission Decision 94/712 concerning the grant o f assistance from the Cohesion financial 
instrument to the project concerning the recovery o f  water from the washing of tanks, 
cleaning of bilges and deballasting o f ships in Spain, 1994 O.J. (L 291) 62.
Commission Decision 94/716 concerning the grant o f assistance from the cohesion financial 
instrument to the stage o f project concerning the water supply and sewerage for Mytilene 
in Greece, 1994 O.J. (L 291) 96.
Commission Decision 94/718 concerning the grant o f assistance from the Cohesion financial 
instrument to the stage o f project concerning the drainage and biological clean-up o f the 
region o f Loutrakion in Greece, 1994 O.J. (L 291) 112.
Commission Decision 96/455 concerning information and publicity measures to be carried out by 
the M ember States and the Commission concerning the activities o f the Cohesion Fund, 
1996 O.J. (L 188) 47.
Commission Decision 96/511 concerning the questionnaires provided for in Dir.80/779, 82/884, 
84/360, and 85/203, 1996 O .J  (L 213) 16.
Commission Recommendation 96/733 concerning Environmental Agreements implementing 
Community Directives, 1996 O.J. (L 333) 59.
4. Agreements with Third Mediterranean Countries.
1980 Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Federal 
Republic o f Yugoslavia, 1983 O.J. (L 41) 2.
1989 Protocol on Financial and Technical Co-operation between the European Economic
Community and Malta, 1989 O.J. (L 180) 47.
1990 Agreement between the European Economic Community and the People’s Republic of
Bulgaria on Trade and Commercial and Economic Co-operation, 1990 O.J. (L 291) 9.
1991 Protocol on Financial and Technical Co-operation between the European Economic
Community and the Republic o f Tunisia, 1992 O.J. (L 18) 35.
1991 Protocol on Financial and Technical Co-operation between the European Community and the 
Syrian Arab Republic, 1994 O.J, (L 32) 45.
1991 Protocol on Financial and Technical Co-operation between the European Economic 
Community and the Kingdom o f Morocco, 1992 O.J. (L 352) 14.
1993 Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of 
Slovenia, 1993 O.J. (L 189)2.
1998 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European
Communities and their Member States, o f the one part, and the Republic o f Tunisia, o f the 
other part, Council Decision 98/238, 1998 O.J. (L 97) 1.
2000 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European
Communities and their Member States, o f the one part, and the Kingdom o f Morocco, o f
the other part, Council Decision 00/204, 2000 O.J. (L 70) 1.
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